This appeal from a judgment of the circuit court for Waukesha county, Max Raskin, circuit judge, was certified to this court by the court of appeals, sec. (Rule) 809.61, Stats. 1979-80, as presenting an issue of first impression, namely, whether an owner of a solar-heated residence states a claim upon which relief can be granted when he asserts that his neighbor’s proposed construction of a residence (which conforms to existing deed restrictions and local ordinances) interferes with his access to an unobstructed path for sunlight across the neighbor’s property. This case thus involves a conflict between one landowner (Glenn Prah, the plaintiff) interested in unobstructed access to sunlight across adjoining property as a natural source of energy and an adjoining landowner (Richard D. Mar-*225etti, the defendant) interested in the development of his land.
The circuit court concluded that the plaintiff presented no claim upon which relief could be granted and granted summary judgment for the defendant. We reverse the judgment of the circuit court and remand the cause to the circuit court for further proceedings.
I.
According to the complaint, the plaintiff is the owner of a residence which was constructed during the years 1978-1979. The complaint alleges that the residence has a solar system which includes collectors on the roof to supply energy for heat and hot water and that after the plaintiff built his solar-heated house, the defendant purchased the lot adjacent to and immediately to the south of the plaintiff’s lot and commenced planning construction of a home. The complaint further states that when the plaintiff learned of defendant’s plans to build the house he advised the defendant that if the house were built at the proposed location, defendant’s house would substantially and adversely affect the integrity of plaintiff’s solar system and could cause plaintiff other damage. Nevertheless, the defendant began construction. The complaint further alleges that the plaintiff is entitled to “unrestricted use of the sun and its solar power” and demands judgment for injunctive relief and damages.1
*226After filing his complaint, the plaintiff moved for a temporary injunction to restrain and enjoin construction by the defendant. In ruling on that motion the circuit court heard testimony, received affidavits and viewed the site.
The record made on the motion reveals the following additional facts: Plaintiff’s home was the first residence built in the subdivision, and although plaintiff did not build his house in the center of the lot it was built in accordance with applicable restrictions. Plaintiff advised defendant that if the defendant’s home were built at the proposed site it would cause a shadowing effect on the solar collectors which would reduce the efficiency of the system and possibly damage the system. To avoid these adverse effects, plaintiff requested defendant to locate his home an additional several feet away from the plaintiff’s lot line, the exact number being disputed. Plaintiff and defendant failed to reach an agreement on the location of defendant’s home before defendant started construction. The Architectural Control Committee of the subdivision and the Planning Commission of the City of Muskego approved the defendant’s plans for his home, including its location on the lot. After such approval, the defendant apparently changed the grade of the property without prior notice to the Architectural Control Committee.2 The problem with defendant’s proposed *227construction, as far as the plaintiff’s interests are concerned, arises from a combination of the grade and the distance of defendant’s home from the defendant’s lot line.
The circuit court denied plaintiff’s motion for injunc-tive relief, declared it would entertain a motion for summary judgment and thereafter entered judgment in favor of the defendant.
1 — 1 HH
The defendant argues that because the circuit court conducted a hearing and considered all material issues of fact, we should consider this case an appeal from a judgment after trial, not as an appeal from a summary judgment. We do not accept the defendant’s characterization of the circuit court’s proceedings.
The circuit court held a hearing to consider plaintiff’s motion for a temporary injunction. A primary consideration on such motion is whether the moving party has a reasonable probability of ultimate success; the ruling on the motion does not resolve the issue of whether the moving party will in fact ultimately succeed in the lawsuit. Werner v. Grootemaat, 80 Wis. 2d 513, 520, 259 N.W.2d 310 (1977). The circuit court denied the motion for a temporary injunction, concluding that there was no reasonable probability that the plaintiff would ultimately succeed and that the plaintiff had not stated a claim upon which relief could be granted. The circuit court ended its memorandum decision on the motion for a temporary injunction with the following comment:
*228“In as much as the court is of the opinion that the plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which equitable relief can be granted, and the parties having joined issue, the court will entertain a motion by the defendant for summary judgment.”
This statement clearly indicates the intention and expectation of the circuit court to deal with this case on a motion for summary judgment. We therefore consider this as an appeal from a judgment entered on a motion for summary judgment.
