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State Constitutional Law: The Connecticut Constitution
State v. Santiago, 318 Conn. 1 (2015) - Majority Opinion
318 Conn. 1
Supreme Court of Connecticut.
STATE of Connecticut
v.
Eduardo SANTIAGO.*
No. 17413.
Argued April 23, 2013.
Decided Aug. 25, 2015.
Synopsis
Background: Defendant was convicted in the Superior Court, Judicial District of Hartford, Lavine, J., of capital felony, two counts of burglary in the first degree, conspiracy to commit murder and two counts of conspiracy to commit burglary in the first degree and was sentenced to death after the Court, Solomon, J., had earlier made pretrial determination that there was probable cause that defendant had committed capital felony by murder for hire. Defendant appealed. The Supreme Court, 305 Conn. 101, 49 A.3d 566, Norcott, J., affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for new penalty phase hearing. Defendant filed motion for reconsideration, which was granted.
Holdings: The Supreme Court, Palmer J., held that:
1 as a matter of first impression, following its prospective abolition, death penalty no longer comported with contemporary standards of decency and, thus, violated state constitutional ban on excessive and disproportionate punishment as applied to capital sentences already imposed;
2 as a matter of first impression, following its prospective abolition, death penalty no longer measurably contributed to legitimate penological goals and, thus, violated state constitutional ban on cruel and unusual punishment, as applied to capital sentences already imposed;
3 parties were afforded adequate opportunity for briefing prior to Supreme Court's determination;
4 Supreme Court was not precluded from determining that, in light of its prospective abolition, death penalty violated state constitutional ban on excessive and disproportionate punishment, as applied to capital sentences already imposed, by fact that there was historical acceptance of capital punishment in state; and
5 Supreme Court was not precluded, out of deference to legislature, from determining that, in light of its prospective abolition, death penalty violated state constitutional ban on excessive and disproportionate punishment as applied to capital sentences already imposed.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
Norcott and McDonald, JJ., filed concurring opinion.
Eveleigh, J., filed concurring opinion.
Rogers, C.J., filed dissenting opinion.
Zarella, J., with whom Espinosa, J., joined, filed dissenting opinion.
Espinosa, J., filed dissenting opinion.
Attorneys and Law Firms
**8 Mark Rademacher, assistant public defender, for the appellant (defendant).
Harry Weller, senior assistant state's attorney, with whom were Matthew A. Weiner, deputy assistant state's attorney, and, on the brief, Kevin T. Kane, chief state's attorney, Gail P. Hardy, state's attorney, Susan C. Marks, supervisory assistant state's attorney, and Marjorie Allen Dauster, Donna Mambrino and John F. Fahey, senior assistant state's attorneys, for the appellee (state).
Constance de la Vega, pro hac vice, and Hope R. Metcalf, New Haven, filed a brief for experts on international human rights and comparative law as amicus curiae.
Alex V. Hernandez and Brian W. Stull filed a brief for legal historians and scholars as amicus curiae.
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Sandra J. Staub
Dockets:36
Cases:28
Appellate Court Documents:9
See Full Profile
Sandra J. Staub, David J. McGuire and Lauren R. Masotta filed a brief for the American Civil Liberties Union Foundation of Connecticut as amicus curiae.
Kent S. Scheidegger, pro hac vice, and Judith Rossi, Rocky Hill, filed a brief for the Criminal Justice Legal Foundation as amicus curiae.
ROGERS, C.J., and NORCOTT, PALMER, ZARELLA, EVELEIGH, McDONALD and ESPINOSA, Js.**
Opinion
PALMER, J.
Although the death penalty has been a fixture of Connecticut's criminal law since early colonial times, public opinion concerning it has long been divided. In 2009, growing opposition to capital punishment led the legislature to enact Public Acts 2009, No. 09–107 (P.A. 09–107), which would have repealed the death penalty for all crimes committed on or after the date of enactment but retained the death penalty for capital felonies committed prior to that date. Then Governor M. Jodi Rell vetoed P.A. 09–107, however, and it did not become law. Three years later, in 2012, the *8 legislature passed a materially identical act that prospectively repealed the death penalty; see Public Acts 2012, No. 12–5 (P.A. 12–5); and, this time, Governor Dannel P. Malloy signed it into law. During the public hearings on both P.A. 09–107 and P.A. 12–5, supporters argued that the proposed legislation represented a measured and lawful approach to the issue. Others raised serious concerns, however, as to whether, following a prospective only repeal, the imposition of the death penalty would violate the state constitutional prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. Perhaps most notably, Chief State's Attorney Kevin T. Kane, who serves as this state's chief law enforcement officer and represents the state in the present case, testified before the legislature that such a statute could not pass constitutional muster.1 Additionally, the **10 Division of Criminal Justice submitted written testimony, in which it advised the legislature that a prospective only repeal would be a “fiction” and that, “[i]n reality, it would effectively abolish the death penalty for anyone who has not yet been executed because it would be untenable as a matter of constitutional law.... [A]ny death penalty that has been imposed and not carried out would effectively *9 be nullified.”2 In the present appeal, the defendant, Eduardo Santiago, raises similar claims, contending that, following the decision by the elected branches to abolish capital punishment for all crimes committed on or after April 25, 2012, it would be unconstitutionally cruel and unusual to execute offenders who committed capital crimes before that date. Upon careful consideration of the defendant's claims in light of the governing constitutional principles and Connecticut's unique historical and legal landscape, we are persuaded that, following its prospective abolition, this state's death penalty no longer comports with contemporary standards of decency and no longer serves any legitimate penological purpose. For these reasons, execution of those offenders who committed capital felonies prior to April 25, 2012, would violate the state constitutional prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.
Following a trial on charges that included capital felony in violation of General Statutes (Rev. to 1999) § 53a–54b (2)3 and General Statutes § 53a–8, a jury found the defendant guilty as charged, and the trial court, Lavine, J., rendered judgment accordingly.4 The court then conducted a penalty phase hearing pursuant to General Statutes (Rev. to 1999) § 53a–46a, at which the jury found the existence of an aggravating factor, one or more jurors found the existence of one or more mitigating factors, and the jury found that the aggravating factor outweighed the mitigating factor or factors. *10 The trial court thereupon imposed a sentence of death,5 and the defendant appealed to this court from both the judgment of conviction and the death sentence. See State v. Santiago, 305 Conn. 101, 117–18, 49 A.3d 566 (2012) (Santiago I ). While the appeal was pending, the legislature repealed the death penalty for all crimes committed on or after the effective date of the repeal, April 25, 2012. See P.A. 12–5. On June 12, 2012, this court ultimately affirmed the judgment of conviction but reversed the sentence of death and remanded the case for a new penalty phase hearing on the ground that the defendant had been deprived of the opportunity to review and use certain potentially mitigating evidence. See State v. Santiago, supra, at 215, 308, 49 A.3d 566. Thereafter, the defendant filed a motion for reconsideration in which he asked **11 this court to consider, among other things, whether the prospective repeal leads inexorably to the conclusion that capital punishment has ceased to comport with state constitutional requirements. The adoption of P.A. 12–5, when considered in light of the history of capital punishment in our state and other recent legal developments, compels us to conclude that the death penalty now constitutes cruel and unusual punishment, in violation of the state constitution. Consequently, we reverse the judgment of the trial court with respect to the sentence of death on the capital felony count and remand the case to that court with direction to sentence the defendant to life imprisonment without the possibility of release on that count.6
The underlying facts of this case, which are set forth in detail in Santiago I, may be summarized briefly as *11 follows. In December, 2000, Mark Pascual agreed to give the defendant a snowmobile from Pascual's repair shop if the defendant would kill the victim, Joseph Niwinski, for whose girlfriend Pascual had developed romantic feelings. Id., at 121, 49 A.3d 566. That same month, with the assistance of Pascual and another friend, the defendant entered the victim's apartment and shot and killed the victim as he slept. Id., at 123, 49 A.3d 566. The defendant was charged with, among other things, the capital felony of “murder committed by a defendant who is hired to commit the same for pecuniary gain,” in violation of § 53a–54b (2).
