4 Introduction 4 Introduction

4.1 Foster v. Svenson 4.1 Foster v. Svenson

[7 NYS3d 96]

Martha G. Foster et al., Appellants, v Arne Svenson, Respondent.

First Department,

April 9, 2015

*151APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL

Menaker & Herrmann LLP, New York City (Richard G. Menaker, Erika S. Krystian and Wojciech Jackowski of counsel), for appellants.

Cowan, DeBaets, Abrahams & Sheppard LLP, New York City (Nancy E. Wolff, Matthew A. Kaplan and Scott J. Sholder of counsel), for respondent.

*152OPINION OF THE COURT

Renwick, J.

In this action, plaintiffs seek damages and injunctive relief for an alleged violation of the statutory right to privacy. Concerns over privacy and the loss thereof have plagued the public for over a hundred years.1 Undoubtedly, such privacy concerns have intensified for obvious reasons.2 New technologies can track thought, movement, and intimacies, and expose them to the general public, often in an instant. This public apprehension over new technologies invading one’s privacy became a reality for plaintiffs and their neighbors when a photographer, using a high powered camera lens inside his own apartment, took photographs through the window into the interior of apartments in a neighboring building. The people who were being photographed had no idea this was happening. This case highlights the limitations of New York’s statutory privacy tort as a means of redressing harm that may be caused by this type of technological home invasion and exposure of private life. We are constrained to find that the invasion of privacy of one’s home that took place here is not actionable as a statutory tort of invasion of privacy pursuant to sections 50 and 51 of the Civil Rights Law, because defendant’s use of the images in question constituted art work and, thus is not deemed “use for advertising or trade purposes,” within the meaning of the statute.

Factual and Procedural Background

Defendant Arne Svenson is a critically acclaimed fine art photographer whose work has appeared in galleries and museums throughout the United States and Europe. Beginning in or about February 2012, after “inheriting” a telephoto camera lens from a “birder” friend, defendant embarked on a project photographing the people living in the building across from him. The neighboring building had a mostly glass facade, with large windows in each unit. Defendant photographed the building’s residents surreptitiously, hiding himself in the shadows of his darkened apartment. Defendant asserts that he did so for reasons of artistic expression; he obscured his *153subjects’ faces, seeking to comment on the “anonymity” of urban life, where individuals only reveal what can be seen through their windows. After approximately one year of photography, defendant assembled a series of photographs called “The Neighbors,” which he exhibited in galleries in Los Angeles and New York.

The exhibit’s promotional materials on defendant’s website stated that for his “subjects there is no question of privacy; they are performing behind a transparent scrim on a stage of their own creation with the curtain raised high.” Defendant further stated that “The Neighbors” did not know they were being photographed, and he “carefully” shot “from the shadows” of his apartment “into theirs.” Defendant apparently spent hours, in his apartment, waiting for his subjects to pass the window, sometimes yelling to himself, “Come to the window!” A reporter for The New Yorker magazine spent time with defendant while he was surreptitiously photographing his subjects. During this time, defendant took a photo of a “little girl, dancing in her tiara; half naked, she looked like a cherub. As she turned away, [defendant] took a photograph. I don’t like it when little girls are running around without their tops,’ he said, ‘but this is a beautiful image.”

During the New York exhibition of “The Neighbors,” plaintiffs and other residents of the building learned, through media coverage of the exhibition, that they had been defendant’s unwitting subjects. Plaintiffs, in particular, learned that their children, then aged three and one, appeared in the exhibition, in the photographs numbered six and twelve. Despite defendant’s professed effort to obscure his subjects’ identity, plaintiffs’ children were identifiable in these photographs, one of which showed their son in his diaper and their daughter in a swimsuit; the other showed plaintiff mother holding her daughter. Upon viewing defendant’s website, and discovering that the photographs of her children were being offered for sale, plaintiff mother called defendant to demand that he stop showing and selling the images of her children. Defendant agreed with respect to the photo with the children together (No. 6), but was noncommittal about the photo of plaintiff’s daughter (No. 12). Plaintiffs then retained counsel, who sent letters to defendant and the Manhattan gallery where the photos were being shown, demanding that the photographs of plaintiffs’ children be removed from the exhibition, the gallery’s website, and defendant’s website. Defendant and the gallery complied. *154Plaintiffs’ counsel sent a similar demand to an online art sales site called “Artsy.” It, too, complied.

Despite this, one of the photographs of plaintiffs’ daughter (No. 12) was shown on a New York City television broadcast discussing defendant and his show. Other showings followed, including one on NBC’s “Today Show” on May 17, 2013, displaying photograph No. 12, showing plaintiffs’ daughter’s face. In addition, the address of the building was revealed in print and electronic media, including a Facebook page.

In May 2013, plaintiffs commenced this action seeking injunctive relief and damages pursuant to the statutory tort of invasion of privacy and the common-law tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress. Plaintiffs simultaneously moved for a preliminary injunction and a temporary restraining order. The TRO was granted on consent. Defendant then submitted his opposition to the motion for a preliminary injunction and cross-moved to dismiss the complaint, asserting the theory that because the photographs were art, they were protected by the First Amendment, and their publication, sale, and use could not be restrained.

In August 2013, Supreme Court denied plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction; instead, it granted defendant’s cross-motion to dismiss the entire complaint. In so doing, the court concluded that the photographs were protected by the First Amendment. The court found that the photographs conveyed defendant’s “thoughts and ideas to the public” and “serve [d] more than just an advertising or trade purpose because they promote the enjoyment of art in the form of a displayed exhibition.” (2013 NY Slip Op 31782[U], *5 [2013].) This Court, however, granted a preliminary appellate injunction pending the outcome of this appeal.

Discussion

As indicated, the denial of the preliminary injunction and the dismissal of the complaint were based on the same ground, namely that the alleged conduct constituting the privacy invasion are not actionable under the statutory tort of invasion of privacy (see Civil Rights Law §§ 50, 51).

New York State’s privacy statute was borne out of judicial prompting from the Court of Appeals in Roberson v Rochester Folding Box Co. (171 NY 538 [1902]). In Roberson, the Court of Appeals declined to establish a common-law right to privacy where a flour company “obtained, made, printed, sold and *155circulated about 25,000 lithographic prints, photographs and likenesses of plaintiff” without the plaintiff’s consent (id. at 542). The “25,000 likenesses of the plaintiff . . . ha[d] been conspicuously posted and displayed in stores, warehouses, saloons and other public places.” (Id.) The plaintiff sought an injunction preventing further use of the photographs as well as damages in the sum of $15,000 (id.). The Supreme Court, affirmed by the Appellate Division (64 App Div 30 [1901]), decided that the plaintiff had a “right . . . to be let alone” (32 Misc 344, 347-348 [1900]) a “so-called right of privacy” (171 NY at 544), which had been invaded by the widespread distribution of her image.

The Court of Appeals, however, reversed, reasoning that the adoption of such a right would result in “a vast amount of litigation [that would] border [ ] upon the absurd,” because the assertions of a right to privacy, according to the court, would be limitless (id. at 545). The Court of Appeals ultimately found that “[t]he legislative body could very well. . . provide that no one should be permitted for his own selfish purpose to use the picture or the name of another for advertising purposes without his consent,” as only the legislature can draw “arbitrary distinctions which no court should promulgate as a part of general jurisprudence” (id. at 545, 555).

Public outcry over the perceived unfairness of Roberson led to a rapid response by the New York State Legislature (see Lerman v Flynt Distrib. Co., Inc., 745 F2d 123, 129 [2d Cir 1984], cert denied 471 US 1054 [1985]). Within a year of Roberson, New York enacted a statutory right to privacy (L 1903, ch 132). The statutorily-created right prohibits the use of a person’s “name, portrait or picture” (Civil Rights Law § 50) or “name, portrait, picture or voice” (Civil Rights Law § 51) for advertising or trade purposes. Section 50 provides for criminal penalties for such prohibited uses, while section 51 gives the individual victim of such appropriation the right to obtain an injunction and bring a cause of action to obtain compensatory and exemplary damages (id.). Two phrases in the New York privacy statute describe the type of unauthorized use that is prohibited. The phrases are: (1) “for advertising purposes” and (2) “for the purposes of trade.”

The legislature’s use of the broad, unqualified terms for advertising and trade purposes, on their face, appear to support plaintiffs’ contention that the statutory terms apply to all items which are bought and sold in commerce. Courts, however, *156have refused to adopt a literal construction of these terms because the advertising and trade limitations of the privacy statute were drafted with the First Amendment in mind. As the Court of Appeals held in Arrington v New York Times Co. (55 NY2d 433, 440 [1982]), the terms trade and advertising concomitantly act as a narrowly-construed categorization crafted by the legislature to strike a balance between the concerns of private individuals and the First Amendment. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals has consistently held that the privacy statute should not be construed to apply to publications regarding newsworthy events and matters of public concern (see Howell v New York Post Co., 81 NY2d 115, 123 [1993]; Finger v Omni Pubis. Intl., 77 NY2d 138, 141-142 [1990]). Thus, the prohibitions of sections 50 and 51 of the privacy statute are not applicable to newsworthy events and matters of public concern because such dissemination or publication is not deemed strictly for the purpose of advertising or trade within the meaning of the privacy statute (see Arrington, 55 NY2d 433, 440 [1982]).

The newsworthy and public concern exemption’s primary focus is to protect the press’s dissemination of ideas that have informational value. However, the exemption has been applied to many others forms of First Amendment speech, protecting literary and artistic expression from the reach of the statutory tort of invasion of privacy (see e.g. University of Notre Dame Du Lac v Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 22 AD2d 452, 456 [1st Dept 1965], affd 15 NY2d 940 [1965] [motion picture and novel]).

Similarly, the exemption has been applied in cases addressing written and nonwritten materials published or televised for the purpose of entertainment (see e.g. Freihofer v Hearst Corp., 65 NY2d 135, 140-141 [1985]; Stephano v News Group Publs., 64 NY2d 174, 184 [1984] [applying the exception to an article of consumer interest regarding events in the fashion industry]; Gautier v Pro-Football, Inc. (304 NY 354 [1952] [dismissing complaint of animal trainer who objected to televised broadcast of act performed during half-time at professional football game]). This is because there is a strong societal interest in facilitating access to information that enables people to discuss and understand contemporary issues (see Time, Inc. v Hill, 385 US 374, 388 [1967], citing Thornhill v Alabama, 310 US 88, 102 [1940]).

Since the newsworthy and public concern exemption has been applied to many types of artistic expressions, including *157literature, movies and theater, it logically follows that it should also be applied equally to other modes of artistic expression. Indeed, works of art also convey ideas. Although the Court of Appeals has not been confronted with the issue of whether works of art fall outside the ambit of the privacy statute, other courts that have addressed the issue have consistently found that they do (see e.g. Altbach v Kulon, 302 AD2d 655 [3d Dept 2003]; Nussenzweig v DiCorcia, 11 Misc 3d 1051 [A], 2006 NY Slip Op 50171[U] [Sup Ct, NY County 2006], affd 38 AD3d 339 [1st Dept 2007], affd 9 NY3d 184 [2007]; Hoepker v Kruger, 200 F Supp 2d 340 [SD NY 2002]; Simeonov v Tiegs, 602 NYS2d 1014 [Civ Ct, NY County 1993]).

For instance, in Altbach v Kulon, the Third Department held that an artist’s publication of a town justice’s photograph, along with a painting of the justice that caricatured him by portraying him as a devil with a horn and a tail, was constitutionally protected as a work of art (302 AD2d at 657-658). In Altbach, the defendant distributed flyers with the caricature and a photo of the justice to promote the opening of his art gallery (id. at 655). Preliminarily, the Court found that the

“similarity of poses between the photograph and the painting, together with the content of the advertising copy identifying plaintiff as an experienced attorney, attest [ed] to the accuracy of [the] defendant’s portrayal of [the] plaintiff’s face and posture, while emphasizing that the painting is a caricature and parody of the public image” (id. at 658).

Nevertheless, the Court found that the photograph’s use can readily be viewed as ancillary to a protected artistic expression because it “prove [s] [the] worth and illustrate [s] [the] content” of the painting exhibited at defendant’s gallery (id.).

Similarly, in Hoepker v Kruger, the federal district court for the Southern District of New York gave First Amendment protection to a collage photograph displayed in the Museum of Contemporary Art, in Los Angeles (200 F Supp 2d 340 [2002]). The defendant Kruger, a collage artist known for her feminist position on issues of beauty, femininity, and power, copied an image, “Charlotte As Seen By Thomas,” created by plaintiff, Thomas Hoepker (id.). She cropped and enlarged the image and superimposed three red blocks containing the words, “It’s a small world but not if you have to clean it” (id. at 342). Kruger’s creation was printed and sold in many forms (e.g., *158postcards and magnets) in the museum’s gift shop. It was also published in a catalog of Kruger’s works (id.). The court held that the creation itself “should be shielded from [the plaintiff’s] right of privacy claim by the First Amendment. [It] is pure First Amendment speech in the form of artistic expression . . . and deserves full protection” (id. at 350).

It is also worth noting Nussenzweig v diCorcia (38 AD3d 339, 341 [1st Dept 2007, Tom, J.P., concurring], affd 9 NY3d 184 [2007]), which involved the same issue presented here— whether a citizen of this state retains the right to preclude the use of his likeness where such likeness is displayed in an artistic form (id.). The defendant, diCorcia, a respected photographer with a history of shows in New York museums, photographed a series called “HEADS,” which involved candid “street photography” of people walking by a Times Square location. The images were exhibited in a gallery for sale (id.). The plaintiff, Nussenzweig, was readily identifiable, and did not consent to diCorcia’s use of the images (id.). Nussenzweig was an Orthodox Jew with deep religious beliefs against the use of his image (id.). The exhibit was open to the public and was advertised. The 10 photos of Nussenzweig sold for $20,000 to $30,000 each (id.).

The majority found it unnecessary to address the constitutional issue and dismissed the privacy tort action as time-barred because more than one year had passed since the first (rather than the last) publication of the photographs (38 AD3d 339).3 However, a concurrence did reach the constitutional issue of whether the defendant’s use of the plaintiff’s photograph was entitled to First Amendment protection (id.). The concurrence opined that “the inclusion of the photograph in a catalog sold in connection with an exhibition of the artist’s work d[id] not render its use commercial” pursuant to the privacy statute because “the public expression of those ideas and concepts [wa]s fully protected by the First Amendment” (id. at 347).

In this case, we are constrained to concur with the views expressed in Altbach, Hoepker, and Nussenzweig’s, concurrence: works of art fall outside the prohibitions of the privacy statute under the newsworthy and public concerns exemption. As indicated, under this exemption, the press is given broad leeway. This is because the informational value of the ideas *159conveyed by the art work is seen as a matter of public interest. We recognize that the public, as a whole, has an equally strong interest in the dissemination of images, aesthetic values and symbols contained in the art work. In our view, artistic expression in the form of art work must therefore be given the same leeway extended to the press under the newsworthy and public concern exemption to the statutory tort of invasion of privacy.

To be sure, despite its breadth, the exception is not without limits. To give absolute protection to all expressive works would be to eliminate the statutory right of privacy. Accordingly, under New York law, the newsworthy and public concern exception does not apply where the newsworthy or public interest aspect of the images at issue is merely incidental to its commercial purpose. For instance, the newsworthy and public concern exemption does not apply where the unauthorized images appear in the media under the guise of news items, solely to promote sales; such advertisement in disguise is commercial use deserving no protection from the privacy statute (see e.g. Beverley v Choices Women’s Med. Ctr., 78 NY2d 745, 751-755 [1991] [nonmedia defendant who produced and distributed a calendar to promote its medical center that included a picture of plaintiff not entitled to protection of newsworthy and public concern exception based on theme of women’s progress where calendar was clearly designed to advertise the medical center]; cf. Stephano v News Group Publs., 64 NY2d 174, 185 [1984] [model for article on men’s fashion not entitled to protection of Civil Rights Law § 51 where photo was also used in column containing information on where to buy new and unusual products]).

Similarly, when a court determines that there is no real relationship between the use of the plaintiff’s name or picture and the article it is used to illustrate, the defendant cannot use the newsworthy and public concern exception as a defense. This is because, by definition, if a person’s image has no real relationship to the work then its only purpose must be for the sale of the work (compare Thompson v Close-Up, Inc., 277 App Div 848 [1st Dept 1950] [publication of photograph did not fall within exceptions to Civil Rights Law §§ 50 or 51 where plaintiffs had no connection to dope peddling, which was the subject of defendant’s article], with Murray v New York Mag. Co., 27 NY2d 406 [1971] [photograph of plaintiff dressed in Irish garb while watching St. Patrick’s Day parade spotlighted a newsworthy event and bore a real relationship to article *160about contemporary attitudes of Irish-Americans in New York City]; and Finger v Omni Publs. Intl., 77 NY2d 138 [1990] [photograph of plaintiffs and their six children bore real relationship to article entitled, “Want a big family?” and fell within the newsworthy exception despite fact that family had no involvement with subject matter of article, caffeine-enhanced in vitro fertilization, where both title and photo involved theme of fertility]).

Applying the newsworthy and public concern exemption to the complaint herein, we conclude that the allegations do not sufficiently plead a cause of action under the statutory tort of invasion of privacy. As detailed above, plaintiffs essentially allege that defendant used their images in local and national media to promote “The Neighbors,” an exhibition that included photographs of individuals taken under the same circumstances as those featuring plaintiffs. Plaintiffs further allege that the photographs were for sale at the exhibit and on a commercial website.

Accepting, as we must, plaintiffs’ allegations as true (Nonnon v City of New York, 9 NY3d 825 [2007]; Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]), they do not sufficiently allege that defendant used the photographs in question for the purpose of advertising or for the purpose of trade within the meaning of the privacy statute. Defendant’s used of the photos falls within the ambit of constitutionally protected conduct in the form of a work of art. While a plaintiff may be able to raise questions as to whether a particular item should be considered a work of art, no such question is presented here. Indeed, plaintiffs concede on appeal that defendant, a renowned fine arts photographer, assembled the photographs into an exhibit that was shown in a public forum, an art gallery. Since the images themselves constitute the work of art, and art work is protected by the First Amendment, any advertising undertaken in connection with the promotion of the art work was permitted. Thus, under any reasonable view of the allegations, it cannot be inferred that plaintiffs’ images were used “for the purpose of advertising” or “for the purpose of trade” within the meaning of the privacy statute.

Contrary to plaintiffs’ arguments, the fact that profit might have been derived from the sale of the art work does not diminish the constitutional protection afforded by the newsworthy and public concern exemption. Stephano v News Group Publs. (64 NY2d 174 [1984]) illustrates how the newsworthy and pub-*161lie concern exemption precludes right of privacy violations when the publication is distributed for profit. Stephano, a professional model who posed for photos for an article on men’s fashion, claimed that the defendant improperly used his picture for trade or advertising purposes without his consent when it published a picture of him modeling a “bomber jacket” in a magazine column containing information regarding new and unusual products and including the approximate price of the jacket, the name of the designer, and the names of three stores where the jacket might be purchased. The motion court granted summary judgment to the defendant, concluding that the article reported a newsworthy fashion event, and was not published for trade or advertising purposes. In agreeing that the plaintiff did not have a claim under the privacy statute, the Court of Appeals explained that “(i)t is the content of the article and not the defendant’s motive ... to increase circulation which determines whether it is a newsworthy item, as opposed to a trade usage, under the Civil Rights Law” (id. at 185).

Plaintiffs also argue that, merely because the use of a person’s name, portrait, or picture is newsworthy or a matter of public concern, such as a legitimate work of art, it should not be exempt from classification as “advertising” or “trade” if it was obtained in an improper manner. Plaintiffs do not cite any authority directly on point for this proposition, and indeed there does not appear to be any. However, acknowledging that Civil Rights Law §§ 50 and 51 reflect a careful balance of a person’s right to privacy against the public’s right to a free flow of ideas, plaintiffs argue that defendant’s work should not be entitled to First Amendment protection because of the manner or context in which it was formed or made. In essence, plaintiffs seem to be arguing that the manner in which the photographs were obtained constitutes the extreme and outrageous conduct contemplated by the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress and serves to overcome the First Amendment protection contemplated by Civil Rights Law §§ 50 and 51.

The Court of Appeals has set a high bar for what constitutes outrageous behavior in this context. In Howell (81 NY2d 115 [1993]), the plaintiff was a patient at a private psychiatric facility who alleged that it was critical to her recovery that no one outside of her immediate family know about her commitment. A New York Post photographer trespassed onto the se*162eluded grounds of the facility for purposes of capturing images of Hedda Nussbaum, who had been prominently thrust into the public eye a year earlier when her boyfriend Joel Steinberg murdered her daughter (id. at 118). Using a telephoto lens, the photographer took pictures of Nussbaum, who happened at the time to be strolling the grounds of the facility with the plaintiff (id.). When the pictures were published in the newspaper, the plaintiff claimed, inter alia, that her statutory right to privacy had been violated and that defendants had intentionally inflicted emotional distress on her (id. at 119).

The Court of Appeals held that the newsworthy and public concerns exception applied to bar the privacy claim because the Nussbaum affair was a matter of public interest and the photographs were directly related to the story (id. at 124-125). It rejected the plaintiff’s contention that her presence at the facility was not newsworthy, since it was the fact of Nussbaum’s interaction with the plaintiff that demonstrated Nussbaum’s path to recovery from the physical and emotional abuse she had suffered at the hands of Steinberg (id. at 125). Notably, in dismissing the plaintiff’s claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress as being “an end run around a failed right to privacy claim,” the Court observed that the “defendants acted within their legal right” (id.). The Court further stated:

“Courts have recognized that newsgathering methods may be tortious (see, e.g., Galella v Onassis, 487 F2d 986, 995 [2d Cir (1973)]) and, to the extent that a journalist engages in such atrocious, indecent and utterly despicable conduct as to meet the rigorous requirements of an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim, recovery may be available. The conduct alleged here, however — a trespass onto Four Winds’ grounds — does not remotely approach the required standard. That plaintiff was photographed outdoors and from a distance diminishes her claim even further” (81 NY2d at 126 [emphasis added]).

The quoted language did not directly apply to the privacy claim in Howell. However, it strongly suggests that expression will not lose entitlement to the newsworthy and public concerns exemption of Civil Rights Law §§ 50 and 51 unless the means by which a person’s privacy was invaded was truly outrageous. Indeed, while one can argue that defendant’s actions were more *163offensive than those of the defendant in Howell, because the intrusion here was into plaintiffs’ home, clearly an even more private space, they certainly do not rise to the level of “atrocious, indecent and utterly despicable” (id.). Further, the depiction of children, by itself, does not create special circumstances which should make a privacy claim more readily available (see Finger, 77 NY2d at 138). We note that defendant’s conduct here, while clearly invasive, does not implicate the type of criminal conduct covered by Penal Law § 250.40 et seq., prohibiting unlawful surveillance.

In short, by publishing plaintiffs’ photos as a work of art without further action toward plaintiffs, defendant’s conduct, however disturbing it may be, cannot properly, under the current state of the law, be deemed so “outrageous” that it went beyond decency and the protections of Civil Rights Law §§ 50 and 51. To be sure, by our holding here — finding no viable cause of action for violation of the statutory right to privacy under these facts — we do not, in any way, mean to give short shrift to plaintiffs’ concerns. Undoubtedly, like plaintiffs, many people would be rightfully offended by the intrusive manner in which the photographs were taken in this case. However, such complaints are best addressed to the legislature — the body empowered to remedy such inequities (see Black v Allstate Ins. Co., 274 AD2d 346 [1st Dept 2000]; Yankelevitz v Royal Globe Ins. Co., 88 AD2d 934 [2d Dept 1982], affd 59 NY2d 928 [1983]). Needless to say, as illustrated by the troubling facts here, in these times of heightened threats to privacy posed by new and ever more invasive technologies, we call upon the legislature to revisit this important issue, as we are constrained to apply the law as it exists.

Accordingly, the order of the Supreme Court, New York County (Eileen Rakower, J.), entered August 5, 2013, which denied plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction, and granted defendant’s cross motion to dismiss the complaint, should be affirmed, without costs.

Mazzarelli, J.R, Andrias, Richter and Feinman, JJ., concur.

Order, Supreme Court, New York County, entered August 5, 2013, affirmed, without costs.

4.2 Moore v. Regents of University of California 4.2 Moore v. Regents of University of California

[No. S006987.

July 9, 1990.]

JOHN MOORE, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. THE REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA et al., Defendants and Repondents.

*124Counsel

Gage, Mazursky, Schwartz, Angelo & Kussman, Sanford M. Gage, Christopher E. Angelo and Jonathan T. Zackey for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Lori Andrews and Marjorie M. Schultz as Amici Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Appellant.

James E. Holst, Allen B. Wagner, John F. Lundberg, George L. Marchand, Ball, Hunt, Hart, Brown & Baerwitz, Anthony Murray, Donn Dimichele, Horvitz. Levy & Amerian, Horvitz & Levy, Ellis J. Horvitz, Peter Abrahams, Coleman & Marcus, Richard M. Coleman, Michael D. Marcus, Hale & Dorr, John G. Fabiano, Ian Crawford, Covington & Crowe, Robert E. Dougherty and Robert H. Reeder for Defendants and Respondents.

Cooley, Godward, Castro, Huddleson & Tatum, Michael Traynor, Brian C. Cunningham, Lloyd R. Day, Louis M. Lupin and Gary H. Ritchey as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Respondents.

Opinion

PANELLI, J.—

I. Introduction

We granted review in this case to determine whether plaintiff has stated a cause of action against his physician and other defendants for using his cells *125in potentially lucrative medical research without his permission. Plaintiff alleges that his physician failed to disclose preexisting research and economic interests in the cells before obtaining consent to the medical procedures by which they were extracted. The superior court sustained all defendants’ demurrers to the third amended complaint, and the Court of Appeal reversed. We hold that the complaint states a cause of action for breach of the physician’s disclosure obligations, but not for conversion.

II. Facts

Our only task in reviewing a ruling on a demurrer is to determine whether the complaint states a cause of action. Accordingly, we assume that the complaint’s properly pleaded material allegations are true and give the complaint a reasonable interpretation by reading it as a whole and all its parts in their context. (Phillips v. Desert Hospital Dist. (1989) 49 Cal.3d 699, 702 [263 Cal.Rptr. 119, 780 P.2d 349]; Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318 [216 Cal.Rptr. 718, 703 P.2d 58]; Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (1980) 27 Cal.3d 167, 170 [164 Cal.Rptr. 839, 610 P.2d 1330, 9 A.L.R.4th 314].) We do not, however, assume the truth of contentions, deductions, or conclusions of fact or law. (Daar v. Yellow Cab Co. (1967) 67 Cal.2d 695, 713 [63 Cal.Rptr. 724, 433 P.2d 732].) For these purposes we briefly summarize the pertinent factual allegations of the 50-page complaint.

The plaintiff is John Moore (Moore), who underwent treatment for hairy-cell leukemia at the Medical Center of the University of California at Los Angeles (UCLA Medical Center). The five defendants are: (1) Dr. David W. Golde (Golde), a physician who attended Moore at UCLA Medical Center; (2) the Regents of the University of California (Regents), who own and operate the university; (3) Shirley G. Quan, a researcher employed by the Regents; (4) Genetics Institute, Inc. (Genetics Institute); and (5) Sandoz Pharmaceuticals Corporation and related entities (collectively Sandoz).

Moore first visited UCLA Medical Center on October 5, 1976, shortly after he learned that he had hairy-cell leukemia. After hospitalizing Moore and “withdrawing] extensive amounts of blood, bone marrow aspirate, and other bodily substances,” Golde1 confirmed that diagnosis. At this time all *126defendants, including Golde, were aware that “certain blood products and blood components were of great value in a number of commercial and scientific efforts” and that access to a patient whose blood contained these substances would provide “competitive, commercial, and scientific advantages.”

On October 8, 1976, Golde recommended that Moore’s spleen be removed. Golde informed Moore “that he had reason to fear for his life, and that the proposed splenectomy operation . . . was necessary to slow down the progress of his disease.” Based upon Golde’s representations, Moore signed a written consent form authorizing the splenectomy.

Before the operation, Golde and Quan “formed the intent and made arrangements to obtain portions of [Moore’s] spleen following its removal” and to take them to a separate research unit. Golde gave written instructions to this effect on October 18 and 19, 1976. These research activities “were not intended to have . . . any relation to [Moore’s] medical . . . care.” However, neither Golde nor Quan informed Moore of their plans to conduct this research or requested his permission. Surgeons at UCLA Medical Center, whom the complaint does not name as defendants, removed Moore’s spleen on October 20, 1976.

Moore returned to the UCLA Medical Center several times between November 1976 and September 1983. He did so at Golde’s direction and based upon representations “that such visits were necessary and required for his health and well-being, and based upon the trust inherent in and by virtue of the physician-patient relationship . . . .” On each of these visits Golde withdrew additional samples of “blood, blood serum, skin, bone marrow aspirate, and sperm.” On each occasion Moore travelled to the UCLA Medical Center from his home in Seattle because he had been told that the procedures were to be performed only there and only under Golde’s direction.

“In fact, [however,] throughout the period of time that [Moore] was under [Golde’s] care and treatment, . . . the defendants were actively involved in a number of activities which they concealed from [Moore] . . . .” Specifically, defendants were conducting research on Moore’s cells and planned to “benefit financially and competitively ... [by exploiting the cells] and [their] exclusive access to [the cells] by virtue of [Golde’s] ongoing physician-patient relationship . . . .”