In deciding a motion for summary judgment the initial question is the same as that on a sec. 802.06(2), Stats. 1979-80, motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, namely, whether the complaint states a claim upon which relief can be granted. Kanack v. Kremski, 96 Wis. 2d 426, 435, 291 N.W.2d 864 (1980) (Abrahamson, J., concurring) . If the complaint states a claim and the pleadings show the existence of factual issues, the court then examines the affidavits and other proof and determines whether there are disputed material facts that entitle the non-moving party to a trial. On summary judgment the court does not decide those issues of fact; it merely decides whether genuine issues of fact exist. Coleman v. Outboard Marine Corp., 92 Wis. 2d 565, 570-71, 285 N.W.2d 631 (1979).
In this case there is some ambiguity whether the judgment was based on the complaint or on factual matters outside the pleadings which were presented to the circuit court in connection with the motion for a temporary injunction. Consequently, we shall first test the sufficiency of the complaint and then determine whether the matters outside the pleadings present disputed material facts sufficient to justify a trial.
*229III.
In testing the sufficiency of the complaint the facts pleaded by the plaintiff, and all reasonable inferences therefrom, are accepted as true. Hartridge v. State Farm Mutual Auto Ins. Co., 86 Wis. 2d 1, 4-5, 271 N.W.2d 598 (1978). The pleadings are to be liberally construed with a view to substantial justice to the parties, sec. 802.02 (6), Stats. 1979-80, and the complaint should be dismissed as legally insufficient only if “it is quite clear that under no circumstances can the plaintiff recover.” Clausen & Lowe, The New Wisconsin Rules of Civil Procedure, Chapters 801-803, 59 Marq. L. Rev 1, 54 (1976), quoted with approval in Morgan v. Pennsylvania General Ins. Co., 87 Wis. 2d 723, 731, 275 N.W.2d 660 (1979).
The plaintiff presents three legal theories to support his claim that the defendant’s continued construction of a home justifies granting him relief: (1) the construction constitutes a common law private nuisance; (2) the construction is prohibited by sec. 844.01, Stats. 1979-80 ;3 *230and (3) the construction interferes with the solar easement plaintiff acquired under the doctrine of prior appropriation.4
As to the claim of private nuisance the circuit court concluded that the law of private nuisance requires the court to make “a comparative evaluation of the conflicting interests and to weigh the gravity of the harm to the plaintiff against the utility of the defendant’s conduct.” The circuit court concluded: “A comparative evaluation of the conflicting interests, keeping in mind the omissions and commissions of both Prah and Maretti, indicates that defendant’s conduct does not cause the gravity of the harm which the plaintiff himself may well have avoided by proper planning.” The circuit court also concluded that sec. 844.01 does not apply to a home constructed in accordance with deed and municipal ordinance requirements. Further, the circuit court rejected the prior appropriation doctrine as “an intrusion of judicial egoism over legislative passivity.”
We consider first whether the complaint states a claim for relief based on common law private nuisance. This state has long recognized that an owner of land does not have an absolute or unlimited right to use the land in a way which injures the rights of others. The rights of neighboring landowners are relative; the uses by one must not unreasonably impair the uses or enjoyment of the other.5 VI-A American Law of Property sec. 28.22, *231pp. 64-65 (1954). When one landowner’s use of his or her property unreasonably interferes with another’s enjoyment of his or her property, that use is said to be a private nuisance. Hoene v. Milwaukee, 17 Wis. 2d 209, 214, 116 N.W.2d 112 (1962); Metzger v. Hochrein, 107 Wis. 267, 269, 83 N.W. 308 (1900). See also Prosser, Law of Torts sec. 89, p. 591 (2d ed. 1971).