In his original appeal to this court, the defendant raised numerous challenges to his conviction of capital felony and his conviction on other charges, as well as his death sentence. Id., at 142–46, 49 A.3d 566. This court affirmed the defendant's conviction on all counts; see id., at 118, 143, 308, 49 A.3d 566; and declined his invitation to revisit our prior decisions holding that the death penalty is not a per se violation of the Connecticut constitution.7 Id., at 307, 49 A.3d 566. We also concluded, however, that the trial court, Solomon, J., improperly had failed to disclose to the defendant certain confidential records in the possession of the Department of Children and Families that were mitigating in nature. Id., at 215, 239–41, 49 A.3d 566. Accordingly, we reversed the trial court's judgment with respect to the sentence of death and remanded the case to the trial court for a new penalty phase hearing. Id., at 241, 308, 49 A.3d 566.
While the defendant's appeal was pending in this court, the legislature passed and the governor signed P.A. 12–5, which repealed the death penalty for all crimes committed on or after the date of passage, April *12 25, 2012. See generally P.A. 12–5. Shortly before we released our opinion in Santiago I, the defendant filed a motion for permission to file a supplemental brief in support of his argument that the prospective abolition of capital punishment barred the state from seeking the death penalty at his new penalty phase hearing. See State v. Santiago, supra, at 307–308 n. 167, 49 A.3d 566. Specifically, the defendant sought review of what we characterized as four “new appellate claims,” the **12 first of which was that, “although his crimes were committed prior to the effective date of [P.A. 12–5], that legislation nevertheless ‘represents a fundamental change in the contemporary standard[s] of decency in Connecticut and a rejection of the penological justifications for the death penalty,’ rendering the death penalty now cruel and unusual punishment....” Id., at 308 n. 167, 49 A.3d 566.
We denied the defendant's motion, concluding that his new appellate claims would be more appropriately addressed in the context of a postjudgment motion. See id. Thereafter, the defendant filed such a motion, in which he sought reconsideration of our decision in Santiago I. In support of his motion, he again maintained, among other things, that P.A. 12–5 “represents a fundamental change in the contemporary standard[s] of decency in Connecticut and a rejection of the penological justifications for the death penalty, eliminating the constitutional prerequisites to the validity of the death penalty, such that it is now cruel and unusual punishment forbidden by ... article first, §§ 8 and 9, of the [state] constitution....” The defendant also urged this court to order supplemental briefing and further oral argument on this and related issues, particularly in light of the fact that the constitutionality of imposing the death penalty following a prospective only repeal presents a question of first impression in Connecticut and one that, to our knowledge, no jurisdiction has addressed comprehensively in the modern era. See *13 State v. Santiago, Conn. Supreme Court Records & Briefs, April Term, 2013, Amicus Brief of the American Civil Liberties Union Foundation of Connecticut p. 2. We granted the defendant's motion for reconsideration and request for supplemental briefing and further oral argument without limitation.8
On reconsideration, although the defendant focuses on the claim that P.A. 12–5 creates an impermissible and arbitrary distinction between individuals who committed murders before and after April 25, 2012, in light of the prospective abolition of capital punishment, he also asks this court to “exercise its independent judgment as to the current acceptability of the death penalty in Connecticut.” Specifically, he argues that the enactment of P.A. 12–5 means that “the death penalty is no longer consistent with standards of decency in Connecticut and does not serve any valid penological objective.” That claim is the sole issue that we address herein.9
note 9: [paraphrasing:] Because we conclude that the state constitution's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment no longer permits the imposition of the death penalty, we need not address the defendant's other claims - principally, that imposing the death penalty on a person who committed a capital felony before 4/25/12 but not after would violate the state and federal equal protection clauses, as well as many other provisions.
**13 *14 Public Act 12–5 not only reflects this state's longstanding aversion to carrying out executions, but also represents the seminal change in the four century long history of capital punishment in Connecticut. Accompanying this dramatic departure are a host of other important developments that have transpired over the past several years. Historians have given us new chronicles of the history and devolution of the death penalty in Connecticut. Legal scholars have provided new understandings of the original meaning of the constitutional prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments. Social scientists repeatedly have confirmed that the risk of capital punishment falls disproportionately on people of color and other disadvantaged groups. Meanwhile, nationally, the number of executions and the number of states that allow the death penalty continue to decline, and convicted capital felons in this state remain on death row for decades with every likelihood that they will not be executed for many years to come, if ever. Finally, it has become apparent that the dual federal constitutional requirements applicable to all capital sentencing schemes—namely, that the jury be provided with objective standards to guide its sentence, on the one hand, and that it be accorded unfettered discretion to impose a sentence of less than death, on the other—are fundamentally in conflict and inevitably open the door to impermissible racial and ethnic biases. For all these reasons, and in light of the apparent intent of the legislature in prospectively repealing the death penalty and this state's failure to implement and operate a fair and functional system of capital punishment, we conclude that the state constitution no longer permits the execution of individuals sentenced to death *15 for crimes committed prior to the enactment of P.A. 12–5.
In part I of this opinion, we review the scope, nature, and history of the protections from cruel and unusual punishment afforded by article first, §§ 8 and 9, of the constitution of Connecticut, both as a general matter and as applied to capital punishment in particular. In part II of this opinion, we explain why, in view of the adoption of P.A. 12–5, and the state's near total moratorium on carrying out executions over the past fifty-five years, capital punishment has become incompatible with contemporary standards of decency in Connecticut and, therefore, now violates the state constitutional prohibition against excessive and disproportionate punishments. In part III of this opinion, we explain why the prospective repeal also means that the death penalty now fails to satisfy any legitimate penological purpose and is unconstitutionally excessive on that basis as well. Finally, in part IV of this opinion, we address certain general objections raised by the dissenting justices, and we explain why their arguments are unpersuasive.10
I
STATE CONSTITUTIONAL PROHIBITIONS AGAINST CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT
Since this court first considered the constitutionality of capital punishment, we **14 have recognized that, “in the area of fundamental civil liberties—which includes all protections of the declaration of rights contained in article first of the Connecticut constitution—we sit as a court of last resort. In such constitutional adjudication, our first referent is Connecticut law and the full panoply of rights Connecticut citizens have come to *16 expect as their due.”11 (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Ross, 230 Conn. 183, 247–48, 646 A.2d 1318 (1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1165, 115 S.Ct. 1133, 130 L.Ed.2d 1095 (1995); accord State v. Mikolinski, 256 Conn. 543, 547, 775 A.2d 274 (2001).
12It is by now well established that the constitution of Connecticut prohibits cruel and unusual punishments under the auspices of the dual due process provisions contained in article first, §§ 8 and 9.12 Those due process *17 protections take as their hallmark principles of fundamental fairness rooted in our state's unique common law, statutory, and constitutional traditions. See State v. Ross, supra, 230 Conn. at 246–47, 646 A.2d 1318; State v. Lamme, 216 Conn. 172, 178–79, 184, 579 A.2d 484 (1990). Although neither provision of the state constitution expressly references cruel or unusual punishments, it is settled constitutional doctrine that both of our due process clauses prohibit governmental infliction of cruel and unusual punishments. See State v. Rizzo, 266 Conn. 171, 206, 833 A.2d 363 (2003) (Rizzo I ); State v. Ross, supra, at 246, 646 A.2d 1318.