*127Sometime before August 1979, Golde established a cell line from Moore’s T-lymphocytes.2 On January 30, 1981, the Regents applied for a patent on the cell line, listing Golde and Quan as inventors. “[B]y virtue of an established policy . . . , [the] Regents, Golde, and Quan would share in any royalties or profits . . . arising out of [the] patent.” The patent issued on March 20, 1984, naming Golde and Quan as the inventors of the cell line and the Regents as the assignee of the patent. (U.S. Patent No. 4,438,032 (Mar. 20, 1984).)

The Regent’s patent also covers various methods for using the cell line to produce lymphokines.3 Moore admits in his complaint that “the true clinical potential of each of the lymphokines . . . [is] difficult to predict, [but] . . . competing commercial firms in these relevant fields have published reports in biotechnology industry periodicals predicting a potential market of approximately $3.01 Billion Dollars by the year 1990 for a whole range of [such lymphokines] . . . .”

With the Regents’ assistance, Golde negotiated agreements for commercial development of the cell line and products to be derived from it. Under an agreement with Genetics Institute, Golde “became a paid consultant” and “acquired the rights to 75,000 shares of common stock.” Genetics Institute also agreed to pay Golde and the Regents “at least $330,000 over three years, including a pro-rata share of [Golde’s] salary and fringe benefits, in exchange for . . . exclusive access to the materials and research performed” on the cell line and products derived from it. On June 4, 1982, *128Sandoz “was added to the agreement,” and compensation payable to Golde and the Regents was increased by $110,000. “[Throughout this period,. . . Quan spent as much as 70 [percent] of her time working for [the] Regents on research” related to the cell line.

Based upon these allegations, Moore attempted to state 13 causes of action.4 Each defendant demurred to each purported cause of action. The superior court, however, expressly considered the validity of only the first cause of action, conversion.5 Reasoning that the remaining causes of action incorporated the earlier, defective allegations, the superior court sustained a general demurrer to the entire complaint with leave to amend. In a subsequent proceeding, the superior court sustained Genetics Institute’s and Sandoz’s demurrers without leave to amend on the grounds that Moore had not stated a cause of action for conversion and that the complaint’s allegations about the entities’ secondary liability were too conclusory. In accordance with its earlier ruling that the defective allegations about conversion rendered the entire complaint insufficient, the superior court took the remaining demurrers off its calendar.

With one justice dissenting, the Court of Appeal reversed, holding that the complaint did state a cause of action for conversion. The Court of Appeal agreed with the superior court that the allegations against Genetics Institute and Sandoz were insufficient, but directed the superior court to give Moore leave to amend. The Court of Appeal also directed the superior court to decide “the remaining causes of action, which [had] never been expressly ruled upon.”

III. Discussion

A. Breach of Fiduciary Duty and Lack of Informed Consent

Moore repeatedly alleges that Golde failed to disclose the extent of his research and economic interests in Moore’s cells6 before obtaining consent to the medical procedures by which the cells were extracted. These allegations, in our view, state a cause of action against Golde for invading a *129legally protected interest of his patient. This cause of action can properly be characterized either as the breach of a fiduciary duty to disclose facts material to the patient’s consent or, alternatively, as the performance of medical procedures without first having obtained the patient’s informed consent.

Our analysis begins with three well-established principles. First, “a person of adult years and in sound mind has the right, in the exercise of control over his own body, to determine whether or not to submit to lawful medical treatment.” (Cobbs v. Grant (1972) 8 Cal.3d 229, 242 [104 Cal.Rptr. 505, 502 P.2d 1]; cf. Schloendorff v. New York Hospital (1914) 211 N.Y. 125 [105 N.E. 92, 93].) Second, “the patient’s consent to treatment, to be effective, must be an informed consent.” (Cobbs v. Grant, supra, 8 Cal.3d at p. 242.) Third, in soliciting the patient’s consent, a physician has a fiduciary duty to disclose all information material to the patient’s decision. (Id., at pp. 242, 246; see also Stafford v. Schultz (1954) 42 Cal.2d 767, 777 [270 P.2d 1]; Nelson v. Gaunt (1981) 125 Cal.App.3d 623, 635 [178 Cal.Rptr. 167]; Berkey v. Anderson (1969) 1 Cal.App.3d 790, 805 [82 Cal.Rptr. 67]; Bowman v. McPheeters (1947) 77 Cal.App.2d 795, 800 [176 P.2d 745].)

These principles lead to the following conclusions: (1) a physician must disclose personal interests unrelated to the patient’s health, whether research or economic, that may affect the physician’s professional judgment; and (2) a physician’s failure to disclose such interests may give rise to a cause of action for performing medical procedures without informed consent or breach of fiduciary duty.

To be sure, questions about the validity of a patient’s consent to a procedure typically arise when the patient alleges that the physician failed to disclose medical risks, as in malpractice cases, and not when the patient alleges that the physician had a personal interest, as in this case. The concept of informed consent, however, is broad enough to encompass the latter. “The scope of the physician’s communication to the patient . . . must be measured by the patient’s need, and that need is whatever information is material to the decision.” (Cobbs v. Grant, supra, 8 Cal.3d at p. 245.)

Indeed, the law already recognizes that a reasonable patient would want to know whether a physician has an economic interest that might affect the physician’s professional judgment. As the Court of Appeal has said, “[c]ertainly a sick patient deserves to be free of any reasonable suspicion that his doctor’s judgment is influenced by a profit motive.” (Magan Medical Clinic v. Cal. State Bd. of Medical Examiners (1967) 249 Cal.App.2d 124, 132 [57 Cal.Rptr. 256].) The desire to protect patients from possible conflicts of interest has also motivated legislative enactments. Among these is Business and Professions Code section 654.2. Under that section, a physi*130cian may not charge a patient on behalf of, or refer a patient to, any organization in which the physician has a “significant beneficial interest, unless [the physician] first discloses in writing to the patient, that there is such an interest and advises the patient that the patient may choose any organization for the purposes of obtaining the services ordered or requested by [the physician].” (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 654.2, subd. (a). See also Bus. & Prof. Code, § 654.1 [referrals to clinical laboratories].) Similarly, under Health and Safety Code section 24173, a physician who plans to conduct a medical experiment on a patient must, among other things, inform the patient of “[t]he name of the sponsor or funding source, if any, . . . and the organization, if any, under whose general aegis the experiment is being conducted.”7 (Health & Saf. Code, § 24173, subd. (c)(9).)

It is important to note that no law prohibits a physician from conducting research in the same area in which he practices. Progress in medicine often depends upon physicians, such as those practicing at the university hospital where Moore received treatment, who conduct research while caring for their patients.

Yet a physician who treats a patient in whom he also has a research interest has potentially conflicting loyalties. This is because medical treatment decisions are made on the basis of proportionality—weighing the benefits to the patient against the risks to the patient. As another court has said, “the determination as to whether the burdens of treatment are worth enduring for any individual patient depends upon the facts unique in each case,” and “the patient’s interests and desires are the key ingredients of the decision-making process.” (Barber v. Superior Court (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 1006, 1018-1019 [195 Cal.Rptr. 484, 47 A.L.R.4th 1].) A physician who adds his own research interests to this balance may be tempted to order a scientifically useful procedure or test that offers marginal, or no, benefits to the patient.8 The possibility that an interest extraneous to the patient’s health has affected the physician’s judgment is something that a reasonable patient would want to know in deciding whether to consent to a proposed course of treatment. It is material to the patient’s decision and, thus, a prerequisite to informed consent. (See Cobbs v. Grant, supra, 8 Cal.3d at p. 245.)

*131Golde argues that the scientific use of cells that have already been removed cannot possibly affect the patient’s medical interests. The argument is correct in one instance but not in another. If a physician has no plans to conduct research on a patient’s cells at the time he recommends the medical procedure by which they are taken, then the patient’s medical interests have not been impaired. In that instance the argument is correct. On the other hand, a physician who does have a preexisting research interest might, consciously or unconsciously, take that into consideration in recommending the procedure. In that instance the argument is incorrect: the physician’s extraneous motivation may affect his judgment and is, thus, material to the patient’s consent.

We acknowledge that there is a competing consideration. To require disclosure of research and economic interests may corrupt the patient’s own judgment by distracting him from the requirements of his health.9 But California law does not grant physicians unlimited discretion to decide what to disclose. Instead, “it is the prerogative of the patient, not the physician, to determine for himself the direction in which he believes his interests lie.” (Cobbs v. Grant, supra, 8 Cal.3d at p. 242.) “Unlimited discretion in the physician is irreconcilable with the basic right of the patient to make the ultimate informed decision . . . .” {Id., at p. 243.)

Accordingly, we hold that a physician who is seeking a patient’s consent for a medical procedure must, in order to satisfy his fiduciary duty10 and to obtain the patient’s informed consent, disclose personal interests unrelated *132to the patient’s health, whether research or economic, that may affect his medical judgment.

1. Dr. Golde

We turn now to the allegations of Moore’s third amended complaint to determine whether he has stated such a cause of action. We first discuss the adequacy of Moore’s allegations against Golde, based upon the physician’s disclosures prior to the splenectomy.

Moore alleges that, prior to the surgical removal of his spleen, Golde “formed the intent and made arrangements to obtain portions of his spleen following its removal from [Moore] in connection with [his] desire to have regular and continuous access to, and possession of, [Moore’s] unique and rare Blood and Bodily Substances.” Moore was never informed prior to the splenectomy of Golde’s “prior formed intent” to obtain a portion of his spleen. In our view, these allegations adequately show that Golde had an undisclosed research interest in Moore’s cells at the time he sought Moore’s consent to the splenectomy. Accordingly, Moore has stated a cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty, or lack of informed consent, based upon the disclosures accompanying that medical procedure.

We next discuss the adequacy of Golde’s alleged disclosures regarding the postoperative takings of blood and other samples. In this context, Moore alleges that Golde “expressly, affirmatively and impliedly represented .. . that these withdrawals of his Blood and Bodily Substances were necessary and required for his health and well-being.” However, Moore also alleges that Golde actively concealed his economic interest in Moore’s cells during this time period. “[Djuring each of these visits . . . , and even when [Moore] inquired as to whether there was any possible or potential commercial or financial value or significance of his Blood and Bodily Substances, or whether the defendants had discovered anything . . . which was or might be . . . related to any scientific activity resulting in commercial or financial benefits . . . , the defendants repeatedly and affirmatively represented to [Moore] that there was no commercial or financial value to his Blood and Bodily Substances . . . and in fact actively discouraged such inquiries.”

Moore admits in his complaint that defendants disclosed they “were engaged in strictly academic and purely scientific medical research . . . .” However, Golde’s representation that he had no financial interest in this research became false, based upon the allegations, at least by May 1979, when he “began to investigate and initiate the procedures . . . for [obtaining] a patent” on the cell line developed from Moore’s cells.

In these allegations, Moore plainly asserts that Golde concealed an economic interest in the postoperative procedures. Therefore, applying the *133principles already discussed, the allegations state a cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty or lack of informed consent.

We thus disagree with the superior court’s ruling that Moore had not stated a cause of action because essential allegations were lacking. We discuss each such allegation. First, in the superior court’s view, Moore needed but failed to allege that defendants knew his cells had potential commercial value on October J, 1976 (the time blood tests were first performed at UCLA Medical Center) and had at that time already formed the intent to exploit the cells. We agree with the superior court that the absence of such allegations precludes Moore from stating a cause of action based upon the procedures undertaken on October 5, 1976. But, as already discussed, Moore clearly alleges that Golde had developed a research interest in his cells by October 20, 1976, when the splenectomy was performed. Thus, Moore can state a cause of action based upon Golde’s alleged failure to disclose that interest before the splenectomy.

The superior court also held that the lack of essential allegations prevented Moore from stating a cause of action based on the splenectomy. According to the superior court, Moore failed to allege that the operation lacked a therapeutic purpose or that the procedure was totally unrelated to therapeutic purposes. In our view, however, neither allegation is essential. Even if the splenectomy had a therapeutic purpose,11 it does not follow that Golde had no duty to disclose his additional research and economic interests. As we have already discussed, the existence of a motivation for a medical procedure unrelated to the patient’s health is a potential conflict of interest and a fact material to the patient’s decision.

2. The Remaining Defendants

The Regents, Quan, Genetics Institute, and Sandoz are not physicians. In contrast to Golde, none of these defendants stood in a fiduciary relationship with Moore or had the duty to obtain Moore’s informed consent to medical procedures. If any of these defendants is to be liable for breach of fiduciary duty or performing medical procedures without informed consent, it can only be on account of Golde’s acts and on the basis of a recognized theory of secondary liability, such as respondeat superior. The procedural posture of this case, however, makes it unnecessary for us to address the sufficiency of Moore’s secondary-liability allegations.

As already mentioned, the superior court addressed only the purported cause of action for conversion. Because the superior court found that Moore *134had not stated such a cause of action, it had no occasion to address the sufficiency of Moore’s allegation that the Regents and Quan were acting as Golde’s “agent[s]” and “joint venturer[s].”12In a later proceeding, however, the superior court did find that the same allegations were too conclusory to state a cause of action against Genetics Institute and Sandoz.

The Court of Appeal did not hold, explicitly or implicitly, that Moore’s secondary-liability allegations were sufficient as against any defendant. The court did hold that Moore had stated a cause of action against the Regents and Quan. However, the court did not reach that conclusion on the basis of secondary liability. Instead, drawing no distinctions between the defendants, the court held simply that each defendant was primarily liable for conversion.13 Because no court has yet addressed the Regents’ and Quan’s secondary liability and because the superior court will need to consider other issues on remand, there is no need to address these issues at this time.14

With respect to Genetics Institute and Sandoz, the situation is slightly different. The Court of Appeal mentioned Moore’s secondary-liability allegations against these defendants but expressed no opinion as to their sufficiency. Instead, as to these defendants the court merely reversed the superior court’s order “for failure to grant leave to amend.” Our affirmance of this part of the Court of Appeal’s decision will leave Moore free to attempt, once again, to allege that Genetics Institute and Sandoz are secondarily liable for Golde’s torts.

B. Conversion

Moore also attempts to characterize the invasion of his rights as a conversion—a tort that protects against interference with possessory and ownership interests in personal property. He theorizes that he continued to own his cells following their removal from his body, at least for the purpose of directing their use, and that he never consented to their use in potentially *135lucrative medical research. Thus, to complete Moore’s argument, defendants’ unauthorized use of his cells constitutes a conversion. As a result of the alleged conversion, Moore claims a proprietary interest in each of the products that any of the defendants might ever create from his cells or the patented cell line.

No court, however, has ever in a reported decision imposed conversion liability for the use of human cells in medical research.15 While that fact does not end our inquiry, it raises a flag of caution. In effect, what Moore is asking us to do is to impose a tort duty on scientists to investigate the consensual pedigree of each human cell sample used in research.16 To impose such a duty, which would affect medical research of importance to all of society, implicates policy concerns far removed from the traditional, two-party ownership disputes in which the law of conversion arose.17 Invoking a tort theory originally used to determine whether the loser or the finder of a horse had the better title, Moore claims ownership of the results of socially important medical research, including the genetic code for chemicals that regulate the functions of every human being’s immune system.18

We have recognized that, when the proposed application of a very general theory of liability in a new context raises important policy concerns, it is especially important to face those concerns and address them openly. (Cf. Nally v. Grace Community Church, supra, 47 Cal.3d 278, 291-300 [declining to expand negligence law to encompass theory of “clergyman malpractice”]; Foley v. Interactive Data Corp. (1988) 47 Cal.3d 654, 694-*136700 [254 Cal.Rptr. 211, 765 P.2d 373] [declining to apply tort remedies for breach of the covenant of good faith in the employment context]; Brown v. Superior Court (1988) 44 Cal.3d 1049, 1061-1066 [245 Cal.Rptr. 412, 751 P.2d 470] [declining to apply strict products liability to pharmaceutical manufacturers].) Moreover, we should be hesitant to “impose [new tort duties] when to do so would involve complex policy decisions” (Nally v. Grace Community Church, supra, 47 Cal.3d at p. 299), especially when such decisions are more appropriately the subject of legislative deliberation and resolution. (See Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., supra, 47 Cal.3d at p. 694 & fn. 31.) This certainly is not to say that the applicability of common law torts is limited to the historical or factual contexts of existing cases. But on occasions when we have opened or sanctioned new areas of tort liability, we “have noted that the ‘wrongs and injuries involved were both comprehensible and assessable within the existing judicial framework.’ ” (Nally v. Grace Community Church, supra, 47 Cal.3d at p. 298, quoting Peter W. v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist. (1976) 60 Cal.App.3d 814, 824 [131 Cal.Rptr. 854].)

Accordingly, we first consider whether the tort of conversion clearly gives Moore a cause of action under existing law. We do not believe it does. Because of the novelty of Moore’s claim to own the biological materials at issue, to apply the theory of conversion in this context would frankly have to be recognized as an extension of the theory. Therefore, we consider next whether it is advisable to extend the tort to this context.

1. Moore’s Claim Under Existing Law

(7) “To establish a conversion, plaintiff must establish an actual interference with his ownership or right of possession. . . . Where plaintiff neither has title to the property alleged to have been converted, nor possession thereof, he cannot maintain an action for conversion.”19 (Del E. Webb Corp. v. Structural Materials Co. (1981) 123 Cal.App.3d 593, 610-611 [176 Cal.Rptr. 824], italics added. See also General Motors A. Corp. v. Dallas (1926) 198 Cal. 365, 370 [245 P. 184].)

Since Moore clearly did not expect to retain possession of his cells following their removal,20 to sue for their conversion he must have retained *137an ownership interest in them. But there are several reasons to doubt that he did retain any such interest. First, no reported judicial decision supports Moore’s claim, either directly or by close analogy. Second, California statutory law drastically limits any continuing interest of a patient in excised cells. Third, the subject matters of the Regents’ patent—the patented cell line and the products derived from it—cannot be Moore’s property.

Neither the Court of Appeal’s opinion, the parties’ briefs, nor our research discloses a case holding that a person retains a sufficient interest in excised cells to support a cause of action for conversion. We do not find this surprising, since the laws governing such things as human tissues,21 transplantable organs,22 blood,23 fetuses,24 pituitary glands,25 corneal tissue,26 and dead bodies27 deal with human biological materials as objects sui generis, regulating their disposition to achieve policy goals rather than abandoning them to the general law of personal property. It is these specialized statutes, not the law of conversion, to which courts ordinarily should and do look for guidance on the disposition of human biological materials.

Lacking direct authority for importing the law of conversion into this context, Moore relies, as did the Court of Appeal, primarily on decisions *138addressing privacy rights.28 One line of cases involves unwanted publicity. (Lugosi v. Universal Pictures (1979) 25 Cal.3d 813 [160 Cal.Rptr. 323, 603 P.2d 425, 10 A.L.R.4th 1150]; Motschenbacher v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Company (9th Cir. 1974) 498 F.2d 821 [interpreting Cal. law].) These opinions hold that every person has a proprietary interest in his own likeness and that unauthorized, business use of a likeness is redressible as a tort. But in neither opinion did the authoring court expressly base its holding on property law. (Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, supra, 25 Cal.3d at pp. 819, 823-826; Motschenbacher v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Company, supra, 498 F.2d at pp. 825-826.) Each court stated, following Prosser, that it was “pointless” to debate the proper characterization of the proprietary interest in a likeness. (Motschenbacher v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Company, supra, 498 F.2d at p. 825, quoting Prosser, Law of Torts (4th ed. 1971) at p. 807; Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, supra, 25 Cal.3d at pp. 819, 824.) For purposes of determining whether the tort of conversion lies, however, the characterization of the right in question is far from pointless. Only property can be converted.

Not only are the wrongful-publicity cases irrelevant to the issue of conversion, but the analogy to them seriously misconceives the nature of the genetic materials and research involved in this case. Moore, adopting the analogy originally advanced by the Court of Appeal, argues that “[i]f the courts have found a sufficient proprietary interest in one’s persona, how could one not have a right in one’s own genetic material, something far more profoundly the essence of one’s human uniqueness than a name or a face?” However, as the defendants’ patent makes clear—and the complaint, too, if read with an understanding of the scientific terms which it has borrowed from the patent—the goal and result of defendants’ efforts has been to manufacture lymphokines.29 Lymphokines, unlike a name or a face, *139have the same molecular structure in every human being and the same, important functions in every human being’s immune system. Moreover, the particular genetic material which is responsible for the natural production of lymphokines, and which defendants use to manufacture lymphokines in the laboratory, is also the same in every person; it is no more unique to Moore than the number of vertebrae in the spine or the chemical formula of hemoglobin.30

Another privacy case offered by analogy to support Moore’s claim establishes only that patients have a right to refuse medical treatment. (Bouvia v. Superior Court (1986) 179 Cal.App.3d 1127 [225 Cal.Rptr. 297].) In this context the court in Bouvia wrote that “ ‘[e]very human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his own body ....’” (Id., at p. 1139, quoting from Schloendorff v. New York Hospital, supra, 211 N.Y. 125 [105 N.E. 92, 93] .)31 Relying on this language to support the proposition that a patient has a continuing right to control the use of excised cells, the Court of Appeal in this case concluded that “[a] patient must have the ultimate power to control what becomes of his or her *140tissues. To hold otherwise would open the door to a massive invasion of human privacy and dignity in the name of medical progress.” Yet one may earnestly wish to protect privacy and dignity without accepting the extremely problematic conclusion that interference with those interests amounts to a conversion of personal property. Nor is it necessary to force the round pegs of “privacy” and “dignity” into the square hole of “property” in order to protect the patient, since the fiduciary-duty and informed-consent theories protect these interests directly by requiring full disclosure.

The next consideration that makes Moore’s claim of ownership problematic is California statutory law, which drastically limits a patient’s control over excised cells. Pursuant to Health and Safety Code section 7054.4, “[notwithstanding any other provision of law, recognizable anatomical parts, human tissues, anatomical human remains, or infectious waste following conclusion of scientific use shall be disposed of by interment, incineration, or any other method determined by the state department [of health services] to protect the public health and safety.”32 Clearly the Legislature did not specifically intend this statute to resolve the question of whether a patient is entitled to compensation for the nonconsensual use of excised cells. A primary object of the statute is to ensure the safe handling of potentially hazardous biological waste materials.33 Yet one cannot escape the conclusion that the statute’s practical effect is to limit, drastically, a patient’s control over excised cells. By restricting how excised cells may be *141used and requiring their eventual destruction, the statute eliminates so many of the rights ordinarily attached to property that one cannot simply assume that what is left amounts to “property” or “ownership” for purposes of conversion law.

It may be that some limited right to control the use of excised cells does survive the operation of this statute. There is, for example, no need to read the statute to permit “scientific use” contrary to the patient’s expressed wish.34 A fully informed patient may always withhold consent to treatment by a physician whose research plans the patient does not approve. That right, however, as already discussed, is protected by the fiduciary-duty and informed-consent theories.

Finally, the subject matter of the Regents’ patent—the patented cell line and the products derived from it—cannot be Moore’s property. This is because the patented cell line is both factually and legally distinct from the cells taken from Moore’s body.35 Federal law permits the patenting of or*142ganisms that represent the product of “human ingenuity,” but not naturally occurring organisms. (Diamond v. Chakrabarty (1980) 447 U.S. 303, 309-310 [65 L.Ed.2d 144, 150, 100 S.Ct. 2204],)36 Human cell lines are patentable because “[l]ong-term adaptation and growth of human tissues and cells in culture is difficult—often considered an art. . . ,” and the probability of success is low. (OTA Rep., supra, at p. 33; see fn. 2, ante.) It is this inventive effort that patent law rewards, not the discovery of naturally occurring raw materials. Thus, Moore’s allegations that he owns the cell line and the products derived from it are inconsistent with the patent, which constitutes an authoritative determination that the cell line is the product of invention.37 Since such allegations are nothing more than arguments or conclusions of law, they of course do not bind us. (Daar v. Yellow Cab Co., supra, 67 Cal.2d at p. 713.)

2. Should Conversion Liability Be Extended?

As we have discussed, Moore’s novel claim to own the biological materials at issue in this case is problematic, at best. Accordingly, his attempt to apply the theory of conversion within this context must frankly be recognized as a request to extend that theory. While we do not purport to hold that excised cells can never be property for any purpose whatsoever, the novelty of Moore’s claim demands express consideration of the policies to be served by extending liability (cf. Nally v. Grace Community Church, supra, 47 Cal.3d at pp. 291-300; Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., supra, 47 Cal.3d at pp. 694-700; Brown v. Superior Court, supra, 44 Cal.3d at pp. 1061-1066) rather than blind deference to a complaint alleging as a legal conclusion the existence of a cause of action.

There are three reasons why it is inappropriate to impose liability for conversion based upon the allegations of Moore’s complaint. First, a fair balancing of the relevant policy considerations counsels against extending the tort. Second, problems in this area are better suited to legislative resolution. Third, the tort of conversion is not necessary to protect patients’ *143rights. For these reasons, we conclude that the use of excised human cells in medical research does not amount to a conversion.

Of the relevant policy considerations, two are of overriding importance. The first is protection of a competent patient’s right to make autonomous medical decisions. That right, as already discussed, is grounded in well-recognized and long-standing principles of fiduciary duty and informed consent. (See, e.g., Cobbs v. Grant, supra, 8 Cal.3d at pp. 242-246; Bowman v. McPheeters, supra, 11 Cal.App.2d at p. 800.) This policy weighs in favor of providing a remedy to patients when physicians act with undisclosed motives that may affect their professional judgment. The second important policy consideration is that we not threaten with disabling civil liability innocent parties who are engaged in socially useful activities, such as researchers who have no reason to believe that their use of a particular cell sample is, or may be, against a donor’s wishes.

To reach an appropriate balance of these policy considerations is extremely important. In its report to Congress (see fn. 2, ante), the Office of Technology Assessment emphasized that “[ujncertainty about how courts will resolve disputes between specimen sources and specimen users could be detrimental to both academic researchers and the infant biotechnology industry, particularly when the rights are asserted long after the specimen was obtained. The assertion of rights by sources would affect not only the researcher who obtained the original specimen, but perhaps other researchers as well.

“Biological materials are routinely distributed to other researchers for experimental purposes, and scientists who obtain cell lines or other specimen-derived products, such as gene clones, from the original researcher could also be sued under certain legal theories [such as conversion]. Furthermore, the uncertainty could affect product developments as well as research. Since inventions containing human tissues and cells may be patented and licensed for commercial use, companies are unlikely to invest heavily in developing, manufacturing, or marketing a product when uncertainty about clear title exists.” (OTA Rep., supra, at p. 27.)

Indeed, so significant is the potential obstacle to research stemming from uncertainty about legal title to biological materials that the Office of Technology Assessment reached this striking conclusion: “[R]egardless of the merit of claims by the different interested parties, resolving the current uncertainty may be more important to the future of biotechnology than resolving it in any particular way.” (OTA Rep., supra, at p. 27.)

We need not, however, make an arbitrary choice between liability and nonliability. Instead, an examination of the relevant policy considerations *144suggests an appropriate balance: Liability based upon existing disclosure obligations, rather than an unprecedented extension of the conversion theory, protects patients’ rights of privacy and autonomy without unnecessarily hindering research.

To be sure, the threat of liability for conversion might help to enforce patients’ rights indirectly. This is because physicians might be able to avoid liability by obtaining patients’ consent, in the broadest possible terms, to any conceivable subsequent research use of excised cells. Unfortunately, to extend the conversion theory would utterly sacrifice the other goal of protecting innocent parties. Since conversion is a strict liability tort,38 it would impose liability on all those into whose hands the cells come, whether or not the particular defendant participated in, or knew of, the inadequate disclosures that violated the patient’s right to make an informed decision. In contrast to the conversion theory, the fiduciary-duty and informed-consent theories protect the patient directly, without punishing innocent parties or creating disincentives to the conduct of socially beneficial research.

Research on human cells plays a critical role in medical research. This is so because researchers are increasingly able to isolate naturally occurring, medically useful biological substances and to produce useful quantities of such substances through genetic engineering. These efforts are beginning to bear fruit. Products developed through biotechnology that have already been approved for marketing in this country include treatments and tests for leukemia, cancer, diabetes, dwarfism, hepatitis-B, kidney transplant rejection, emphysema, osteoporosis, ulcers, anemia, infertility, and gynecological tumors, to name but a few. (Note, Source Compensation for Tissues and Cells Used in Biotechnical Research: Why a Source Shouldn’t Share in the Profits (1989) 64 Notre Dame L. Rev. 628 & fn. 1 (hereafter Note, Source Compensation); see also OTA Rep., supra, at pp. 58-59.)

The extension of conversion law into this area will hinder research by restricting access to the necessary raw materials. Thousands of human cell lines already exist in tissue repositories, such as the American Type Culture Collection and those operated by the National Institutes of Health and the American Cancer Society. These repositories respond to tens of thousands *145of requests for samples annually. Since the patent office requires the holders of patents on cell lines to make samples available to anyone, many patent holders place their cell lines in repositories to avoid the administrative burden of responding to requests. (OTA Rep., supra, at p. 53.) At present, human cell lines are routinely copied and distributed to other researchers for experimental purposes, usually free of charge.39 This exchange of scientific materials, which still is relatively free and efficient, will surely be compromised if each cell sample becomes the potential subject matter of a lawsuit. (OTA Rep., supra, at p. 52.)40

To expand liability by extending conversion law into this area would have a broad impact. The House Committee on Science and Technology of the United States Congress found that “49 percent of the researchers at medical institutions surveyed used human tissues or cells in their research.” Many receive grants from the National Institute of Health for this work. (OTA Rep., supra, at p. 52.) In addition, “there are nearly 350 commercial biotechnology firms in the United States actively engaged in biotechnology research and commercial product development and approximately 25 to 30 percent appear to be engaged in research to develop a human therapeutic or diagnostic reagent. . . . Most, but not all, of the human therapeutic products are derived from human tissues and cells, or human cell lines or cloned genes.” (Id., at p. 56.)