The private nuisance doctrine has traditionally been employed in this state to balance the conflicting rights of landowners,6 and this court has recently adopted the analysis of private nuisance set forth in the Restatement (Second) of Torts. CEW Mgmt. Corp. v. First Federal Savings & Loan Association, 88 Wis. 2d 631, 633, 277 N.W.2d 766 (1979). The Restatement defines private nuisance as “a nontrespassory invasion of another’s interest in the private use and enjoyment of land.” Restate*232ment (Second) of Torts Sec. 821D (1977). The phrase “interest in the private use and enjoyment of land” as used in sec. 821D is broadly defined to include any disturbance of the enjoyment of property. The comment in the Restatement describes the landowner’s interest protected by private nuisance law as follows:
“The phrase ‘interest in the use and enjoyment of land’ is used in this Restatement in a broad sense. It comprehends not only the interests that a person may have in the actual present use of land for residential, agricultural, commercial, industrial and other purposes, but also his interests in having the present use value of the land unimpaired by changes in its physical condition. Thus the destruction of trees on vacant land is as much an invasion of the owner’s interest in its use and enjoyment as is the destruction of crops or flowers that he is growing on the land for his present use. ‘Interest in use and enjoyment’ also comprehends the pleasure, comfort and enjoyment that a person normally derives from the occupancy of land. Freedom from discomfort and annoyance while using land is often as important to a person as freedom from physical interruption with his use or freedom from detrimental change in the physical condition of the land itself.” Restatement (Second) of Torts, Sec. 821D, Comment b, p. 101 (1977).
Although the defendant’s obstruction of the plaintiff’s access to sunlight appears to fall within the Restatement’s broad concept of a private nuisance as a nontres-passory invasion of another’s interest in the private use and enjoyment of land, the defendant asserts that he has a right to develop his property in compliance with statutes, ordinances and private covenants without regard to the effect of such development upon the plaintiff’s access to sunlight. In essence, the defendant is asking this court to hold that the private nuisance doctrine is not applicable in the instant case and that his right to develop his land is a right which is per se superior to his neighbor’s interest in access to sunlight. *233This position is expressed in the maxim “cujus est solum, ejus est usque ad coelum et ad infernos,” that is, the owner of land owns up to the sky and down to the center of the earth. The rights of the surface owner are, however, not unlimited. U.S. v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 260-1 (1946). See also 114.03, Stats. 1979-80.
The defendant is not completely correct in asserting that the common law did not protect a landowner’s access to sunlight across adjoining property. At English common law a landowner could acquire a right to receive sunlight across adjoining land by both express agreement and under the judge-made doctrine of “ancient lights.” Under the doctrine of ancient lights if the landowner had received sunlight across adjoining property for a specified period of time,7 the landowner was entitled to continue to receive unobstructed access to sunlight across the adjoining property. Under the doctrine the landowner acquired a negative prescriptive easement and could prevent the adjoining landowner from obstructing access to light.8
Although American courts have not been as receptive to protecting a landowner’s access to sunlight as the English courts, American courts have afforded some protection to a landowner’s interest in access to sunlight. American courts honor express easements to sunlight. American courts initially enforced the English common law doctrine of ancient lights, but later every state which considered the doctrine repudiated it as incon*234sistent with the needs of a developing country. Indeed, for just that reason this court concluded that an easement to light and air over adjacent property could not be created or acquired by prescription and has been unwilling to recognize such an easement by implication. Depner v. United States National Bank, 202 Wis. 405, 408, 232 N.W. 851 (1930) ; Miller v. Hoeschler, 126 Wis. 263, 268-69, 105 N.W. 790 (1905).
Many jurisdictions in this country have protected a landowner from malicious obstruction of access to light (the spite fence cases) under the common law private nuisance doctrine.9 If an activity is motivated by malice it lacks utility and the harm it causes others outweighs any social values. VI-A Law of Property sec. 28.28, p. 79 (1954). This court was reluctant to protect a landowner’s interest in sunlight even against a spite fence, only to be overruled by the legislature. Shortly after this court upheld a landowner’s right to erect a useless and unsightly sixteen-foot spite fence four feet from his neighbor’s windows, Metzger v. Hochrain, 107 N.W. 267, 83 N.W. 308 (1900), the legislature enacted a law specifically defining a spite fence as an actionable private nuisance.10 Thus a landowner’s interest in sunlight has been pro*235tected in this country by common law private nuisance law at least in the narrow context of the modern American rule invalidating spite fences. See, e.g., Sundowner, Inc. v. King, 95 Idaho 367, 509 P.2d 785 (1973) ; Restatement (Second) of Torts, sec. 829 (1977).