12It is by now well established that the constitution of Connecticut prohibits cruel and unusual punishments under the auspices of the dual due process provisions contained in article first, §§ 8 and 9.12 Those due process *17 protections take as their hallmark principles of fundamental fairness rooted in our state's unique common law, statutory, and constitutional traditions. See State v. Ross, supra, 230 Conn. at 246–47, 646 A.2d 1318; State v. Lamme, 216 Conn. 172, 178–79, 184, 579 A.2d 484 (1990). Although neither provision of the state constitution expressly references cruel or unusual punishments, it is settled constitutional doctrine that both of our due process clauses prohibit governmental infliction of cruel and unusual punishments. See State v. Rizzo, 266 Conn. 171, 206, 833 A.2d 363 (2003) (Rizzo I ); State v. Ross, supra, at 246, 646 A.2d 1318.
In this part of the opinion, we examine the freedoms from cruel and unusual punishment traditionally enjoyed by the citizens of this state. Because we have not previously undertaken a comprehensive review of these constitutional liberties, we first consider their scope and nature in full, before considering how they apply to the defendant's specific challenge to Connecticut's **15 current capital punishment scheme. In parts II and III of this opinion, we turn to that issue, namely, whether, in light of the enactment of P.A. 12–5, the Connecticut constitution now forbids the imposition of the death penalty.
34In State v. Geisler, 222 Conn. 672, 610 A.2d 1225 (1992), we identified six nonexclusive tools of analysis to be considered, to the extent applicable, whenever we are called on as a matter of first impression to define the scope and parameters of the state constitution: (1) persuasive relevant federal precedents; (2) historical insights into the intent of our constitutional forebears; (3) the operative constitutional text; (4) related Connecticut precedents; (5) persuasive precedents of other states; and (6) contemporary understandings of applicable economic and sociological norms, or, as otherwise *18 described, relevant public policies.13 See id., at 684–85, 610 A.2d 1225; see also State v. Rizzo, supra, 266 Conn. at 208, 833 A.2d 363. These factors, which we consider in turn, inform our application of the established state constitutional standards—standards that, as we explain hereinafter, derive from United States Supreme Court precedent concerning the eighth amendment—to the defendant's claims in the present case.14
34In State v. Geisler, 222 Conn. 672, 610 A.2d 1225 (1992), we identified six nonexclusive tools of analysis to be considered, to the extent applicable, whenever we are called on as a matter of first impression to define the scope and parameters of the state constitution: (1) persuasive relevant federal precedents; (2) historical insights into the intent of our constitutional forebears; (3) the operative constitutional text; (4) related Connecticut precedents; (5) persuasive precedents of other states; and (6) contemporary understandings of applicable economic and sociological norms, or, as otherwise *18 described, relevant public policies.13 See id., at 684–85, 610 A.2d 1225; see also State v. Rizzo, supra, 266 Conn. at 208, 833 A.2d 363. These factors, which we consider in turn, inform our application of the established state constitutional standards—standards that, as we explain hereinafter, derive from United States Supreme Court precedent concerning the eighth amendment—to the defendant's claims in the present case.14
A
Federal Constitutional Standards
567The eighth amendment to the federal constitution establishes the minimum standards for what constitutes *19 impermissibly cruel and unusual punishment.15 See, e.g., State v. Rizzo, supra, 266 Conn. at 206, 833 A.2d 363. Specifically, the United States Supreme Court has **16 indicated that at least three types of punishment may be deemed unconstitutionally cruel: (1) inherently barbaric punishments; (2) excessive and disproportionate punishments; and (3) arbitrary or discriminatory punishments.16 In Ross, we broadly adopted, as a matter of state constitutional law, this federal framework for evaluating challenges to allegedly cruel and unusual punishments.17 See State v. Ross, supra, 230 Conn. at 252, 646 A.2d 1318.
*20 1
Inherently Barbaric Punishments
89First, the eighth amendment categorically prohibits the imposition of inherently barbaric punishments. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 59, 130 S.Ct. 2011, 176 L.Ed.2d 825 (2010). This prohibition is directed toward manifestly and unnecessarily cruel punishments, such as torture and other wanton infliction of physical pain. See, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 170–72, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 49 L.Ed.2d 859 (1976) (opinion announcing judgment); In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 447, 10 S.Ct. 930, 34 L.Ed. 519 (1890). In the context of capital punishment, the eighth amendment also bars particular modes of execution that present a substantial or objectively intolerable risk of inflicting severe pain. Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 50, 52, 128 S.Ct. 1520, 170 L.Ed.2d 420 (2008) (opinion announcing judgment).
**17 2
Excessive and Disproportionate Punishments
10Second, the eighth amendment mandates that punishment be proportioned and graduated to the offense of conviction. See Graham v. Florida, supra, at 59, 130 S.Ct. 2011. In the capital punishment context, the United States Supreme Court has held, for example, that the death penalty is categorically excessive and disproportionate *21 when imposed on certain classes of offenders. See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 568, 125 S.Ct. 1183, 161 L.Ed.2d 1 (2005) (prohibiting execution of individuals who were under eighteen years of age when they committed capital crimes); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321, 122 S.Ct. 2242, 153 L.Ed.2d 335 (2002) (execution of intellectually disabled individuals was held to be unconstitutional). The court also has concluded that capital punishment is never warranted for nonhomicide crimes against individuals. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 446, 128 S.Ct. 2641, 171 L.Ed.2d 525 (2008) (death penalty was held to be disproportionate punishment for child rape); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 797, 102 S.Ct. 3368, 73 L.Ed.2d 1140 (1982) (eighth amendment does not permit execution of defendant who did not kill or intend to kill but who played minor role in felony in course of which murder was committed by others); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 and n. 4, 97 S.Ct. 2861, 53 L.Ed.2d 982 (1977) (plurality opinion) (sentence of death for rape of adult woman was held to be grossly disproportionate and excessive punishment).
1112A reviewing court engages in a two stage analysis in determining whether a challenged punishment is unconstitutionally excessive and disproportionate. Enmund v. Florida, supra, 458 U.S. at 788–89, 102 S.Ct. 3368. First, the court looks to “objective factors” to determine whether the punishment at issue comports with contemporary standards of decency. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 788, 102 S.Ct. 3368. These objective indicia include “the historical development of the punishment at issue,” legislative enactments, and the decisions of prosecutors and sentencing juries. Id.; see also Roper v. Simmons, supra, 543 U.S. at 563, 125 S.Ct. 1183; Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 821–22, 108 S.Ct. 2687, 101 L.Ed.2d 702 (1988).
1314151617This objective evidence of contemporary social mores, however, does not wholly determine the issue. *22 “Although legislative measures adopted by the people's chosen representatives provide one important means of ascertaining contemporary values, it is evident that legislative judgments alone cannot be determinative of [e]ighth [a]mendment standards since that [a]mendment was intended to safeguard individuals from the abuse of legislative power.” Gregg v. Georgia, supra, 428 U.S. at 174 n. 19, 96 S.Ct. 2909 (opinion announcing judgment). Because the eighth amendment imposes “a restraint [on] the exercise of legislative power”; id., at 174, 96 S.Ct. 2909; the United States Supreme Court repeatedly has emphasized that courts must conduct a second stage of analysis in which they bring their own independent judgments to bear, giving careful consideration to the reasons why a civilized society may accept or reject a given penalty. See, e.g., Hall v. Florida, ––– U.S. ––––, 134 S.Ct. 1986, 1993, 1999–2000, 188 L.Ed.2d 1007 (2014); Atkins v. Virginia, supra, 536 U.S. at 312, 122 S.Ct. 2242; Thompson v. Oklahoma, supra, 487 U.S. at 822–23, 108 S.Ct. 2687. “Although the judgments of legislatures, juries, and prosecutors weigh heavily in the balance, it is for [the court] ultimately to judge whether the [constitution] permits imposition **18 of the death penalty....” Enmund v. Florida, supra, 458 U.S. at 797, 102 S.Ct. 3368. Our independent analysis must be informed not only by judicial precedents, but also by our own understanding of the rights secured by the constitution. Kennedy v. Louisiana, supra, 554 U.S. at 434, 128 S.Ct. 2641. This analysis necessarily encompasses the question of whether the penalty at issue promotes any of the penal goals that courts and commentators have recognized as legitimate: deterrence, retribution, incapacitation, and rehabilitation.18 E.g., *23 Graham v. Florida, supra, 560 U.S. at 71, 130 S.Ct. 2011. A sentence materially lacking any legitimate penological justification would be nothing more than the “gratuitous infliction of suffering” and, by its very nature, disproportionate. Gregg v. Georgia, supra, at 183, 96 S.Ct. 2909 (opinion announcing judgment).