*146In deciding whether to create new tort duties we have in the past considered the impact that expanded liability would have on activities that are important to society, such as research. For example, in Brown v. Superior Court, supra, 44 Cal.3d 1049, the fear that strict product liability would frustrate pharmaceutical research led us to hold that a drug manufacturer’s liability should not be measured by those standards. We wrote that, “[i]f drug manufacturers were subject to strict liability, they might be reluctant to undertake research programs to develop some pharmaceuticals that would prove beneficial or to distribute others that are available to be marketed, because of the fear of large adverse monetary judgments.” (Id., at p. 1063.)

As in Brown, the theory of liability that Moore urges us to endorse threatens to destroy the economic incentive to conduct important medical research. If the use of cells in research is a conversion, then with every cell sample a researcher purchases a ticket in a litigation lottery. Because liability for conversion is predicated on a continuing ownership interest, “companies are unlikely to invest heavily in developing, manufacturing, or marketing a product when uncertainty about clear title exists.” (OTA Rep., supra, at p. 27.)41 In our view, borrowing again from Brown, “[i]t is not unreasonable to conclude in these circumstances that the imposition of a harsher test for liability would not further the public interest in the development and availability of these important products.” (Brown v. Superior Court, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 1065.)42

*147Indeed, this is a far more compelling case for limiting the expansion of tort liability than Brown. In Brown, eliminating strict liability made it more difficult for plaintiffs to recover actual damages for serious physical injuries resulting from their mothers’ prenatal use of the drug diethylstilbestrol (DES). (Brown v. Superior Court, supra, 44 Cal.3d at pp. 1054-1055.) In this case, by comparison, limiting the expansion of liability under a conversion theory will only make it more difficult for Moore to recover a highly theoretical windfall. Any injury to his right to make an informed decision remains actionable through the fiduciary-duty and informed-consent theories.

If the scientific users of human cells are to be held liable for failing to investigate the consensual pedigree of their raw materials, we believe the Legislature should make that decision. Complex policy choices affecting all society are involved, and “ [legislatures, in making such policy decisions, have the ability to gather empirical evidence, solicit the advice of experts, and hold hearings at which all interested parties present evidence and express their views . . . .” (Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., supra, 47 Cal.3d at p. 694, fn. 31.) Legislative competence to act in this area is demonstrated by the existing statutes governing the use and disposition of human biological materials.43 Legislative interest is demonstrated by the extensive study recently commissioned by the United States Congress. (OTA Rep., supra.) Commentators are also recommending legislative solutions. (See Danforth, Cells, Sales, and Royalties: The Patient’s Right to a Portion of the Profits (1988) 6 Yale L. & Pol’y Rev. 179, 198-201; Note, Source Compensation, supra, 64 Notre Dame L. Rev. at pp. 643-645.)

Finally, there is no pressing need to impose a judicially created rule of strict liability, since enforcement of physicians’ disclosure obligations will protect patients against the very type of harm with which Moore was threatened. So long as a physician discloses research and economic interests that may affect his judgment, the patient is protected from conflicts of interest. Aware of any conflicts, the patient can make an informed decision to consent to treatment, or to withhold consent and look elsewhere for medical assistance. As already discussed, enforcement of physicians’ disclosure obligations protects patients directly, without hindering the socially useful activities of innocent researchers.

For these reasons, we hold that the allegations of Moore’s third amended complaint state a cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty or lack of informed consent, but not conversion.44

*148IV. Disposition

The decision of the Court of Appeal is affirmed in part and reversed in part. The case is remanded to the Court of Appeal, which shall direct the superior court to: (1) overrule Golde’s demurrers to the causes of action for breach of fiduciary duty and lack of informed consent; (2) sustain, with leave to amend, the demurrers of the Regents, Quan, Sandoz, and Genetics Institute to the purported causes of action for breach of fiduciary duty and lack of informed consent; (3) sustain, without leave to amend, all defendants’ demurrers to the purported cause of action for conversion; and (4) hear and determine all defendants’ remaining demurrers.

Lucas, C. J., Eagleson, J., and Kennard, J., concurred.

ARABIAN, J., Concurring.

I join in the views cogently expounded by the majority. I write separately to give voice to a concern that I believe informs much of that opinion but finds little or no expression therein. I speak of the moral issue.

Plaintiff has asked us to recognize and enforce a right to sell one’s own body tissue for profit He entreats us to regard the human vessel—the single most venerated and protected subject in any civilized society—as equal with the basest commercial commodity. He urges us to commingle the sacred with the profane. He asks much.

My learned colleague, Justice Mosk, in an impressive if ultimately unpersuasive dissent, recognizes the moral dimension of the matter. “[Ojur society,” he writes, “acknowledges a profound ethical imperative to respect the human body as the physical and temporal expression of the unique human persona.” (Dis. opn. of Mosk, J.,post, p. 173.) He concludes, however, that morality militates in favor of recognizing plaintiff’s claim for conversion of his body tissue. Why? Essentially, he answers, because of these defendants’ moral shortcomings, duplicity and greed. Let them be compelled, he argues, *149to disgorge a portion of their ill-gotten gains to the uninformed individual whose body was invaded and exploited and without whom such profits would not have been possible.

I share Justice Mosk’s sense of outrage, but I cannot follow its path. His eloquent paean to the human spirit illuminates the problem, but not the solution. Does it uplift or degrade the “unique human persona” to treat human tissue as a fungible article of commerce? Would it advance or impede the human condition, spiritually or scientifically, by delivering the majestic force of the law behind plaintiff’s claim? I do not know the answers to these troubling questions, nor am I willing—like Justice Mosk—to treat them simply as issues of “tort” law, susceptible of judicial resolution.

It is true, that this court has not often been deterred from deciding difficult legal issues simply because they require a choice between competing social or economic policies. (Foley v. Interactive Data Corp. (1988) 47 Cal.3d 654, 719-723 [254 Cal.Rptr. 211, 765 P.2d 373] (cone, and dis. opn. of Kaufman, J.).) The difference here, however, lies in the nature of the conflicting moral, philosophical and even religious values at stake, and in the profound implications of the position urged. The ramifications of recognizing and enforcing a property interest in body tissues are not known, but are greatly feared—the effect on human dignity of a marketplace in human body parts, the impact on research and development of competitive bidding for such materials, and the exposure of researchers to potentially limitless and uncharted tort liability. (See Danforth, Cells, Sales, & Royalties: The Patient's Right to a Portion of the Profits (1988) 6 Yale L. & Pol’y Rev. 179, 195; Note, Source Compensation for Tissues and Cells Used in Biotechnical Research: Why a Source Shouldn't Share in the Profits (1989) 64 Notre Dame L. Rev. 628, 634.)

Whether, as plaintiff urges, his cells should be treated as property susceptible to conversion is not, in my view, ours to decide. The question implicates choices which not only reflect, but which ultimately define our essence. A mark of wisdom for us as expositors of the law is the recognition that we cannot cure every ill, mediate every dispute, resolve every conundrum. Sometimes, as Justice Brandéis said, “the most important thing we do, is not doing.”1

Where then shall a complete resolution be found? Clearly the Legislature, as the majority opinion suggests, is the proper deliberative forum. Indeed, a legislative response creating a licensing scheme, which establishes a fixed rate of profit sharing between researcher and subject, has already been *150suggested. (Danforth, supra, 6 Yale L. & Pol’y Rev. at pp. 198-201.) Such an arrangement would not only avoid the moral and philosophical objections to a free market operation in body tissue, but would also address stated concerns by eliminating the inherently coercive effect of a waiver system and by compensating donors regardless of temporal circumstances.

The majority view is not unmindful of the seeming injustice in a result that denies plaintiff a claim for conversion of his body tissue, yet permits defendants to retain the fruits thereof. As we have explained, the reason for our holding is essentially twofold: First, plaintiff in this matter is not without a remedy; he remains free to pursue defendants on a breach-of-fiduciary-duty theory, as well as, perhaps, other tort claims not before us. Second, a judicial pronouncement, while supple, is not without its limitations. Courts cannot and should not seek to fashion a remedy for every “heartache and the thousand natural shocks that flesh is heir to.”2 Sometimes, the discretion of forbearance is the better part of responsive valor. This is such an occasion.

BROUSSARD, J., Concurring and Dissenting.

Given the novel scientific setting in which this case arises and the considerable interest this litigation has engendered within the medical research community and the public generally, it is easy to lose sight of the fact that the specific allegations on which the complaint in this case rests are quite unusual, setting this matter apart from the great majority of instances in which donated organs or cells provide the raw materials for the advancement of medical science and the development of new and beneficial medical products. Ordinarily, when a patient consents to the use of a body part for scientific purposes, the potential value of the excised organ or cell is discovered only through subsequent experimentation or research, often months or years after the removal of the organ. In this case, however, the complaint alleges that plaintiff’s doctor recognized the peculiar research and commercial value of plaintiff’s cells before their removal from plaintiff’s body. Despite this knowledge, the doctor allegedly failed to disclose these facts or his interest in the cells to plaintiff, either before plaintiff’s initial surgery or throughout the ensuing seven-year period during which the doctor continued to obtain additional cells from plaintiff’s body in the course of periodic medical examinations.

The majority opinion, of course, is not oblivious to the significance of these unusual allegations. It relies on those allegations in concluding that the complaint states a cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty. I concur fully in that holding.

*151When it turns to the conversion cause of action, however, the majority opinion fails to maintain its focus on the specific allegations before us. Concerned that the imposition of liability for conversion will impede medical research by innocent scientists who use the resources of existing cell repositories—a factual setting not presented here—the majority opinion rests its holding, that a conversion action cannot be maintained, largely on the proposition that a patient generally possesses no right in a body part that has already been removed from his body. Here, however, plaintiff has alleged that defendants interfered with his legal rights before his body part was removed. Although a patient may not retain any legal interest in a body part after its removal when he has properly consented to its removal and use for scientific purposes, it is clear under California law that before a body part is removed it is the patient, rather than his doctor or hospital, who possesses the right to determine the use to which the body part will be put after removal. If, as alleged in this case, plaintiff’s doctor improperly interfered with plaintiff’s right to control the use of a body part by wrongfully withholding material information from him before its removal, under traditional common law principles plaintiff may maintain a conversion action to recover the economic value of the right to control the use of his body part. Accordingly, I dissent from the majority opinion insofar as it rejects plaintiff’s conversion cause of action.

I

To begin with, I concur fully in the majority’s conclusion that the facts alleged in the complaint state a cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty against Dr. Golde. As the majority persuasively explains, because a physician’s research activities and related commercial ventures may potentially affect his or her professional judgment, a physician has an obligation to disclose such personal interests to his patient. In this case, the complaint clearly alleges that Dr. Golde failed to fulfill this duty.

With respect to the additional defendants—the Regents of the University of California (hereafter Regents), Shirley G. Quan, Genetics Institute, Inc. (hereafter Genetics Institute), and Sandoz Pharmaceuticals Corporation (hereafter Sandoz)—I cannot fully join in the majority’s conclusion. Although I agree that the trial court erred in sustaining these defendants’ demurrers to the breach of fiduciary duty cause of action without leave to amend, in my view the majority’s ruling with respect to these defendants is more equivocal than is warranted. (See maj. opn., ante, pp. 133-134.) As the majority recognizes, the breach of fiduciary duty alleged in the complaint encompasses postoperative conduct—for example, the periodic withdrawal of blood, blood serum, bone marrow aspirate and sperm samples from plaintiff, requiring plaintiff to travel from Seattle to the Medical Center of *152the University of California at Los Angeles (hereafter UCLA Medical Center)—which continued until September 1983. By that date, according to the complaint, all of the defendants, including Genetics Institute and Sandoz, were already involved in the commercial venture. Despite the “boilerplate” nature of some of the agency allegations in the complaint (see maj. opn., ante, p. 134, fn. 12), the complaint’s allegations, viewed in their entirety,1 charge sufficient complicity on the part of all defendants in the allegedly improper postoperative conduct to survive a demurrer. If, after discovery, it becomes clear that the additional defendants bear no responsibility for either the original or continuing breach of fiduciary duty, those defendants can, of course, move for summary judgment on this count. At the present pleading stage, however, it is premature to absolve any of the defendants of liability for breach of fiduciary duty.

I disagree, however, with the suggestion in the dissenting opinion that defendants will be able to avoid all liability under the breach-of-fiduciary-duty theory simply by showing that plaintiff would have proceeded with the surgical removal of his diseased spleen even if defendants had disclosed their research and commercial interest in his cells. (See dis. opn., post, pp. 179-180.) In the first place, because the alleged breach of fiduciary duty encompasses the postoperative conduct of defendants as well as the presurgical failure to disclose, plaintiff will clearly be entitled to recover under a breach-of-fiduciary-duty theory by establishing that he would not have consented to some or all of the extensive postoperative medical procedures if he had been fully aware of defendants’ research and economic interests and motivations. Second, and more generally, in this context—unlike in the traditional “informed consent” context of Cobbs v. Grant (1972) 8 Cal.3d 229 [104 Cal.Rptr. 505, 502 P.2d 1]—a plaintiff should not be required to establish that he would not have proceeded with the medical treatment in question if his physician had made full disclosure, but only that the doctor’s wrongful failure to disclose information proximately caused the plaintiff some type of compensable damage. The majority does not attempt to identify in advance of trial the various kinds of damage or injury for which *153plaintiff may properly recover in his breach-of-fiduciary-duty action, and that may be understandable. Nonetheless, it is worth noting that, in appropriate circumstances, punitive as well as compensatory damages would clearly be recoverable in such an action. Accordingly, the dissent underestimates the potential efficacy of the breach-of-fiduciary-duty cause of action in dismissing the action as a “paper tiger.” (Dis. opn., post, p. 180.)

II

With respect to the conversion cause of action, I dissent from the majority’s conclusion that the facts alleged in this case do not state a cause of action for conversion.

If this were a typical case in which a patient consented to the use of his removed organ for general research purposes and the patient’s doctor had no prior knowledge of the scientific or commercial value of the patient’s organ or cells, I would agree that the patient could not maintain a conversion action. In that common scenario, the patient has abandoned any interest in the removed organ and is not entitled to demand compensation if it should later be discovered that the organ or cells have some unanticipated value. I cannot agree, however, with the majority that a patient may never maintain a conversion action for the unauthorized use of his excised organ or cells, even against a party who knew of the value of the organ or cells before they were removed and breached a duty to disclose that value to the patient. Because plaintiff alleges that defendants wrongfully interfered with his right to determine, prior to the removal of his body parts, how those parts would be used after removal, I conclude that the complaint states a cause of action under traditional, common law conversion principles.

In analyzing the conversion issue, the majority properly begins with the established requirements of a common law conversion action, explaining that a plaintiff is required to demonstrate an actual interference with his “ownership or right of possession” in the property in question. (Maj. opn., ante, p. 136.) Although the majority opinion, at several points, appears to suggest that a removed body part, by its nature, may never constitute “property” for purposes of a conversion action (see maj. opn., ante, pp. 138, 140), there is no reason to think that the majority opinion actually intends to embrace such a broad or dubious proposition. If, for example, another medical center or drug company had stolen all of the cells in question from the UCLA Medical Center laboratory and had used them for its own benefit, there would be no question but that a cause of action for conversion would properly lie against the thief, and the majority opinion does not suggest otherwise. Thus, the majority’s analysis cannot rest on the broad proposition that a removed body part is not property, but rather rests on the *154proposition that a patient retains no ownership interest in a body part once the body part has been removed from his or her body.

The majority opinion fails to recognize, however, that, in light of the allegations of the present complaint, the pertinent inquiry is not whether a patient generally retains an ownership interest in a body part after its removal from his body, but rather whether a patient has a right to determine, before a body part is removed, the use to which the part will be put after removal. Although the majority opinion suggests that there are “reasons to doubt” that a patient retains “any” ownership interest in his organs or cells after removal (maj. opn., ante, p. 137), the opinion fails to identify any statutory provision or common law authority that indicates that a patient does not generally have the right, before a body part is removed, to choose among the permissible uses to which the part may be put after removal. On the contrary, the most closely related statutory scheme—the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act (Health & Saf. Code, § 7150 et seq.)2 — makes it quite clear that a patient does have this right.

The Uniform Anatomical Gift Act is a comprehensive statutory scheme that was initially adopted in California in 1970 and most recently revised in 1988. Although that legislation, by its terms, applies only to a donation of all or part of a human body which is “to take effect upon or after [the] death [of the donor]” (§ 7150.1, subd. (a))—and thus is not directly applicable to the present case which involves a living donor—the act is nonetheless instructive with regard to this state’s general policy concerning an individual’s authority to control the use of a donated body part. The act, which authorizes an anatomical gift to be made, inter alia, to “[a] hospital [or a] physician[,] ... for transplantation, therapy, medical or dental education, research or advancement of medical or dental science” (§ 7153, subd. (a)(1)), expressly provides that such a gift “may be made to a designated donee or without designating a donee” (§ 7153, subd. (b)) and also that the donor may make such a gift “for any of the purposes [specified in the statute or may] limit an anatomical gift to one or more of those purposes . . . .” (§ 7150.5, subd. (a).) Thus, the act clearly recognizes that it is the donor of the body part, rather than the hospital or physician who receives the part, who has the authority to designate, within the parameters of the statutorily authorized uses, the particular use to which the part may be put.

Although, as noted, the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act applies only to anatomical gifts that take effect on or after the death of the donor, the general principle of “donor control” which the act embodies is clearly not limited to that setting. In the transplantation context, for example, it is *155common for a living donor to designate the specific donee—often a relative—who is to receive a donated organ. If a hospital, after removing an organ from such a donor, decided on its own to give the organ to a different donee, no one would deny that the hospital had violated the legal right of the donor by its unauthorized use of the donated organ. Accordingly, it is clear under California law that a patient has the right, prior to the removal of an organ, to control the use to which the organ will be put after removal.

It is also clear, under traditional common law principles, that this right of a patient to control the future use of his organ is protected by the law of conversion. As a general matter, the tort of conversion protects an individual not only against improper interference with the right of possession of his property but also against unauthorized use of his property or improper interference with his right to control the use of his property. Sections 227 and 228 of the Restatement Second of Torts specifically provide in this regard that “[o]ne who uses a chattel in a manner which is a serious violation of the right of another to control its use is subject to liability to the other for conversion” and that “[o]ne who is authorized to make a particular use of a chattel, and uses it in a manner exceeding the authorization, is subject to liability for conversion to another whose right to control the use of the chattel is thereby seriously violated.” California cases have also long recognized that “unauthorized use” of property can give rise to a conversion action. (See Hollywood M. P. Equipment Co. v. Purer (1940) 16 Cal.2d 184, 189 [105 P.2d 299]. See generally 5 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (9th ed. 1988) Torts, § 622, p. 716.)

The application of these principles to the present case is evident. If defendants had informed plaintiff", prior to removal, of the possible uses to which his body part could be put and plaintiff" had authorized one particular use, it is clear under the foregoing authorities that defendants would be liable for conversion if they disregarded plaintiff’s decision and used the body part in an unauthorized manner for their own economic benefit. Although in this case defendants did not disregard a specific directive from plaintiff with regard to the future use of his body part, the complaint alleges that, before the body part was removed, defendants intentionally withheld material information that they were under an obligation to disclose to plaintiff and that was necessary for his exercise of control over the body part; the complaint also alleges that defendants withheld such information in order to appropriate the control over the future use of such body part for their own economic benefit. If these allegations are true, defendants clearly improperly interfered with plaintiff’s right in his body part at a time when he had the authority to determine the future use of such part, thereby misappropriating plaintiff’s right of control for their own advantage. Under *156these circumstances, the complaint fully satisfies the established requirements of a conversion cause of action.

As already noted, the majority maintains that there are a number of “reasons to doubt” that a patient retains any legally protectible interest in his organs after removal (maj. opn., ante, p. 137), but none of these reasons withstands scrutiny. The majority first relies on the fact that “no reported judicial decision supports Moore’s claim, either directly or by close analogy.” (Maj. opn., ante, p. 137.) By the same token, however, there is no reported judicial decision that rejects such a claim. This is simply a case of first impression. And while the majority goes on to emphasize that it is the “specialized statutes” dealing with human biological materials to which the court should look for guidance in determining whether a patient has any legal rights with respect to an organ after removal (maj. opn., ante, p. 137), the majority fails to recognize that the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act, as we have seen, expressly confirms a patient’s right to designate, prior to removal, the use to which a body part will be put. (See ante, pp. 154-155.)

The majority next relies on the provisions of section 7054.4,3 a statute that addresses the potential health hazards posed by the improper disposal of human body parts, reasoning that this statute “drastically limits a patient’s control over excised cells.” (Maj. opn., ante, p. 140.) While I agree with the majority that section 7054.4 should reasonably be interpreted to apply to body parts removed from a living patient as well as from dead bodies, the statute nonetheless provides absolutely no support for the majority’s conclusion. Although section 7054.4 limits a patient’s control over an excised body part in the sense that it prohibits him from taking the removed part to his home and keeping it on his mantel, the statute certainly does not suggest that a patient does not have the right to choose among the legally permissible uses of his organ. Similarly, there is nothing in section 7054.4 which indicates that a doctor or medical facility that removes a patient’s organ possesses any greater right than the patient himself to choose the further use to which the removed organ will be put. Since the majority does not suggest that the provisions of section 7054.4 should be interpreted to prohibit the research or commercial activities at issue in this case—and I agree that the statute cannot reasonably be interpreted to prohibit such use—I cannot understand how section 7054.4 provides any assistance to the majority’s argument.

*157Finally, the majority maintains that plaintiff’s conversion action is not viable because “the subject matter of the Regents’ patent—the patented cell line and the products derived from it—cannot be Moore’s property.” (Maj. opn., ante, p. 141.) Even if this is an accurate statement of federal patent law, it does not explain why plaintiff may not maintain a conversion action for defendants’ unauthorized use of his own body parts, blood, blood serum, bone marrow, and sperm. Although the damages which plaintiff may recover in a conversion action may not include the value of the patent and the derivative products, the fact that plaintiff may not be entitled to all of the damages which his complaint seeks does not justify denying his right to maintain any conversion action at all. Similarly, although the question whether plaintiff’s cells are “unique” may well affect the amount of damages plaintiff will be able to recover in a conversion action, the question of uniqueness has no proper bearing on plaintiff’s basic right to maintain a conversion action; ordinary property, as well as unique property, is, of course, protected against conversion.

Thus, unlike the majority, I conclude that under established common law principles the facts alleged in the complaint state a cause of action for conversion.4

Ill

Although the majority opinion does not acknowledge that plaintiff’s conversion action is supported by existing common law principles, its reasoning suggests that the majority would, in any event, conclude that considerations of public policy support a judicially crafted limitation on a patient’s right to sue anyone involved in medical research activities for conversion of a patient’s excised organs or cells. (Maj. opn., ante, pp. 142-147.) For a number of reasons, I cannot agree that this court should carve out such a broad immunity from general conversion principles.

One of the majority’s principal policy concerns is that “[t]he extension of conversion law into this area will hinder research by restricting access to the *158necessary raw materials”—the thousands of cell lines and tissues already in cell and tissue repositories. (Maj. opn., ante, p. 144.) The majority suggests that the “exchange of scientific materials, which still is relatively free and efficient, will surely be compromised if each cell sample becomes the potential subject matter of a lawsuit.” (Maj. opn., ante, p. 145.)

This policy argument is flawed in a number of respects. First, the majority’s stated concern does not provide any justification for barring plaintiff from bringing a conversion action against a party who does not obtain organs or cells from a cell bank but who directly interferes with or misappropriates a patient’s right to control the use of his organs or cells. Although the majority opinion suggests that the availability of a breach-of-fiduciary-duty cause of action obviates any need for a conversion action against this category of defendants (see maj. opn., ante, p. 147), the existence of a breach-of-fiduciary-duty cause of action does not provide a complete answer. Even if in this case plaintiff may obtain the same remedy against such defendants under a breach-of-fiduciary-duty theory as he could under a conversion cause of action, in other factual settings an unlawful interference with a patient’s right to control the use of his body part may occur in the absence of a breach of fiduciary duty. For example, if a patient donated his removed cells to a medical center, reserving the right to approve or disapprove the research projects for which the cells would be used, and if another medical center or a drug manufacturer stole the cells after removal and used them in an unauthorized manner for its own economic gain, no breach-of-fiduciary-duty cause of action would be available and a conversion action would be necessary to vindicate the patient’s rights. Under the majority’s holding, however, the patient would have no right to bring a conversion action, even against such a thief. As this hypothetical illustrates, even if there were compelling policy reasons to limit the potential liability of innocent researchers who use cells obtained from an existing cell bank, those policy considerations would not justify the majority’s broad abrogation of all conversion liability for the unauthorized use of body parts.

Second, even with respect to those persons who are not involved in the initial conversion, the majority’s policy arguments are less than compelling. To begin with, the majority’s fear that the availability of a conversion remedy will restrict access to existing cell lines is unrealistic. In the vast majority of instances the tissues and cells in existing repositories will not represent a potential source of liability because they will have come from patients who consented to their organ’s use for scientific purposes under circumstances in which such consent was not tainted by a failure to disclose the known valuable nature of the cells. Because potential liability under a conversion theory will exist in only the exceedingly rare instance in which a doctor knowingly concealed from the patient the value of his body part or *159the patient’s specific directive with regard to the use of the body part was disregarded, there is no reason to think that application of settled conversion law will have any negative effect on the primary conduct of medical researchers who use tissue and cell banks.

Furthermore, even in the rare instance—like the present case—in which a conversion action might be successfully pursued, the potential liability is not likely “to destroy the economic incentive to conduct important medical research,” as the majority asserts. (Maj. opn., ante, p. 146.) If, as the majority suggests, the great bulk of the value of a cell line patent and derivative products is attributable to the efforts of medical researchers and drug companies, rather than to the “raw materials” taken from a patient (maj. opn., ante, pp. 141-142), the patient’s damages will be correspondingly limited, and innocent medical researchers and drug manufacturers will retain the considerable economic benefits resulting from their own work. Under established conversion law, a “subsequent innocent converter” does not forfeit the proceeds of his own creative efforts, but rather “is entitled to the benefit of any work or labor that he has expended on the [property] . . . .” (1 Harper et al., The Law of Torts (2d ed. 1986) § 2.34, p. 234. See generally Rest. 2d Torts, § 927, corns, f, g.)

Finally, the majority’s analysis of the relevant policy considerations tellingly omits a most pertinent consideration. In identifying the interests of the patient that are implicated by the decision whether to recognize a conversion cause of action, the opinion speaks only of the “patient’s right to make autonomous medical decisions” (maj. opn., ante, p. 143) and fails even to mention the patient’s interest in obtaining the economic value, if any, that may adhere in the subsequent use of his own body parts. Although such economic value may constitute a fortuitous “windfall” to the patient (maj. opn., ante, p. 147), the fortuitous nature of the economic value does not justify the creation of a novel exception from conversion liability which sanctions the intentional misappropriation of that value from the patient.

This last point reveals perhaps the most serious flaw in the majority’s public policy analysis in this case. It is certainly arguable that, as a matter of policy or morality, it would be wiser to prohibit any private individual or entity from profiting from the fortuitous value that adheres in a part of a human body, and instead to require all valuable excised body parts to be deposited in a public repository which would make such materials freely available to all scientists for the betterment of society as a whole. The Legislature, if it wished, could create such a system, as it has done with respect to organs that are donated for transplantation. (See § 7155, subd. (a); Pen. Code, § 367f. See also 42 U.S.C. § 274e.) To date, however, the Legislature has not adopted such a system for organs that are to be used for *160research or commercial purposes,5 and the majority opinion, despite some oblique suggestions to the contrary (see maj. opn., ante, pp. 144-145), emphatically does not do so by its holding in this case. Justice Arabian’s concurring opinion suggests that the majority’s conclusion is informed by the precept that it is immoral to sell human body parts for profit. (See cone, opn., ante, p. 149.) But the majority’s rejection of plaintiff’s conversion cause of action does not mean that body parts may not be bought or sold for research or commercial purposes or that no private individual or entity may benefit economically from the fortuitous value of plaintiff’s diseased cells. Far from elevating these biological materials above the marketplace, the majority’s holding simply bars plaintiff, the source of the cells, from obtaining the benefit of the cells’ value, but permits defendants, who allegedly obtained the cells from plaintiff by improper means, to retain and exploit the full economic value of their ill-gotten gains free of their ordinary common law liability for conversion.

Because I conclude that plaintiff’s complaint states a cause of action for conversion under traditional common law principles, I dissent from the majority opinion insofar as it rejects such a claim.

MOSK, J.

I dissent.

Contrary to the principal holding of the Court of Appeal, the majority conclude that the complaint does not—in fact cannot—state a cause of action for conversion. I disagree with this conclusion for all the reasons *161stated by the Court of Appeal, and for additional reasons that I shall explain. For convenience I shall discuss the six premises of the majority’s conclusion in the order in which they appear.

1.

The majority first take the position that Moore has no cause of action for conversion under existing law because he retained no “ownership interest” in his cells after they were removed from his body. (Maj. opn., ante, p. 137.) To state a conversion cause of action a plaintiff must allege his “ownership or right to possession of the property at the time of the conversion” (Baldwin v. Marina City Properties, Inc. (1978) 79 Cal.App.3d 393, 410). Here the complaint defines Moore’s “Blood and Bodily Substances” to include inter alia his blood, his bodily tissues, his cells, and the cell lines derived therefrom.1 Moore thereafter alleges that “he is the owner of his Blood and Bodily Substances and of the by-products produced therefrom . . . .” And he further alleges that such blood and bodily substances “are his tangible personal property, and the activities of the defendants as set forth herein constitute a substantial interference with plaintiff’s possession or right thereto, as well as defendants’ wrongful exercise of dominion over plaintiff’s personal property rights in his Blood and Bodily Substances.”