This court’s reluctance in the nineteenth and early part of the twentieth century to provide broader protection for a landowner’s access to sunlight was premised on three policy considerations. First, the right of landowners to use their property as they wished, as long as they did not cause physical damage to a neighbor, was jealously guarded. Metzger v. Hochrein, 107 Wis. 267, 272, 83 N.W. 308 (1900).
Second, sunlight was valued only for aesthetic enjoyment or as illumination. Since artificial light could be used for illumination, loss of sunlight was at most a personal annoyance which was given little, if any, weight by society.
Third, society had a significant interest in not restricting or impeding land development. Dillman v. Hoffman, 38 Wis. 559, 574 (1875). This court repeatedly emphasized that in the growth period of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries change is to be expected and is essential to property and that recognition of a right to sunlight would hinder property development. The court expressed this concept as follows:
“As the city grows, large grounds appurtenant to residences must be cut up to supply more residences. . . . The cistern, the outhouse, the cesspool, and the private drain must disappear in deference to the public waterworks and sewer; the terrace and the garden, to the need for more complete occupancy. . . . Strict limitation [on the recognition of easements of light and air over adjacent premises is] in accord with the popular conception upon which real estate has been and is daily being conveyed in Wisconsin and to be essential to easy and rapid development at least of our municipalities.” Mil*236ler v. Hoeschler, supra, 126 Wis. at 268, 270; quoted with approval in Depner, supra, 202 Wis. at 409.
Considering these three policies, this court concluded that in the absence of an express agreement granting access to sunlight, a landowner’s obstruction of another’s access to sunlight was not actionable. Miller v. Hoeschler, supra, 126 Wis. at 271; Depner v. United States National Bank, supra, 202 Wis. at 410. These three policies are no longer fully accepted or applicable. They reflect factual circumstances and social priorities that are now obsolete.
First, society has increasingly regulated the use of land by the landowner for the general welfare. Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926) ; Just v. Marinette, 56 Wis. 2d 7, 201 N.W.2d 761 (1972).
Second, access to sunlight has taken on a new significance in recent years. In this case the plaintiff seeks to protect access to sunlight, not for aesthetic reasons or as a source of illumination but as a source of energy. Access to sunlight as an energy source is of significance both to the landowner who invests in solar collectors and to a society which has an interest in developing alternative sources of energy.11
*237Third, the policy of favoring unhindered private development in an expanding economy is no longer in harmony with the realities of our society. State v. Deetz, 66 Wis. 2d 1, 224 N.W.2d 407 (1974). The need for easy and rapid development is not as great today as it once was, while our perception of the value of sunlight as a source of energy has increased significantly.
Courts should not implement obsolete policies that have lost their vigor over the course of the years. The law of private nuisance is better suited to resolve landowners’ disputes about property development in the 1980’s than is a rigid rule which does not recognize a landowner’s interest in access to sunlight. As we said in Ballstadt v. Pagel, 202 Wis. 484, 489, 232 N.W. 862 (1930), “What is regarded in law as constituting a nuisance in modern times would no doubt have been tolerated without question in former times.” We read State v. Deetz, 66 Wis. 2d 1, 224 N.W.2d 407 (1974), as an endorsement of the application of common law nuisance to situations involving the conflicting interests of landowners and as rejecting per se exclusions to the nuisance law reasonable use doctrine.
