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State Constitutional Law: The Connecticut Constitution

Connecticut Coalition for Justice in Edu... v. Rell: Right to a Minimum Quality of Education

CONNECTICUT COALITION FOR JUSTICE IN EDUCATION FUNDING, INC., ET AL. v. GOVERNOR M. JODI RELL ET AL.

(SC 18032)

Norcott, Katz, Palmer, VertefeuiUe, ZareUa, SchaUer and McLachlan, Js.*

*241Argued April 22, 2008

officially released March 30, 2010

*242 Neil Weare and David Noah, certified legal interns, with whom were Robert A. Solomon and Robin Golden, for the appellants (plaintiffs).

Gregory T. DAuria, associate attorney general, with whom were Clare E. Kindall and Robert J. Deichert, assistant attorneys general, and, on the brief, Richard Blumenthal, attorney general, for the appellees (defendants).

Erika L. Amarante and Michael A. Rebell filed a brief for the Campaign for Educational Equity et al. as amici curiae.

Steven D. Ecker filed a brief for the Workforce Alliance et al. as amici curiae.

Robert M. DeCrescenzo filed a brief for the Connecticut Conference of Municipalities et al. as amici curiae.

Linda L. Morkan, Ndidi N. Moses and Nicole A. Bernabo filed a brief for One Connecticut as amicus curiae.

John C. Brittain, Jennifer Mullen St. Hilaire and Emily A. Gianquinto filed a brief for the Connecticut State Conference NAACP et al. as amici curiae.

David N. Rosen filed a brief for Christopher Collier and Simon J. Bernstein as amici curiae.

Opinion

NORCOTT, J.

It is by now well established that, under the constitution of Connecticut, the state must “ ‘provide a substantially equal educational opportunity to its youth in its free public elementary and secondary schools’ Horton v. Meskill, 172 Conn. 615, 649, 376 A.2d 359 (1977) (Horton 1); and that this court has a role in ensuring that our state’s public school students receive that fundamental guarantee. See Sheff v. O’Neill, *243238 Conn. 1, 45-46, 678 A.2d 1267 (1996). In this public interest appeal, we consider whether article eighth, § 1, of the constitution of Connecticut1 also guarantees students in our state’s public schools the right to a particular minimum quality of education, namely, suitable educational opportunities. The plaintiffs, the Connecticut Coalition for Justice in Education Funding, Inc.,2 and numerous parents and their children, who are enrolled in public schools across the state,3 appeal, upon a grant of certification by the Chief Justice pursuant to General Statutes § 52-265a,4 from the judgment *244of the trial court granting the motion of the defendants, various state officials and members of the state board of education,5 to strike counts one, two and four of the plaintiffs’ amended complaint.6 Having determined that the plaintiffs’ claims are justiciable because they do not present a political question, we conclude that article eighth, § 1, of the Connecticut constitution guarantees Connecticut’s public school students educational standards and resources suitable to participate in democratic institutions, and to prepare them to attain *245productive employment and otherwise to contribute to the state’s economy, or to progress on to higher education. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court.

The record reveals the following relevant facts, as alleged in the operative complaint and construed in the manner most favorable to the pleader; see, e.g., Violano v. Fernandez, 280 Conn. 310, 317-18, 907 A.2d 1188 (2006); and procedural history. The individual plaintiffs’ children attend public schools in Bridgeport, Danbury, Windham, Hartford, New Haven, East Hartford, New London, Plainfield and New Britain. The plaintiffs allege that the state has failed to provide their children with “suitable and substantially equal educational opportunities” because of inadequate and unequal inputs, which “are essential components of a suitable educational opportunity,” namely: (1) high quality preschool; (2) appropriate class sizes; (3) programs and services for at-risk students; (4) highly qualified administrators and teachers; (5) modem and adequate libraries; (6) modem technology and appropriate instruction; (7) an adequate number of hours of instruction; (8) a rigorous curriculum with a wide breadth of courses; (9) modem and appropriate textbooks; (10) a school environment that is healthy, safe, well maintained and conducive to learning; (11) adequate special needs services pursuant to the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq.; (12) appropriate career and academic counseling; and (13) suitably ran extracurricular activities. These inputs have been recognized by the state board of education in various “[p]osition [statements” as “necessary components of a suitable educational opportunity.”

The availability and quality of these essential inputs vary significantly in schools across the state, as demonstrated by statistics from the 2003-2004 school year cited by the plaintiffs. For example, at the Lincoln Ele*246mentary School (Lincoln) in New Britain, 50 percent of the kindergarten students attended preschool, nursery school or Head Start, as compared to 76 percent statewide. None of the computers at Lincoln are high or moderate powered, in comparison to the statewide average of 63 percent. Lincoln’s library has ninety non-print materials, as compared to an average of 395 elsewhere in the state. At Lincoln, 68 percent of the teachers have a master’s degree, in comparison to 80 percent statewide. Finally, although numerous students at Lincoln perform poorly in mathematics, the school does not offer pull-out remedial instruction or in-class tutorials in that subject.7

II

We now turn to the merits of the plaintiffs’ claims, which are properly framed using the state constitutional *270analysis articulated by State v. Geisler, supra, 222 Conn. 672, and posit that the fundamental right to education under article eighth, § 1, of the state constitution encompasses a minimum qualitative standard that guarantees students the right to “suitable educational opportunities.” The plaintiffs define “suitable educational opportunities” as having three components: (1) “An educational experience that prepares them to function as responsible citizens and enables them to fully participate in democratic institutions”; (2) “a meaningful high school education that enables them to advance through institutions of higher learning, or that enables them to compete on equal footing to find productive employment and contribute to the state’s economy”; and (3) an opportunity to meet the educational standards as set by the political branches of the state. We conclude, consistent with the conclusions of other state courts that have considered similar constitutional guarantees, that article eighth, § 1, of the state constitution embodies a substantive component requiring that the public schools provide their students with an education suitable to give them the opportunity to be responsible citizens able to participate fully in democratic institutions, such as jury service and voting, and to prepare them to progress to institutions of higher education, or to attain productive employment and otherwise to contribute to the state’s economy.