The majority impliedly hold these allegations insufficient as a matter of law, finding three “reasons to doubt” that Moore retained a sufficient ownership interest in his cells, after their excision, to support a conversion cause of action. (Maj. opn., ante, p. 137.) In my view the majority’s three reasons, taken singly or together, are inadequate to the task.

The majority’s first reason is that “no reported judicial decision supports Moore’s claim, either directly or by close analogy.” (Maj. opn., ante, p. 137.) Neither, however, is there any reported decision rejecting such a claim. The issue is as new as its source—the recent explosive growth in the commercialization of biotechnology.

The majority next cite several statutes regulating aspects of the commerce in or disposition of certain parts of the human body, and conclude in effect that in the present case we should also “look for guidance” to the Legislature rather than to the law of conversion. (Id. at p. 137.) Surely this argument is out of place in an opinion of the highest court of this state. As the majority acknowledge, the law of conversion is a creature of the common law. “ ‘The inherent capacity of the common law for growth and change is *162its most significant feature. Its development has been determined by the social needs of the community which it serves. It is constantly expanding and developing in keeping with advancing civilization and the new conditions and progress of society, and adapting itself to the gradual change of trade, commerce, arts, inventions, and the needs of the country.’ [Citation.] [H] In short, as the United States Supreme Court has aptly said, ‘This flexibility and capacity for growth and adaptation is the peculiar boast and excellence of the common law.’ [Citation.] . . . Although the Legislature may of course speak to the subject, in the common law system the primary instruments of this evolution are the courts, adjudicating on a regular basis the rich variety of individual cases brought before them.” (Rodriguez v. Bethlehem Steel Corp. (1974) 12 Cal.3d 382, 394 [115 Cal.Rptr. 765, 525 P.2d 669].)

Especially is this true in the field of torts. I need not review the many instances in which this court has broken fresh ground by announcing new rules of tort law: time and again when a new rule was needed we did not stay our hand merely because the matter was one of first impression.2 For example, in Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories (1980) 26 Cal.3d 588 [163 Cal.Rptr. 132, 607 P.2d 924, 2 A.L.R.4th 1061], we adopted a “market share” theory of liability for injury resulting from administration of a prescription drug and suffered by a plaintiff who without fault cannot trace the particular manufacturer of the drug that caused the harm. Like the opinion in the case at bar, the dissent in Sindell objected that market share liability was “a wholly new theory” and an “unprecedented extension of liability” (Id. at pp. 614-615), and urged that in view of the economic, social, and medical effects of this new rule the decision to adopt it should rest with the Legislature (Id. at p. 621). We nevertheless declared the new rule for sound policy reasons, explaining that “In our contemporary complex industrialized society, advances in science and technology create fungible goods which may harm consumers and which cannot be traced to any specific producer. The response of the courts can be either to adhere rigidly to prior doctrine, denying recovery to those injured by such products, or to fashion remedies to meet these changing needs.” {Id. at p. 610.) We took the latter course.3

The case at bar, of course, does not involve a drug-induced injury. Yet it does present a claim arising, like Sindell’s, from “advances in science and technology” that could not have been foreseen when traditional tort doc*163trine—here, the law of conversion—was formulated. My point is that if the cause of action for conversion is otherwise an appropriate remedy on these facts, we should not refrain from fashioning it simply because another court has not yet so held or because the Legislature has not yet addressed the question. We need not wait on either event, because neither is a precondition to an exercise of our long-standing “power to insure the just and rational development of the common law in our state” (Rodriguez v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., supra, 12 Cal.3d 382, 394).4

2.

The majority’s second reason for doubting that Moore retained an ownership interest in his cells after their excision is that “California statutory law . . . drastically limits a patient’s control over excised cells.” (Maj. opn., ante, p. 140.) For this proposition the majority rely on Health and Safety Code section 7054.4 (hereafter section 7054.4), set forth in the margin.5 The majority concede that the statute was not meant to directly resolve the question whether a person in Moore’s position has a cause of action for conversion, but reason that it indirectly resolves the question by limiting the patient’s control over the fate of his excised cells: “By restricting how excised cells may be used and requiring their eventual destruction, the statute eliminates so many of the rights ordinarily attached to property that one cannot simply assume that what is left amounts to ‘property’ or ‘ownership’ for purposes of conversion law.” (Maj. opn., ante, pp. 140-141.) As will appear, I do not believe section 7054.4 supports the just quoted conclusion of the majority.

First, in my view the statute does not authorize the principal use that defendants claim the right to make of Moore’s tissue, i.e., its commercial exploitation. In construing section 7054.4, of course, “we look first to the words of the statute themselves” (Long Beach Police Officers Assn. v. City of *164 Long Beach (1988) 46 Cal.3d 736, 741 [250 Cal.Rptr. 869, 759 P.2d 504]), and give those words their usual and ordinary meaning (California Teachers Assn. v. San Diego Community College Dist. (1981) 28 Cal.3d 692, 698 [170 Cal.Rptr. 817, 621 P.2d 856]).

By its terms, section 7054.4 permits only “scientific use” of excised body parts and tissue before they must be destroyed. We must therefore determine the usual and ordinary meaning of that phrase. I would agree that “scientific use” at least includes routine postoperative examination of excised tissue conducted by a pathologist for diagnostic or prognostic reasons (e.g., to verify preoperative diagnosis or to assist in determining postoperative treatment). I might further agree that “scientific use” could be extended to include purely scientific study of the tissue by a disinterested researcher for the purpose of advancing medical knowledge—provided of course that the patient gave timely and informed consent to that use. It would stretch the English language beyond recognition, however, to say that commercial exploitation of the kind and degree alleged here is also a usual and ordinary meaning of the phrase “scientific use.”

The majority dismiss this difficulty by asserting that I read the statute to define “scientific use” as “not-for-profit scientific use,” and by finding “no reason to believe that the Legislature intended to make such a distinction.” (Maj. opn., ante, p. 141, fn. 34.) The objection misses my point. I do not stress the concept of profit, but the concept of science: the distinction I draw is not between nonprofit scientific use and scientific use that happens to lead to a marketable by-product; it is between a truly scientific use and the blatant commercial exploitation of Moore’s tissue that the present complaint alleges. Under those allegations, defendants Dr. David W. Golde and Shirley G. Quan were not only scientists, they were also full-fledged entrepreneurs: the complaint repeatedly declares that they appropriated Moore’s tissue in order “to further defendants’ independent research and commercial activities and promote their economic, financial and competitive interests.” The complaint also alleges that defendant Regents of the University of California (hereafter Regents) actively assisted the individual defendants in applying for patent rights and in negotiating with bioengineering and pharmaceutical companies to exploit the commercial potential of Moore’s tissue. Finally, the complaint alleges in detail the contractual arrangements between the foregoing defendants and defendants Genetics Institute, Inc., and Sandoz Pharmaceuticals Corporation, giving the latter companies exclusive rights to exploit that commercial potential while providing substantial financial benefits to the individual defendants in the form of cash, stock options, consulting fees, and fringe benefits. To exclude such traditionally commercial activities from the phrase “scientific use,” as I do here, does not *165give it a restrictive definition; rather, it gives the phrase its usual and ordinary meaning, as settled law requires.

Secondly, even if section 7054.4 does permit defendants’ commercial exploitation of Moore’s tissue under the guise of “scientific use,” it does not follow that—as the majority conclude—the statute “eliminates so many of the rights ordinarily attached to property” that what remains does not amount to “property” or “ownership” for purposes of the law of conversion. (Maj. opn., ante, p. 141.)

The concepts of property and ownership in our law are extremely broad. (See Civ. Code, §§ 654, 655.) A leading decision of this court approved the following definition: “ ‘The term “property” is sufficiently comprehensive to include every species of estate, real and personal, and everything which one person can own and transfer to another. It extends to every species of right and interest capable of being enjoyed as such upon which it is practicable to place a money value.’ ” (Yuba River Power Co. v. Nevada Irr. Dist. (1929) 207 Cal. 521, 523 [279 P. 128].)

Being broad, the concept of property is also abstract: rather than referring directly to a material object such as a parcel of land or the tractor that cultivates it, the concept of property is often said to refer to a “bundle of rights” that may be exercised with respect to that object—principally the rights to possess the property, to use the property, to exclude others from the property, and to dispose of the property by sale or by gift. “Ownership is not a single concrete entity but a bundle of rights and privileges as well as of obligations.” (Union Oil Co. v. State Bd. of Equal. (1963) 60 Cal.2d 441, 447 [34 Cal.Rptr. 872, 386 P.2d 496].) But the same bundle of rights does not attach to all forms of property. For a variety of policy reasons, the law limits or even forbids the exercise of certain rights over certain forms of property. For example, both law and contract may limit the right of an owner of real property to use his parcel as he sees fit.6 Owners of various forms of personal property may likewise be subject to restrictions on the time, place, and manner of their use.7 Limitations on the disposition of real *166property, while less common, may also be imposed.8 Finally, some types of personal property may be sold but not given away,9 while others may be given away but not sold,10 and still others may neither be given away nor sold.11

In each of the foregoing instances, the limitation or prohibition diminishes the bundle of rights that would otherwise attach to the property, yet what remains is still deemed in law to be a protectible property interest. “Since property or title is a complex bundle of rights, duties, powers and immunities, the pruning away of some or a great many of these elements does not entirely destroy the title . . . .” (People v. Walker (1939) 33 Cal.App.2d 18, 20 [90 P.2d 854] [even the possessor of contraband has certain property rights in it against anyone other than the state].) The same rule applies to Moore’s interest in his own body tissue: even if we assume that section 7054.4 limited the use and disposition of his excised tissue in the manner claimed by the majority, Moore nevertheless retained valuable rights in that tissue. Above all, at the time of its excision he at least had the right to do with his own tissue whatever the defendants did with it: i.e., he could have contracted with researchers and pharmaceutical companies to develop and exploit the vast commercial potential of his tissue and its products. Defendants certainly believe that their right to do the foregoing is not barred by section 7054.4 and is a significant property right, as they have demonstrated by their deliberate concealment from Moore of the true value of his tissue, their efforts to obtain a patent on the Mo cell line, their contractual agreements to exploit this material, their exclusion of Moore from any participation in the profits, and their vigorous defense of this lawsuit. The Court of Appeal summed up the point by observing that “Defendants’ position that plaintiff cannot own his tissue, but that they can, is fraught with irony.” It is also legally untenable. As noted above, the majority cite no case holding that an individual’s right to develop and exploit the commercial potential of his own tissue is not a right of sufficient worth or dignity to be deemed a protectible property interest. In the absence of such authority—or of legislation to the same effect—the right falls within the traditionally broad concept of property in our law.

*1673.

The majority’s third and last reason for their conclusion that Moore has no cause of action for conversion under existing law is that “the subject matter of the Regents’ patent—the patented cell line and the products derived from it—cannot be Moore’s property.” (Maj. opn., ante, p. 141.) The majority then offer a dual explanation: “This is because the patented cell line is both factually and legally distinct from the cells taken from Moore’s body.” {Ibid., italics added.) Neither branch of the explanation withstands analysis.

First, in support of their statement that the Mo cell line is “factually distinct” from Moore’s cells, the majority assert that “Cells change while being developed into a cell line and continue to change over time,” and in particular may acquire an abnormal number of chromosomes. (Maj. opn., ante, p. 141, fn. 35.) No one disputes these assertions, but they are nonetheless irrelevant. For present purposes no distinction can be drawn between Moore’s cells and the Mo cell line. It appears that the principal reason for establishing a cell line is not to “improve” the quality of the parent cells but simply to extend their life indefinitely, in order to permit long-term study and/or exploitation of the qualities already present in such cells. The complaint alleges that Moore’s cells naturally produced certain valuable proteins in larger than normal quantities; indeed, that was why defendants were eager to culture them in the first place. Defendants do not claim that the cells of the Mo cell line are in any degree more productive of such proteins than were Moore’s own cells. Even if the cells of the Mo cell line in fact have an abnormal number of chromosomes, at the present stage of this case we do not know if that fact has any bearing whatever on their capacity to produce proteins; yet it is in the commercial exploitation of that capacity—not simply in their number of chromosomes—that Moore seeks to assert an interest. For all that appears, therefore, the emphasized fact is a distinction without a difference.

Second, the majority assert in effect that Moore cannot have an ownership interest in the Mo cell line because defendants patented it.12 The majority’s point wholly fails to meet Moore’s claim that he is entitled to compensation for defendants’ unauthorized use of his bodily tissues before defend*168ants patented the Mo cell line: defendants undertook such use immediately after the splenectomy on October 20, 1976, and continued to extract and use Moore’s cells and tissue at least until September 20, 1983; the patent, however, did not issue until March 20, 1984, more than seven years after the unauthorized use began. Whatever the legal consequences of that event, it did not operate retroactively to immunize defendants from accountability for conduct occurring long before the patent was granted.

Nor did the issuance of the patent in 1984 necessarily have the drastic effect that the majority contend. To be sure, the patent granted defendants the exclusive right to make, use, or sell the invention for a period of 17 years. (35 U.S.C. § 154.) But Moore does not assert any such right for himself. Rather, he seeks to show that he is entitled, in fairness and equity, to some share in the profits that defendants have made and will make from their commercial exploitation of the Mo cell line. I do not question that the cell line is primarily the product of defendants’ inventive effort. Yet likewise no one can question Moore’s crucial contribution to the invention—an invention named, ironically, after him: but for the cells of Moore’s body taken by defendants, there would have been no Mo cell line. Thus the complaint alleges that Moore’s “Blood and Bodily Substances were absolutely essential to defendants’ research and commercial activities with regard to his cells, cell lines, [and] the Mo cell-line, . . . and that defendants could not have applied for and had issued to them the Mo cell-line patent and other patents described herein without obtaining and culturing specimens of plaintiff’s Blood and Bodily Substances.” Defendants admit this allegation by their demurrers, as well they should: for all their expertise, defendants do not claim they could have extracted the Mo cell line out of thin air.

Nevertheless the majority conclude that the patent somehow cut off all Moore’s rights—past, present, and future—to share in the proceeds of defendants’ commercial exploitation of the cell line derived from his own body tissue. The majority cite no authority for this unfair result, and I cannot believe it is compelled by the general law of patents: a patent is not a license to defraud.13 Perhaps the answer lies in an analogy to the concept of “joint inventor.” I am aware that “patients and research subjects who contribute cells to research will not be considered inventors.” (OTA Rep., supra, at p. 71.) Nor is such a person, strictly speaking, a “joint inventor” within the *169meaning of the term in federal law. (35 U.S.C. § 116.) But he does fall within the spirit of that law: “The joint invention provision guarantees that all who contribute in a substantial way to a product’s development benefit from the reward that the product brings. Thus, the protection of joint inventors encourages scientists to cooperate with each other and ensures that each contributor is rewarded fairly.

“Although a patient who donates cells does not fit squarely within the definition of a joint inventor, the policy reasons that inform joint inventor patents should also apply to cell donors. Neither John Moore nor any other patient whose cells become the basis for a patentable cell line qualifies as a ‘joint inventor’ because he or she did not further the development of the product in any intellectual or conceptual sense. Nor does the status of patients as sole owners of a component part make them deserving of joint inventorship status. What the patients did do, knowingly or unknowingly, is collaborate with the researchers by donating their body tissue. ... By providing the researchers with unique raw materials, without which the resulting product could not exist, the donors become necessary contributors to the product. Concededly, the patent is not granted for the cell as it is found in nature, but for the modified biogenetic product. However, the uniqueness of the product that gives rise to its patentability stems from the uniqueness of the original cell. A patient’s claim to share in the profits flowing from a patent would be analogous to that of an inventor whose collaboration was essential to the success of a resulting product. The patient was not a coequal, but was a necessary contributor to the cell line. ” (Dan-forth, Cells, Sales, & Royalties: The Patient’s Right to a Portion of the Profits (1988) 6 Yale L. & Pol’y Rev. 179, 197, fns. omitted, italics added (hereafter Danforth).)

Under this reasoning, which I find persuasive, the law of patents would not be a bar to Moore’s assertion of an ownership interest in his cells and their products sufficient to warrant his sharing in the proceeds of their commercial exploitation.

4.

Having concluded—mistakenly, in my view—that Moore has no cause of action for conversion under existing law, the majority next consider whether to “extend” the conversion cause of action to this context. Again the majority find three reasons not to do so, and again I respectfully disagree with each.

The majority’s first reason is that a balancing of the “relevant policy considerations” counsels against recognizing a conversion cause of action in *170these circumstances. (Maj. opn., ante, p. 143.) The memo identifies two such policies, but concedes that one of them—“protection of a competent patient’s right to make autonomous medical decisions” (id. at p. 143)— would in fact be promoted, even though “indirectly,” by recognizing a conversion cause of action. (Id. at p. 144.)

The majority focus instead on a second policy consideration, i.e., their concern “that we not threaten with disabling civil liability innocent parties who are engaged in socially useful activities, such as researchers who have no reason to believe that their use of a particular cell sample is, or may be, against a donor’s wishes.” (Maj. opn., ante, p. 143.) As will appear, in my view this concern is both overstated and outweighed by contrary considerations.14

The majority begin their analysis by stressing the obvious facts that research on human cells plays an increasingly important role in the progress of medicine, and that the manipulation of those cells by the methods of biotechnology has resulted in numerous beneficial products and treatments. Yet it does not necessarily follow that, as the majority claim, application of the law of conversion to this area “will hinder research by restricting access to the necessary raw materials,” i.e., to cells, cell cultures, and cell lines. (Maj. opn., ante, p. 144.) The majority observe that many researchers obtain their tissue samples, routinely and at little or no cost, from cell-culture repositories. The majority then speculate that “This exchange of scientific materials, which is still relatively free and efficient, will surely be compromised if each cell sample becomes the potential subject matter of a lawsuit.” (Maj. opn., ante, p. 145.) There are two grounds to doubt that this prophecy will be fulfilled.

To begin with, if the relevant exchange of scientific materials was ever “free and efficient,” it is much less so today. Since biological products of genetic engineering became patentable in 1980 (Diamond v. Chakrabarty *171(1980) 447 U.S. 303 [65 L.Ed.2d 144, 100 S.Ct. 2204]), human cell lines have been amenable to patent protection and, as the Court of Appeal observed in its opinion below, “The rush to patent for exclusive use has been rampant.” Among those who have taken advantage of this development, of course, are the defendants herein: as we have seen, defendants Golde and Quan obtained a patent on the Mo cell line in 1984 and assigned it to defendant Regents. With such patentability has come a drastic reduction in the formerly free access of researchers to new cell lines and their products: the “novelty” requirement for patentability prohibits public disclosure of the invention at all times up to one year before the filing of the patent application. (35 U.S.C. § 102(b).) Thus defendants herein recited in their patent specification, “At no time has the Mo cell line been available to other than the investigators involved with its initial discovery and only the conditioned medium from the cell line has been made available to a limited number of investigators for collaborative work with the original discoverers of the Mo cell line.”

An even greater force for restricting the free exchange of new cell lines and their products has been the rise of the biotechnology industry and the increasing involvement of academic researchers in that industry.15 When scientists became entrepreneurs and negotiated with biotechnological and pharmaceutical companies to develop and exploit the commercial potential of their discoveries—as did defendants in the case at bar—layers of contractual restrictions were added to the protections of the patent law.16

In their turn, the biotechnological and pharmaceutical companies demanded and received exclusive rights in the scientists’ discoveries, and frequently placed those discoveries under trade secret protection. Trade secret protection is popular among biotechnology companies because, among other reasons, the invention need not meet the strict standards of *172patentability and the protection is both quickly acquired and unlimited in duration. (Note, Patent and Trade Secret Protection in University-Industry Research Relationships in Biotechnology (1987) 24 Harv. J. on Legis. 191, 218-219.)17 Secrecy as a normal business practice is also taking hold in university research laboratories, often because of industry pressure (id. at pp. 204-208): “One of the most serious fears associated with university-industry cooperative research concerns keeping work private and not disclosing it to the researcher’s peers. [Citation.] . . . Economic arrangements between industry and universities inhibit open communication between researchers, especially for those who are financially tied to smaller biotechnology firms.” (Howard, supra, 44 Food Drug Cosm. L.J. at p. 339, fn. 72.)

Secondly, to the extent that cell cultures and cell lines may still be “freely exchanged,” e.g., for purely research purposes, it does not follow that the researcher who obtains such material must necessarily remain ignorant of any limitations on its use: by means of appropriate recordkeeping, the researcher can be assured that the source of the material has consented to his proposed use of it, and hence that such use is not a conversion. To achieve this end the originator of the tissue sample first determines the extent of the source’s informed consent to its use—e.g., for research only, or for public but academic use, or for specific or general commercial purposes; he then enters this information in the record of the tissue sample, and the record accompanies the sample into the hands of any researcher who thereafter undertakes to work with it. “Record keeping would not be overly burdensome because researchers generally keep accurate records of tissue sources for other reasons: to trace anomalies to the medical history of the patient, to maintain title for other researchers and for themselves, and to insure reproducibility of the experiment.” (Toward the Right of Commerciality, supra, 34 UCLA L.Rev. at p. 241.) As the Court of Appeal correctly observed, any claim to the contrary “is dubious in light of the meticulous care and planning necessary in serious modern medical research.”

The majority rely on Brown v. Superior Court, supra, 44 Cal.3d 1049 (hereafter Brown), but the case is plainly distinguishable. In a unanimous opinion that I authored for the court, we considered inter alia whether pharmaceutical manufacturers should be held strictly liable for injuries caused by “defectively designed” prescription drugs. We declined to so hold for several policy reasons. (Id. at pp. 1063-1065.) One of those reasons was our concern that “the fear of large adverse monetary judgments” might dissuade such manufacturers from developing or distributing potentially beneficial new drugs. (Id. at p. 1063.) The majority now seek to draw an *173analogy between Brown and the case at bar, but the analogy fails because liability exposure in the Brown context is qualitatively far greater. As we acknowledged in Brown, “unlike other important medical products . . . harm to some users from prescription drugs is unavoidable. (Ibid., italics added.) On an industry-wide basis, therefore, the imposition of strict liability for defective prescription drugs would inevitably result in hundreds, if not thousands, of meritorious claims by often seriously harmed plaintiffs, most of them likely to be seeking exemplary as well as compensatory damages.18 Given the innocence and vulnerability of the typical plaintiff in such cases, sympathetic juries might well return substantial verdicts again and again, and the industry’s total liability could reach intimidating proportions. Indeed, in Brown we chronicled actual instances in which the mere threat of such liability did cause the industry to refuse to supply new prescription drugs. (Id. at p. 1064.)

None of the foregoing is true in the case at bar. The majority claim that a conversion cause of action threatens to “destroy the economic incentive” to conduct the type of research here in issue (maj. opn., ante, p. 146), but it is difficult to take this hyperbole seriously. First, the majority reason that with every cell sample a researcher “purchases a ticket in a litigation lottery.” (Id. at p. 146.) This is a colorful image, but it does not necessarily reflect reality: as explained above, with proper recordkeeping the researcher acquires not a litigation-lottery ticket but the information he needs precisely in order to avoid litigation. In contrast to Brown, therefore, here the harm is by no means “unavoidable.” Second, the risk at hand is not of a multiplicity of actions: in Brown the harm would be suffered by many members of the public—the users of the end product of the process of developing the new drug—while here it can be suffered by only one person—the original source of the research material that began that process. Third, the harm to the latter will be primarily economic, rather than the potentially grave physical injuries at issue in Brown.

In any event, in my view whatever merit the majority’s single policy consideration may have is outweighed by two contrary considerations, i.e., policies that are promoted by recognizing that every individual has a legally protectible property interest in his own body and its products. First, our society acknowledges a profound ethical imperative to respect the human body as the physical and temporal expression of the unique human persona. One manifestation of that respect is our prohibition against direct abuse of the body by torture or other forms of cruel or unusual punishment. Another is our prohibition against indirect abuse of the body by its economic exploi*174tation for the sole benefit of another person. The most abhorrent form of such exploitation, of course, was the institution of slavery. Lesser forms, such as indentured servitude or even debtor’s prison, have also disappeared. Yet their specter haunts the laboratories and boardrooms of today’s biotechnological research-industrial complex. It arises wherever scientists or industrialists claim, as defendants claim here, the right to appropriate and exploit a patient’s tissue for their sole economic benefit—the right, in other words, to freely mine or harvest valuable physical properties of the patient’s body: “Research with human cells that results in significant economic gain for the researcher and no gain for the patient offends the traditional mores of our society in a manner impossible to quantify. Such research tends to treat the human body as a commodity—a means to a profitable end. The dignity and sanctity with which we regard the human whole, body as well as mind and soul, are absent when we allow researchers to further their own interests without the patient’s participation by using a patient’s cells as the basis for a marketable product.” (Danforth, supra, 6 Yale L. & Pol’y Rev. at p. 190, fn. omitted.)

A second policy consideration adds notions of equity to those of ethics. Our society values fundamental fairness in dealings between its members, and condemns the unjust enrichment of any member at the expense of another. This is particularly true when, as here, the parties are not in equal bargaining positions. We are repeatedly told that the commercial products of the biotechnological revolution “hold the promise of tremendous profit.” (Toward the Right of Commerciality, supra, 34 UCLA L.Rev. at p. 211.)19 In the case at bar, for example, the complaint alleges that the market for the kinds of proteins produced by the Mo cell line was predicted to exceed $3 billion by 1990. These profits are currently shared exclusively between the biotechnology industry and the universities that support that industry. The profits are shared in a wide variety of ways, including “direct entrepreneurial ties to genetic-engineering firms” and “an equity interest in fledgling biotechnology firms” (Howard, supra, 44 Food Drug Cosm. L.J. at p. 338). Thus the complaint alleges that because of his development of the Mo cell line defendant Golde became a paid consultant of defendant Genetics Institute and acquired the rights to 75,000 shares of that firm’s stock at a cost of 1 cent each; that Genetics Institute further contracted to pay Golde and the Regents at least $330,000 over 3 years, including a pro rata share of Golde’s salary and fringe benefits; and that defendant Sandoz Pharmaceuticals Corporation subsequently contracted to increase that compensation by a further $110,000.

*175There is, however, a third party to the biotechnology enterprise—the patient who is the source of the blood or tissue from which all these profits are derived. While he may be a silent partner, his contribution to the venture is absolutely crucial: as pointed out above (pt. 3, ante), but for the cells of Moore’s body taken by defendants there would have been no Mo cell line at all.20 Yet defendants deny that Moore is entitled to any share whatever in the proceeds of this cell line. This is both inequitable and immoral. As Dr. Thomas H. Murray, a respected professor of ethics and public policy, testified before Congress, “the person [who furnishes the tissue] should be justly compensated. ... If biotechnologists fail to make provision for a just sharing of profits with the person whose gift made it possible, the public’s sense of justice will be offended and no one will be the winner.” (Murray, Who Owns the Body? On the Ethics of Using Human Tissue for Commercial Purposes (Jan.-Feb. 1986) IRB: A Review of Human Subjects Research, at p. 5.)21

There will be such equitable sharing if the courts recognize that the patient has a legally protected property interest in his own body and its products: “property rights in one’s own tissue would provide a morally acceptable result by giving effect to notions of fairness and preventing unjust enrichment. ...[][] Societal notions of equity and fairness demand recognition of property rights. There are bountiful benefits, monetary and otherwise, to be derived from human biologies. To deny the person contributing the raw material a fair share of these ample benefits is both unfair and morally wrong.” (Toward the Right of Commerciality, supra, 34 UCLA L.Rev. at p. 229.) “Recognizing a donor’s property rights would prevent unjust enrichment by giving monetary rewards to the donor and researcher proportionate to the value of their respective contributions. Biotechnology depends upon the contributions of both patients and researchers. If not for the patient’s contribution of cells with unique attributes, the medical value of the bioengineered cells would be negligible. But for the physician’s contribution of knowledge and skill in developing the cell product, the commercial value of the patient’s cells would also be negligible. Failing to compensate the patient unjustly enriches the researcher because only the researcher’s contribution is recognized.” (Id. at p. 230.) In short, as the *176Court of Appeal succinctly put it, “If this science has become science for profit, then we fail to see any justification for excluding the patient from participation in those profits.”

5.

The majority’s second reason for declining to extend the conversion cause of action to the present context is that “the Legislature should make that decision.” (Maj. opn., ante, p. 147.) I do not doubt that the Legislature is competent to act on this topic. The fact that the Legislature may intervene if and when it chooses, however, does not in the meanwhile relieve the courts of their duty of enforcing—or if need be, fashioning—an effective judicial remedy for the wrong here alleged. As I observed above (pt. 1, ante), if a conversion cause of action is otherwise an appropriate remedy on these facts we should not refrain from recognizing it merely because the Legislature has not yet addressed the question. To do so would be to abdicate pro tanto our responsibility over a body of law—torts—that is particularly a creature of the common law. And such reluctance to act would be especially unfortunate at the present time, when the rapid expansion of biotechnological science and industry makes resolution of these issues an increasingly pressing need.

The inference I draw from the current statutory regulation of human biological materials, moreover, is the opposite of that drawn by the majority. By selective quotation of the statutes (maj. opn., ante, p. 137, fns. 22 & 23) the majority seem to suggest that human organs and blood cannot legally be sold on the open market—thereby implying that if the Legislature were to act here it would impose a similar ban on monetary compensation for the use of human tissue in biotechnological research and development. But if that is the argument, the premise is unsound: contrary to popular misconception, it is not true that human organs and blood cannot legally be sold.