3
Arbitrary or Discriminatory Punishments
18Third, the eighth amendment prohibits punishments that are imposed in an “arbitrary and unpredictable fashion....” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Kennedy v. Louisiana, supra, 554 U.S. at 436, 128 S.Ct. 2641. In the context of capital punishment, the United States Supreme Court has indicated that there are two dimensions to this rule.
1920On the one hand, in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 239–40, 92 S.Ct. 2726, 33 L.Ed.2d 346 (1972), in which the court held, in a per curiam opinion, that capital punishment as then applied violated the eighth amendment, and four years later in Gregg v. Georgia, supra, 428 U.S. 153, 96 S.Ct. 2909 in which the court held that Georgia's revamped capital punishment statute did not offend the United States constitution; id., at 206–207, 96 S.Ct. 2909 (opinion announcing judgment); the court established the principle that a capital sentencing scheme must provide the sentencing authority sufficient guidance as to which crimes and criminals are death worthy to ensure that the death penalty is not imposed in an arbitrary or freakish manner. Id., at 192–95, 96 S.Ct. 2909 (opinion announcing judgment). “To pass constitutional muster, a capital sentencing scheme must genuinely narrow the class of persons eligible for the death penalty and must reasonably justify the imposition of a more severe sentence on the defendant compared to others found guilty of *24 murder.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 244, 108 S.Ct. 546, 98 L.Ed.2d 568 (1988). “This means that if a [s]tate wishes to authorize capital punishment it has a constitutional responsibility to tailor and apply its law in a manner that avoids the arbitrary and capricious infliction of the death penalty. Part of a [s]tate's responsibility in this regard is to define the crimes for which death may be the sentence in a way that obviates standardless [sentencing] discretion.... It must channel the sentencer's discretion by clear and **19 objective standards that provide specific and detailed guidance, and that make rationally reviewable the process for imposing a sentence of death.”19 (Citations omitted; footnotes omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 428, 100 S.Ct. 1759, 64 L.Ed.2d 398 (1980) (plurality opinion).
1920On the one hand, in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 239–40, 92 S.Ct. 2726, 33 L.Ed.2d 346 (1972), in which the court held, in a per curiam opinion, that capital punishment as then applied violated the eighth amendment, and four years later in Gregg v. Georgia, supra, 428 U.S. 153, 96 S.Ct. 2909 in which the court held that Georgia's revamped capital punishment statute did not offend the United States constitution; id., at 206–207, 96 S.Ct. 2909 (opinion announcing judgment); the court established the principle that a capital sentencing scheme must provide the sentencing authority sufficient guidance as to which crimes and criminals are death worthy to ensure that the death penalty is not imposed in an arbitrary or freakish manner. Id., at 192–95, 96 S.Ct. 2909 (opinion announcing judgment). “To pass constitutional muster, a capital sentencing scheme must genuinely narrow the class of persons eligible for the death penalty and must reasonably justify the imposition of a more severe sentence on the defendant compared to others found guilty of *24 murder.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 244, 108 S.Ct. 546, 98 L.Ed.2d 568 (1988). “This means that if a [s]tate wishes to authorize capital punishment it has a constitutional responsibility to tailor and apply its law in a manner that avoids the arbitrary and capricious infliction of the death penalty. Part of a [s]tate's responsibility in this regard is to define the crimes for which death may be the sentence in a way that obviates standardless [sentencing] discretion.... It must channel the sentencer's discretion by clear and **19 objective standards that provide specific and detailed guidance, and that make rationally reviewable the process for imposing a sentence of death.”19 (Citations omitted; footnotes omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 428, 100 S.Ct. 1759, 64 L.Ed.2d 398 (1980) (plurality opinion).
2122It goes without saying, moreover, that the eighth amendment is offended not only by the random or arbitrary imposition of the death penalty, but also by the greater evils of racial discrimination and other forms of pernicious bias in the selection of who will be executed. See, e.g., Tuilaepa v. California, 512 U.S. 967, 973, 114 S.Ct. 2630, 129 L.Ed.2d 750 (1994) (guarding against bias or caprice in sentencing is “controlling objective” of court's review); see also Graham v. Collins, 506 U.S. 461, 484, 113 S.Ct. 892, 122 L.Ed.2d 260 (1993) (Thomas, J., concurring) (racial prejudice is “the paradigmatic capricious and irrational sentencing factor”); Furman v. Georgia, supra, 408 U.S. at 242, 92 S.Ct. 2726 (Douglas, J., concurring) (one aim of English Declaration of Rights of 1689, in which eighth amendment language originated, *25 was to forbid discriminatory penalties); Furman v. Georgia, supra, at 310, 92 S.Ct. 2726 (Stewart, J., concurring) (“if any basis can be discerned for the selection of these few to be sentenced to die, it is the constitutionally impermissible basis of race”). The eighth amendment, then, requires that any capital sentencing scheme determine which defendants will be eligible for the death penalty on the basis of legitimate, rational, nondiscriminatory factors.
2324On the other hand, the United States Supreme Court also has insisted that, at the sentencing stage, juries must have unlimited discretion to assess “the character and record of the individual offender and the circumstances of the particular offense as a constitutionally indispensable part of the process of inflicting the penalty of death.” Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304, 96 S.Ct. 2978, 49 L.Ed.2d 944 (1976) (opinion announcing judgment). The court in Woodson held that this sort of individualized sentencing determination is necessary to arrive at a just and appropriate sentence and to honor the eighth amendment's “fundamental respect for humanity....” Id. The court also has consistently indicated that the government has broad discretion as to whom to prosecute and what charge to file. See, e.g., Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 263, 126 S.Ct. 1695, 164 L.Ed.2d 441 (2006); McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 296–97, 107 S.Ct. 1756, 95 L.Ed.2d 262 (1987); Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607, 105 S.Ct. 1524, 84 L.Ed.2d 547 (1985). As currently construed, then, the federal constitution simultaneously requires that states narrowly limit and carefully define which offenders are eligible for capital punishment, while, paradoxically, also giving prosecutors and juries, respectively, virtually unfettered discretion whether actually to charge defendants with capital crimes and whether to sentence convicted offenders to death.
*26 In response to Furman and Gregg, a majority of the states, including Connecticut, drafted new capital punishment statutes in the 1970s that attempted to define with greater precision that small subset of felonies the commission of which could **20 subject an offender to the ultimate punishment. During the ensuing four decades, a majority of the United States Supreme Court has continued to hold—in the face of persistent dissent—that capital punishment comports with contemporary American standards of decency, satisfies legitimate penological objectives, and is not imposed in an impermissibly arbitrary or discriminatory manner. See, e.g., Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163, 181, 126 S.Ct. 2516, 165 L.Ed.2d 429 (2006); McCleskey v. Kemp, supra, 481 U.S. at 291–92, 107 S.Ct. 1756. That court, however, never has addressed the specific issue raised by the present appeal, namely, whether a state's prospective only repeal of its capital felony statutes renders its continued imposition of the death penalty unconstitutionally excessive and disproportionate punishment. Indeed, the parties have not brought to our attention any case in which a federal court has addressed that question.