“It is well established that federal constitutional and statutory law establishes a minimum national standard for the exercise of individual rights and does not inhibit state governments from affording higher levels of protection for such rights. . . . Furthermore, although we often rely on the United States Supreme Court’s interpretation of the amendments to the constitution of the *271United States to delineate the boundaries of the protections provided by the constitution of Connecticut, we have also recognized that, in some instances, our state constitution provides protections beyond those provided by the federal constitution, as that document has been interpreted by the United States Supreme Court. . . . The analytical framework by which we determine whether, in any given instance, our state constitution affords broader protection to our citizens than the federal constitutional minimum is well settled. In State v. Geisler, [supra, 222 Conn. 684-86], we enumerated the following six factors to be considered in determining that issue: (1) persuasive relevant federal precedents; (2) the text of the operative constitutional provisions; (3) historical insights into the intent of our constitutional forebears; (4) related Connecticut precedents; (5) persuasive precedents of other state courts; and (6) contemporary understandings of applicable economic and sociological norms, or as otherwise described, relevant public policies.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. McKenzie-Adams, 281 Conn. 486, 509-10, 915 A.2d 822, cert. denied, 552 U.S. 888, 128 S. Ct. 248, 169 L. Ed. 2d 148 (2007).

“The Geisler factors serve a dual purpose: they encourage the raising of state constitutional issues in a manner to which the opposing party — the state or the defendant — can respond; and they encourage a principled development of our state constitutional jurisprudence. Although in Geisler we compartmentalized the factors that should be considered in order to stress that a systematic analysis is required, we recognize that they may be inextricably interwoven. . . . Finally, not every Geisler factor is relevant in all cases.”26 (Citation omit*272ted.) State v. Morales, 232 Conn. 707, 716 n.10, 657 A.2d 585 (1995). Accordingly, we now turn to the parties’ specific arguments with respect to each factor.

A

The Operative Constitutional Text

As noted previously, the text of article eighth, § 1, of the constitution of Connecticut provides: “There shall always be free public elementary and secondary schools in the state. The general assembly shall implement this principle by appropriate legislation.” Thus, the plaintiffs argue that the textual factor supports their claim because the use of the word “school” in article eighth, § 1, necessarily means institutions wherein “systematic” or “intellectual, moral and social” instruction is provided, and that not maintaining a minimum constitutional standard would eviscerate the legislature’s responsibilities thereunder. The defendants contend in response that § 2 of article eighth of the state constitution, which provides that the University of Connecticut shall be devoted to “excellence” in education, as well as the use of qualitative language in other states’ education clauses, indicates that the drafters acted intentionally to omit a particular qualitative standard from article eighth, § 1. The defendants rely, then, on Moore v. Ganim, 233 Conn. 557, 595, 660 A.2d 742 (1995), for the proposition that “[w]e are especially hesitant to read into the constitution unenumerated affirmative *273governmental obligations. In general, the declaration of rights in our state constitution was implemented not to impose affirmative obligations on the government, but rather to secure individual liberties against direct infringement through state action. ” The defendants contend, therefore, that the plaintiffs’ adequacy claims are distinct from those considered in Sheff v. O’Neill, supra, 238 Conn. 1, which also involved constitutional provisions directly implicating equality and segregation. In our view, the text of article eighth, § 1, is ambiguous, which necessitates a complete Geisler analysis to determine its meaning with respect to a qualitative component.

“In dealing with constitutional provisions we must assume that infinite care was employed to couch in scrupulously fitting language a proposal aimed at establishing or changing the organic law of the state. . . . Unless there is some clear reason for not doing so, effect must be given to every part of and each word in the constitution.” (Citations omitted.) Stolberg v. Caldwell, 175 Conn. 586, 597-98, 402 A.2d 763 (1978), appeal dismissed sub nom. Stolberg v. Davidson, 454 U.S. 958, 102 S. Ct. 496, 70 L. Ed. 2d 374 (1981). Moreover, we do not supply constitutional language that the drafters intentionally may have chosen to omit. See State v. Colon, 272 Conn. 106, 320, 864 A.2d 666 (2004), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 848, 126 S. Ct. 102, 163 L. Ed. 2d 116 (2005).

As noted previously, the text of article eighth, § 1, of the constitution of Connecticut, provides: “There shall always be free public elementary and secondary schools in the state. The general assembly shall implement this principle by appropriate legislation.” Article eighth, § 1, does not contain any qualitative language, in contrast to § 2 of article eighth of the constitution of Connecticut, which requires the state to “maintain a system of higher education, including The University of Connecticut, *274which shall be dedicated to excellence in higher education. The general assembly shall determine the size, number, terms and method of appointment of the governing boards of The University of Connecticut and of such constituent units or coordinating bodies in the system as from time to time may be established.” (Emphasis added.) Indeed, this court previously has held that the qualitative standard of “excellence” under article eighth, § 2, “was not meant to be a wedge for penetration of the educational establishment by judicial intervention in policy decisions.” Simmons v. Budds, supra, 165 Conn. 514; id. (rejecting professor’s challenge to actions of officials of university setting grading policies to apply in wake of student antiwar protests).

The language of certain other states’ education clauses also supports the defendants’ textual argument superficially. The majority of the states have constitutional language that requires their legislatures to establish and maintain schools that are “adequate,” “general,” “thorough” or “efficient,” which supports the defendants’ argument that the drafters of article eighth, § 1, of the constitution of Connecticut could have imposed similar qualitative standards. See, e.g., Ark. Const., art. 14, § 1 (“[intelligence and virtue being the safeguards of liberty and the bulwark of a free and good government, the State shall ever maintain a general, suitable and efficient system of free public schools and shall adopt all suitable means to secure to the people the advantages and opportunities of education”); Colo. Const., art. IX, § 2 (“[t]he general assembly shall, as soon as practicable, provide for the establishment and maintenance of a thorough and uniform system of free public schools throughout the state, wherein all residents of the state, between the ages of six and twenty-one years, may be educated gratuitously”); Fla. Const., art. IX, § 1 (a) (“The education of children is a fundamental value of the people of the State of Florida. It *275is, therefore, a paramount duty of the state to make adequate provision for the education of all children residing within its borders. Adequate provision shall be made by law for a uniform, efficient, safe, secure, and high quality system of free public schools that allows students to obtain a high quality education and for the establishment, maintenance, and operation of institutions of higher learning and other public education programs that the needs of the people may require.”); Ga. Const., art. VIII, § 1 (“The provision of an adequate public education for the citizens shall be a primary obligation of the State of Georgia. Public education for the citizens prior to the college or postsecondaiy level shall be free and shall be provided for by taxation.”); N.J. Const., art. VIII, § 4 (1) (“[t]he Legislature shall provide for the maintenance and support of a thorough and efficient system of free public schools for the instruction of all the children in the State between the ages of five and eighteen years”); Ohio Const., art. VI, § 2 (“ [t]he general assembly shall make such provisions, by taxation, or otherwise, as, with the income arising from the school trust fund, will secure a thorough and efficient system of common schools throughout the state; but no religious or other sect, or sects, shall ever have any exclusive right to, or control of, any part of the school funds of this state”); Va. Const., art. VIII, § 1 (“[t]he General Assembly shall provide for a system of free public elementary and secondary schools for all children of school age throughout the Commonwealth, and shall seek to ensure that an educational program of high quality is established and continually maintained”); Wyo. Const., art. 7, § 97-7-001 (“[t]he legislature shall provide for the establishment and maintenance of a complete and uniform system of public instruction, embracing free elementary schools of every needed kind and grade, a university with such technical and professional departments as the public good may require and the means of the state allow, and such other *276institutions as may be necessary”).27 Thus, these other *277states’ educational provisions provide some indication that the drafters of article eighth, § 1, could have, but did not, act to enact a constitutional provision with a clearly articulated qualitative standard for its public schools.