In Deetz the court abandoned the rigid common law common enemy rule with respect to surface water and adopted the private nuisance reasonable use rule, namely that the landowner is subject to liability if his or her interference with the flow of surface waters unreasonably invades a neighbor’s interest in the use and enjoyment of land. Restatement (Second) of Torts, sec. 822, 826, 829 (1977). This court concluded that the common enemy rule which served society “well in the days of burgeoning national expansion of the mid-nineteenth and *238early-twentieth centuries” should be abandoned because it was no longer “in harmony with the realities of our society.” Deetz, supra, 66 Wis. 2d at 14-15. We recognized in Deetz that common law rules adapt to changing social values and conditions.12
Yet the defendant would have us ignore the flexible private nuisance law as a means of resolving the dispute between the landowners in this case and would have us adopt an approach, already abandoned in Deetz, of favoring the unrestricted development of land and of applying a rigid and inflexible rule protecting his right to build on his land and disregarding any interest of the plaintiff in the use and enjoyment of his land. This we refuse to do.13
*239Private nuisance law, the law traditionally used to adjudicate conflicts between private landowners, has the flexibility to protect both a landowner’s right of access to sunlight and another landowner’s right to develop land. Private nuisance law is better suited to regulate access to sunlight in modern society and is more in harmony with legislative policy and the prior decisions of this court than is an inflexible doctrine of non-recognition of any interest in access to sunlight across adjoining land.14
*240We therefore hold that private nuisance law, that is, the reasonable use doctrine as set forth in the Restatement, is applicable to the instant case. Recognition of a nuisance claim for unreasonable obstruction of access to sunlight will not prevent land development or unduly hinder the use of adjoining land. It will promote the reasonable use and enjoyment of land in a manner suitable to the 1980’s. That obstruction of access to light might be found to constitute a nuisance in certain circumstances does not mean that it will be or must be found to constitute a nuisance under all circumstances. The result in each case depends on whether the conduct complained of is unreasonable.
Accordingly we hold that the plaintiff in this case has stated a claim under which relief can be granted. Nonetheless we do not determine whether the plaintiff in this case is entitled to relief. In order to be entitled to relief the plaintiff must prove the elements required to establish actionable nuisance, and the conduct of the defendant herein must be judged by the reasonable use doctrine.
IV.
The defendant asserts that even if we hold that the private nuisance doctrine applies to obstruction of access to sunlight across adjoining land, the circuit court’s granting of summary judgment should be affirmed.
Although the memorandum decision of the circuit court in the instant case is unclear, it appears that the circuit court recognized that the common law private nuisance doctrine was applicable but concluded that defendant’s conduct was not unreasonable.15 The circuit court ap*241parently attempted to balance the utility of the defendant’s conduct with the gravity of the harm. Sec. 826, Restatement (Second) of Torts (1977).16 The defendant urges us to accept the circuit court’s balance as adequate. We decline to do so.
*242The circuit court concluded that because the defendant’s proposed house was in conformity with zoning regulations, building codes and deed restrictions, the defendant’s use of the land was reasonable. This court has concluded that a landowner’s compliance with zoning laws does not automatically bar a nuisance claim. Compliance with the law “is not the controlling factor, though it is, of course, entitled to some weight.” Bie v. Ingersoll, 27 Wis. 2d 490, 495, 135 N.W.2d 250 (1965). The circuit court also concluded that the plaintiff could have avoided any harm by locating his own house in a better place. Again, plaintiff’s ability to avoid the harm is a relevant but not a conclusive factor. See secs. 826, 827, 828, Restatement (Second) of Torts (1977).
Furthermore, our examination of the record leads us to conclude that the record does not furnish an adequate basis for the circuit court to apply the proper legal principles on summary judgment. The application of the reasonable use standard in nuisance cases normally requires a full exposition of all underlying facts and circumstances. Too little is known in this case of such matters as the extent of the harm to the plaintiff, the suitability of solar heat in that neighborhood, the availability of remedies to the plaintiff, and the costs to the defendant of avoiding the harm.17 Summary judgment is not an appropriate procedural vehicle in this case when the circuit court must weigh evidence which has not been presented at trial. 6 (Pt. 2) Moore’s Federal Practice, 56.15 [7], pp. 56-638 (1982) ; 10 Wright and Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure — Civil, secs. 2729, 2731 (1973).
Because the plaintiff has stated a claim of common law private nuisance upon which relief can be granted, the judgment of the circuit court must be reversed. We need not, and do not, reach the question of whether the complaint states a claim under sec. 844.01, Stats. 1979-*24380, or under the doctrine of prior appropriation. Attoe v. Madison Professional Policemen’s Assoc., 79 Wis. 2d 199, 205, 255 N.W.2d 489 (1977).
For the reasons set forth, we reverse the judgment of the circuit court dismissing the complaint and remand the matter to circuit court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
By the Court. — The judgment of the circuit court is reversed and the cause remanded for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
Ceci, J., took no part.