2324On the other hand, the United States Supreme Court also has insisted that, at the sentencing stage, juries must have unlimited discretion to assess “the character and record of the individual offender and the circumstances of the particular offense as a constitutionally indispensable part of the process of inflicting the penalty of death.” Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304, 96 S.Ct. 2978, 49 L.Ed.2d 944 (1976) (opinion announcing judgment). The court in Woodson held that this sort of individualized sentencing determination is necessary to arrive at a just and appropriate sentence and to honor the eighth amendment's “fundamental respect for humanity....” Id. The court also has consistently indicated that the government has broad discretion as to whom to prosecute and what charge to file. See, e.g., Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 263, 126 S.Ct. 1695, 164 L.Ed.2d 441 (2006); McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 296–97, 107 S.Ct. 1756, 95 L.Ed.2d 262 (1987); Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607, 105 S.Ct. 1524, 84 L.Ed.2d 547 (1985). As currently construed, then, the federal constitution simultaneously requires that states narrowly limit and carefully define which offenders are eligible for capital punishment, while, paradoxically, also giving prosecutors and juries, respectively, virtually unfettered discretion whether actually to charge defendants with capital crimes and whether to sentence convicted offenders to death.
*26 In response to Furman and Gregg, a majority of the states, including Connecticut, drafted new capital punishment statutes in the 1970s that attempted to define with greater precision that small subset of felonies the commission of which could **20 subject an offender to the ultimate punishment. During the ensuing four decades, a majority of the United States Supreme Court has continued to hold—in the face of persistent dissent—that capital punishment comports with contemporary American standards of decency, satisfies legitimate penological objectives, and is not imposed in an impermissibly arbitrary or discriminatory manner. See, e.g., Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163, 181, 126 S.Ct. 2516, 165 L.Ed.2d 429 (2006); McCleskey v. Kemp, supra, 481 U.S. at 291–92, 107 S.Ct. 1756. That court, however, never has addressed the specific issue raised by the present appeal, namely, whether a state's prospective only repeal of its capital felony statutes renders its continued imposition of the death penalty unconstitutionally excessive and disproportionate punishment. Indeed, the parties have not brought to our attention any case in which a federal court has addressed that question.
B
Relevant State Constitutional History
We next consider our state's constitutional and pre-constitutional history with respect to the freedom from cruel and unusual punishment.20 We consider, first, the preconstitutional era and the legal traditions that inform the meaning of the Connecticut constitution and, second, the period leading up to the adoption of the Connecticut constitution of 1818.21
*27 1
Preconstitutional Legal Traditions
25We first consider the preconstitutional roots of the freedom from cruel and unusual punishment in Connecticut. As early as 1672, our colonial code, which incorporated a quasi-constitutional statement of individual liberties, provided that, “for bodily punishment, none shall be inflicted that are Inhumane, Barbarous or Cruel.”22 The Book of the General Laws for the People within the Jurisdiction of Connecticut (1672) p. 58 (Laws of Connecticut); see also W. Holdsworth, Law and Society in Colonial Connecticut, 1636–1672 (1974) p. 484 (unpublished doctoral dissertation, Claremont Graduate School) (explaining that 1672 code incorporated what were, in essence, constitutional statutes). The 1672 code also differed from prior Connecticut statutes in that it (1) forbade the use of torture to extract confessions, (2) placed new restrictions on the use of corporal punishment, and (3) afforded novel procedural rights to criminal defendants, especially in capital cases.23 See **21 Laws of Connecticut, supra, at p. 65; W. Holdsworth, supra, at pp. 513–14, 527, 539, 581. Many of these protections, in turn, derived from the Massachusetts Body of Liberties of 1641; see C. Collier, “The Common Law and Individual Rights in Connecticut Before the Federal Bill of Rights,” 76 Conn. B.J. 1, 12 (2002); a *28 declaration of rights that was far more progressive24 than English law at that time.25 See A. Granucci, “ ‘Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishments Inflicted:’ The Original Meaning,” 57 Calif. L.Rev. 839, 851 (1969).
In perhaps the most substantial scholarly account of the early legal traditions of the Connecticut colony, *29 William K. Holdsworth offers a window into the original meaning of Connecticut's inceptive prohibition of cruel punishment. Holdsworth describes the years leading up to the adoption of the 1672 code as a key formative period in the colony's legal history. W. Holdsworth, supra, at p. x. “The decade [of 1662 through 1672] was a watershed in the early history of Connecticut,” he explains, “a period of profound intellectual, social, economic, and political change that set the **22 colony on a course of its own.” Id., at p. 582. During this period of “extraordinarily rapid and vital change”; id., at p. 479; a new generation of leaders restructured the colony's political and judicial systems. See id., at pp. 479–80, 547–48. The legislature “made fairer use of its juries ... gave formal recognition to numerous civil liberties, displayed a greater awareness of individual rights, dealt less severely with most criminal offenders than before, and, either formally or in practice, reduced the penalties for several capital crimes.” Id., at pp. 547–48. In the process, Connecticut's new leaders bequeathed to its citizens a “legacy of moderation....” Id., at p. 545.
During the decade, dramatic shifts in public, judicial, and executive attitudes toward crime and punishment resulted in fundamental changes in how the criminal law was applied, changes that directly foreshadowed the prohibition against cruel punishment and other freedoms that the legislature enshrined in the 1772 code. “[N]ew social conditions and new attitudes on the part of the people and their leaders” that emerged during the decade of 1662 through 1672 were mirrored by a growing judicial leniency.26 Id., at p. 537. Magistrates *30 enjoyed considerable latitude in enforcing the nascent criminal code during this period, and Holdsworth suggests that the penalties that were actually imposed may provide a more accurate picture of Connecticut's early legal landscape, and particularly of public attitudes regarding what constituted acceptable punishment, than the first legal codes themselves provided. See id., at pp. 353–54. Although the punishments prescribed often were severe, the criminal law generally was enforced without “needless cruelty” in the 1660s; id., at p. 286; and, over the course of the decade, courts became increasingly lenient in the sanctions they imposed. See id., at pp. 286–87, 363, 576. Whipping began to fall out of favor, for example, with fines—and, in the case of fornication, mandatory marriage—emerging as the primary sanction for many sexual crimes and crimes against property. See id., at pp. 292, 295–300, 313–17. More brutal forms of corporal punishment “all but disappeared....” Id., at p. 364. Christopher Collier, Connecticut's state historian, observed that, “through the imposition of lenient punishments outside of statutory specifications, nonenforcement of restrictive statutes, a tendency to let local consensus be their guide, and a punctilious regard for due process ... Connecticut's jurists lightened the load of ancient oppressive laws....” C. Collier, supra, 76 Conn. B.J. at 49–50.
“[This unmistakable] tendency toward judicial moderation in the use of physical punishments in the years [1662 through 1675] ... is all the more pronounced when we consider capital crimes and capital punishment.” W. Holdsworth, supra, at p. 365. As public attitudes *31 evolved, magistrates grew more reluctant to inflict capital punishment and came to believe that the death penalty should be reserved for only the most heinous and universally condemned **23 offenses. See id., at pp. 382, 431. Before adultery was demoted from a capital offense to a lesser crime in 1672; C. Collier, supra, 76 Conn. B.J. at 19; for example, “magistrates displayed marked reluctance to inflict death for the offense”; W. Holdsworth, supra, at p. 533; and courts found ways to avoid imposing the statutory death penalty on adulterers. C. Collier, supra, at 19 n. 42. By the 1670s, courts also were demonstrating less willingness “to exact the full measure of retribution” for sodomy and other capital crimes. W. Holdsworth, supra, at p. 418; see also id., at pp. 371, 519. In 1677, for example, a jury declined to convict Nicholas Sension of capital sodomy, despite what Holdsworth suggests was clear evidence of his guilt. See id., at pp. 418–19.