As to organs, the majority rely on the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act (Health & Saf. Code, § 7150 et seq.; hereafter the UAGA) for the proposition that a competent adult may make a post mortem gift of any part of his body but may not receive “valuable consideration” for the transfer. But the prohibition of the UAGA against the sale of a body part is much more limited than the majority recognize: by its terms (Health & Saf. Code, §7155, subd. (a)) the prohibition applies only to sales for “transplantation” or “therapy.”22 Yet a diiferent section of the UAGA authorizes the transfer *177and receipt of body parts for such additional purposes as “medical or dental education, research, or advancement of medical or dental science.” (Health & Saf. Code, § 7153, subd. (a)(1).) No section of the UAGA prohibits anyone from selling body parts for any of those additional purposes; by clear implication, therefore, such sales are legal.23 Indeed, the fact that the UAGA prohibits no sales of organs other than sales for “transplantation” or “therapy” raises a further implication that it is also legal for anyone to sell human tissue to a biotechnology company for research and development purposes.

With respect to the sale of human blood the matter is much simpler: there is in fact no prohibition against such sales. The majority rely (maj. opn., ante, p. 137, fn. 23) on Health and Safety Code section 1606, which provides in relevant part that the procurement and use of blood for transfusion “shall be construed to be, and is declared to be . . . the rendition of a service . . . and shall not be construed to be, and is declared not to be, a sale . . . .” There is less here, however, than meets the eye: the statute does not mean that a person cannot sell his blood or, by implication, that his blood is not his property. “While many jurisdictions have classified the transfer of blood or other human tissue as a service rather than a sale, this position does not conflict with the notion that human tissue is property.” (Columbia Note, supra, 90 Colum. L.Rev. at p. 544, fn. 76.) The reason is plain: “No State or Federal statute prohibits the sale of blood, plasma, semen, or other replenishing tissues if taken in nonvital amounts. Nevertheless, State laws usually characterize these paid transfers as the provision of services rather than the sale of a commodity. . . . [1j] The primary legal reason for characterizing these transactions as involving services rather than goods is to avoid liability for contaminated blood products under either general product liability principles or the [Uniform Commercial Code’s] implied warranty provisions.” (OTA Rep., supra, at p. 76, fn. omitted.) The courts have repeatedly recognized that the foregoing is the real purpose of this harmless legal fiction. (See, e.g., Hyland Therapeutics v. Superior Court (1985) 175 Cal.App.3d 509 [220 Cal.Rptr. 590]; Cramer v. Queen of Angels Hosp. (1976) 62 Cal.App.3d 812 [133 Cal.Rptr. 339]; Shepard v. Alexian Brothers Hosp. (1973) 33 Cal.App.3d 606 [109 Cal.Rptr. 132].) Thus despite the statute relied on by the majority, it is perfectly legal in this state for a person to sell his blood for transfusion or for any other *178purpose—indeed, such sales are commonplace, particularly in the market for plasma. (See OTA Rep., supra, at p. 121.)

It follows that the statutes regulating the transfers of human organs and blood do not support the majority’s refusal to recognize a conversion cause of action for commercial exploitation of human blood cells without consent. On the contrary, because such statutes treat both organs and blood as property that can legally be sold in a variety of circumstances, they impliedly support Moore’s contention that his blood cells are likewise property for which he can and should receive compensation, and hence are protected by the law of conversion.

6.

The majority’s final reason for refusing to recognize a conversion cause of action on these facts is that “there is no pressing need” to do so because the complaint also states another cause of action that is assertedly adequate to the task (maj. opn., ante, p. 147); that cause of action is “the breach of a fiduciary duty to disclose facts material to the patient’s consent or, alternatively, . . . the performance of medical procedures without first having obtained the patient’s informed consent” {id. at p. 129).24 Although last, this reason is not the majority’s least; in fact, it underlies much of the opinion’s discussion of the conversion cause of action, recurring like a leitmotiv throughout that discussion.

The majority hold that a physician who intends to treat a patient in whom he has either a research interest or an economic interest is under a fiduciary duty to disclose such interest to the patient before treatment, that his failure to do so may give rise to a nondisclosure cause of action, and that the complaint herein states such a cause of action at least against defendant Golde. I agree with that holding as far as it goes.

I disagree, however, with the majority’s further conclusion that in the present context a nondisclosure cause of action is an adequate—in fact, a superior—substitute for a conversion cause of action. In my view the nondisclosure cause of action falls short on at least three grounds.

First, the majority reason that “enforcement of physicians’ disclosure obligations” will ensure patients’ freedom of choice. (Maj. opn., ante, p. *179147.) The majority do not spell out how those obligations will be “enforced”; but because they arise from judicial decision (the majority opinion herein) rather than from legislative or administrative enactment, we may infer that the obligations will primarily be enforced by the traditional judicial remedy of an action for damages for their breach. Thus the majority’s theory apparently is that the threat of such an action will have a prophylactic effect: it will give physician-researchers incentive to disclose any conflicts of interest before treatment, and will thereby protect their patients’ right to make an informed decision about what may be done with their body parts.

The remedy is largely illusory. “[A]n action based on the physician’s failure to disclose material information sounds in negligence. As a practical matter, however, it may be difficult to recover on this kind of negligence theory because the patient must prove a causal connection between his or her injury and the physician’s failure to inform.” (Martin & Lagod, Biotechnology and the Commercial Use of Human Cells: Toward an Organic View of Life and Technology (1989) 5 Santa Clara Computer & High Tech L.J. 211, 222, fn. omitted, italics added.) There are two barriers to recovery. First, “the patient must show that if he or she had been informed of all pertinent information, he or she would have declined to consent to the procedure in question.” (Ibid.) As we explained in the seminal case of Cobbs v. Grant (1972) 8 Cal.3d 229, 245 [104 Cal.Rptr. 505, 502 P.2d 1], “There must be a causal relationship between the physician’s failure to inform and the injury to the plaintiff. Such a causal connection arises only if it is established that had revelation been made consent to treatment would not have been given.”25

The second barrier to recovery is still higher, and is erected on the first: it is not even enough for the plaintiff to prove that he personally would have refused consent to the proposed treatment if he had been fully informed; he must also prove that in the same circumstances no reasonably prudent person would have given such consent. The purpose of this “objective” standard is evident: “Since at the time of trial the uncommunicated hazard has materialized, it would be surprising if the patient-plaintiff did not claim that had he been informed of the dangers he would have declined treatment. Subjectively he may believe so, with the 20/20 vision of hindsight, but we doubt that justice will be served by placing the physician in jeopardy of the *180patient’s bitterness and disillusionment. Thus an objective test is preferable: i.e., what would a prudent person in the patient’s position have decided if adequately informed of all significant perils.” (Cobbs v. Grant, supra, 8 Cal.3d 229, 245.)26

Even in an ordinary Cobbs-type action it may be difficult for a plaintiff to prove that no reasonably prudent person would have consented to the proposed treatment if the doctor had disclosed the particular risk of physical harm that ultimately caused the injury. (See, e.g., Morganroth v. Pacific Medical Center, Inc. (1976) 54 Cal.App.3d 521, 534 [126 Cal.Rptr. 681] [affirming nonsuit in Cobbs-type action on ground, inter alia, of lack of proof that plaintiff would have refused coronary arteriogram if he had been told of risk of stroke].) This is because in many cases the potential benefits of the treatment to the plaintiff clearly outweigh the undisclosed risk of harm. But that imbalance will be even greater in the kind of nondisclosure action that the majority now contemplate: here we deal not with a risk of physical injuries such as a stroke, but with the possibility that the doctor might later use some of the patient’s cast-off tissue for scientific research or the development of commercial products. Few if any judges or juries are likely to believe that disclosure of such a possibility of research or development would dissuade a reasonably prudent person from consenting to the treatment. For example, in the case at bar no trier of fact is likely to believe that if defendants had disclosed their plans for using Moore’s cells, no reasonably prudent person in Moore’s position—i.e., a leukemia patient suffering from a grossly enlarged spleen—would have consented to the routine operation that saved or at least prolonged his life. Here, as in Morganroth {ibid.), a motion for nonsuit for failure to prove proximate cause will end the matter. In this context, accordingly, the threat of suit on a nondisclosure cause of action is largely a paper tiger.

The second reason why the nondisclosure cause of action is inadequate for the task that the majority assign to it is that it fails to solve half the problem before us: it gives the patient only the right to refuse consent, i.e., the right to prohibit the commercialization of his tissue; it does not give him the right to grant consent to that commercialization on the condition that he share in its proceeds. “Even though good reasons exist to support in*181formed consent with tissue commercialization, a disclosure requirement is only the first step toward full recognition of a patient’s right to participate fully. Informed consent to commercialization, absent a right to share in the profits from such commercial development, would only give patients a veto over their own exploitation. But recognition that the patient[s] [have] an ownership interest in their own tissues would give patients an affirmative right of participation. Then patients would be able to assume the role of equal partners with their physicians in commercial biotechnology research.” (Howard, supra, 44 Food Drug Cosm. L.J. at p. 344.)

Reversing the words of the old song, the nondisclosure cause of action thus accentuates the negative and eliminates the positive: the patient can say no, but he cannot say yes and expect to share in the proceeds of his contribution. Yet as explained above (pt. 4, ante), there are sound reasons of ethics and equity to recognize the patient’s right to participate in such benefits. The nondisclosure cause of action does not protect that right; to that extent, it is therefore not an adequate substitute for the conversion remedy, which does protect the right.

Third, the nondisclosure cause of action fails to reach a major class of potential defendants: all those who are outside the strict physician-patient relationship with the plaintiff. Thus the majority concede that here only defendant Golde, the treating physician, can be directly liable to Moore on a nondisclosure cause of action: “The Regents, Quan, Genetics Institute, and Sandoz are not physicians. In contrast to Golde, none of these defendants stood in a fiduciary relationship with Moore or had the duty to obtain Moore’s informed consent to medical procedures.” (Maj. opn., ante, p. 133.) As to these defendants, the majority can offer Moore only a slim hope of recovery: if they are to be liable on a nondisclosure cause of action, say the majority, “it can only be on account of Golde’s acts and on the basis of a recognized theory of secondary liability, such as respondeat superior.” (Maj. opn., ante, p. 133.) Although the majority decline to decide the question whether the secondary-liability allegations of the complaint are sufficient, they strongly imply disapproval of those allegations.27 And the *182majority further note that the trial court has already ruled insufficient the allegations of agency as to the corporate defendants. (Maj. opn., ante, p. 134.)

To the extent that a plaintiff such as Moore is unable to plead or prove a satisfactory theory of secondary liability, the nondisclosure cause of action will thus be inadequate to reach a number of parties to the commercial exploitation of his tissue. Such parties include, for example, any physician-researcher who is not personally treating the patient, any other researcher who is not a physician, any employer of the foregoing (or even of the treating physician), and any person or corporation thereafter participating in the commercial exploitation of the tissue. Yet some or all of those parties may well have participated more in, and profited more from, such exploitation than the particular physician with whom the plaintiff happened to have a formal doctor-patient relationship at the time.

In sum, the nondisclosure cause of action (1) is unlikely to be successful in most cases, (2) fails to protect patients’ rights to share in the proceeds of the commercial exploitation of their tissue, and (3) may allow the true exploiters to escape liability. It is thus not an adequate substitute, in my view, for the conversion cause of action.

7.

My respect for this court as an institution compels me to make one last point: I dissociate myself completely from the amateur biology lecture that the majority impose on us throughout their opinion. (Maj. opn., ante, fns. 2, 29, 30, 33 and 35, and text at pp. 138-139.) For several reasons, the inclusion of most of that material in an opinion of this court is improper.

First, with the exception of defendants’ patent none of the material in question is part of the record on appeal as defined by the California Rules of Court. Because this appeal is taken from a judgment of dismissal entered after the sustaining of general and special demurrers, there is virtually no record other than the pleadings. The case has never been tried, and hence there is no evidence whatever on the obscure medical topics on which the majority presume to instruct us. Instead, all the documents that the majority rely on for their medical explanations appear in an appendix to defendant *183Golde’s opening brief on the merits. Such an appendix, however, is no more a part of the record than the brief itself, because the record comprises only the materials before the trial court when it made its ruling. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rules 4 through 5.2.) Nor could Golde have moved to augment the record to include any of these documents, because none was “part of the original superior court file,” a prerequisite to such augmentation. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 12(a).) “As a general rule, documents not before the trial court cannot be included as a part of the record on appeal.” (Doers v. Golden Gate Bridge etc. Dist. (1979) 23 Cal.3d 180, 184, fn. 1 [151 Cal.Rptr. 837, 588 P.2d 1261].)

Second, most of these documents bear solely or primarily on the majority’s discussion of whether Moore’s “genetic material” was or was not “unique” (see maj. opn., ante, p. 139), but that entire discussion is legally irrelevant to the present appeal. As Justice Broussard correctly observes in his separate opinion, “the question of uniqueness has no proper bearing on plaintiff’s basic right to maintain a conversion action; ordinary property, as well as unique property, is, of course, protected against conversion.” (Cone, and dis. opn. of Broussard, J., ante, p. 157.)

Third, this nonissue is also a noncontention. The majority claim that “Moore relies . . . primarily” on an analogy to certain right-of-privacy decisions (maj. opn., ante, pp. 137-138), but this is not accurate. Under our rules, as in appellate practice generally, the parties to an appeal are confined to the contentions raised in their briefs (see Cal. Rules of Court, rule 29.3). In his brief on the merits in this court Moore does not even cite, less still “rely primarily,” on the right-of-privacy decisions discussed by the majority, nor does he draw any analogy to the rule of those decisions. It is true that in the course of oral argument before this court, counsel for Moore briefly paraphrased the analogy argument that the majority now attribute to him; but a party may not, of course, raise a new contention for the first time in oral argument.

Fourth, much of the material that the majority rely on in this regard is written in highly technical scientific jargon by and for specialists in the field of contemporary molecular biology. (See, e.g., articles cited in maj. opn., ante, fn. 30, 2d par., & fn. 35, 2d par.) As far as I know, no member of this court is trained as a molecular biologist, or even as a physician; without expert testimony in the record, therefore, the majority are not competent to explain these arcane points of medical science any more than a doctor would be competent to explain esoteric questions of the law of negotiable *184instruments or federal income taxation, or the rule against perpetuities.28 In attempting to expound this science the majority run two serious risks. First, because they have no background in molecular biology the majority may simply misunderstand what they are reading, much as a layman might misunderstand a highly technical article in a professional legal journal. Indeed, I suggest the majority have already fallen into this very trap, since some of their explanations appear either mistaken, confused, or incomplete (e.g., maj. opn., ante, fin. 29).

The second risk is that of omission. The majority have access to most of the legal literature published in this country; but even if the majority could understand the medical literature, as a practical matter they have access to virtually none of it. This is demonstrated by the fact that every one of the medical articles now relied on by the majority came into their possession as reprints furnished to this court by one of the parties to this lawsuit—obviously not an unbiased source. Because the majority are thus not equipped to independently research the medical points they seek to make, they risk presenting only one side of the story; it may well be that other researchers have reached different or even contrary results, reported in publications that defendants, acting in self-interest, have not furnished to the court. I leave it *185to professionals in molecular biology to say whether the majority’s explanations on this topic are both correct and balanced. Because I fear they may be neither, I cannot subscribe to any of them.

I would affirm the decision of the Court of Appeal to direct the trial court to overrule the demurrers to the cause of action for conversion.

Respondents’ petition for a rehearing was denied August 30, 1990. Mosk, J., and Broussard, J., were of the opinion that the petition should be granted.

4.3 Marsh v. Alabama 4.3 Marsh v. Alabama

MARSH v. ALABAMA.

No. 114.

Argued December 6, 1945.

Decided January 7, 1946.

*502 Mr. Hayden C. Covington, with whom Mr. Grover C. Powell was on the brief, for appellant.

William M. McQueen, Attorney General of Alabama, and John 0. Harris, Assistant Attorney General, submitted for appellee.

Mr. Justice Black

delivered the opinion of the Court.

In this case we are asked to decide whether a State, consistently with the First and Fourteenth Amendments, can impose criminal punishment on a person who undertakes to distribute religious literature on the premises of a company-owned town contrary to the wishes of the town’s management. The town, a suburb of Mobile, Alabama, known as Chickasaw, is owned by the Gulf Shipbuilding Corporation. Except for that it has all the characteristics of any other American town. The property consists of residential buildings, streets, a system of sewers, a sewage disposal plant and a “business block” on which business places are situated. A deputy of the Mobile County Sheriff, paid by the company, serves as the town’s policeman. Merchants and service establishments have rented the stores and business places on the business block and *503the United States uses one of the places as a post office from which six carriers deliver mail to the people of Chickasaw and the adjacent area. The town and the surrounding neighborhood, which can not be distinguished from the Gulf property by anyone not familiar with the property lines, are thickly settled, and according to all indications the residents use the business block as their regular shopping center. To do so, they now, as they have for many years, make use of a company-owned paved street and sidewalk located alongside the store fronts in order to enter and leave the stores and the post office. Intersecting company-owned roads at each end of the business block lead into a four-lane public highway which runs parallel to the business block at a distance of thirty feet. There is nothing to stop highway traffic from coming onto the business block and upon arrival a traveler may make free use of the facilities available there. In short the town and its shopping district are accessible to and freely used by the public in general and there is nothing to distinguish them from any other town and shopping center except the fact that the title to the property belongs to a private corporation.

Appellant, a Jehovah’s Witness, came onto the sidewalk we have just described, stood near the post office and undertook to distribute religious literature. In the stores the corporation had posted a notice which read as follows: “This Is Private Property, and Without Written Permission, No Street, or House Vendor, Agent or Solicitation of Any Kind Will Be Permitted.” Appellant was warned that she could not distribute the literature without a permit and told that no permit would be issued to her. She protested that the company rule could not be constitutionally applied so as to prohibit her from distributing religious writings. When she was asked to leave the sidewalk and Chickasaw she declined. The deputy sheriff arrested her and she was charged in the state court with violating Title *50414, § 426 of the 1940 Alabama Code which makes it a crime to enter or remain on the premises of another after haying been warned not to do so. Appellant contended that to construe the state statute as applicable to her activities would abridge her right to freedom of press and religion contrary to the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution. This contention was rejected and she was convicted. The Alabama Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the statute as applied was constitutional because the title to the sidewalk was in the corporation and because the public use of the sidewalk had not been such as to give rise to a presumption under Alabama law of its irrevocable dedication to the public. 21 So. 2d 558. The State Supreme Court denied certiorari, 246 Ala. 539, 21 So. 2d 564, and the case is here on appeal under § 237 (a) of the Judicial Code, 28 U. S. C. § 344 (a).

Had the title to Chickasaw belonged not to a private but to a municipal corporation and had appellant been arrested for violating a municipal ordinance rather than a ruling by those appointed by the corporation to manage a company town it would have been clear that appellant's conviction must be reversed. Under our decision in Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U. S. 444 and others which have followed that case,1 neither a State nor a municipality can completely bar the distribution of literature containing religious or political ideas on its streets, sidewalks and public places or make the right to distribute dependent on a flat license tax or permit to be issued by an official who could deny it at will. We have also held that an ordinance completely prohibiting the dissemination of ideas on the city streets cannot be justified on the ground that the *505municipality holds legal title to them. Jamison y. Texas, 318 U. S. 413. And we have recognized that the preservation of a free society is so far dependent upon the right of each individual citizen to receive such literature as he himself might desire that a municipality could not, without jeopardizing that vital individual freedom, prohibit door to door distribution of literature. Martin v. Struthers, 319 U. S. 141, 146, 147. From these decisions it is clear that had the people of Chickasaw owned all the homes, and all the stores, and all the streets, and all the sidewalks, all those owners together could not have set up a municipal government with sufficient power to pass an ordinance completely barring the distribution of religious literature. Our question then narrows down to this: Can those people who live in or come to Chickasaw be denied freedom of press and religion simply because a single company has legal title to all the town? For it is the State’s contention that the mere fact that all the property interests in the town are held by a single company is enough to give that company power, enforceable by a state statute, to abridge these freedoms.

We do not agree that the corporation’s property interests settle the question.2 The State urges in effect that *506the corporation’s right to control the inhabitants of Chickasaw is coextensive with the right of a homeowner to regulate the conduct of his guests. We cannot accept that contention. Ownership does not always mean absolute dominion. The more an owner, for his advantage, opens up his property for use by the public in general, the more do his rights become circumscribed by the statutory and constitutional rights of those who use it. Cf. Republic Aviation Corp. v. Labor Board, 324 U. S. 793, 798, 802, n. 8. Thus, the owners of privately held bridges, ferries, turnpikes and railroads may not operate them as freely as a farmer does his farm. Since these facilities are built and operated primarily to benefit the public and since their operation is essentially a public function, it is subject to state regulation.3

And,

though the issue is not directly analogous to the one before us, we do want to point out by way of illustration that such regulation may not result in an operation of these facilities, even by privately owned companies, which unconstitutionally interferes with and discriminates against interstate commerce. Port Richmond Ferry v. Hudson County, supra, 234 U. S. at 326 and cases cited, pp. 328-329; cf. South Carolina Highway Dept. v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U. S. 177. Had the corporation here owned the segment of the four-lane highway which runs parallel to the “business block” and operated the same under a state franchise, doubtless no one would have seriously contended that the corporation’s property interest in the highway gave it power to obstruct through traffic or to discriminate against interstate commerce. See *507 County Commissioners v. Chandler, 96 U. S. 205, 208; Donovan v. Pennsylvania Co., supra, 199 U. S. at 294; Covington Drawbridge Co. v. Shepherd, 21 How. 112, 125. And even had there been no express franchise but mere acquiescence by the State in the corporation’s use of its property as a segment of the four-lane highway, operation of all the highway, including the segment owned by the corporation, would still have been performance of a public function and discrimination would certainly have been illegal.4

We do not think it makes any significant constitutional difference as to the relationship between the rights of the owner and those of the public that here the State, instead of permitting the corporation to operate a highway, permitted it to use its property as a town, operate a “business block” in the town and a street and sidewalk on that business block. Cf. Barney v. Keokuk, 94 U. S. 324, 340. Whether a corporation or a municipality owns or possesses the town the public in either case has an identical interest in the functioning of the community in such manner that the channels of communication remain free. As we *508have heretofore stated, the town of Chickasaw does not function differently from any other town. The “business block” serves as the community shopping center and is freely accessible and open to the people in the area and those passing through. The managers appointed by the corporation cannot curtail the liberty of press and religion of these people consistently with the purposes of the Constitutional guarantees, and a state statute, as the one here involved, which enforces such action by criminally punishing those who attempt to distribute religious literature clearly violates the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution.

Many people in the United States live in company-owned towns.5 These people, just as residents of municipalities, are free citizens of their State and country. Just as all other citizens they must make decisions which affect the welfare of community and nation. To act as good citizens they must be informed. In order to enable them to be properly informed their information must be uncensored. There is no more reason for depriving these people of the liberties guaranteed by the First and Four*509teenth Amendments than there is for curtailing these freedoms with respect to any other citizen.6

When we balance the Constitutional rights of owners of property against those of the people to enjoy freedom of press and religion, as we must here, we remain mindful of the fact that the latter occupy a preferred position.7 As we have stated before, the right to exercise the liberties safeguarded by the First Amendment “lies at the foundation of free government by free men” and we must in all cases “weigh the circumstances and . . . appraise the . . . reasons ... in support of the regulation ... of the rights.” Schneider v. State, 308 U. S. 147,161. In our view the circumstance that the property rights to the premises where the deprivation of liberty, here involved, took place, were held by others than the public, is not sufficient to justify the State’s permitting a corporation to govern a community of citizens so as to restrict their fundamental liberties and the enforcement of such restraint by the application of a state statute. Insofar as the State has attempted to impose criminal punishment on appellant for undertaking to distribute religious literature in a company town, its action cannot stand. The case is re*510versed and the cause remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

Reversed and remanded.

Mr. Justice Jackson took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.

Mr. Justice Frankfurter,

concurring.

So long as the views which prevailed in Jones v. Opelika, 319 U. S. 103, in connection with 316 U. S. 584, 600; Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U. S. 105; Martin v. Struthers, 319 U. S. 141, express the law of the Constitution, I am unable to find legal significance in the fact that a town in which the Constitutional freedoms of religion and speech are invoked happens to be company-owned. These decisions accorded the purveyors of ideas, religious or otherwise, “a preferred position,” Murdock v. Pennsylvania, supra at 115, even to the extent of relieving them from an unhampering and non-discriminatory duty of bearing their share of the cost of maintaining the peace and the other amenities of a civilized society. Constitutional privileges having such a reach ought not to depend upon a State court’s notion of the extent of “dedication” of private property to public purposes. Local determinations of such technical matters govern controversies affecting property. But when decisions by State courts involving local matters are so interwoven with the decision of the question of Constitutional rights that one necessarily involves the other, State determination of local questions cannot control the Federal Constitutional right.

A company-owned town gives rise to a net-work of property relations. As to these, the judicial organ of a State has the final say. But a company-owned town is a town. In its community aspects it does not differ from other towns. These community aspects are decisive in *511adjusting the relations now before us, and more particularly in adjudicating the clash of freedoms which the Bill of Rights was designed to resolve — the freedom of the community to regulate its life and the freedom of the individual to exercise his religion and to disseminate his ideas. Title to property as defined by State law controls property relations; it cannot control issues of civil liberties which arise precisely because a company town is a town as well as a congeries of property relations. And similarly the technical distinctions on which a finding of “trespass” so often depends are too tenuous to control decision regarding the scope of the vital liberties guaranteed by the Constitution.

Accordingly, as I have already indicated, so long as the scope of the guarantees of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by absorption of the First remains that which the Court gave to it in the series of cases in the October Term, 1942, the circumstances of the present case seem to me clearly to fall within it. And so I agree with the opinion of the Court, except that portion of it which relies on arguments drawn from the restrictions which the Commerce Clause imposes on State regulation of commerce. It does not seem to me to further Constitutional analysis to seek help for the solution of the delicate problems arising under the First Amendment from the very different order of problems which the Commerce Clause presents. The latter involves an accommodation between National and State powers operating in the same field. Where the First Amendment applies, it is a denial of all governmental power in our Federal system.

Mr. Justice Reed,

dissenting.

Former decisions of this Court have interpreted generously the Constitutional rights of people in this Land to *512exercise freedom of religion, of speech and of the press.1 It has never been held and is not now by this opinion of the Court that these rights are absolute and unlimited either in respect to the manner or the place of their exercise.2 What the present decision establishes as a principle is that one may remain on private property against the will of the owner and contrary to the law of the state so long as the only objection to his presence is that he is exercising an asserted right to spread there his religious views. See Marrone v. Washington Jockey Club, 227 U. S. 633. This is the first case to extend by law the privilege of religious exercises beyond public places or to private places without the assent of the owner. Compare Martin v. Struthers, 319 U. S. 141.

As the rule now announced permits this intrusion, without possibility of protection of the property by law, and apparently is equally applicable to the freedom of speech and the press, it seems appropriate to express a dissent to this, to us, novel Constitutional doctrine. Of course, such principle may subsequently be restricted by this Court to the precise facts of this case — that is to private property in a company town where the owner for his own advantage has permitted a restricted public use by his licensees and invitees. Such distinctions are of degree and require new arbitrary lines, judicially drawn, instead of those hitherto established by legislation and precedent. While the power *513of this Court, as the interpreter of the Constitution to determine what use of real property by the owner makes that property subject, at will, to the reasonable practice of religious exercises by strangers, cannot be doubted, we find nothing in the principles of the First Amendment, adopted now into the Fourteenth, which justifies their application to the facts of this case.3

Both Federal and Alabama law permit, so far as we are aware, company towns. By that we mean an area occupied by numerous houses, connected by passways, fenced or not, as the owners may choose. These communities may be essential to furnish proper and convenient living conditions for employees on isolated operations in lumbering, mining, production of high explosives and large-scale farming. The restrictions imposed by the owners upon the occupants are sometimes galling to the employees and may appear unreasonable to outsiders. Unless they fall under the prohibition of some legal rule, however, they are a matter for adjustment between owner and licensee, or by appropriate legislation. Compare Western Turf Assn. v. Greenberg, 204 U. S. 359.

Alabama has a statute generally applicable to all privately owned premises. It is Title 14, § 426, Alabama Code 1940 which so far as pertinent reads as follows:

“Trespass after warning. — Any person who, without legal cause or good excuse, enters into the dwelling house or on the premises of another, after having been warned, within six months preceding, not to do so; or any person, who, having entered into the dwelling house or on the premises of another without having been warned within six months not to do so, and fails or refuses, without legal *514cause or good excuse, to leave immediately on being ordered or requested to do so by the person in possession, his agent or representative, shall, on conviction, be fined not more than one hundred dollars, and may also be imprisoned in the county jail, or sentenced to hard labor for the county, for not more than three months.”

Appellant was distributing religious pamphlets on a privately owned passway or sidewalk thirty feet removed from a public highway of the State of Alabama and remained on these private premises after an authorized order to get off. We do not understand from the record that there was objection to appellant’s use of the nearby public highway and under our decisions she could rightfully have continued her activities a few feet from the spot she insisted upon using. An owner of property may very well have been willing for the public to use the private passway for business purposes and yet have been unwilling to furnish space for street trades or a location for the practice of religious exhortations by itinerants. The pass-way here in question was not put to any different use than other private passways that lead to privately owned areas, amusement places, resort hotels or other businesses. There had been no dedication of the sidewalk to the public use, express or implied. Alabama so decided and we understand that this Court accepts that conclusion. Alabama, also, decided that appellant violated by her activities the above-quoted state statute.

The Court calls attention to the fact that the owners of public utilities, bridges, ferries, turnpikes and railroads are subject to state regulation of rates and are forbidden to discriminate against interstate commerce. This is quite true but we doubt if the Court means to imply that the property of these utilities may be utilized, against the companies’ wishes, for religious exercises of the kind in question.