*278We disagree, however, with the defendants’ contention that Moore v. Ganim, supra, 233 Conn. 580-81, is dispositive of the plaintiffs’ claims under the textual factor. In Moore, we rejected the plaintiffs’ claim that the state constitution contains an “unenumerated . . . obligation of the state to provide subsistence benefits to all its citizens in need,” concluding “that the state has no affirmative constitutional obligation to provide minimal subsistence to its poor citizens.” Id., 580-81. We emphasized that “[t]he text of our constitution makes evident the fact that its drafters have been explicit when choosing to impose affirmative obligations on the state,” noting that, “the history of article eighth, § 1, is particularly instructive in the present case. This explicit textual provision, and its counterparts, article eighth, § 2 (system of higher education), and article eighth, § 4 (school fund), are the only constitutional provisions, recognized to date, that impose affirmative obligations on the part of the state to expend public funds to afford benefits to its citizenry. Other provisions, such as those in article first, protect individuals from state intrusion.”28 Id., 595-96. Moore is inapposite because, in the present case, we are called on to consider the extent of the state’s obligations under the already existing education clause, rather than to carve a new unenumerated right out of whole cloth.

*279Moreover, although the defendants’ textual arguments are plausible, the constitutional language nevertheless is ambiguous, and is not dispositive of this appeal. See State v. Gethers, 197 Conn. 369, 385-88, 497 A.2d 408 (1985) (recognizing that “superficially appealing” constitutional language may be rendered ambiguous in context of relevant case law in concluding that no right to hybrid representation in criminal case exists under article first, § 8, of the constitution of Connecticut). The commonly cited dictionary definitions of the relevant terms in article eighth, § 1, namely, “elementary,” “secondary” and “school,” have a qualitative connotation, as “elementary school” is defined as “a school usu[ally] the first four to the first eight grades and often a kindergarten,” and particularly, “secondary school” is defined as a “school intermediate between elementary school and college and usu[aily] offering general, technical, vocational, or college-preparatory courses.”29 Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary (10th Ed. 1998). Indeed, even Justice Loiselle’s dissenting opinion in Horton I, supra, 172 Conn. 658-59, in which he concluded that education was not a fundamental right under the state constitution, appears to contemplate that the education clause must have some substantive content in order to be meaningful, as he said that “when the constitution says free education it must be interpreted in a reasonable way. A town may not herd children in an open field to hear lectures by illiterates.” See also id., 661 (Loiselle, J., dissenting) (“[w]e cannot lose sight of the fact that the issue is not that our children are not getting a sound education, measured by reasonable standards, which will enable them to exercise fully their rights as citizens of their country”). Accordingly, since the text of article eighth, § 1, is ambiguous, we necessarily must continue with our review of the other Geisler factors.

*280B

The Holdings and Dicta of This Court

This factor similarly is not dispositive of the plaintiffs’ appeal because this case presents a question of first impression, namely, the qualitative content of the education clause with respect to inadequacy without considerations of inequality.30 A review of this court’s31 education clause jurisprudence demonstrates, however, that the plaintiffs’ claims are in fact consistent with our precedents. The seminal32 case is Horton I, supra, 172 Conn. 618, wherein the plaintiffs challenged the state’s educational finance system, claiming that its reliance on the property tax “ensure [d] that, regardless of the educational needs or wants of children, more educational dollars will be allotted to children who live *281in property-rich towns than to children who live in property-poor towns.” Id., 633.

This court first determined, with respect to the applicable level of scrutiny, that, “in Connecticut the right to education is so basic and fundamental that any infringement of that right must be strictly scrutinized.”33 Id., 646. In so concluding, the court emphasized the presence of a specific education clause in the state constitution, in contrast to the federal constitution, under which education is not a fundamental right. See id., 640-45 (distinguishing and discussing San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 93 S. Ct. 1278, 36 L. Ed. 2d 16 [1973]). The court, therefore, concluded that “the present legislation enacted by the General Assembly to discharge the state’s constitutional duty to educate its children, depending, as it does, primarily on a local property tax base without regard to the disparity in the financial ability of the towns to finance an educational program and with no significant equalizing state support, is not ‘appropriate legislation’ (article eighth, § 1) to implement the requirement that the state provide a substantially equal educational opportunity to its youth in its free public elementary and secondary schools.” Horton I, supra, 172 Conn. *282649. The court left the remedy to the legislature in the first instance, however, noting that “the fashioning of a constitutional system for financing elementary and secondary education in the state is not only the proper function of the legislative department but its expressly mandated duty under the provisions of the constitution of Connecticut, article eighth, § l.”34 Id., 651; see also id. (“[t]he judicial department properly stays its hand to give the legislative department an opportunity to act”).

*283The concurring and dissenting opinions in Horton I demonstrate that, as a basic fundamental point, the entire court agreed that article eighth, § 1, necessarily embodies some qualitative component.

Justice Loiselle dissented from the majority’s holding that education is a fundamental right under the state constitution. Id., 655-56. He characterized the majority’s opinion as “requiring ... an equalized pot of money per town”; id., 658 (Loiselle, J., dissenting); and stated that “the constitution requires free education, and ‘appropriate legislation’ is legislation which makes education free. I will concede that when the constitution says free education it must be interpreted in a reasonable way. A town may not herd children in an *284 open field to hear lectures by illiterates. But there is no contention that such situations exist, or that education in Connecticut is not meaningful or does not measure up to standards accepted by knowledgeable leaders in the field of education.” (Emphasis added.) Id., 658-59. Finally, Justice Loiselle emphasized that “[w]e cannot lose sight of the fact that the issue is not that-our children are not getting a sound education, measured by reasonable standards, which will enable them to exercise fully their rights as citizens of their country. The issue is whether, because our state laws allow some towns to furnish a broader spectrum of choice than other towns desire to furnish or feel financially able to furnish, that the system has to tumble down.” (Emphasis added.) Id., 661. In our view, the various opinions in Horton I support the plaintiffs’ position that the fundamental right to an education is not an empty linguistic shell, but has at least some minimal substantive content. Indeed, Justice Loiselle’s emphasis on the lack of a claim that the plaintiffs in Horton I were not getting a basic education is a harbinger of the plaintiffs’ claims in this appeal.