Even more than the courts, however, it was Connecticut's forward thinking governor, John Winthrop, Jr., a leading colonial physician and scientist, who was responsible for the restraint that the colony began to exercise in the 1660s with respect to capital crimes ranging from witchcraft and blasphemy, on the one hand, to adultery, sodomy, and rape, on the other. See id., at pp. 522–25, 579–80. Governor Winthrop's “legendary toleration and the force of his moderating influence over the affairs of his colony” effectively extinguished the colony's hysteria over witchcraft, and ultimately resulted in the delisting of adultery as a capital crime in 1672.27 Id., at p. 580. Holdsworth concludes that this *32 dramatic evolution in public and judicial attitudes toward crime and penology during the 1660s directly influenced the decision in 1672 to adopt key freedoms that Massachusetts afforded its criminal defendants, including the freedoms from inhumane, barbarous and cruel punishments, in addition to torture, when formulating the new colonial statutes. See id., at pp. 513, 537, 539, 582. “The [c]ode of 1672 expounded in the language of law the new ideal of a new generation, a more moderate, more explicit, more progressive conception” of crime and punishment. Id., at p. 582. “By giving formal legal recognition to many of the changes that had transpired during the preceding decade,” Holdsworth explains, “the [c]ode of 1672 reflected to a greater extent than its predecessor the essential institutional character that was to mark Connecticut for the remainder of the colonial period.” Id., at p. 583.
In addition to abolishing such brutal forms of capital punishment as flogging to death and breaking on the wheel, the 1672 code lessened the severity of many criminal sanctions, reducing the maximum number of lashes that could be imposed for noncapital crimes and replacing whipping with imprisonment as the penalty for others. See id., at pp. 513, 537–39, 576. Moreover, although legislators did retain severe corporal punishments such as branding, which replaced death as the penalty for those crimes that were decapitalized in 1672, court records indicate that such punishments were rarely if ever inflicted. See id., at pp. 535, 576.
**24 It is apparent from this history that, long before the adoption of either the federal or state constitution, Connecticut citizens enjoyed a quasi-constitutional freedom from cruel punishment, one that reflected our unique *33 social and political traditions and that far exceeded the protections recognized in England at the time. These protections were enshrined in Connecticut's early constitutional statutes and common law, and, from the start, were intimately tied to the principles of due process.
2
1818
We next consider the historical circumstances leading up to the adoption of the state constitution in 1818. The late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries witnessed the twilight of a premodern system of criminal justice in the United States. See generally note, “The Eighth Amendment, Proportionality, and the Changing Meaning of ‘Punishments,’ ” 122 Harv. L.Rev. 960 (2009). The rapid evolution in penology that occurred in the decades following the founding was especially pronounced in Connecticut. The late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries in Connecticut witnessed a pronounced liberalization in public, legislative, and judicial attitudes toward crime and punishment. The period has been described as one characterized by penological reform, a broader commitment to human rights, and the first serious public questioning of the moral legitimacy of capital punishment. See L. Goodheart, The Solemn Sentence of Death: Capital Punishment in Connecticut (2011) pp. 69–70. This time between the adoption of the federal and state constitutions also saw an emerging awareness of and compassion for “the fate of the condemned perpetrator.” Id., at p. 85. These changes coincided with the reopening of the newly established Newgate Prison (Newgate) in 1790, which provided the opportunity to impose incarceration as an alternative to more severe traditional punishments. See id., at p. 75.
During this period, Connecticut's legislators, jurists, and citizens refined their understanding of what constituted *34 cruel and unusual punishment. Nowhere was this more apparent than in the repudiation of corporal punishment as a legitimate penal sanction. “With the establishment of a [s]tate prison, many of the barbarous punishments [began] to disappear from the statute book, replaced by confinement for a term of years.” Judicial and Civil History of Connecticut (D. Loomis & J. Calhoun eds., 1895) p. 98. In 1808, for instance, “legislators crafted a less draconian statute for the regulation of female sexuality”; L. Goodheart, supra, at p. 77; and, by the middle of the next decade, a broad consensus had emerged in the state that corporal punishment of any sort was degrading and debasing. See id., at pp. 77–78. When the criminal code was revised in 1821 to comport with the state constitution of 1818, bodily punishment was largely abolished. See Judicial and Civil History of Connecticut, supra, at pp. 98–99. The last vestige of the old system, the whipping post, survived only one decade more as a punishment for theft.28 Id., at p. 99.
During this period, Connecticut's legislators, jurists, and citizens refined their understanding of what constituted *34 cruel and unusual punishment. Nowhere was this more apparent than in the repudiation of corporal punishment as a legitimate penal sanction. “With the establishment of a [s]tate prison, many of the barbarous punishments [began] to disappear from the statute book, replaced by confinement for a term of years.” Judicial and Civil History of Connecticut (D. Loomis & J. Calhoun eds., 1895) p. 98. In 1808, for instance, “legislators crafted a less draconian statute for the regulation of female sexuality”; L. Goodheart, supra, at p. 77; and, by the middle of the next decade, a broad consensus had emerged in the state that corporal punishment of any sort was degrading and debasing. See id., at pp. 77–78. When the criminal code was revised in 1821 to comport with the state constitution of 1818, bodily punishment was largely abolished. See Judicial and Civil History of Connecticut, supra, at pp. 98–99. The last vestige of the old system, the whipping post, survived only one decade more as a punishment for theft.28 Id., at p. 99.
**25 *35 Connecticut's earliest reported judicial decisions indicate that the courts, like the legislature, had begun to adopt a broader conception of cruel and unusual punishment in the years leading up to the adoption of the 1818 constitution. In State v. Smith, 5 Day (Conn.) 175 (1811), for example, the defendant argued that imposing successive terms of imprisonment in Newgate for multiple incidents of counterfeiting was “novel, without precedent, cruel and illegal.” Id., at 178. A majority of this court ultimately denied the requested relief, but only because it concluded that “[n]o injustice [was] done to the prisoner; and this proceeding [was] neither new, nor without precedent; such [had] been the usage of our courts, for many years past, in this state.” Id., at 179. Indeed, the majority went out of its way to note that courts “are bound to become acquainted with the situation and circumstances of the prisoner, when they pronounce the sentence. If through infirmity, it should appear to be inhuman or improper to confine him to hard labor, in Newgate, immediately upon conviction, it would be the duty of the court to postpone the commencement of his confinement, to a future day.” Id.
That Connecticut had developed by the turn of the nineteenth century a more expansive conception of what constituted impermissibly cruel punishment is further revealed in the writings of former Chief Justice Zephaniah Swift. Swift did not hesitate to condemn as “cruel and illiberal” not only corporal punishment and the like, but also what he saw as outmoded and unjust common-law traditions. 2 Z. Swift, A System of the Laws of the State of Connecticut (1796) p. 398. Practices ranging from false imprisonment, to the denial of *36 defense counsel in capital cases, to punishing a parent for harboring a fugitive child were all, to Swift, examples of cruelties that the law ought not countenance. See id., at pp. 58, 371–72, 398–99. Swift was especially troubled by the traditional English punishment for suicide—forfeiture of the deceased's estate and burial on a public highway with a stake driven through the body—which he characterized as the product of a “barbarous period of superstition, and cruelty.” Id., at p. 304.29
That Connecticut had developed by the turn of the nineteenth century a more expansive conception of what constituted impermissibly cruel punishment is further revealed in the writings of former Chief Justice Zephaniah Swift. Swift did not hesitate to condemn as “cruel and illiberal” not only corporal punishment and the like, but also what he saw as outmoded and unjust common-law traditions. 2 Z. Swift, A System of the Laws of the State of Connecticut (1796) p. 398. Practices ranging from false imprisonment, to the denial of *36 defense counsel in capital cases, to punishing a parent for harboring a fugitive child were all, to Swift, examples of cruelties that the law ought not countenance. See id., at pp. 58, 371–72, 398–99. Swift was especially troubled by the traditional English punishment for suicide—forfeiture of the deceased's estate and burial on a public highway with a stake driven through the body—which he characterized as the product of a “barbarous period of superstition, and cruelty.” Id., at p. 304.29
**26 Nor was capital punishment immune from these broader currents in Connecticut's criminal justice system. Opposition to capital punishment gained traction in the decade before the adoption of the 1818 state constitution. In 1808, then Judge Swift instructed a grand jury that courts were adopting a “milder practice” in applying the capital law. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) L. Goodheart, supra, at p. 76; see also id., at p. 71. The following year, in a speech to the legislature, Lieutenant Governor John Treadwell shared his view that “[c]onfinement in Newgate ... [was] terrible, but not cruel; and it [was] probably more effectual to prevent [atrocious] crimes, than capital punishment....” J. Treadwell, “Lieutenant Governor Treadwell's Speech to the Legislature of Connecticut: October, 1809,” The American Register, January 1, 1810, p. 6. Although he lamented that there were few penitents among the inmates housed at Newgate, Treadwell proposedthat *37 providing them with Bibles and religious instruction might have a beneficial effect. See id.