*515A state does have the moral duty of furnishing the opportunity for information, education and religious enlightenment to its inhabitants, including those who live in company towns, but it has not heretofore been adjudged that it must commandeer, without compensation, the private property of other citizens to carry out that obligation. Heretofore this Court has sustained the right of employees, under an appropriate statute, protecting full freedom of employee organization, to solicit union membership in nonworking time on the property of an employer and against his express prohibition. This is because the prohibition is an impediment to the right of organization which is protected by a statute which governs a relation between employers and employees if and when the latter are admitted to the employers’ premises as licensees. It was recognized in the opinion that the freedom of solicitation was the result of a regulatory statute and was not a Constitutional right. Republic Aviation Corp. v. Labor Board, 324 U. S. 793, 803. In the area which is covered by the guarantees of the First Amendment, this Court has been careful to point out that the owner of property may protect himself against the intrusion of strangers. Although in Martin v. Struthers, 319 U. S. 141, an ordinance forbidding the summonsing of the occupants of a dwelling to receive handbills was held invalid because in conflict with the freedom of speech and press, this Court pointed out at page 147 that, after warning, the property owner would be protected from annoyance.4 *516The very Alabama statute which is now held powerless to protect the property of the Gulf Shipbuilding Corporation, after notice, from this trespass was there cited, note 10, to show that it would protect the householder, after notice. The right to communicate ideas was expressed by us in Jamison v. Texas, 318 U. S. 413, 416, as follows: “But one who is rightfully on a street which the state has left open to the public carries with him there as elsewhere the Constitutional right to express his views in an orderly fashion.”

Our Constitution guarantees to every man the right to express his views in an orderly fashion. An essential element of “orderly” is that the man shall also have a right to use the place he chooses for his exposition. The rights of the owner, which the Constitution protects as well as the right of free speech, are not outweighed by the interests of the trespasser, even though he trespasses in behalf of religion or free speech. We cannot say that Jehovah’s Witnesses can claim the privilege of a license, which has never been granted, to hold their meetings in other private places, merely because the owner has admitted the public to them for other limited purposes. Even though we have reached the point where this Court is required to force private owners to open their property for the practice there of religious activities or propaganda dis*517tasteful to the owner, because of the public interest in freedom of speech and religion, there is no need for the application of such a doctrine here. Appellant, as we have said, was free to engage in such practices on the public highways, without becoming a trespasser on the company’s property.

The Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Burton join in this dissent.

4.4 Federal question 4.4 Federal question

The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.

Notes

Historical and Revision Notes

Based on title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., §41(1) (Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 231, §24, par. 1, 36 Stat. 1091; May 14, 1934, ch. 283, §1, 48 Stat. 775; Aug. 21, 1937, ch. 726, §1, 50 Stat. 738; Apr. 20, 1940, ch. 117, 54 Stat. 143).

Jurisdiction of federal questions arising under other sections of this chapter is not dependent upon the amount in controversy. (See annotations under former section 41 of title 28, U.S.C.A., and 35 C.J.S., p. 833 et seq., §§30–43. See, also, reviser's note under section 1332 of this title.)

Words "wherein the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $3,000, exclusive of interest and costs," were added to conform to rulings of the Supreme Court. See construction of provision relating to jurisdictional amount requirement in cases involving a Federal question in United States v. Sayward, 16 S.Ct. 371, 160 U.S. 493, 40 L.Ed. 508; Fishback v. Western Union Tel. Co., 16 S.Ct. 506, 161 U.S. 96, 40 L.Ed. 630; and Halt v. Indiana Manufacturing Co., 1900, 20 S.Ct. 272, 176 U.S. 68, 44 L.Ed. 374.

Words "all civil actions" were substituted for "all suits of a civil nature, at common law or in equity" to conform with Rule 2 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

Words "or treaties" were substituted for "or treaties made, or which shall be made under their authority," for purposes of brevity.

The remaining provisions of section 41(1) of title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., are incorporated in sections 1332, 1341, 1342, 1345, 1354, and 1359 of this title.

Changes were made in arrangement and phraseology.

Amendments

1980—Pub. L. 96–486 struck out "; amount in controversy; costs" in section catchline, struck out minimum amount in controversy requirement of $10,000 for original jurisdiction in federal question cases which necessitated striking the exception to such required minimum amount that authorized original jurisdiction in actions brought against the United States, any agency thereof, or any officer or employee thereof in an official capacity, struck out provision authorizing the district court except where express provision therefore was made in a federal statute to deny costs to a plaintiff and in fact impose such costs upon such plaintiff where plaintiff was adjudged to be entitled to recover less than the required amount in controversy, computed without regard to set-off or counterclaim and exclusive of interests and costs, and struck out existing subsection designations.

1976—Subsec. (a). Pub. L. 94–574 struck out $10,000 jurisdictional amount where action is brought against the United States, any agency thereof, or any officer or employee thereof in his official capacity.

1958—Pub. L. 85–554 included costs in section catchline, designated existing provisions as subsec. (a), substituted "$10,000" for "$3,000", and added subsec. (b).

Effective Date of 1980 Amendment; Applicability

Pub. L. 96–486, §4, Dec. 1, 1980, 94 Stat. 2370, provided: "This Act [amending this section and section 2072 of Title 15, Commerce and Trade, and enacting provisions set out as a note under section 1 of this title] shall apply to any civil action pending on the date of enactment of this Act [Dec. 1, 1980]."

Effective Date of 1958 Amendment

Pub. L. 85–554, §3, July 25, 1958, 72 Stat. 415, provided that: "This Act [amending this section and sections 1332 and 1345 of this title] shall apply only in the case of actions commenced after the date of the enactment of this Act [July 25, 1958]."

4.5 Removal of civil actions 4.5 Removal of civil actions

(a) Generally.—Except as otherwise expressly provided by Act of Congress, any civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or the defendants, to the district court of the United States for the district and division embracing the place where such action is pending.

(b) Removal Based on Diversity of Citizenship.—(1) In determining whether a civil action is removable on the basis of the jurisdiction under section 1332(a) of this title, the citizenship of defendants sued under fictitious names shall be disregarded.

(2) A civil action otherwise removable solely on the basis of the jurisdiction under section 1332(a) of this title may not be removed if any of the parties in interest properly joined and served as defendants is a citizen of the State in which such action is brought.

(c) Joinder of Federal Law Claims and State Law Claims.—(1) If a civil action includes—

(A) a claim arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States (within the meaning of section 1331 of this title), and

(B) a claim not within the original or supplemental jurisdiction of the district court or a claim that has been made nonremovable by statute,


the entire action may be removed if the action would be removable without the inclusion of the claim described in subparagraph (B).

(2) Upon removal of an action described in paragraph (1), the district court shall sever from the action all claims described in paragraph (1)(B) and shall remand the severed claims to the State court from which the action was removed. Only defendants against whom a claim described in paragraph (1)(A) has been asserted are required to join in or consent to the removal under paragraph (1).

(d) Actions Against Foreign States.—Any civil action brought in a State court against a foreign state as defined in section 1603(a) of this title may be removed by the foreign state to the district court of the United States for the district and division embracing the place where such action is pending. Upon removal the action shall be tried by the court without jury. Where removal is based upon this subsection, the time limitations of section 1446(b) of this chapter may be enlarged at any time for cause shown.

(e) Multiparty, Multiforum Jurisdiction.—(1) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (b) of this section, a defendant in a civil action in a State court may remove the action to the district court of the United States for the district and division embracing the place where the action is pending if—

(A) the action could have been brought in a United States district court under section 1369 of this title; or

(B) the defendant is a party to an action which is or could have been brought, in whole or in part, under section 1369 in a United States district court and arises from the same accident as the action in State court, even if the action to be removed could not have been brought in a district court as an original matter.


The removal of an action under this subsection shall be made in accordance with section 1446 of this title, except that a notice of removal may also be filed before trial of the action in State court within 30 days after the date on which the defendant first becomes a party to an action under section 1369 in a United States district court that arises from the same accident as the action in State court, or at a later time with leave of the district court.

(2) Whenever an action is removed under this subsection and the district court to which it is removed or transferred under section 1407(j) 1 has made a liability determination requiring further proceedings as to damages, the district court shall remand the action to the State court from which it had been removed for the determination of damages, unless the court finds that, for the convenience of parties and witnesses and in the interest of justice, the action should be retained for the determination of damages.

(3) Any remand under paragraph (2) shall not be effective until 60 days after the district court has issued an order determining liability and has certified its intention to remand the removed action for the determination of damages. An appeal with respect to the liability determination of the district court may be taken during that 60-day period to the court of appeals with appellate jurisdiction over the district court. In the event a party files such an appeal, the remand shall not be effective until the appeal has been finally disposed of. Once the remand has become effective, the liability determination shall not be subject to further review by appeal or otherwise.

(4) Any decision under this subsection concerning remand for the determination of damages shall not be reviewable by appeal or otherwise.

(5) An action removed under this subsection shall be deemed to be an action under section 1369 and an action in which jurisdiction is based on section 1369 of this title for purposes of this section and sections 1407, 1697, and 1785 of this title.

(6) Nothing in this subsection shall restrict the authority of the district court to transfer or dismiss an action on the ground of inconvenient forum.

(f) Derivative Removal Jurisdiction.—The court to which a civil action is removed under this section is not precluded from hearing and determining any claim in such civil action because the State court from which such civil action is removed did not have jurisdiction over that claim.

Notes

Historical and Revision Notes

Based on title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., §§71, 114 (Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 231, §§28, 53, 36 Stat. 1094, 1101; Jan. 20, 1914, ch. 11, 38 Stat. 278; Jan. 31, 1928, ch. 14, §1, 45 Stat. 54).

Section consolidates removal provisions of sections 71 and 114 of title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., and is intended to resolve ambiguities and conflicts of decisions.

Phrases such as "in suits of a civil nature, at law or in equity," the words "case," "cause," "suit," and the like have been omitted and the words "civil action" substituted in harmony with Rules 2 and 81(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

Ambiguous phrases such as "the District Court of the United States for the proper district" have been clarified by the substitution of the phrase "the district and division embracing the place where such action is pending." (See General Investment Co. v. Lake Shore & M.S. Ry. Co., 1922, 43 S.Ct. 107, 112, 260 U.S. 261, 67 L.Ed. 244 and cases cited therein.)

All the provisions with reference to removal of controversies between citizens of different States because of inability, from prejudice or local influence, to obtain justice, have been discarded. These provisions, born of the bitter sectional feelings engendered by the Civil War and the Reconstruction period, have no place in the jurisprudence of a nation since united by three wars against foreign powers. Indeed, the practice of removal for prejudice or local influence has not been employed much in recent years.

Subsection (c) has been substituted for the provision in section 71 of title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., "and when in any suit mentioned in this section, there shall be a controversy which is wholly between citizens of different States, and which can be fully determined as between them, then either one or more of the defendants actually interested in such controversy may remove said suit into the district court of the United States."

This quoted language has occasioned much confusion. The courts have attempted to distinguish between separate and separable controversies, a distinction which is sound in theory but illusory in substance. (See 41 Harv. L. Rev. 1048; 35 Ill. L. Rev. 576.)

Subsection (c) permits the removal of a separate cause of action but not of a separable controversy unless it constitutes a separate and independent claim or cause of action within the original jurisdiction of United States District Courts. In this respect it will somewhat decrease the volume of Federal litigation.

Rules 18, 20, and 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permit the most liberal joinder of parties, claims, and remedies in civil actions. Therefore there will be no procedural difficulty occasioned by the removal of the entire action. Conversely, if the court so desires, it may remand to the State court all nonremovable matters.

The provisions of section 71 of title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., with respect to removal of actions under the Federal Employer's Liability Act (U.S.C., 1940 ed., title 45, Railroads, §§51–60) and actions against a carrier for loss, damage, or delay to shipments under section 20 of title 49, U.S.C., 1940 ed., Transportation, are incorporated in section 1445 of this title.

Amendments

2011—Pub. L. 112–63, §103(a)(1), substituted "Removal of civil actions" for "Actions removable generally" in section catchline.

Subsec. (a). Pub. L. 112–63, §103(a)(2), inserted heading and in text struck out at end "For purposes of removal under this chapter, the citizenship of defendants sued under fictitious names shall be disregarded."

Subsec. (b). Pub. L. 112–63, §103(a)(3), amended subsec. (b) generally. Prior to amendment, text read as follows: "Any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction founded on a claim or right arising under the Constitution, treaties or laws of the United States shall be removable without regard to the citizenship or residence of the parties. Any other such action shall be removable only if none of the parties in interest properly joined and served as defendants is a citizen of the State in which such action is brought."

Subsec. (c). Pub. L. 112–63, §103(a)(4), amended subsec. (c) generally. Prior to amendment, text read as follows: "Whenever a separate and independent claim or cause of action within the jurisdiction conferred by section 1331 of this title is joined with one or more otherwise non-removable claims or causes of action, the entire case may be removed and the district court may determine all issues therein, or, in its discretion, may remand all matters in which State law predominates."

Subsec. (d). Pub. L. 112–63, §103(a)(5), inserted heading.

Subsec. (e). Pub. L. 112–63, §103(a)(6), inserted heading.

Subsec. (f). Pub. L. 112–63, §103(a)(7), inserted heading.

2002—Subsecs. (e), (f). Pub. L. 107–273 added subsec. (e), redesignated former subsec. (e) as (f), and substituted "The court to which a civil action is removed under this section" for "The court to which such civil action is removed".

1991—Subsec. (c). Pub. L. 102–198 struck out comma after "title" and substituted "may" for "may may" before "remand".

1990—Subsec. (c). Pub. L. 101–650 substituted "within the jurisdiction conferred by section 1331 of this title" for ", which would be removable if sued upon alone" and "may remand all matters in which State law predominates" for "remand all matters not otherwise within its original jurisdiction".

1988—Subsec. (a). Pub. L. 100–702 inserted at end "For purposes of removal under this chapter, the citizenship of defendants sued under fictitious names shall be disregarded."

1986—Subsec. (e). Pub. L. 99–336 added subsec. (e).

1976—Subsec. (d). Pub. L. 94–583 added subsec. (d).

Effective Date of 2011 Amendment

Amendment by Pub. L. 112–63 effective upon the expiration of the 30-day period beginning on Dec. 7, 2011, and applicable to any action or prosecution commenced on or after such effective date, with provisions for treatment of cases removed to Federal court, see section 105 of Pub. L. 112–63, set out as a note under section 1332 of this title.

Effective Date of 2002 Amendment

Amendment by Pub. L. 107–273 applicable to a civil action if the accident giving rise to the cause of action occurred on or after the 90th day after Nov. 2, 2002, see section 11020(c) of Pub. L. 107–273, set out as an Effective Date note under section 1369 of this title.

Effective Date of 1986 Amendment

Pub. L. 99–336, §3(b), June 19, 1986, 100 Stat. 637, provided that: "The amendment made by this section [amending this section] shall apply with respect to claims in civil actions commenced in State courts on or after the date of the enactment of this section [June 19, 1986]."

Effective Date of 1976 Amendment

Amendment by Pub. L. 94–583 effective 90 days after Oct. 21, 1976, see section 8 of Pub. L. 94–583, set out as an Effective Date note under section 1602 of this title.

4.6 New York Times Co. v. United States 4.6 New York Times Co. v. United States

403 U.S. 713
91 S.Ct. 2140
29 L.Ed.2d 822
NEW YORK TIMES COMPANY, Petitioner,

v.

UNITED STATES. UNITED STATES, Petitioner, v. The WASHINGTON POST COMPANY et al.

Nos. 1873, 1885.
Argued June 26, 1971.
Decided June 30, 1971.

          Sol. Gen. Erwin N. Griswold, for the United States.

          Alexander M. Bickel, New Haven, Conn., for the New York Times.

          William R. Glendon, Washington, D.C., for the Washington Post Co.

Page 714

           PER CURIAM.

          We granted certiorari, 403 U.S. 942, 943, 91 S.Ct. 2270, 2271, 29 L.Ed.2d 853 (1971) in these cases in which the United States seeks to enjoin the New York Times and the Washington Post from publishing the contents of a classified study entitled 'History of U.S. Decision-Making Process on Viet Nam Policy.'

          'Any system of prior restraints of expression comes to this Court bearing a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity.' Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70, 83 S.Ct. 631, 639, 9 L.Ed.2d 584 (1963); see also Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 51 S.Ct. 625, 75 L.Ed. 1357 (1931). The Government 'thus carries a heavy burden of showing justification for the imposition of such a restraint.' Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419, 91 S.Ct. 1575, 1578, 29 L.Ed.2d 1 (1971). The District Court for the Southern District of New York in the New York Times case, 328 F.Supp. 324, and the District Court for the District of Columbia and the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, 446 F.2d 1327, in the Washington Post case held that the Government had not met that burden. We agree.

          The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit is therefore affirmed. The order of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit is reversed, 444 F.2d 544, and the case is remanded with directions to enter a judgment affirming the judgment of the District Court for the Southern District of New York. The stays entered June 25, 1971, by the Court are vacated. The judgments shall issue forthwith.

          So ordered.

          Judgment of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed; order of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed and case remanded with directions.

           Mr. Justice BLACK, with whom Mr. Justice DOUGLAS joins, concurring. DP I adhere to the view that the Government's case against the Washington Post should have been dismissed and that the injunction against the New York Times should have been vacated without oral argument when the cases were first presented to this Court. I believe

Page 715

that every moment's continuance of the injunctions against these newspapers amounts to a flagrant, indefensible, and continuing violation of the First Amendment. Furthermore, after oral argument, I agree completely that we must affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit and reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit for the reasons stated by my Brothers DOUGLAS and BRENNAN. In my view it is unfortunate that some of my Brethren are apparently willing to hold that the publication of news may sometimes be enjoined. Such a holding would make a shambles of the First Amendment.

          Our Government was launched in 1789 with the adoption of the Constitution. The Bill of Rights, including the First Amendment, followed in 1791. Now, for the first time in the 182 years since the founding of the Republic, the federal courts are asked to hold that the First Amendment does not mean what it says, but rather means that the Government can halt the publication of current news of vital importance to the people of this country.

          In seeking injunctions against these newspapers and in its presentation to the Court, the Executive Branch seems to have forgotten the essential purpose and history of the First Amendment. When the Constitution was adopted, many people strongly opposed it because the document contained no Bill of Rights to safeguard certain basic freedoms.1 They especially feared that the

Page 716

new powers granted to a central government might be interpreted to permit the government to curtail freedom of religion, press, assembly, and speech. In response to an overwhelming public clamor, James Madison offered a series of amendments to satisfy citizens that these great liberties would remain safe and beyond the power of government to abridge. Madison proposed what later became the First Amendment in three parts, two of which are set out below, and one of which proclaimed: 'The people shall not be deprived or abridged of their right to speak, to write, or to publish their sentiments; and the freedom of the press, as one of the great bulwarks of liberty, shall be inviolable.'2 The amendments were offered to curtail and restrict the general powers granted to the Executive, Legislative, and Judicial Branches two years before in the original Constitution. The Bill of Rights changed the original Constitution into a new charter under which no branch of government could abridge the people's freedoms of press, speech, religion, and assembly. Yet the Solicitor General argues and some members of the Court appear to agree that the general powers of the Government adopted in the original Constitution should be interpreted to limit and restrict the specific and emphatic guarantees of the Bill of Rights adopted later. I can imagine no greater perversion of history. Madison and the other Framers of the First Amendment, able men

Page 717

that they were, wrote in language they earnestly believed could never be misunderstood: 'Congress shall make no law * * * abridging the freedom * * * of the press * * *.' Both the history and language of the First Amendment support the view that the press must be left free to publish news, whatever the source, without censorship, injunctions, or prior restraints.

          In the First Amendment the Founding Fathers gave the free press the protection it must have to fulfill its essential role in our democracy. The press was to serve the governed, not the governors. The Government's power to censor the press was abolished so that the press would remain forever free to censure the Government. The press was protected so that it could bare the secrets of government and inform the people. Only a free and unrestrained press can effectively expose deception in government. And paramount among the responsibilities of a free press is the duty to prevent any part of the government from deceiving the people and sending them off to distant lands to die of foreign fevers and foreign shot and shell. In my view, far from deserving condemnation for their courageous reporting, the New York Times, the Washington Post, and other newspapers should be commended for serving the purpose that the Founding Fathers saw so clearly. In revealing the workings of government that led to the Vietnam war, the newspapers nobly did precisely that which the Founders hoped and trusted they would do.

          The Government's case here is based on premises entirely different from those that guided the Framers of the First Amendment. The Solicitor General has carefully and emphatically stated:

          'Now, Mr. Justice (BLACK), your construction of * * * (the First Amendment) is well known, and I certainly respect it. You say that no law means no law, and that should be obvious. I can only

Page 718

          say, Mr. Justice, that to me it is equally obvious that 'no law' does not mean 'no law', and I would seek to persuade the Court that that is true. * * * (T)here are other parts of the Constitution that grant powers and responsibilities to the Executive, and * * * the First Amendment was not intended to make it impossible for the Executive to function or to protect the security of the United States.'3

          And the Government argues in its brief that in spite of the First Amendment, '(t)he authority of the Executive Department to protect the nation against publication of information whose disclosure would endanger the national security stems from two interrelated sources: the constitutional power of the President over the conduct of foreign affairs and his authority as Commander-in-Chief.'4

          In other words, we are asked to hold that despite the First Amendment's emphatic command, the Executive Branch, the Congress, and the Judiciary can make laws enjoining publication of current news and abridging freedom of the press in the name of 'national security.' The Government does not even attempt to rely on any act of Congress. Instead it makes the bold and dangerously farreaching contention that the courts should take it upon themselves to 'make' a law abridging freedom of the press in the name of equity, presidential power and national security, even when the representatives of the people in Congress have adhered to the command of the First Amendment and refused to make such a law.5 See concurring opinion of Mr. Justice DOUGLAS,

Page 719

post, at 721—722. To find that the President has 'inherent power' to halt the publication of news by resort to the courts would wipe out the First Amendment and destroy the fundamental liberty and security of the very people the Government hopes to make 'secure.' No one can read the history of the adoption of the First Amendment without being convinced beyond any doubt that it was injunctions like those sought here that Madison and his collaborators intended to outlaw in this Nation for all time.

          The word 'security' is a broad, vague generality whose contours should not be invoked to abrogate the fundamental law embodied in the First Amendment. The guarding of military and diplomatic secrets at the expense of informed representative government provides no real security for our Republic. The Framers of the First Amendment, fully aware of both the need to defend a new nation and the abuses of the English and Colonial Governments, sought to give this new society strength and security by providing that freedom of speech, press, religion, and assembly should not be abridged. This thought was eloquently expressed in 1937 by Mr. Chief Justice Hughes—great man and great Chief Justice that he was when the Court held a man could not be punished for attending a meeting run by Communists.

          'The greater the importance of safeguarding the community from incitements to the overthrow of our institutions by force and violence, the more imperative is the need to preserve inviolate the constitutional rights of free speech, free press and free

Page 720

          assembly in order to maintain the opportunity for free political discussion, to the end that government may be responsive to the will of the people and that changes, if desired, may be obtained by peaceful means. Therein lies the security of the Republic, the very foundation of constitutional government.'6

           Mr. Justice DOUGLAS, with whom Mr. Justice BLACK joins, concurring .

          While I join the opinion of the Court I believe it necessary to express my views more fully.

          It should be noted at the outset that the First Amendment provides that 'Congress shall make no law * * * abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press.' That leaves, in my view, no room for governmental restraint on the press.1

          There is, moreover, no statute barring the publication by the press of the material which the Times and the Post seek to use. Title 18 U.S.C. § 793(e) provides that '(w)hoever having unauthorized possession of, access to, or control over any document, writing * * * or information relating to the national defense which information the possessor has reason to believe could be used to the injury of the United States or to the advantage of any foreign nation, willfully communicates * * * the same to any person not entitled to receive it * * * (s)hall be fined

Page 721

not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both.'

          The Government suggests that the word 'communicates' is broad enough to encompass publication.

          There are eight sections in the chapter on espionage and censorship, §§ 792—799. In three of those eight 'publish' is specifically mentioned: § 794(b) applies to 'Whoever, in time of war, with intent that the same shall be communicated to the enemy, collects, records, publishes, or communicates * * * (the disposition of armed forces).'

          Section 797 applies to whoever 'reproduces, publishes, sells, or gives away' photographs of defense installations.

          Section 798 relating to cryptography applies to whoever: 'communicates, furnishes, transmits, or otherwise makes available * * * or publishes' the described materials.2 (Emphasis added.)

          Thus it is apparent that Congress was capable of and did distinguish between publishing and communication in the various sections of the Espionage Act.

          The other evidence that § 793 does not apply to the press is a rejected version of § 793. That version read: 'During any national emergency resulting from a war to which the United States is a party, or from threat of such a war, the President may, by proclamation, declare the existence of such emergency and, by proclamation, prohibit the publishing or communicating of, or the attempting to publish or communicate any information relating to the national defense which, in his judgment, is of such character that it is or might be useful to the

Page 722

enemy.' 55 Cong.Rec. 1763. During the debates in the Senate the First Amendment was specifically cited and that provision was defeated. 55 Cong.Rec. 2167.

          Judge Gurfein's holding in the Times case that this Act does not apply to this case was therefore preeminently sound. Moreover, the Act of September 23, 1950, in amending 18 U.S.C. § 793 states in § 1(b) that:

          'Nothing in this Act shall be construed to authorize, require, or establish military or civilian censorship or in any way to limit or infringe upon freedom of the press or of speech as guaranteed by the Constitution of the United States and no regulation shall be promulgated hereunder having that effect.' 64 Stat. 987.

          Thus Congress has been faithful to the command of the First Amendment in this area.

          So any power that the Government possesses must come from its 'inherent power.'

          The power to wage war is 'the power to wage war successfully.' See Kiyoshi Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 93, 63 S.Ct. 1375, 1382, 87 L.Ed. 1774. But the war power stems from a declaration of war. The Constitution by Art. I, § 8, gives Congress, not the President, power '(t)o declare War.' Nowhere are presidential wars authorized. We need not decide therefore what leveling effect the war power of Congress might have.

          These disclosures3 may have a serious impact. But that is no basis for sanctioning a previous restraint on

Page 723

the press. As stated by Chief Justice Hughes in Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 719—720, 51 S.Ct. 625, 632, 75 L.Ed. 1357:

          'While reckless assaults upon public men, and efforts to bring obloquy upon those who are endeavoring faithfully to discharge official duties, exert a baleful influence and deserve the severest condemnation in public opinion, it cannot be said that this abuse is greater, and it is believed to be less, than that which characterized the period in which our institutions took shape. Meanwhile, the administration of government has become more complex, the opportunities for malfeasance and corruption have multiplied, crime has grown to most serious proportions, and the danger of its protection by unfaithful officials and of the impairment of the fundamental security of life and property by criminal alliances and official neglect, emphasizes the primary need of a vigilant and courageous press, especially in great cities. The fact that the liberty of the press may be abused by miscreant purveyors of scandal does not make any the less necessary the immunity of the press from previous restraint in dealing with official misconduct.'

          As we stated only the other day in Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419, 91 S.Ct. 1575, 1578, 29 L.Ed.2d 1 '(a)ny prior restraint on expression comes to this Court with a 'heavy presumption' against its constitutional validity.'

          The Government says that it has inherent powers to go into court and obtain an injunction to protect the national interest, which in this case is alleged to be national security.

          Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 51 S.Ct. 625, 75 L.Ed. 1357, repudiated that expansive doctrine in no uncertain terms.

          The dominant purpose of the First Amendment was to prohibit the widespread practice of governmental sup-

Page 724

pression of embarrassing information. It is common knowledge that the First Amendment was adopted against the widespread use of the common law of seditious libel to punish the dissemination of material that is embarrassing to the powers-that-be. See T. Emerson, The System of Freedom of Expression, c. V (1970); Z. Chafee, Free Speech in the United States, c. XIII (1941). The present cases will, I think, go down in history as the most dramatic illustration of that principle. A debate of large proportions goes on in the Nation over our posture in Vietnam. That debate antedated the disclosure of the contents of the present documents. The latter are highly relevant to the debate in progress.

          Secrecy in government is fundamentally anti-democratic, perpetuating bureaucratic errors. Open debate and discussion of public issues are vital to our national health. On public questions there should be 'uninhibited, robust, and wide-open' debate. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269—270, 84 S.Ct. 710, 720—721, 11 L.Ed.2d 686.

          I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals in the Post case, vacate the stay of the Court of Appeals in the Times case and direct that it affirm the District Court.

          The stays is these cases that have been in effect for more than a week constitute a flouting of the principles of the First Amendment as interpreted in Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson.

           Mr. Justice BRENNAN, concurring.

I

          I write separately in these cases only to emphasize what should be apparent: that our judgments in the present cases may not be taken to indicate the propriety, in the future, of issuing temporary stays and restraining

Page 725

orders to block the publication of material sought to be suppressed by the Government. So far as I can determine, never before has the United States sought to enjoin a newspaper from publishing information in its possession. The relative novelty of the questions presented, the necessary haste with which decisions were reached, the magnitude of the interests asserted, and the fact that all the parties have concentrated their arguments upon the question whether permanent restraints were proper may have justified at least some of the restraints heretofore imposed in these cases. Certainly it is difficult to fault the several courts below for seeking to assure that the issues here involved were preserved for ultimate review by this Court. But even if it be assumed that some of the interim restraints were proper in the two cases before us, that assumption has no bearing upon the propriety of similar judicial action in the future. To begin with, there has now been ample time for reflection and judgment; whatever values there may be in the preservation of novel questions for appellate review may not support any restraints in the future. More important, the First Amendment stands as an absolute bar to the imposition of judicial restraints in circumstances of the kind presented by these cases.