Our most recent decision with respect to article eighth, § 1, is Sheff v. O’Neill, supra, 238 Conn. 1. In Sheff, we considered claims that severe racial and ethnic isolation in Hartford, as well as the high concentration of poverty there, violated the rights of the plaintiff schoolchildren under article eighth, § 1, and article first, §§ 1 and 20,35 of the state constitution. Id., 3-5. The *285plaintiffs argued that the state bore responsibility for the de facto racial and ethnic segregation between Hartford and its surrounding suburban school districts; id., 5; and also that “the defendants have failed to provide the plaintiffs with an equal opportunity to a free public education as required by article first, §§ 1 and 20, and article eighth, § 1, because the defendants have maintained in Hartford a public school district that, by comparison with surrounding suburban public school districts: (1) is severely educationally disadvantaged; (2) fails to provide equal educational opportunities for Hartford schoolchildren; and (3) fails to provide a minimally adequate education for Hartford schoolchildren.” Id., 6.

On the merits of the plaintiffs’ claims, this court framed the issue as “whether the state has fully satisfied its affirmative constitutional obligation to provide a substantially equal educational opportunity if the state demonstrates that it has substantially equalized school funding and resources.”36 Id., 25. We concluded that, notwithstanding the lack of any invidious intentional conduct on the part of the state in creating the conditions of segregation, “in the context of public education, in which the state has an affirmative obligation to monitor and to equalize educational opportunity, the state’s awareness of existing and increasing severe racial and ethnic isolation imposes upon the state the responsibility to remedy segregation . . . because of race [or] . . . ancestry .... We therefore hold that, textually, article eighth, § 1, as informed by article first, § 20, *286requires the legislature to take affirmative responsibility to remedy segregation in our public schools, regardless of whether that segregation has occurred de jure or de facto.”37 (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 29-30.

We applied the strict scrutiny analysis from Horton v. Meskill, 195 Conn. 24, 38-39, 486 A.2d 1099 (1985) (Horton III); see footnote 34 of this opinion; and noted that the “methodology requires us to balance the legislature’s affirmative constitutional obligation to provide all of the state’s schoolchildren with a substantially equal educational opportunity against the legislature’s recognized significant discretion in matters of public elementary and secondary education.” Sheff v. O’Neill, supra, 238 Conn. 37. Citing statistics with respect to the ethnic and racial composition of the schools’ population, we stated that “the disparities in the racial and ethnic composition of public schools in Hartford and the surrounding communities are more than de minimis . . . [and] jeopardize the plaintiffs’ fundamental right to education.”38 Id., 38-39.

*287

*288In our view, Sheff supports the plaintiffs in the present case. Although not decided as an educational adequacy case, our determination therein that the claim that the government’s failure to fulfill its constitutional responsibilities pursuant to article first, § 20, was justiciable; see footnotes 18 through 24 of this opinion and the accompanying text; as well as our willingness to consider and order judicial remedies for the effect of the segregated conditions in Hartford’s schools on the education of the children there, indicates that this court is willing to protect the state constitutional right to an education afforded under article eighth, § 1.

In contrast, Justice Borden rejected the plaintiffs’ educational adequacy claim in his dissenting opinion, although he concluded that “it is not necessary in this case to decide whether article eighth, § 1, embodies a requirement that the state provide a minimally adequate education or, if it does, the extent to which such a requirement is subject to judicial review . . . [or] to define the specific contours of such an education.” Id., 142. Justice Borden assumed that there was a constitutional right to an adequate education, but rejected the plaintiffs’ reliance on state mastery test scores as a standard for determining whether that right had been violated, noting that, “[n]ot only the trial court’s findings in this case, but also common sense tells me that any appropriate standard by which to measure the state’s assumed obligation to provide a minimally adequate education must be based generally, not on what level of achievement students reach, but on what the state reasonably attempts to make available to them, taking into account any special needs of a particular local school system.” (Emphasis added.) Id., 143.

C

Constitutional History

As noted by the parties and the brief of the amici curiae, Christopher Collier, the state historian emeritus, and Simon J. Bernstein, the principal draftsman and proponent of article eighth, § 1, at the 1965 constitutional convention, Connecticut’s deeply rooted commit*293ment to free public education is well documented. See State ex rel. Huntington v. Huntington School Committee, 82 Conn. 563, 566, 74 A. 882 (1909) (“Connecticut has for centuries recognized it as her right and duty to provide for the proper education of the young”); see also Bissell v. Davison, 65 Conn. 183, 191, 32 A. 348 (1894) (describing education as duty “assumed by the [s]tate . . . chiefly because it is one of great public necessity for the protection and welfare of the [s]tate itself’). Indeed, the Code of Laws for the Colony of Connecticut, promulgated in 1650 and commonly known as the Ludlow Code, recognized that “the good Education of Children is of singular behoofe and benefitt to any Common wealth,” and required families to educate their children “to read the [E]nglish tounge, and knowledge of the Capitall Lawes,” in the “grounds and principles of religion,” and “in some honest lawfull . . . labour or [e]mployment, either in husbandry, or some other trade proffitable for themselves and the Common wealth, if they will not nor cannott traine them [u]p in Learning to fitt them for higher [e]mployments.” Code of Laws, Children (1650), reprinted in 1 Col. Rec. 509, 520-21 (J. Hammond Trumbull ed., 1850).

D

Federal Precedents

Having reviewed those Geisler factors specific to Connecticut, we now turn to a review of those considerations that go beyond our borders. We note, however, that “not every Geisler factor is relevant in all cases.” State v. Morales, supra, 232 Conn. 716 n.10; see also

*297 Kerrigan v. Commissioner of Public Health, 289 Conn. 135, 157, 956 A.2d 1174 (2008) (same). Thus, the lack of a comparable provision in the United States constitution that assures a fundamental right to a free public education renders federal precedent, most significantly San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, supra, 411 U.S. 1, largely inapposite, and this Geisler factor generally is irrelevant to our analysis herein.

Accord*299ingly, we conclude that federal precedent does not inform our analysis of the plaintiffs’ claims in this appeal.