Finally, in a series of events that culminated in the decision to convene a constitutional convention, the legislature voted in 1816 to grant a new trial for Peter Lung, who had been condemned to die for the murder of his wife. J. Zeldes, “Connecticut's Most Memorable ‘Good for Nothing Rascal’ in This ‘Land of Steady Habits,’ ” 80 Conn. B.J. 367, 380–81, 393–94 (2006). The deciding vote in favor of a retrial was cast by a member of the governing council who “was not willing that a man should be [hanged as a result of] his vote.”30 (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 394. Following his conviction upon retrial, Lung was in fact hanged. The following week, the Middlesex Gazette published an article remarking on the “infrequency of capital punishment” and observing that the “[behavior] of this unfortunate sufferer on this trying occasion, was such as to attract the tenderest sympathy of every rational beholder.” “Execution,” Middlesex Gazzette, reprinted in The Weekly Recorder: A Newpaper Conveying Important Intelligence and Other Useful Matter Under the Three General Heads of Theology, Literature and National Affairs, July 31, 1816, p. 8.
In summary, it is clear that, from the earliest days of the colonies, and extending until the adoption of the state constitution in 1818,31 the people of Connecticut *38 saw **27 themselves as enjoying significant freedoms from cruel and unusual punishment, freedoms that were safeguarded by our courts and enshrined in our state's pre-constitutional statutory and common law. That our history reveals a particular sensitivity to such concerns warrants our scrupulous and independent review of allegedly cruel and unusual practices and punishments, and informs our analysis thereof.
In summary, it is clear that, from the earliest days of the colonies, and extending until the adoption of the state constitution in 1818,31 the people of Connecticut *38 saw **27 themselves as enjoying significant freedoms from cruel and unusual punishment, freedoms that were safeguarded by our courts and enshrined in our state's pre-constitutional statutory and common law. That our history reveals a particular sensitivity to such concerns warrants our scrupulous and independent review of allegedly cruel and unusual practices and punishments, and informs our analysis thereof.
C
Relevant Constitutional Text
We next consider the relevant provisions of the state constitution. In light of our state's firm and enduring *39 commitment to the principle that even those offenders who commit the most heinous crimes should not be subjected to inhumane, barbarous, or cruel punishment, the question naturally arises why the framers of the 1818 constitution decided to embed these traditional liberties in our dual due process clauses; see Conn. Const. (1818), art. I, §§ 9 and 10; rather than in an express punishments clause. Although there is no indication that that question was debated during the 1818 constitutional convention, we find guidance in the broader legal history of turn of the century Connecticut.
Connecticut was among three of the original thirteen states that chose not to officially ratify the eighth amendment or, indeed, any of the first ten amendments to the federal constitution.32 C. Leedham, Our Changing Constitution (1964) p. 41. In 1787, the state's representatives to the federal constitutional convention had argued vehemently against the need for a bill of rights. See C. Collier, supra, at 57, 67. “In Connecticut, unlike those states that had recently been under the domination of royal and proprietary governors and appointed upper houses, limited government **28 was taken for granted. Calvinist theory described limited government, [Connecticut's] Fundamental Orders [of 1639] proclaimed it, the [Connecticut] Charter [of 1662] established it, tradition demanded it, common law enforced it, and frequent elections guaranteed it.” Id., at 53. During the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, for example, Connecticut courts routinely safeguarded the basic rights enshrined in the federal Bill of Rights on the basis of natural rights or common law, without the need for any formal constitutional sanction. See *40 id., at 31, 65. Moreover, there was a particular fear in Connecticut that the adoption of a written bill of rights would imply, by negative inference, that citizens were no longer entitled to unenumerated protections long enshrined in the state's common law.33 See id., at 56–59. “A strong statewide consensus, then, held that no bill of rights was necessary and, indeed, might even limit individual liberty.” Id., at 57.
Although this viewpoint had become less prevalent by 1818, when Connecticut adopted its first formal constitution; see id., at 68–69; it retained many “influential adherents....” Id., at 69. This likely accounts for the fact that certain protections long entrenched in the state's constitutional common law were not expressly enumerated in the new written constitution. Indeed, in an 1821 speech, Governor Oliver Wolcott called on Connecticut's courts to articulate and protect the many natural rights that remained unenumerated by either constitution or statute. See id., at 37–38.
Although this viewpoint had become less prevalent by 1818, when Connecticut adopted its first formal constitution; see id., at 68–69; it retained many “influential adherents....” Id., at 69. This likely accounts for the fact that certain protections long entrenched in the state's constitutional common law were not expressly enumerated in the new written constitution. Indeed, in an 1821 speech, Governor Oliver Wolcott called on Connecticut's courts to articulate and protect the many natural rights that remained unenumerated by either constitution or statute. See id., at 37–38.
Accordingly, in Moore v. Ganim, 233 Conn. 557, 660 A.2d 742 (1995), we “assume[d] that the framers believed that individuals would continue to possess certain natural rights even if those rights were not enumerated in the written constitution. On the basis of this assumption, we [would] not draw firm conclusions from the silence of the constitutional text.... Rather, in determining whether unenumerated rights were incorporated into the constitution, we must focus on the framers' understanding of whether a particular right was part of the natural law, i.e., on the framers' understanding of whether the particular right was so fundamental to an ordered society that it did not require explicit enumeration. We can discern the framers' understanding, of course, only by examining the historical sources.” (Emphasis omitted.) Id., at 601, 660 A.2d 742.
*41 In her dissenting opinion, Chief Justice Rogers cites to Cologne v. Westfarms Associates, 192 Conn. 48, 60, 469 A.2d 1201 (1984), for the proposition that, by the time the 1818 constitution was adopted, the view that the basic liberties of the people should be enshrined in a written constitution had come to prevail in Connecticut. See footnote 6 of Chief Justice Rogers' dissenting opinion. Chief Justice Rogers, however, neglects to consider an adjacent passage in Cologne that recognizes that “[a]n opposing view was expressed that such a detailed specification of individual rights was superfluous and tended to abridge them, because all governmental powers not granted by the constitution were reserved to the people.” Cologne v. Westfarms Associates, supra, at 60, 469 A.2d 1201. In fact, history reveals that article first of the 1818 constitution was born of and reflected a compromise between these two constitutional philosophies. See R. Purcell, Connecticut in Transition: 1775–1818 (New Ed.1963) pp. 241–42 (discussing opposition to bill of rights at constitutional convention and implying that ultimate decision of which freedoms to enshrine and which to exclude **29 was somewhat haphazard); J. Trumbull, Historical Notes on the Constitutions of Connecticut and on the Constitutional Convention of 1818 (1873) p. 53 (identifying prominent delegates to convention who opposed incorporation of any bill of rights in state constitution); J. Trumbull, supra, at p. 56 (recognizing ultimate compromise). For these reasons, we find little merit in the argument that the decision of the framers of the Connecticut constitution not to include an express bar on cruel and unusual punishment somehow suggests that this liberty was uncherished.