II

          The error that has pervaded these cases from the outset was the granting of any injunctive relief whatsoever, interim or otherwise. The entire thrust of the Government's claim throughout these cases has been that publication of the material sought to be enjoined 'could,' or 'might,' or 'may' prejudice the national interest in various ways. But the First Amendment tolerates absolutely no prior judicial restraints of the press predicated upon surmise or conjecture that untoward consequences

Page 726

may result.* Our cases, it is true, have indicated that there is a single, extremely narrow class of cases in which the First Amendment's ban on prior judicial restraint may be overridden. Our cases have thus far indicated that such cases may arise only when the Nation 'is at war,' Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52, 39 S.Ct. 247, 249, 63 L.Ed. 470 (1919), during which times '(n)o one would question but that a government might prevent actual obstruction to its recruiting service or the publication of the sailing dates of transports or the number and location of troops.' Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 716, 51 S.Ct. 625, 631, 75 L.Ed. 1357 (1931). Even if the present world situation were assumed to be tantamount to a time of war, or if the power of presently available armaments would justify even in peacetime the suppression of information that would set in motion a nuclear holocaust, in neither of these actions has the Government presented or even alleged that publication of items from or based upon the material at issue would cause the happening of an event of that nature. '(T)he chief purpose of (the First Amendment's) guaranty (is) to prevent previous restraints upon publication.' Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, supra, at 713, 51 S.Ct., at 630. Thus, only governmental allegation and proof that publication must inevitably, di-

Page 727

rectly, and immediately cause the occurrence of an event kindred to imperiling the safety of a transport already at sea can support even the issuance of an interim restraining order. In no event may mere conclusions be sufficient: for if the Executive Branch seeks judicial aid in preventing publication, it must inevitably submit the basis upon which that aid is sought to scrutiny by the judiciary. And therefore, every restraint issued in this case, whatever its form, has violated the First Amendment—and not less so because that restraint was justified as necessary to afford the courts an opportunity to examine the claim more thoroughly. Unless and until the Government has clearly made out its case, the First Amendment commands that no injunction may issue.

           Mr. Justice STEWART, with whom Mr. Justice WHITE joins, concurring.

          In the governmental structure created by our Constitution, the Executive is endowed with enormous power in the two related areas of national defense and international relations. This power, largely unchecked by the Legislative1 and Judicial2 branches, has been pressed to the very hilt since the advent of the nuclear missile age. For better of for worse, the simple fact is that a

Page 728

President of the United States possesses vastly greater constitutional independence in these two vital areas of power than does, say, a prime minister of a country with a parliamentary form of government.

          In the absence of the governmental checks and balances present in other areas of our national life, the only effective restraint upon executive policy and power in the areas of national defense and international affairs may lie in an enlightened citizenry—in an informed and critical public opinion which alone can here protect the values of democratic government. For this reason, it is perhaps here that a press that is alert, aware, and free most vitally serves the basic purpose of the First Amendment. For without an informed and free press there cannot be an enlightened people.

          Yet it is elementary that the successful conduct of international diplomacy and the maintenance of an effective national defense require both confidentiality and secrecy. Other nations can hardly deal with this Nation in an atmosphere of mutual trust unless they can be assured that their confidences will be kept. And within our own executive departments, the development of considered and intelligent international policies would be impossible if those charged with their formulation could not communicate with each other freely, frankly, and in confidence. In the area of basic national defense the frequent need for absolute secrecy is, of course, self-evident.

          I think there can be but one answer to this dilemma, if dilemma it be. The responsibility must be where the power is.3 If the Constitution gives the Executive

Page 729

a large degree of unshared power in the conduct of foreign affairs and the maintenance of our national defense, then under the Constitution the Executive must have the largely unshared duty to determine and preserve the degree of internal security necessary to exercise that power successfully. It is an awesome responsibility, requiring judgment and wisdom of a high order. I should suppose that moral, political, and practical considerations would dictate that a very first principle of that wisdom would be an insistence upon avoiding secrecy for its own sake. For when everything is classified, then nothing is classified, and the system becomes one to be disregarded by the cynical or the careless, and to be manipulated by those intent on self-protection or self-promotion. I should suppose, in short, that the hallmark of a truly effective internal security system would be the maximum possible disclosure, recognizing that secrecy can best be preserved only when credibility is truly maintained. But be that as it may, it is clear to me that it is the constitutional duty of the Executive—as a matter of sovereign prerogative and not as a matter of law as the courts know law—through the promulgation and enforcement of executive regulations, to protect

Page 730

the confidentiality necessary to carry out its responsibilities in the fields of international relations and national defense.

          This is not to say that Congress and the courts have no role to play. Undoubtedly Congress has the power to enact specific and appropriate criminal laws to protect government property and preserve government secrets. Congress has passed such laws, and several of them are of very colorable relevance to the apparent circumstances of these cases. And if a criminal prosecution is instituted, it will be the responsibility of the courts to decide the applicability of the criminal law under which the charge is brought. Moreover, if Congress should pass a specific law authorizing civil proceedings in this field, the courts would likewise have the duty to decide the constitutionality of such a law as well as its applicability to the facts proved.

          But in the cases before us we are asked neither to construe specific regulations nor to apply specific laws. We are asked, instead, to perform a function that the Constitution gave to the Executive, not the Judiciary. We are asked, quite simply, to prevent the publication by two newspapers of material that the Executive Branch insists should not, in the national interest, be published. I am convinced that the Executive is correct with respect to some of the documents involved. But I cannot say that disclosure of any of them will surely result in direct, immediate, and irreparable damage to our Nation or its people. That being so, there can under the First Amendment be but one judicial resolution of the issues before us. I join the judgments of the Court.

           Mr. Justice WHITE, with whom Mr. Justice STEWART joins, concurring.

          I concur in today's judgments, but only because of the concededly extraordinary protection against prior re-

Page 731

straints enjoyed by the press under our constitutional system. I do not say that in no circumstances would the First Amendment permit an injunction against publishing information about government plans or operations.1 Nor, after examining the materials the Government characterizes as the most sensitive and destructive, can I deny that revelation of these documents will do substantial damage to public interests. Indeed, I am confident that their disclosure will have that result. But I nevertheless agree that the United States has not satisfied the very heavy burden that it must meet to warrant an injunction against publication in these cases, at least in the absence of express and appropriately limited congressional authorization for prior restraints in circumstances such as these.

Page 732

          The Government's position is simply stated: The responsibility of the Executive for the conduct of the foreign affairs and for the security of the Nation is so basic that the President is entitled to an injunction against publication of a newspaper story whenever he can convince a court that the information to be revealed threatens 'grave and irreparable' injury to the public interest;2 and the injunction should issue whether or not the material to be published is classified, whether or not publication would be lawful under relevant criminal statutes enacted by Congress, and regardless of the circumstances by which the newspaper came into possession of the information.

          At least in the absence of legislation by Congress, based on its own investigations and findings, I am quite unable to agree that the inherent powers of the Executive and the courts reach so far as to authorize remedies having such sweeping potential for inhibiting publications by the press. Much of the difficulty inheres in the 'grave and irreparable danger' standard suggested by the United States. If the United States were to have judgment under such a standard in these cases, our decision would be of little guidance to other courts in other cases, for the material at issue here would not be available from the Court's opinion or from public records, nor would it be published by the press. Indeed, even today where we hold that the United States has not met its burden, the material remains sealed in court records and it is

Page 733

properly not discussed in today's opinions. Moreover, because the material poses substantial dangers to national interests and because of the hazards of criminal sanctions, a responsible press may choose never to publish the more sensitive materials. To sustain the Government in these cases would start the courts down a long and hazardous road that I am not willing to travel, at least without congressional guidance and direction.

          It is not easy to reject the proposition urged by the United States and to deny relief on its good-faith claims in these cases that publication will work serious damage to the country. But that discomfiture is considerably dispelled by the infrequency of prior-restraint cases. Normally, publication will occur and the damage be done before the Government has either opportunity or grounds for suppression. So here, publication has already begun and a substantial part of the threatened damage has already occurred. The fact of a massive breakdown in security is known, access to the documents by many unauthorized people is undeniable, and the efficacy of equitable relief against these or other newspapers to avert anticipated damage is doubtful at best.

          What is more, terminating the ban on publication of the relatively few sensitive documents the Government now seeks to suppress does not mean that the law either requires or invites newspapers or others to publish them or that they will be immune from criminal action if they do. Prior restraints require an unusually heavy justification under the First Amendment; but failure by the Government to justify prior restraints does not measure its constitutional entitlement to a conviction for criminal publication. That the Government mistakenly chose to proceed by injunction does not mean that it could not successfully proceed in another way.

          When the Espionage Act was under consideration in

Page 734

1917, Congress eliminated from the bill a provision that would have given the President broad powers in time of war to proscribe, under threat of criminal penalty, the publication of various categories of information related to the national defense.3 Congress at that time was unwilling to clothe the President with such far-reaching powers to monitor the press, and those opposed to this part of the legislation assumed that a necessary concomitant of such power was the power to 'filter out the news to the people through some man.' 55 Cong.Rec. 2008 (remarks of Sen. Ashurst). However, these same members of Congress appeared to have little doubt that newspapers would be subject to criminal prosecution if they insisted on publishing information of the type Congress had itself determined should not be revealed. Senator Ashurst, for example, was quite sure that the editor of such a newspaper 'should be punished if he did publish information as to the movements of the fleet, the troops, the aircraft, the location of powder factories, the location of defense works, and all that sort of thing.' Id., at 2009.4

Page 735

          The Criminal Code contains numerous provisions potentially relevant to these cases. Section 7975 makes it a crime to publish certain photographs or drawings of military installations. Section 798,6 also in precise language, proscribes knowing and willful publication of any classified information concerning the cryptographic sys-

Page 736

tems or communication intelligence activities of the United States as well as any information obtained from communication intelligence operations.7 If any of the material here at issue is of this nature, the newspapers are presumably now on full notice of the position of the United States and must face the consequences if they

Page 737

publish. I would have no difficulty in sustaining convictions under these sections on facts that would not justify the intervention of equity and the imposition of a prior restraint.

          The same would be true under those sections of the Criminal Code casting a wider net to protect the national defense. Section 793(e)8 makes it a criminal act for any unauthorized possessor of a document 'relating to the national defense' either (1) willfully to communicate or cause to be communicated that document to any person not entitled to receive it or (2) willfully to retain the document and fail to deliver it to an officer of the United States entitled to receive it. The subsection was added in 1950 because pre-existing law provided no

Page 738

penalty for the unauthorized possessor unless demand for the documents was made.9 'The dangers surrounding the unauthorized possession of such items are self-

Page 739

evident, and it is deemed advisable to require their surrender in such a case, regardless of demand, especially since their unauthorized possession may be unknown to the authorities who would otherwise make the demand.' S.Rep.No. 2369, pt. 1, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., 9 (1950). Of course, in the cases before us, the unpublished documents have been demanded by the United States and their import has been made known at least to counsel for the newspapers involved. In Gorin v. United States, 312 U.S. 19, 28, 61 S.Ct. 429, 434, 85 L.Ed. 488 (1941), the words 'national defense' as used in a predecessor of § 793 were held by a unanimous Court to have 'a well understood connotation'—a 'generic concept of broad connotations, referring to the military and naval establishments and the related activities of national preparedness'—and to be 'sufficiently definite to apprise the public of prohibited activi-

Page 740

ties' and to be consonant with due process. 312 U.S., at 28, 61 S.Ct., at 434. Also, as construed by the Court in Gorin, information 'connected with the national defense' is obviously not limited to that threatening 'grave and irreparable' injury to the United States.10

          It is thus clear that Congress has addressed itself to the problems of protecting the security of the country and the national defense from unauthorized disclosure of potentially damaging information. Cf. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 585—586, 72 S.Ct. 863, 865—866, 96 L.Ed. 1153 (1953); see also id., at 593—628, 72 S.Ct., at 888—928 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). It has not, however, authorized the injunctive remedy against threatened publication. It has apparently been satisfied to rely on criminal sanctions and their deterrent effect on the responsible as well as the irresponsible press. I am not, of course, saying that either of these newspapers has yet committed a crime or that either would commit a crime if it published all the material now in its possession. That matter must await resolution in the context of a criminal proceeding if one is instituted by the United States. In that event, the issue of guilt or innocence would be determined by procedures and standards quite different from those that have purported to govern these injunctive proceedings.

           Mr. Justice MARSHALL, concurring.

          The Government contends that the only issue in these cases is whether in a suit by the United States, 'the First Amendment bars a court from prohibiting a news-

Page 741

paper from publishing material whose disclosure would pose a 'grave and immediate danger to the security of the United States." Brief for the United States 7. With all due respect, I believe the ultimate issue in this case is even more basic than the one posed by the Solicitor General. The issue is whether this Court or the Congress has the power to make law.

          In these cases there is no problem concerning the President's power to classify information as 'secret' or 'top secret.' Congress has specifically recognized Presidential authority, which has been formally exercised in Exec. Order 10501 (1953), to classify documents and information. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 798; 50 U.S.C. § 783.1 Nor is there any issue here regarding the President's power as Chief Executive and Commander in Chief to protect national security by disciplining employees who disclose information and by taking precautions to prevent leaks.

          The problem here is whether in these particular cases the Executive Branch has authority to invoke the equity jurisdiction of the courts to protect what it believes to be the national interest. See In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564, 584, 15 S.Ct. 900, 906, 39 L.Ed. 1092 (1895). The Government argues that in addition to the inherent power of any government to protect itself, the President's power to conduct foreign affairs and his position as Commander in Chief give him authority to impose censorship on the press to protect his ability to deal effectively with foreign nations and to conduct the military affairs of the country. Of course, it is beyond cavil that the President has broad powers by virtue of his primary responsibility for the conduct of our foreign affairs and his position as Commander in Chief. Chicago & Southern Air Lines v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 68 S.Ct. 431, 92 L.Ed. 568 (1948); Kiyoshi Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 93, 63 S.Ct. 1375, 1382, 87 L.Ed. 1774 (1943); United States v. Curtiss-

Page 742

Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 57 S.Ct. 216, 81 L.Ed. 255 (1936).2 And in some situations it may be that under whatever inherent powers the Government may have, as well as the implicit authority derived from the President's mandate to conduct foreign affairs and to act as Commander in Chief, there is a basis for the invocation of the equity jurisdiction of this Court as an aid to prevent the publication of material damaging to 'national security,' however that term may be defined.

          It would, however, be utterly inconsistent with the concept of separation of powers for this Court to use its power of contempt to prevent behavior that Congress has specifically declined to prohibit. There would be a similar damage to the basic concept of these co-equal branches of Government if when the Executive Branch has adequate authority granted by Congress to protect 'national security' it can choose instead to invoke the contempt power of a court to enjoin the threatened conduct. The Constitution provides that Congress shall make laws, the President execute laws, and courts interpret laws. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 72 S.Ct. 863, 96 L.Ed. 1153 (1952). It did not provide for government by injunction in which the courts and the Executive Branch can 'make law' without regard to the action of Congress. It may be more convenient for the Executive Branch if it need only convince a judge to prohibit conduct rather than ask the Congress to pass a law, and it may be more convenient to enforce a contempt order than to seek a criminal conviction in a jury trial. Moreover, it may be considered politically wise to get a court to share the responsibility for arresting those who the Executive Branch has probable cause to believe are violating the law. But convenience and political considerations of the

Page 743

moment do not justify a basic departure from the principles of our system of government.

          In these cases we are not faced with a situation where Congress has failed to provide the Executive with broad power to protect the Nation from disclosure of damaging state secrets. Congress has on several occasions given extensive consideration to the problem of protecting the military and strategic secrets of the United States. This consideration has resulted in the enactment of statutes making it a crime to receive, disclose, communicate, withhold, and publish certain documents, photographs, instruments, appliances, and information. The bulk of these statutes is found in chapter 37 of U.S.C., Title 18, entitled Espionage and Censorship.3 In that chapter,

Page 744

Congress has provided penalties ranging from a $10,000 fine to death for violating the various statutes.

          Thus it would seem that in order for this Court to issue an injunction it would require a showing that such an injunction would enhance the already existing power of the Government to act. See People ex rel. Bennett v. Laman, 277 N.Y. 368, 14 N.E.2d 439 (1938). It is a traditional axiom of equity that a court of equity will not do a useless thing just as it is a traditional axiom that equity will not enjoin the commission of a crime. See Z. Chafee & E. Re, Equity 935—954 (5th ed. 1967); 1 H. Joyce, Injunctions §§ 58—60a (1909). Here there has been no attempt to make such a showing. The Solicitor General does not even mention in his brief whether the Government considers that there is probable cause to believe a crime has been committed or whether there is a conspiracy to commit future crimes.

          If the Government had attempted to show that there was no effective remedy under traditional criminal law, it would have had to show that there is no arguably applicable statute. Of course, at this stage this Court could not and cannot determine whether there has been a violation of a particular statute or decide the constitutionality of any statute. Whether a good-faith prosecution could have been instituted under any statute could, however, be determined.

Page 745

          At least one of the many statutes in this area seems relevant to these cases. Congress has provided in 18 U.S.C. § 793(e) that whoever 'having unauthorized possession of, access to, or control over any document, writing, code book, signal book * * * or note relating to the national defense, or information relating to the national defense which information the possessor has reason to believe could be used to the injury of the United States or to the advantage of any foreign nation, willfully communicates, delivers, transmits * * * the same to any person not entitled to receive it, or willfully retains the same and fails to deliver it to the officer or employee of the United States entitled to receive it * * * (s)hall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both.' Congress has also made it a crime to conspire to commit any of the offenses listed in 18 U.S.C. § 793(e).

          It is true that Judge Gurfein found that Congress had not made it a crime to publish the items and material specified in § 793(e). He found that the words 'communicates, delivers, transmits * * *' did not refer to publication of newspaper stories. And that view has some support in the legislative history and conforms with the past practice of using the statute only to prosecute those charged with ordinary espionage. But see 103 Cong.Rec. 10449 (remarks of Sen. Humphrey). Judge Gurfein's view of the Statute is not, however, the only plausible construction that could be given. See my Brother WHITE's concurring opinion.

          Even if it is determined that the Government could not in good faith bring criminal prosecutions against the New York Times and the Washington Post, it is clear that Congress has specifically rejected passing legislation that would have clearly given the President the power he seeks here and made the current activity of the newspapers unlawful. When Congress specifically declines to make conduct unlawful it is not for this Court

Page 746

to redecide those issues—to overrule Congress. See Youngtown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 72 S.Ct. 863, 96 L.Ed. 1153 (1952).

          On at least two occasions Congress has refused to enact legislation that would have made the conduct engaged in here unlawful and given the President the power that he seeks in this case. In 1917 during the debate over the original Espionage Act, still the basic provisions of § 793, Congress rejected a proposal to give the President in time of war or threat of war authority to directly prohibit by proclamation the publication of information relating to national defense that might be useful to the enemy. The proposal provided that:

          'During any national emergency resulting from a war to which the United States is a party, or from threat of such a war, the President may, by proclamation, declare the existence of such emergency and, by proclamation, prohibit the publishing or communicating of, or the attempting to publish or communicate any information relating to the national defense which, in his judgment, is of such character that it is or might be useful to the enemy. Whoever violates any such prohibition shall be punished by a fine of not more than $10,000 or by imprisonment for not more than 10 years, or both: Provided, that nothing in this section shall be construed to limit or restrict any discussion, comment, or criticism of the acts or policies of the Government or its representatives or the publication of the same.' 55 Cong.Rec. 1763.

          Congress rejected this proposal after war against Germany had been declared even though many believed that there was a grave national emergency and that the threat of security leaks and espionage was serious. The Executive Branch has not gone to Congress and requested that the decision to provide such power be reconsidered. In-

Page 747

stead, the Executive Branch comes to this Court and asks that it be granted the power Congress refused to give.

          In 1957 the United States Commission on Government Security found that '(a) irplane journals, scientific periodicals, and even the daily newspaper have featured articles containing information and other data which should have been deleted in whole or in part for security reasons.' In response to this problem the Commission proposed that 'Congress enact legislation making it a crime for any person willfully to disclose without proper authorization, for any purpose whatever, information classified 'secret' or 'top secret,' knowing, or having reasonable grounds to believe, such information to have been so classified.' Report of Commission on Government Security 619—620 (1957). After substantial floor discussion on the proposal, it was rejected. See 103 Cong.Rec. 10447—10450. If the proposal that Sen. Cotton championed on the floor had been enacted, the publication of the documents involved here would certainly have been a crime. Congress refused, however, to make it a crime. The Government is here asking this Court to remake that decision. This Court has no such power.

          Either the Government has the power under statutory grant to use traditional criminal law to protect the country or, if there is no basis for arguing that Congress has made the activity a crime, it is plain that Congress has specifically refused to grant the authority the Government seeks from this Court. In either case this Court does not have authority to grant the requested relief. It is not for this Court to fling itself into every breach perceived by some Government official nor is it for this Court to take on itself the burden of enacting law, especially a law that Congress has refused to pass.

          I believe that the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit should

Page 748

be affirmed and the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit should be reversed insofar as it remands the case for further hearings.

           Mr. Chief Justice BURGER, dissenting.

          So clear are the constitutional limitations on prior restraint against expression, that from the time of Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 51 S.Ct. 625, 75 L.Ed. 1357 (1931), until recently in Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 91 S.Ct. 1575, 29 L.Ed.2d 1 (1971), we have had little occasion to be concerned with cases involving prior restraints against news reporting on matters of public interest. There is, therefore, little variation among the members of the Court in terms of resistance to prior restraints against publication. Adherence to this basic constitutional principle, however, does not make these cases simple ones. In these cases, the imperative of a free and unfettered press comes into collision with another imperative, the effective functioning of a complex modern government and specifically the effective exercise of certain constitutional powers of the Executive. Only those who view the First Amendment as an absolute in all circumstances—a view I respect, but reject—can find such cases as these to be simple or easy.

          These cases are not simple for another and more immediate reason. We do not know the facts of the cases. No District Judge knew all the facts. No Court of Appeals Judge knew all the facts. No member of this Court knows all the facts.

          Why are we in this posture, in which only those judges to whom the First Amendment is absolute and permits of no restraint in any circumstances or for any reason, are really in a position to act?

          I suggest we are in this posture because these cases have been conducted in unseemly haste. Mr. Justice HARLAN covers the chronology of events demonstrating the hectic pressures under which these cases have been processed and I need not restate them. The prompt

Page 749

settling of these cases reflects our universal abhorrence of prior restraint. But prompt judicial action does not mean unjudicial haste.

          Here, moreover, the frenetic haste is due in large part to the manner in which the Times proceeded from the date it obtained the purloined documents. It seems reasonably clear now that the haste precluded reasonable and deliberate judicial treatment of these cases and was not warranted. The precipitate action of this Court aborting trials not yet completed is not the kind of judicial conduct that ought to attend the disposition of a great issue.

          The newspapers make a derivative claim under the First Amendment; they denominate this right as the public 'right to know'; by implication, the Times asserts a sole trusteenship of that right by virtue of its journalistic 'scoop.' The right is asserted as an absolute. Of course, the First Amendment right itself is not an absolute, as Justice Holmes so long ago pointed out in his aphorism concerning the right to shout 'fire' in a crowded theater if there was no fire. There are other exceptions, some of which Chief Justice Hughes mentioned by way of example in Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson. There are no doubt other exceptions no one has had occasion to describe or discuss. Conceivably such exceptions may be lurking in these cases and would have been flushed had they been properly considered in the trial courts, free from unwarranted deadlines and frenetic pressures. An issue of this importance should be tried and heard in a judicial atmosphere conducive to thoughtful, reflective deliberation, especially when haste, in terms of hours, is unwarranted in light of the long period the Times, by its own choice, deferred publication.1

Page 750

          It is not disputed that the Times has had unauthorized possession of the documents for three to four months, during which it has had its expert analysts studying them, presumably digesting them and preparing the material for publication. During all of this time, the Times, presumably in its capacity as trustee of the public's 'right to know,' has held up publication for purposes it considered proper and thus public knowledge was delayed. No doubt this was for a good reason; the analysis of 7,000 pages of complex material drawn from a vastly greater volume of material would inevitably take time and the writing of good news stories takes time. But why should the United States Government, from whom this information was illegally acquired by someone, along with all the counsel, trial judges, and appellate judges be placed under needless pressure? After these months of deferral, the alleged 'right to know' has somehow and suddenly become a right that must be vindicated instanter.

          Would it have been unreasonable, since the newspaper could anticipate the Government's objections to release of secret material, to give the Government an opportunity to review the entire collection and determine whether agreement could be reached on publication? Stolen or not, if security was not in fact jeopardized, much of the material could not doubt have been declassified, since it spans a period ending in 1968. With such an approach—one that great newspapers have in the past practiced and stated editorially to be the duty of an honorable press—the newspapers and Government might well have nar-

Page 751

rowed the area of disagreement as to what was and was not publishable, leaving the remainder to be resolved in orderly litigation, if necessary. To me it is hardly believable that a newspaper long regarded as a great institution in American life would fail to perform one of the basic and simple duties of every citizen with respect to the discovery or possession of stolen property or secret government documents. That duty, I had thought perhaps naively—was to report forthwith, to responsible public officers. This duty rests on taxi drivers, Justices, and the New York Times. The course followed by the Times, whether so calculated or not, removed any possibility of orderly litigation of the issues. If the action of the judges up to now has been correct, that result is sheer happenstance.2

          Our grant of the writ of certiorari before final judgment in the Times case aborted the trial in the District Court before it had made a complete record pursuant to the mandate of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.

          The consequence of all this melancholy series of events is that we literally do not know what we are acting on. As I see it, we have been forced to deal with litigation concerning rights of great magnitude without an adequate record, and surely without time for adequate treatment either in the prior proceedings or in this Court. It is interesting to note that counsel, on both sides, in oral argument before this Court, were frequently unable to respond to questions on factual points. Not surprisingly they pointed out that they had been working literally 'around the clock' and simply were unable to review the documents that give rise to these cases and

Page 752

were not familiar with them. This Court is in no better posture. I agree generally with Mr. Justice HARLAN and Mr. Justice BLACKMUN but I am not prepared to reach the merits.3

          I would affirm the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit and allow the District Court to complete the trial aborted by our grant of certiorari, meanwhile preserving the status quo in the post case. I would direct that the District Court on remand give priority to the Times case to the exclusion of all other business of that court but I would not set arbitrary deadlines.

          I should add that I am in general agreement with much of what Mr. Justice WHITE has expressed with respect to penal sanctions concerning communication or retention of documents or information relating to the national defense.

          We all crave speedier judicial processes but when judges are pressured as in these cases the result is a parody of the judicial function.

           Mr. Justice HARLAN, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE and Mr. Justice BLACKMUN join, dissenting.

          These cases forcefully call to mind the wise admonition of Mr. Justice Holmes, dissenting in Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 400—401, 24 S.Ct. 436, 468, 48 L.Ed. 679 (1904):

          'Great cases, like hard cases, make bad law. For great cases are called great, not by reason of their

Page 753

          real importance in shaping the law of the futture, but because of some accident of immediate overwhelming interest which appeals to the feelings and distorts the judgment. These immediate interests exercise a kind of hydraulic pressure which makes what previously was clear seem doubtful, and before which even well settled principles of law will bend.'

          With all respect, I consider that the Court has been almost irresponsibly feverish in dealing with these cases.

          Both the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit and the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit rendered judgment on June 23. The New York Times' petition for certiorari, its motion for accelerated consideration thereof, and its application for interim relief were filed in this Court on June 24 at about 11 a.m. The application of the United States for interim relief in the Post case was also filed here on June 24 at about 7:15 p.m. This Court's order setting a hearing before us on June 26 at 11 a.m., a course which I joined only to avoid the possibility of even more peremptory action by the Court, was issued less than 24 hours before. The record in the Post case was filed with the Clerk shortly before 1 p.m. on June 25; the record in the Times case did not arrive until 7 or 8 o'clock that same night. The briefs of the parties were received less than two hours before argument on June 26.

          This frenzied train of events took place in the name of the presumption against prior restraints created by the First Amendment. Due regard for the extraordinarily important and difficult questions involved in these litigations should have led the Court to shun such a precipitate timetable. In order to decide the merits of these cases properly, some or all of the following questions should have been faced:

          1. Whether the Attorney General is authorized to bring these suits in the name of the United States. Com-

Page 754

pare In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564, 15 S.Ct. 900, 39 L.Ed. 1092 (1895), with Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 72 S.Ct. 863, 96 L.Ed. 1153 (1952). This question involves as well the construction and validity of a singularly opaque statute—the Espionage Act, 18 U.S.C. § 793(e).

          2. Whether the First Amendment permits the federal courts to enjoin publication of stories which would present a serious threat to national security. See Near v. Minnesota, ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 716, 51 S.Ct. 625, 631, 75 L.Ed. 1357 (1931) (dictum).

          3. Whether the threat to publish highly secret documents is of itself a sufficient implication of national security to justify an injunction on the theory that regardless of the contents of the documents harm enough results simply from the demonstration of such a breach of secrecy.

          4. Whether the unauthorized disclosure of any of these particular documents would seriously impair the national security.

          5. What weight should be given to the opinion of high officers in the Executive Branch of the Government with respect to questions 3 and 4.

          6. Whether the newspapers are entitled to retain and use the documents notwithstanding the seemingly uncontested facts that the documents, or the originals of which they are duplicates, were purloined from the Government's possession and that the newspapers received them with knowledge that they had been feloniously acquired. Cf. Liberty Lobby, Inc. v. Pearson, 129 U.S.App.D.C. 74, 390 F.2d 489 (1967, amended 1968).