E

Sister State Decisions

A review of the sister state decisions in this area is of paramount importance to this appeal, which presents a question of first impression in an area of constitutional law that uniquely has been the province of the states. Cf. San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, supra, 411 U.S. 133 n.100 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“nothing in the [c]ourt’s decision today should inhibit further review of state educational funding schemes under state constitutional provisions”). The linguistic diversity of the various states’ education clauses; see part II A of this opinion; requires a careful review of the sister state decisions to determine which cases are of greatest precedential significance. Put differently, our analysis must go beyond simply determining the “majority” and “minority” approaches to this issue, and must focus specifically on decisions from states whose constitutional clauses, like article eighth, § 1, do not *300use qualitative language to describe their respective rights to education.48

We begin, then, with New York case law, which, as explained by the amici curiae Campaign for Educational *301Equity et al., is particularly instructive, given the similarity between its broadly worded constitutional provision and ours. New York’s education clause provides simply that “[t]he legislature shall provide for the maintenance and support of a system of free common schools, wherein all the children of this state may be educated.” N.Y. Const., art. XI, § 1. In 1995, the New York Court of Appeals addressed a claim that the “[s]tate’s educational financing scheme fails to provide public school students in the [c]ity of New York ... an opportunity to obtain a sound basic education as required by the [s]tate [constitution.” Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State, 86 N.Y.2d 307, 314, 655 N.E.2d 661, 631 N.Y.S.2d 565 (1995) (Campaign I). In the context of a motion to dismiss, an analogue to our motion to strike, the court concluded that New York’s education clause “requires the [s]tate to offer all children the opportunity of a sound basic education .... Such an education should consist of the basic literacy, calculating, and verbal skills necessary to enable children to eventually function productively as civic participants capable of voting and serving on a jury. If the physical facilities and pedagogical services and resources made available under the present system are adequate to provide children with the opportunity to obtain these essential skills, the [s]tate will have satisfied its constitutional obligation.” (Citation omitted.) Id., 316. The court further emphasized that “[t]he state must assure that some essentials are provided,” specifically, “minimally adequate physical facilities and classrooms which provide enough light, space, heat, and air to permit children to learn. Children should have access to minimally adequate instrumentalities of learning such as desks, chairs, pencils, and reasonably current textbooks. Children are also entitled to minimally adequate teaching of reasonably up-to-date basic curricula such as reading, writing, mathematics, science, and social studies, by sufficient personnel adequately trained to teach those *302subject areas.” Id., 317. The court did not, however, “attempt to definitively specify what the constitutional concept and mandate of a sound basic education entails” because of the early procedural posture of the case, which lacked a developed factual record.49 Id.

These cases are illustrative, as our research has revealed that those state courts that have reached the *309merits of the issue54 overwhelmingly have held that there is a floor with respect to the adequacy of the education provided pursuant to their states’ education clauses; that education must be in some way “minimally adequate” or “soundly basic.”55 Furthermore, many of *310these decisions have articulated comprehensive standards that have defined the components of a constitutionally adequate education, which provide us with further guidance as we consider the merits of this appeal. See part III of this opinion.

F

Economic and Sociological Public Policy Considerations

Finally, we address the sixth Geisler factor, which requires consideration of the economic and sociological concerns presented by this appeal.56 The plaintiffs, sup*311ported by several of the amici, cite statistics linking higher education and productive employment, given the changing structure of Connecticut’s economy, and argue that an education suitable to prepare students for higher education is necessary because students without higher education are more likely to wind up unemployed. The plaintiffs also cite statistics demonstrating that citizens without high school diplomas or higher education are less likely to vote in elections. In response, the defendants do not dispute that education should be, and is a high social priority, as shown by the fact that education already is the second highest appropriation in the state budget. They do, however, cite standardized testing statistics from the United States Department of Education indicating that Connecticut’s students already have a “ ‘better-than-average chance for success at every stage’ of their educational trajectory,” and emphasize that our students already perform above the national average on standardized tests. Emphasizing that the trial court has left intact the plaintiffs’ equal protection claim, they argue that it is unlikely that judicial intervention will remedy the imperfections that do exist in the system, and likely would result in its upheaval, which would “stifle educational innovation” by reducing local control. Finally, the defendants reiterate their argument that the “prudential concerns” with respect to the enforcement of a right to a suitable education, namely, the complications *312attendant to supplanting the legislature with the judiciary as the primary education policy making body, favor their restrictive interpretation of article eighth, § 1. Although we acknowledge the prudential concerns that will attend the crafting of a remedy for a constitutional violation that may well be found in this case, we nevertheless conclude that this sixth Geisler factor favors the plaintiffs.

In addressing the problems wrought by racial and ethnic school segregation, we previously have acknowledged the policy behind public education, quoting the United States Supreme Court and stating that “a sound education is the very foundation of good citizenship. Today it is a principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing him for later professional training, and in helping him to adjust normally to his environment.

Ill

The wealth of information yielded by our Geisler analysis has served well to explain the ambiguous text of Connecticut’s education clause, article eighth, § 1, of our state constitution. Thus, we conclude that article eighth, § 1, entitles Connecticut public school students to an education suitable to give them the opportunity to be responsible citizens able to participate fully in democratic institutions, such as jury service and voting. A constitutionally adequate education also will leave Connecticut’s students prepared to progress to institutions of higher education, or to attain productive employment and otherwise contribute to the state’s *315economy.58 To satisfy this standard, the state, through the local school districts, must provide students with an objectively “meaningful opportunity” to receive the benefits of this constitutional right. Neeley v. West Orange-Cove Consolidated Independent School District, supra, 176 S.W.3d 787 (“[t]he public education *316system need not operate perfectly; it is adequate if districts are reasonably able to provide their students the access and opportunity the district court described” [emphasis in original]); see also Sheff v. O'Neill, supra, 238 Conn. 143 (Borden, J., dissenting) (constitutional adequacy determined not by “what level of achievement students reach, but on what the state reasonably attempts to make available to them, taking into account any special needs of a particular local school system”). Moreover, we agree with the New York Court of Appeals’ explication of the “essential” components requisite to this constitutionally adequate education, namely: (1) “minimally adequate physical facilities and classrooms which provide enough light, space, heat, and air to permit children to learn”; (2) “minimally adequate instrumentalities of learning such as desks, chairs, pencils, and reasonably current textbooks”; (3) “minimally adequate teaching of reasonably up-to-date basic curricula such as reading, writing, mathematics, science, and social studies”; and (4) “sufficient personnel adequately trained to teach those subject areas.” Campaign I, supra, 86 N.Y.2d 317; see also, e.g., Abbeville County School District v. State, supra, 335 S.C. 68 (state constitution requires provision to students of “adequate and safe facilities in which they have the opportunity to acquire: [1] the ability to read, write, and speak the English language, and knowledge of mathematics and physical science; [2] a fundamental knowledge of economic, social, and political systems, and of history and governmental processes; and [3] academic and vocational skills”); Pauley v. Kelly, 162 W. Va. 672, 706, 255 S.E.2d 859 (1979) (provision of constitutionally adequate education “implicitly]” requires “supportive services: [1] good physical facilities, instructional materials and personnel; [2] careful state and local supervision to prevent waste and to monitor pupil, teacher and administrative competency”).

*317

We conclude, therefore, that the trial court improperly granted the defendants’ motion to strike because further proceedings are required to determine as a question of fact whether the state’s educational resources and standards have in fact provided the public school students in this case with constitutionally suitable educational opportunities.

The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded for further proceedings according to law.

In this opinion KATZ and SCHALLER, Js., concurred.

PALMER, J.,

concurring in the judgment. I agree with the plaintiffs1 that their claims under article eighth, § 1, of the Connecticut constitution2 are justiciable. I also conclude that the right embodied in that provision is a *321substantive one that requires the state3 to provide an educational opportunity to the students of our free public elementary and secondary schools that, at the least, is minimally adequate by modem educational standards.4 Consequently, like the plurality, I also conclude that the judgment of the trial court must be reversed. I am unable to join the plurality opinion, however, primarily because I take a different view from the plurality with respect to the scope of the right guaranteed by article eighth, § 1. In particular, I believe that the executive and legislative branches are entitled to considerable deference with respect to the determination of what it means, in practice, to provide for a minimally adequate, free public education. Thus, it is the prerogative of the legislature to determine, within reasonable limits, what a minimally adequate education entails. Consequently, in my view, the plaintiffs will not be able to prevail on their claims unless they are able to establish that what the state has done to discharge its obligations under article eighth, § 1, is so lacking as to be unreasonable by any fair or objective standard. As I explain more fully hereinafter, any other approach, including the approach that the plurality advocates, would permit the judicial branch to second-guess the reasoned judgment of the legislative and executive branches with respect to the education policy of this state, thereby depriving those *322branches of their “recognized significant discretion in matters of public elementary and secondary education.” Sheff v. O’Neill, 238 Conn. 1, 37, 678 A.2d 1267 (1996).

II

THE CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARD

By its terms, article eighth, § 1, of the state constitution is not merely precatoiy or hortatory. On the contrary, it imposes an affirmative, mandatory obligation on the legislature to enact legislation appropriate to the task of maintaining a system of free public elementary and secondary schools. The issue, therefore, is whether article eighth, § 1, obligates the state to ensure that those free public schools provide to the students attending them an educational opportunity of a certain level or quality. I believe that it does.

For several reasons, I am unable to conclude that article eighth, § 1, is satisfied as long as the state maintains a system of public elementary and secondary schools no matter how fundamentally inadequate some or all of those schools may be. It is apparent that Simon Bernstein, one of the delegates at the state constitutional convention of 1965, and other delegates who supported the idea of constitutionalizing the right to free public schools were proud of Connecticut’s long-standing commitment to the education of its schoolchildren, and they urged their colleagues to support the proposed right as an expression of the state’s continued recognition of that responsibility. See Proceedings of the Connecticut Constitutional Convention (1965), Pt. 1, p. 312, remarks of Bernstein (“[w]e have a great history and tradition requiring that the public body supply our chil*330dren with free public education”); Proceedings of the Connecticut Constitutional Convention (1965), Pt. 3, p. 1039, remarks of Bémstein (noting this state’s educational “tradition which goes back to our earliest days of a free good public education”); see also id., p. 1062, remarks of Chase Going Woodhouse (“it is extremely fitting that we should finally put into our [constitution a reference to our great public schools because Henry Barnard of Connecticut is perhaps one of the greatest historical figures in this development of public school education in this whole nation of ours”). To presume, therefore, that the legislature may, if it chooses, establish and maintain manifestly inferior or substandard public schools would be inconsistent with the purpose underlying article eighth, § 1, namely, to underscore the importance of free public schools by elevating that principle to constitutional status. See, e.g., id., p. 1039, remarks of Bernstein (“I submitted a resolution . . . which pertained to the subject of education . . . and the statement of purpose of that resolution . . . was that our system of free public education have a tradition [of] acceptance on a par with our bill of rights and it should have the same [constitutional sanctity. It was because our [constitution had no reference to our school system that I submitted my resolution and of course others were aware of the same [omission] in our [constitution and other similar resolutions were submitted. . . . [W]e have [had] good public schools so that this again is not anything revolutionary, it is something which we have, it is which is [in] practically all [constitutions in the [s]tates of our nation and Connecticut with its great tradition certainly ought to honor this principle.”). Moreover, a contrary determination would be incompatible with the requirement of article eighth, § 1, that the legislature shall implement a system of free public elementary and secondary schools by “appropriate” legislation, a mandate that suggests that *331the delegates contemplated the establishment of free public schools of at least some measure or level of quality. Indeed, it would do violence to the meaning of the term “school,”11 as a place where students go to learn, to conclude that the legislature is free to establish and maintain a system of public education that is not even minimally adequate to meet the needs of those students.

Finally, I agree with Justice Schaller that our determination in Horton I concerning the right to an equal educational opportunity informs our determination of whether that right also includes a qualitative component. As Justice Schaller explains in his concurring opinion: “To be sure, the court concluded in Horton I only that the plaintiffs [in that case] were entitled to receive an education that was substantially equal in quality to the education that was provided to other children, not that they were guaranteed an education meeting a minimum qualitative standard. ... It is not possible to infer generally from a requirement of equality a requirement of adequacy. On the other hand, the idea that it is the quality of education to which Connecticut children have an equal right, rather than merely equality in education financing, supports the general proposition that the interest that children have in the fundamental right to education guaranteed by [article eighth, § 1] is inextricably linked to the quality of the education provided. Put another way, our conclusion in Horton I that the plaintiffs [in that case] had a right to substantially equal educational funding is based on the right to an education of substantially equal quality. The notion that children have a right to an education of substantially equal quality presupposes that ‘quality’ is an essential component of [article eighth, § 1]. We *332cannot fairly separate the right to education from the right to a quality education.” (Citation omitted; emphasis in original.) Thus, implicit in the right to an equal educational opportunity in our free public elementary and secondary schools is the right to an education that, at the least, satisfies minimum qualitative standards.

Having determined that article eighth, § 1, contains a qualitative component, the following question remains: What is the nature and scope of the right guaranteed under that provision? For the reasons that follow, I conclude, first, that the right established under article eighth, § 1, requires only that the legislature establish and maintain a minimally adequate system of free public schools. I also conclude that the legislature is entitled to considerable deference with respect to both its conception of the scope of the right and its implementation of the right.