          7. Whether the threatened harm to the national security or the Government's possessory interest in the documents justifies the issuance of an injunction against publication in light of—

          a. The strong First Amendment policy against prior restraints on publication;

Page 755

          b. The doctrine against enjoining conduct in violation of criminal statutes; and

          c. The extent to which the materials at issue have apparently already been otherwise disseminated.

          These are difficult questions of fact, of law, and of judgment; the potential consequences of erroneous decision are enormous. The time which has been available to us, to the lower courts,* and to the parties has been wholly inadequate for giving these cases the kind of consideration they deserve. It is a reflection on the stability of the judicial process that these great issues—as important as any that have arisen during my time on the Court—should have been decided under the pressures engendered by th torrent of publicity that has attended these litigations from their inception.

          Forced as I am to reach the merits of these cases, I dissent from the opinion and judgments of the Court. Within the severe limitations imposed by the time constraints under which I have been required to operate, I can only state my reasons in telescoped form, even though in different circumstances I would have felt constrained to deal with the cases in the fuller sweep indicated above.

          It is a sufficient basis for affirming the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in the Times litigation to observe that its order must rest on the conclusion that because of the time elements the Government had not been given an adequate opportunity to present its case

Page 756

to the District Court. At the least this conclusion was not an abuse of discretion.

          In the Post litigation the Government had more time to prepare; this was apparently the basis for the refusal of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit on rehearing to conform its judgment to that of the Second Circuit. But I think there is another and more fundamental reason why this judgment cannot stand—a reason which also furnishes an additional ground for not reinstating the judgment of the District Court in the Times litigation, set aside by the Court of Appeals. It is plain to me that the scope of the judicial function in passing upon the activities of the Executive Branch of the Government in the field of foreign affairs is very narrowly restricted. This view is, I think, dictated by the concept of separation of powers upon which our constitutional system rests.

          In a speech on the floor of the House of Representatives, Chief Justice John Marshall, then a member of that body, stated:

          'The President is the sole organ of the nation in its external relations, and its sole representative with foreign nations.' 10 Annals of Cong. 613.

          From that time, shortly after the founding of the Nation, to this, there has been no substantial challenge to this description of the scope of executive power. See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319—321, 57 S.Ct. 216, 220—221, 81 L.Ed. 255 (1936), collecting authorities.

          From this constitutional primacy in the field of foreign affairs, it seems to me that certain conclusions necessarily follow. Some of these were stated concisely by President Washington, declining the request of the House of Representatives for the papers leading up to the negotiation of the Jay Treaty:

          'The nature of foreign negotiations requires caution, and their success must often depend on secrecy;

Page 757

          and even when brought to a conclusion a full disclosure of all the measures, demands, or eventual concessions which may have been proposed or contemplated would be extremely impolitic; for this might have a pernicious influence on future negotiations, or produce immediate inconveniences, perhaps danger and mischief, in relation to other powers.' 1 J. Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents 194—195 (1896).

          The power to evaluate the 'pernicious influence' of premature disclosure is not, however, lodged in the Executive alone. I agree that, in performance of its duty to protect the values of the First Amendment against political pressures, the judiciary must review the initial Executive determination to the point of satisfying itself that the subject matter of the dispute does lie within the proper compass of the President's foreign relations power. Constitutional considerations forbid 'a complete abandonment of judicial control.' Cf. United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 8, 73 S.Ct. 528, 532, 97 L.Ed. 727 (1953). Moreover the judiciary may properly insist that the determination that disclosure of the subject matter would irreparably impair the national security be made by the head of the Executive Department concerned—here the Secretary of State or the Secretary of Defense after actual personal consideration by that officer. This safeguard is required in the analogous area of executive claims of privilege for secrets of state. See id., at 8 and n. 20, 73 S.Ct., at 532; Duncan v. Cammell, Laird & Co., (1942) A.C. 624, 638 (House of Lords).

          But in my judgment the judiciary may not properly go beyond these two inquiries and redetermine for itself the probable impact of disclosure on the national security.

          '(T)he very nature of executive decisions as to foreign policy is political, not judicial. Such de-

Page 758

          cisions are wholly confided by our Constitution to the political departments of the government, Executive and Legislative. They are delicate, complex, and involve large elements of prophecy. They are and should be undertaken only by those directly responsible to the people whose welfare they advance or imperil. They are decisions of a kind for which the Judiciary has neither aptitude, facilities nor responsibility and have long been held to belong in the domain of political power not subject to judicial intrusion or inquiry.' Chicago & Southern Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman Steamship Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111, 68 S.Ct. 431, 436, 92 L.Ed. 568 (1948) (Jackson J.).

          Even if there is some room for the judiciary to override the executive determination, it is plain that the scope of review must be exceedingly narrow. I can see no indication in the opinions of either the District Court or the Court of Appeals in the Post litigation that the conclusions of the Executive were given even the deference owing to an administrative agency, much less that owing to a co-equal branch of the Government operating within the field of its constitutional prerogative.

          Accordingly, I would vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit on this ground and remand the case for further proceedings in the District Court. Before the commencement of such further proceedings, due opportunity should be afforded the Government for procuring from the Secretary of State or the Secretary of Defense or both an expression of their views on the issue of national security. The ensuing review by the District Court should be in accordance with the views expressed in this opinion. And for the reasons stated above I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.

          Pending further hearings in each case conducted under the appropriate ground rules, I would continue the

Page 759

restraints on publication. I cannot believe that the doctrine prohibiting prior restraints reaches to the point of preventing courts from maintaining the status quo long enough to act responsibly in matters of such national importance as those involved here.

           Mr. Justice BLACKMUN, dissenting.

          I join Mr. Justice HARLAN in his dissent. I also am in substantial accord with much that Mr. Justice WHITE says, by way of admonition, in the latter part of his opinion.

          At this point the focus is on only the comparatively few documents specified by the Government as critical. So far as the other material—vast in amount—is concerned, let it be published and published forthwith if the newspapers, once the strain is gone and the sensationalism is eased, still feel the urge so to do.

          But we are concerned here with the few documents specified from the 47 volumes. Almost 70 years ago Mr. Justice Holmes, dissenting in a celebrated case, observed:

          'Great cases, like hard cases, make bad law. For great cases are called great, not by reason of their real importance in shaping the law of the future, but because of some accident of immediate overwhelming interest which appeals to the feelings and distorts the judgment. These immediate interests exercise a kind of hydraulic pressure * * *.' Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 400—401, 24 S.Ct. 436, 468, 48 L.Ed. 679 (1904).

          The present cases, if not great, are at least unusual in their posture and implications, and the Holmes observation certainly has pertinent application.

          The New York Times clandestinely devoted a period of three months to examining the 47 volumes that came into its unauthorized possession. Once it had begun publi-

Page 760

cation of material from those volumes, the New York case now before us emerged. It immediately assumed, and ever since has maintained, a frenetic pace and character. Seemingly once publication started, the material could not be made public fast enough. Seemingly, from then on, every deferral or delay, by restraint or otherwise, was abhorrent and was to be deemed violative of the First Amendment and of the public's 'right immediately to know.' Yet that newspaper stood before us at oral argument and professed criticism of the Government for not lodging its protest earlier than by a Monday telegram following the initial Sunday publication.

          The District of Columbia case is much the same.

          Two federal district courts, two United States courts of appeals, and this Court—within a period of less than three weeks from inception until today—have been pressed into hurried decision of profound constitutional issues on inadequately developed and largely assumed facts without the careful deliberation that, one would hope, should characterize the American judicial process. There has been much writing about the law and little knowledge and less digestion of the facts. In the New York case the judges, both trial and appellate, had not yet examined the basic material when the case was brought here. In the District of Columbia case, little more was done, and what was accomplished in this respect was only on required remand, with the Washington Post, on the axcuse that it was trying to protect its source of information, initially refusing to reveal what material it actually possessed, and with the District Court forced to make assumptions as to that possession.

          With such respect as may be due to the contrary view, this, in my opinion, is not the way to try a lawsuit of this magnitude and asserted importance. It is not the way for federal courts to adjudicate, and to be required to adjudicate, issues that allegedly concern the Nation's

Page 761

vital welfare. The country would be none the worse off were the cases tried quickly, to be sure, but in the customary and properly deliberative manner. The most recent of the material, it is said, dates no later than 1968, already about three years ago, and the Times itself took three months to formulate its plan of procedure and, thus, deprived its public for that period.

          The First Amendment, after all, is only one part of an entire Constitution. Article II of the great document vests in the Executive Branch primary power over the conduct of foreign affairs and places in that branch the responsibility for the Nation's safety. Each provision of the Constitution is important, and I cannot subscribe to a doctrine of unlimited absolutism for the First Amendment at the cost of downgrading other provisions. First Amendment absolutism has never commanded a majority of this Court. See, for example, Near v. Minnesota, ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 708, 51 S.Ct. 625, 628, 75 L.Ed. 1357 (1931), and Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52, 39 S.Ct. 247, 249, 63 L.Ed. 470 (1919). What is needed here is a weighing, upon properly developed standards, of the broad right of the press to print and of the very narrow right of the Government to prevent. Such standards are not yet developed. The parties here are in disagreement as to what those standards should be. But even the newspapers concede that there are situations where restraint is in order and is constitutional. Mr. Justice Holmes gave us a suggestion when he said in Schenck,

          'It is a question of proximity and degree. When a nation is at war many things that might be said in time of peace are such a hindrance to its effort that their utterance will not be endured so long as men fight and that no Court could regard them as protected by any constitutional right.' 249 U.S., at 52, 39 S.Ct., at 249.

          I therefore would remand these cases to be developed expeditiously, of course, but on a schedule permitting the

Page 762

orderly presentation of evidence from both sides, with the use of discovery, if necessary, as authorized by the rules, and with the preparation of briefs, oral argument, and court opinions of a quality better than has been seen to this point. In making this last statement, I criticize no lawyer or judge. I know from past personal experience the agony of time pressure in the preparation of litigation. But these cases and the issues involved and the courts, including this one, deserve better than has been produced thus far.

          It may well be that if these cases were allowed to develop as they should be developed, and to be tried as lawyers should try them and as courts should hear them, free of pressure and panic and sensationalism, other light would be shed on the situation and contrary considerations, for me, might prevail. But that is not the present posture of the litigation.

          The Court, however, decides the cases today the other way. I therefore add one final comment.

          I strongly urge, and sincerely hope, that these two newspapers will be fully aware of their ultimate responsibilities to the United States of America. Judge Wilkey, dissenting in the District of Columbia case, after a review of only the affidavits before his court (the basic papers had not then been made available by either party), concluded that there were a number of examples of documents that, if in the possession of the Post, and if published, 'could clearly result in great harm to the nation,' and he defined 'harm' to mean 'the death of soldiers, the destruction of alliances, the greatly increased difficulty of negotiation with our enemies, the inability of our diplomats to negotiate * * *.' I, for one, have now been able to give at least some cursory study not only to the affidavits, but to the material itself. I regreat to say that from this examination I fear that Judge Wilkey's statements have possible foundation. I therefore share

Page 763

his concern. I hope that damage has not already been done. If, however, damage has been done, and if, with the Court's action today, these newspapers proceed to publish the critical documents and there results therefrom 'the death of soldiers, the destruction of alliances, the greatly increased difficulty of negotiation with our enemies, the inability of our diplomats to negotiate,' to which list I might add the factors of prolongation of the war and of further delay in the freeing of United States prisoners, then the Nation's people will know where the responsibility for these sad consequences rests.

1. In introducing the Bill of Rights in the House of Representatives, Madison said: '(B)ut I believe that the great mass of the people who opposed (the Constitution), disliked it because it did not contain effectual provisions against the encroachments on particular rights * * *.' 1 Annals of Cong. 433. Congressman Goodhue added: '(I)t is the wish of many of our constituents, that something should be added to the Constitution, to secure in a stronger manner their liberties from the inroads of power.' Id., at 426.

2. The other parts were:

'The civil rights of none shall be abridged on account of religious belief or worship, nor shall any national religion be established, nor shall the full and equal rights of conscience be in any manner, or on any pretext, infringed.'

'The people shall not be restrained from peaceably assembling and consulting for their common good; nor from applying to the Legislature by petitions, or remonstrances, for redress of their grievances.' 1 Annals of Cong. 434.

3. Tr. of Oral Arg. 76.

4. Brief for the United States 13—14.

5. Compare the views of the Solicitor General with those of James Madison, the author of the First Amendment. When speaking of the Bill of Rights in the House of Representatives, Madison said: 'If they (the first ten amendments) are incorporated into the Constitution, independent tribunals of justice will consider themselves in a peculiar manner the guardians of those rights; they will be an impenetrable bulwark against every assumption of power in the Legislative or Executive; they will be naturally led to resist every encroachment upon rights expressly stipulated for in the Constitution by the declaration of rights.' 1 Annals of Cong. 439.

6. De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 365, 57 S.Ct. 255, 260, 81 L.Ed. 278.

1. See Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 267, 72 S.Ct. 725, 736, 96 L.Ed. 919 (dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Black), 284, 72 S.Ct. 744 (my dissenting opinion); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 508, 77 S.Ct. 1304, 1321, 1 L.Ed.2d 1498 (my dissenting opinion which Mr. Justice Black joined); Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 339, 77 S.Ct. 1064, 1087, 1 L.Ed.2d 1356 (separate opinion of Mr. Justice Black which I joined); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 293, 84 S.Ct. 710, 733, 11 L.Ed.2d 686 (concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Black which I joined); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 80, 85 S.Ct. 209, 218, 13 L.Ed.2d 125 (my concurring opinion which Mr. Justice Black joined).

2. These documents contain data concerning the communications system of the United States, the publication of which is made a crime. But the criminal sanction is not urged by the United States as the basis of equity power.

3. There are numerous sets of this material in existence and they apparently are not under any controlled custody. Moreover, the President has sent a set to the Congress. We start then with a case where there already is rather wide distribution of the material that is destined for publicity, not secrecy. I have gone over the material listed in the in camera brief of the United States. It is all history, not future events. None of it is more recent than 1968.

* Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 85 S.Ct. 734, 13 L.Ed.2d 649 (1965), and similar cases regarding temporary restraints of allegedly obscene materials are not in point. For those cases rest upon the proposition that 'obscenity is not protected by the freedoms of speech and press.' Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 481, 77 S.Ct. 1304, 1307, 1 L.Ed.2d 1498 (1957). Here there is no question but that the material sought to be suppressed is within the protection of the First Amendment; the only question is whether, notwithstanding that fact, its publication may be enjoined for a time because of the presence of an overwhelming national interest. Similarly, copyright cases have no pertinence here: the Government is not asserting an interest in the particular form of words chosen in the documents, but is seeking to suppress the ideas expressed therein. And the copyright laws, of course, protect only the form of expression and not the ideas expressed.

1. The President's power to make treaties and to appoint ambassadors is, of course, limited by the requirement of Art. II, § 2, of the Constitution that he obtain the advice and consent of the Senate. Article I, § 8, empowers Congress to 'raise and support Armies,' and 'provide and maintain a Navy.' And, of course, Congress alone can declare war. This power was last exercised almost 30 years ago at the inception of World War II. Since the end of that war in 1945, the Armed Forces of the United States have suffered approximately half a million casualties in various parts of the world.

2. See Chicago & Southern Air Lines Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 68 S.Ct. 431, 92 L.Ed. 568; Kiyoshi Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 63 S.Ct. 1375, 87 L.Ed. 1774; United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 57 S.Ct. 216, 81 L.Ed. 255; cf. Mora v. McNamara, 389 U.S. 934, 88 S.Ct. 282, 19 L.Ed.2d 287 (Stewart, J., dissenting).

3. 'It is quite apparent that if, in the maintenance of our international relations, embarrassment—perhaps serious embarrassment—is to be avoided and success for our aims achieved, congressional legislation which is to be made effective through negotiation and inquiry within the international field must often accord to the President a degree of discretion and freedom from statutory restriction which would not be admissible were domestic affairs alone involved. Moreover, he, not Congress, has the better opportunity of knowing the conditions which prevail in foreign countries, and especially is this true in time of war. He has his confidential sources of information. He has his agents in the form of diplomatic, consular and other officials. Secrecy in respect of information gathered by them may be highly necessary, and the premature disclosure of it productive of harmful results. Indeed, so clearly is this true that the first President refused to accede to a request to lay before the House of Representatives the instructions, correspondence and documents relating to the negotiation of the Jay Treaty—a refusal the wisdom of which was recognized by the House itself and has never since been doubted. * * *' United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320, 57 S.Ct. 216, 221, 81 L.Ed. 255.

1. The Congress has authorized a strain of prior restraints against private parties in certain instances. The National Labor Relations Board routinely issues cease-and-desist orders against employers who it finds have threatened or coerced employees in the exercise of protected rights. See 29 U.S.C. § 160(c). Similarly, the Federal Trade Commission is empowered to impose cease-and-desist orders against unfair methods of competition. 15 U.S.C. § 45(b). Such orders can, and quite often do, restrict what may be spoken or written under certain circumstances. See, e.g., NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 616—620, 89 S.Ct. 1918, 1941—1943, 23 L.Ed.2d 547 (1969). Article I, § 8, of the Constitution authorizes Congress to secure the 'exclusive right' of authors to their writings, and no one denies that a newspaper can properly be enjoined from publishing the copyrighted works of another. See L. A. Westermann Co. v. Dispatch Printing Co., 249 U.S. 100, 39 S.Ct. 194, 63 L.Ed. 499 (1919). Newspapers do themselves rely from time to time on the copyright as a means of protecting their accounts of important events. However, those enjoined under the statutes relating to the National Labor Relations Board and the Federal Trade Commission are private parties, not the press; and when the press is enjoined under the copyright laws the complainant is a private copyright holder enforcing a private right. These situations are quite distinct from the Government's request for an injunction against publishing information about the affairs of government, a request admittedly not based on any statute.

2. The 'grave and irreparable danger' standard is that asserted by the Government in this Court. In remanding to Judge Gurfein for further hearings in the Times litigation, five members of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit directed him to determine whether disclosure of certain items specified with particularity by the Government would 'pose such grave and immediate danger to the security of the United States as to warrant their publication being enjoined.'

3. 'Whoever, in time of war, in violation of reasonable regulations to be prescribed by the President, which he is hereby authorized to make and promulgate, shall publish any information with respect to the movement, numbers, description, condition, or disposition of any of the armed forces, ships, aircraft, or war materials of the United States, or with respect to the plans or conduct of any naval or military operations, or with respect to any works or measures undertaken for or connected with, or intended for the fortification or defense of any place, or any other information relating to the public defense calculated to be useful to the enemy, shall be punished by a fine * * * or by imprisonment * * *.' 55 Cong.Rec. 2100.

4. Senator Ashurst also urged that "freedom of the press' means freedom from the restraints of a censor, means the absolute liberty and right to publish whatever you wish; but you take your chances of punishment in the courts of your country for the violation of the laws of libel, slander, and treason.' 55 Cong.Rec. 2005.

5. Title 18 U.S.C. § 797 provides:

'On and after thirty days from the date upon which the President defines any vital military or naval installation or equipment as being within the category contemplated under section 795 of this title, whoever reproduces, publishes, sells, or gives away any photograph, sketch, picture, drawing, map, or graphical representation of the vital military or naval installations or equipment so defined, without first obtaining permission of the commanding officer of the military or naval post, camp, or station concerned, or higher authority, unless such photograph, sketch, picture, drawing, map, or graphical representation has clearly indicated thereon that it has been censored by the proper military or naval authority, shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than one year, or both.'

6. In relevant part 18 U.S.C. § 798 provides:

'(a) Whoever knowingly and willfully communicates, furnishes, transmits, or otherwise makes available to an unauthorized person, or publishes, or uses in any manner prejudicial to the safety or interest of the United States or for the benefit of any foreign government to the detriment of the United States any classified information—

'(1) concerning the nature, preparation, or use of any code, cipher, or cryptographic system of the United States or any foreign government; or

'(2) concerning the design, construction, use, maintenance, or repair of any device, apparatus, or appliance used or prepared or planned for use by the United States or any foreign government for cryptographic or communication intelligence purposes; or

'(3) concerning the communication intelligence activities of the United States or any foreign government; or

'(4) obtained by the process of communication intelligence from the communications of any foreign government, knowing the same to have been obtained by such processes—

'Shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both.'

7. The purport of 18 U.S.C. § 798 is clear. Both the House and Senate Reports on the bill, in identical terms, speak of furthering the security of the United States by preventing disclosure of information concerning the cryptographic systems and the communication intelligence systems of the United States, and explaining that '(t)his bill make it a crime to reveal the methods, techniques, and mate riel used in the transmission by this Nation of enciphered or coded messages. * * * Further, it makes it a crime to reveal methods used by this Nation in breaking the secret codes of a foreign nation. It also prohibits under certain penalties the divulging of any information which may have come into this Government's hands as a result of such a code-breaking.' H.R.Rep.No.1895, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., 1 (1950). The narrow reach of the statute was explained as covering 'only a small category of classified matter, a category which is both vital and vulnerable to an almost unique degree.' Id., at 2. Existing legislation was deemed inadequate.

'At present two other acts protect this information, but only in a limited way. These are the Espionage Act of 1917 (40 Stat. 217) and the act of June 10, 1933 (48 Stat. 122). Under the first, unauthorized revelation of information of this kind can be penalized only if it can be proved that the person making the revelation did so with an intent to injure the United States. Under the second, only diplomatic codes and messages transmitted in diplomatic codes are protected. The present bill is designed to protect against knowing and willful publication or any other revelation of all important information affecting the United States communication intelligence operations and all direct information about all United States codes and ciphers.' Ibid. Section 798 obviously was intended to cover publications by non-employees of the Government and to ease the Government's burden in obtaining convictions. See H.R.Rep.No.1895, supra, at 2 5. The identical Senate Report, not cited in parallel in the text of this footnote, is S.Rep.No.111, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949).

8. Section 793(e) of 18 U.S.C. provides that:

'(e) Whoever having unauthorized possession of, access to, or control over any document, writing, code book, signal book, sketch, photograph, photographic negative, blueprint, plan, map, model, instrument, appliance, or note relating to the national defense, or information relating to the national defense which information the possessor has reason to believe could be used to the injury of the United States or to the advantage of any foreign nation, willfully communicates, delivers, transmits or causes to be communicated, delivered, or transmitted, or attempts to communicate, deliver, transmit or cause to be communicated, delivered, or transmitted the same to any person not entitled to receive it, or willfully retains the same and fails to deliver it to the officer or employee of the United States entitled to receive it;' is guilty of an offense punishable by 10 years in prison, a $10,000 fine, or both. It should also be noted that 18 U.S.C. § 793(g), added in 1950 (see 64 Stat. 1004; S.Rep.No.2369, pt. 1, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., 9 (1950)), provides that '(i)f two or more persons conspire to violate any of the foregoing provisions of this section, and one or more of such persons do any act to effect the object of the conspiracy, each of the parties to such conspiracy shall be subject to the punishment provided for the offense which is the object of such conspiracy.'

9. The amendment of § 793 that added subsection (e) was part of the Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950, which was in turn Title I of the Internal Security Act of 1950. See 64 Stat. 987. The report of the Senate Judiciary Committee best explains the purposes of the amendment:

'Section 18 of the bill amends section 793 of title 18 of the United States Code (espionage statute). The several paragraphs of section 793 of title 18 are designated as subsections (a) through (g) for purposes of convenient reference. The significant changes which would be made in section 793 of title 18 are as follows:

'(1) Amends the fourth paragraph of section 793, title 18 (subsec. (d)), to cover the unlawful dissemination of 'information relating to the national defense which information the possessor has reason to believe could be used to the injury of the United States or to the advantage of any foreign nation.' The phrase 'which information the possessor has reason to believe could be used to the injury of the United States or to the advantage of any foreign nation' would modify only 'information relating to the national defense' and not the other items enumerated in the subsection. The fourth paragraph of section 793 is also amended to provide that only those with lawful possession of the items relating to national defense enumerated therein may retain them subject to demand therefor. Those who have unauthorized possession of such items are treated in a separate subsection.

'(2) Amends section 793, title 18 (subsec. (e)), to provide that unauthorized possessors of items enumerated in paragraph 4 of section 793 must surrender possession thereof to the proper authorities without demand. Existing law provides no penalty for the unauthorized possession of such items unless a demand for them is made by the person entitled to receive them. The dangers surrounding the unauthorized possession of such items are self-evident, and it is deemed advisable to require their surrender in such a case, regardless of demand, especially since their unauthorized possession may be unknown to the authorities who would otherwise make the demand. The only difference between subsection (d) and subsection (e) of section 793 is that a demand by the person entitled to receive the items would be a necessary element of an offense under subsection (d) where the possession is lawful, whereas such

a demand would not be a necessary element of an offense under subsection (e) where the possession is unauthorized.' S.Rep.No.2369, pt. 1, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., 8—9 (1950) (emphasis added).

It seems clear from the foregoing, contrary to the intimations of the District Court for the Southern District of New York in this case, that in prosecuting for communicating or withholding a 'document' as contrasted with similar action with respect to 'information' the Government need not prove an intent to injure the United States or to benefit a foreign nation but only willful and knowing conduct. The District Court relied on Gorin v. United States, 312 U.S. 19, 61 S.Ct. 429, 85 L.Ed. 488 (1941). But that case arose under other parts of the predecessor to § 793, see 312 U.S., at 21—22, 61 S.Ct., at 430—432—parts that imposed different intent standards not repeated in § 793(d) or § 793(e). Cf. 18 U.S.C. § 793(a), (b), and (c). Also, from the face of subsection (e) and from the context of the Act of which it was a part, it seems undeniable that a newspaper, as well as others unconnected with the Government, are vulnerable to prosecution under § 793(e) if they communicate or withhold the materials covered by that section. The District Court ruled that 'communication' did not reach publication by a newspaper of documents relating to the national defense. I intimate no views on the correctness of that conclusion. But neither communication nor publication is necessary to violate the subsection.

10. Also relevant is 18 U.S.C. § 794. Subsection (b) thereof forbids in time of war the collection or publication, with intent that it shall be communicated to the enemy, of any information with respect to the movements of military forces, 'or with respect to the plans or conduct * * * of any naval or military operations * * * or any other information relating to the public defense, which might be useful to the enemy * * *.'

1. See n. 3, infra.

2. But see Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 78 S.Ct. 1113, 2 L.Ed.2d 1204 (1958); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 72 S.Ct. 863, 96 L.Ed. 1153 (1952).

3. There are several other statutory provisions prohibiting and punishing the dissemination of information, the disclosure of which Congress thought sufficiently imperiled national security to warrant that result. These include 42 U.S.C. §§ 2161 through 2166 relating to the authority of the Atomic Energy Commission to classify and declassify 'Restricted Data' ('Restricted Data' is a term of art employed uniquely by the Atomic Energy Act). Specifically, 42 U.S.C. § 2162 authorizes the Atomic Energy Commission to classify certain information. Title 42 U.S.C. § 2274, subsection (a), provides penalties for a person who 'communicates, transmits, or discloses (restricted data) * * * with intent to injure the United States or with intent to secure an advantage to any foreign nation * * *.' Subsection (b) of § 2274 provides lesser penalties for one who 'communicates, transmits, or discloses' such information 'with reason to believe such data will be utilized to injure the United States or to secure an advantage to any foreign nation * * *.' Other sections of Title 42 of the United States Code dealing with atomic energy prohibit and punish acquisition, removal, concealment, tampering with, alteration, mutilation, or destruction of documents incorporating 'Restricted Data' and provide penalties for employees and former employees of the Atomic Energy Commission, the armed services, contractors and licensees of the Atomic Energy Commission. Title 42 U.S.C. §§ 2276, 2277. Title 50 U.S.C.App. § 781, 56 Stat. 390, prohibits the making of any sketch or other representation of military installations or any military equipment located on any military installation, as specified; and indeed Congress in the National Defense Act of 1940, 54 Stat. 676, as amended, 56 Stat. 179, conferred jurisdiction on federal district courts over civil actions 'to enjoin any violation' thereof. 50 U.S.C.App. § 1152(6). Title 50 U.S.C. § 783(b) makes it unlawful for any officers or employees of the United States or any corporation which is owned by the United States to communicate material which has been 'classified' by the President to any person who that governmental employee knows or has reason to believe is an agent or representative of any foreign government or any Communist organization.

1. As noted elsewhere the Times conducted its analysis of the 47 volumes of Government documents over a period of several months and did so with a degree of security that a government might envy. Such security was essential, of course, to protect the enterprise from others. Meanwhile the Times has copyrighted its material and there were strong intimations in the oral argument that the Times contemplated enjoining its use by any other publisher in violation of its copyright. Paradoxically this would afford it a protection, analogous to prior restraint, against all others—a protection the Times denies the Government of the United States.

2. Interestingly the Times explained its refusal to allow the Government to examine its own purloined documents by saying in substance this might compromise its sources and informants! The Times thus asserts a right to guard the secrecy of its sources while denying that the Government of the United States has that power.

3. With respect to the question of inherent power of the Executive to classify papers, records, and documents as secret, or otherwise unavailable for public exposure, and to secure aid of the courts for enforcement, there may be an analogy with respect to this Court. No statute gives this Court express power to establish and enforce the utmost security measures for the secrecy of our deliberations and records. Yet I have little doubt as to the inherent power of the Court to protect the confidentiality of its internal operations by whatever judicial measures may be required.

* The hearing in the Post case before Judge Gesell began at 8 a.m. on June 21, and his decision was rendered, under the hammer of a deadline imposed by the Court of Appeals, shortly before 5 p.m. on the same day. The hearing in the Times case before Judge Gurfein was held on June 18 and his decision was rendered on June 19. The Government's appeals in the two cases were heard by the Courts of Appeals for the District of Columbia and Second Circuits, each court sitting en banc, on June 22. Each court rendered its decision on the following afternoon.

4.8 Questions to consider 4.8 Questions to consider