A number of considerations support the conclusion that the right under article eighth, § 1, places no greater an obligation on the legislature than to provide a minimally adequate educational opportunity to this state’s public elementary and secondary school students. First, article eighth, § 1, contains no language that mandates any particular standard or otherwise purports to delineate expressly the parameters of the right to a minimally adequate education. At first blush, the framer’s omission of such language might appear to be neutral with respect to the issue of the scope of the right created under article eighth, § 1. As the plurality has observed, however, the analogous provisions of a majority of state constitutions require the legislatures in those states to establish and maintain schools of a certain caliber, level or quality. See, e.g., Ark. Const., art. 14, § 1 (state must maintain “a general, suitable and efficient system of free public schools”); Colo. Const., art. IX, § 2 (legislature directed to provide for “a thorough and uniform system of free public schools”); Fla. Const., art. IX, § 1 (a) (state *333shall provide for “a uniform, efficient, safe, secure, and high quality system of free public schools that allows students to obtain a high quality education”); Idaho Const., art. IX, § 1 (legislature shall provide for “a general, uniform and thorough system of public, free common schools”); 111. Const., art. X, § 1 (“[t]he state shall provide for an efficient system of high quality public educational institutions and services”); Minn. Const., art. XIII, § 1 (legislature shall provide for “a thorough and efficient system of public schools”); Mont. Const., art. X, § 1, para. 3 (“[t]he legislature shall provide a basic system of free quality public elementary and secondary schools”); N.J. Const., art. VIII, § IV, para. 1 (“[t]he [legislature shall provide for the maintenance and support of a thorough and efficient system of free public schools”); Ohio Const., art. VI, § 2 (Ohio General Assembly shall make provisions for “a thorough and efficient system of common schools throughout the state”); Va. Const., art. VIII, § 1 (“[t]he General Assembly . . . shall seek to ensure that an educational program of high quality is established and continually maintained”); W. Va. Const., art. XII, § 1 (legislature “shall provide, by general law, for a thorough and efficient system of free schools”); Wyo. Const., art. 7, § 1 (“[t]he [legislature shall provide for the establishment and maintenance of a complete and uniform system of public instruction”). In Connecticut, however, we have elected to establish the constitutional right to a free public education without reference to any substantive or qualitative requirement. Although I am not persuaded that the absence of such language in article eighth, § 1, reflects an intent by the framers that our public elementary and secondary schools need not meet any minimum or threshold qualitative standard, the fact that article eighth, § 1, contains no such language is nevertheless reason for this court to refrain from defining the right too broadly or expansively.

*334Furthermore, article eighth, § 2, of the Connecticut constitution, which, like article eighth, § 1, was adopted at the 1965 constitutional convention, requires that the state “maintain a system of higher education, including The University of Connecticut, which shall be dedicated to excellence in higher education.” (Emphasis added.) The fact that this provision makes reference to a particular qualitative standard supports an inference that the framers intentionally drafted article eighth, § 1, in non-substantive terms and further counsels against an expansive interpretation of article eighth, § 1.

The history of article eighth, § 1, also indicates that the framers themselves did not believe that they were establishing a broad, new right. For example, the main sponsor of the proposed provision, Bernstein, urged its adoption because the other states already had seen fit to include similar provisions in their state constitutions. See Proceedings of the Connecticut Constitutional Convention, supra, Pt. 3, p. 1039, remarks of Bernstein. Indeed, Bernstein expressly stated that the principle embodied in his proposal was “not anything revolutionary.” Id.; see also id., p. 1040, remarks of Albert E. Waugh (explaining that because Connecticut was only state not to have constitutional provision establishing right to free public education, adoption of proposed amendment was “natural and proper thing to do”). Thus, the intent and purpose of the framers, as reflected in the proceedings of the 1965 constitutional convention, coupled with the language of article eighth, § 1, strongly suggest that a particularly demanding qualitative requirement was not a matter of paramount importance. These considerations, taken together, nevertheless support the conclusion that article eighth, § 1, contemplates free public elementary and secondary schools that, at the least, are minimally adequate.

VERTEFEUILLE, J.,

dissenting. I agree with the plurality’s conclusion that the claim by the plaintiffs, the Connecticut Coalition for Justice in Education Funding, Inc., and numerous parents and their public school children, that the defendants, Governor M. Jodi Rell and various state officials and members of the state board of education,1 have violated article eighth, § 1, of the Connecticut constitution by failing to provide the schoolchildren with suitable educational opportunities is justiciable. I also agree that this court’s decision in State v. Geisler, 222 Conn. 672, 684-86, 610 A.2d 1225 (1992), sets forth the factors to be considered in *384determining the scope of the right guaranteed by the constitutional provision. I disagree, however, with the plurality’s conclusion that the Geisler factors support the view that “article eighth, § 1, entitles Connecticut public school students to an education suitable to give them the opportunity to be responsible citizens able to participate fully in democratic institutions, such as jury service and voting,” and that, to be constitutionally adequate, that education must “leave Connecticut’s students prepared to progress to institutions of higher education, or to attain productive employment and otherwise contribute to the state’s economy.” Instead, I would conclude that the constitutional requirement that “[t]here shall always be free public elementary and secondary schools in the state”; Conn. Const., art. VIII, § 2; was intended to ensure the perpetuation of Connecticut’s statewide system of free public schools, and was not intended to guarantee a “suitable” education as interpreted by the majority. I therefore would conclude that the trial court properly granted the defendants’ motion to strike counts one, two and four of the plaintiffs’ complaint.

*399ZARELLA, J., with whom McLACHLAN, J.,

joins, dissenting. This case presents this court with a rare opportunity to consider the experience of our sister states in deciding whether to become involved in the resolution of an issue that raises important philosophical and practical questions regarding the legitimate exercise of judicial power. Rather than examining and learning from this experience, however, a majority of this court has elected to ignore it, thus setting the court on a path that will lead to decades of confusion and produce a trail of wasteful litigation. James Madison warned in the Federalist Papers that judges must refrain from lawmaking: “Were the power of judging joined with the legislative . . . the judge would then be the legislator.” The Federalist No. 47 (James Madison). Yet that is what will come to pass as a result of the court’s conclusion that the plaintiffs’1 stricken claims are justiciable under Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217, 82 S. Ct. 691, 7 L. Ed. 2d 663 (1962). Judges will become legislators because courts will now be allowed, and very likely required, to define minimum educational “inputs” and “outputs” in order to determine whether the state has satisfied its purported constitutional mandate to provide Connecticut schoolchildren with a “suitable” education, a task that involves educational policy making and demands specialized skills that courts do not possess. In concluding that the plaintiffs’ claims do not involve a political question, this court misinterprets our case law and dismisses the clear distinctions between the plaintiffs’ claims and the claims adjudicated by this court in Sheff v. O’Neill, 238 Conn. 1, 678 A.2d 1267 (1996), and Seymour v. Region One Board of Educa *400 tion, 261 Conn. 475, 803 A.2d 318 (2002). More importantly, this court disregards the plain language of article eighth, § 1, which directs the General Assembly, not the judiciary, to implement the principle of “free public elementary and secondary” education by enacting “appropriate legislation.” The most immediate practical effect of the court’s decision is that it will take control of educational matters from local boards of education and vest it with the courts, a result that the framers of article eighth, § 1, could not have possibly envisioned. Moreover, it will require the legislature to appropriate at least $2 billion per year in additional funding to ensure that Connecticut schoolchildren will be provided with the resources allegedly required for a suitable education. See part III D of this opinion. Thus, by extending judicial authority into areas expressly reserved to the legislature, this court’s ruling in the present case sets a dangerous precedent that will create a quagmire of uncertainty with respect to future controversies regarding the boundaries of judicial and legislative power in matters concerning education. Because I cannot agree with this clear violation of the separation of powers, I respectfully dissent.2

*401

Ill

APPLICATION OF THE BAKER FACTORS

A

Textually Demonstrable Commitment to the Legislature

I begin by noting that article eighth, § 1, does not refer to a “suitable” education or to an “adequate” education, nor does any other constitutional provision suggest that the state is obligated to provide Connecticut schoolchildren with a suitable or minimum standard of education. Even the plurality ultimately concedes in its discussion of the first Geisler factor that the defendants’3 inteipretation of the constitutional text to mean that it does not confer a right to suitable educational opportunities is reasonable in the absence of an affirmative provision regarding a minimum educational standard. Consequently, I would initially conclude that the plaintiffs’ claims are nonjusticiable because there is no explicit basis in the constitution for the right to a suitable education.

The lack of such a provision is consistent with the purpose of article eighth, § 1. As this court noted in Sheff, “[t]he primary motivation for the addition of arti-

*405cle eighth, § 1, to the constitution in 1965 appears to have been the realization that Connecticut was the only state in the nation that did not provide an express right to public elementary and secondary education in its constitution. See [Proceedings of the Connecticut Constitutional Convention (1965), Pt. 3] pp. 1039-40, remarks of [Simon Bernstein].” Sheff v. O’Neill, supra, 238 Conn. 30-31. Bernstein, a delegate to the constitutional convention and the proponent of article eighth, § 1, explained during a debate on the matter that he had submitted a similar resolution earlier in the proceedings and that the purpose of the resolution was to ensure “that our system of free public education have a tradition [of] acceptance on a par with our bill of rights and it should have the same [constitutional sanctity.4 It was because our [c]onstitution had no reference to our school system that I submitted my resolution and of course others were aware of the same [omission] in our [c]onstitution and other similar resolutions were submitted. . . . Connecticut with its great tradition certainly ought to honor this principle. ... I can’t possibly see any dispute over the principle involved, [as] it is such a basic principle that it should be in the [constitution.” Proceedings of the Connecticut Constitutional Convention (1965), Pt. 3, pp. 1039-40. The only other delegate to speak on the proposed provision explained that he supported it because Connecticut was the only state in the nation in which the constitution made no reference to elementary and secondary education, and, therefore, adopting the amendment seemed like the “natural and proper thing to do.” Id., p. 1040, *406remarks of Albert E. Waugh. Thus, the delegates gave no thought to the question of educational quality, their intent simply being to elevate the general principle of a free public elementary and secondary education to the status of a constitutional right, as every other jurisdiction in the nation had done.5 Indeed, if it had been the intent and purpose of the delegates to adopt a constitutional provision that would guarantee students a minimum standard of education or level of educational achievement, one would have expected such a controversial concept to have been mentioned and fiercely debated. An examination of the proceedings, however, indicates that the very brief discussion that occurred when Bernstein introduced the provision that became article eighth, § 1, was entirely about constitutionalizing the right to a free public education, not the right to a minimum standard of education or level of educational achievement. See Proceedings of the Connecticut Constitutional Convention (1965), Pt. 1, pp. 310-13; Proceedings of the Connecticut Constitutional Convention (1965), Pt. 3, pp. 1038-41. To that end, Bernstein repeatedly emphasized that the purpose of the proposed provi*407sion was to secure nothing more than the right to a “free public education,” adding that the principle ought to be honored because it was “not anything revolutionary . . . .” Proceedings of the Connecticut Constitutional Convention (1965), Pt. 3, p. 1039; see also Sheff v. O'Neill, supra, 120 (Borden, J., dissenting) (“[Bernstein] made clear that [article eighth, § 1] was intended only to constitutionalize the then existing system of free public education” [emphasis added]). Accordingly, in the absence of an affirmative statement of a governmental obligation to provide Connecticut schoolchildren with a minimum standard of education, there is no textual basis or historical support for the judicial enforcement of such a right. See, e.g., Moore v. Ganim, 233 Conn. 557, 595, 660 A.2d 742 (1995) (“We are especially hesitant to read into the constitution unenumerated affirmative governmental obligations. In general, the declaration of rights in our state constitution was implemented not to impose affirmative obligations on the government . . . but rather to secure individual liberties against direct infringement through state action.”).

Our decisions in Horton v. Meskill, 172 Conn. 615, 376 A.2d 359 (1977) (Horton I), and Horton v. Meskill, 195 Conn. 24, 486 A.2d 1099 (1985) (Horton III), are distinguishable because the constitutional challenge in *411those cases was brought under both article eighth, § 1, and the equal protection provisions of the state constitution, namely, article first, §§ 1 and 20. See, e.g., Horton v. Meskill, supra, 172 Conn. 621. The right to equal protection, as with most other rights guaranteed by the state constitution, differs from the right to education because it is a “negative” right, that is, a right granted to the individual on which the government may not infringe. State ex rel. Morrison v. Sebelius, 285 Kan. 875, 894, 179 P.3d 366 (2008). The judiciary almost always can protect a negative constitutional right by ordering the government to cease the infringement, either by striking the offending statute or by prohibiting the offending act. Id. In contrast, a person alleging that the legislature has failed to perform an affirmative duty must seek a judicial remedy that mandates the performance of that duty. Id. Our precedent, however, particularly in Simmons, in which this court declined to intervene even though the constitution specifically declared that the University of Connecticut shall be dedicated to excellence; see Simmons v. Budds, supra, 165 Conn. 514; compels this court to refrain from interfering in the present dispute because the duty to implement the principle of a free public education is clearly committed to the legislature.

*426

Accordingly, because I conclude that the plaintiffs’ claims are nonjusticiable, I respectfully dissent.