D
Relevant Connecticut Precedents
Turning to the next Geisler factor, namely, relevant Connecticut precedents, we write on a relatively blank *42 slate with respect to cruel and unusual punishment. Nevertheless, since this court first recognized in Ross that our due process clauses independently prohibit cruel and unusual punishment; see State v. Ross, supra, 230 Conn. at 246–47, 646 A.2d 1318; we have begun to carve out the broad contours of that prohibition. In Ross itself, as we have noted, we adopted the aforementioned federal framework for evaluating challenges to allegedly cruel and unusual punishments. See id., at 252, 646 A.2d 1318. Specifically, we recognized that, under the state constitution, whether a challenged punishment is cruel and unusual is to be judged according to the “evolving standards of human decency”; id., at 251, 646 A.2d 1318; and that those standards are reflected not only in constitutional and legislative text, but also “in our history and in the teachings of the jurisprudence of our sister states as well as that of the federal courts.” Id. In Ross, we also rejected the theory that “article first, § 9, confers the authority to determine what constitutes cruel and unusual punishment solely on the Connecticut legislature and not on the courts.” Id., at 248, 646 A.2d 1318. “Although we should exercise our authority with great restraint,” we explained, “this court cannot abdicate its nondelegable responsibility for the adjudication of constitutional rights.” Id., at 249, 646 A.2d 1318.
Subsequently, in Rizzo I, we characterized it as “settled constitutional doctrine that, independently of federal constitutional requirements, our due process clauses, because they prohibit cruel and unusual punishment, impose constitutional limits on the imposition of the death penalty.” State v. Rizzo, supra, 266 Conn. at 206, 833 A.2d 363. In that case, we recognized that there is an “overarching concern for consistency and reliability in the imposition of the death penalty” under our state constitution. (Emphasis omitted.) Id., at 233, 833 A.2d 363. Accordingly, in order to avoid having to resolve the state constitutional question raised in that case, we construed General Statutes (Rev. to 1997) § 53a–46a to require that a jury must *43 find beyond a reasonable doubt that the death penalty is the appropriate penalty.34 See id., at 234, 833 A.2d 363.
**30 Most recently, in State v. Rizzo, 303 Conn. 71, 184–201, 31 A.3d 1094 (2011) (Rizzo II ), cert. denied, ––– U.S. ––––, 133 S.Ct. 133, 184 L.Ed.2d 64 (2012), we engaged in a full analysis of the constitutionality of the death penalty pursuant to the state constitution. At that time, we reiterated that, “in determining whether a particular punishment is cruel and unusual in violation of [state] constitutional standards, we must look beyond historical conceptions to the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.”35 (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 187–88, 31 A.3d 1094. We also “recognize[d] that assessing the propriety of [a punishment] *44 is not exclusively the domain of the legislature, and that this court has an independent duty to determine that the penalty remains constitutionally viable as the sensibilities of our citizens evolve.” Id., at 197, 31 A.3d 1094. We return to these well established principles in parts II and III of this opinion.
**30 Most recently, in State v. Rizzo, 303 Conn. 71, 184–201, 31 A.3d 1094 (2011) (Rizzo II ), cert. denied, ––– U.S. ––––, 133 S.Ct. 133, 184 L.Ed.2d 64 (2012), we engaged in a full analysis of the constitutionality of the death penalty pursuant to the state constitution. At that time, we reiterated that, “in determining whether a particular punishment is cruel and unusual in violation of [state] constitutional standards, we must look beyond historical conceptions to the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.”35 (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 187–88, 31 A.3d 1094. We also “recognize[d] that assessing the propriety of [a punishment] *44 is not exclusively the domain of the legislature, and that this court has an independent duty to determine that the penalty remains constitutionally viable as the sensibilities of our citizens evolve.” Id., at 197, 31 A.3d 1094. We return to these well established principles in parts II and III of this opinion.
E
Persuasive Sister State Precedents
2627The unique structure and text of the Connecticut constitution of 1965, in which the freedom from cruel and unusual punishment is embedded in our dual due process clauses rather than in a distinct punishments clause, mean that sister state authority is less directly relevant than in cases in which we have construed other constitutional provisions. We do agree with our sister courts, however, that, under the state constitution, the pertinent standards by which we judge the fairness, decency, and efficacy of a punishment are necessarily those of Connecticut. Although regional, national, and international norms may inform our analysis; see, e.g., State v. Rizzo, supra, 303 Conn. at 188–96, 31 A.3d 1094; the ultimate question is whether capital punishment has come to be excessive and disproportionate in Connecticut. Cf. Fleming v. Zant, 259 Ga. 687, 690, 386 S.E.2d 339 (1989) ( “[t]he standard of decency that is relevant to the interpretation of the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment found in the Georgia [c]onstitution is the standard of the people of Georgia, not the national standard” [internal quotation marks omitted] ); District Attorney v. Watson, 381 Mass. 648, 661, 664–65, 411 N.E.2d 1274 (1980) (holding that death penalty violated state constitution on basis of contemporary standards of decency in Massachusetts);36 J. Acker & E. Walsh, *45 “ **31 Challenging the Death Penalty under State Constitutions,” 42 Vand. L.Rev. 1299, 1325 (1989) (“[e]ven if state courts are guided by the doctrinal analysis now associated with the eighth amendment, their frame of reference for measuring evolving standards of decency must be within state borders” [internal quotation marks omitted] ); cf. also Kerrigan v. Commissioner of Public Health, 289 Conn. 135, 188–213, 957 A.2d 407 (2008) (in context of determining whether gay persons are entitled to heightened protection for equal protection purposes under state constitution, court assessed their political power or lack thereof in Connecticut). Justice Zarella's arguments to the contrary notwithstanding, we also agree with those courts that have determined that it is perfectly reasonable to apply the federal evolving standards of decency rubric to cruel and unusual punishment claims brought under a state constitution. See, e.g., People v. Anderson, 6 Cal.3d 628, 647–48, 493 P.2d 880, 100 Cal.Rptr. 152, cert. denied, 406 U.S. 958, 92 S.Ct. 2060, 32 L.Ed.2d 344 (1972);37 Fleming v. Zant, supra, at 689–90, 386 S.E.2d 339; District Attorney v. Watson, supra, at 661–62, 411 N.E.2d 1274. Indeed, we are not aware of any court that has concluded that the federal evolving standards of decency rubric is inapplicable to state constitutional claims.
F
Conclusion
To summarize our analysis of the first five Geisler factors, when construing the state constitutional freedom *46 from cruel and unusual punishment, we broadly adopt the framework that the federal courts have used to evaluate eighth amendment challenges. We apply this framework, however, with respect to the constitutional facts as they exist in Connecticut and mindful of our state's unique and expansive constitutional and preconstitutional history. To the extent that the sixth Geisler factor—economic and sociological norms and policy considerations—is relevant, we take such considerations into account in parts II and III of this opinion, in which we address the defendant's specific constitutional challenge.38
II
THE DEATH PENALTY FAILS TO COMPORT WITH CONTEMPORARY STANDARDS OF DECENCY
We next consider whether the death penalty, as currently imposed in Connecticut, **32 and following the enactment of P.A. 12–5, is so out of step with our contemporary standards of decency as to violate the state constitutional ban on excessive and disproportionate punishment. We conclude that it is.
2829As we previously noted, both the federal and state constitutions prohibit the imposition of any punishment that is not proportioned and graduated to the offense of conviction. Whether a punishment is disproportionate *47 and excessive is to be judged by the contemporary, “evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.” Trop v. Dulles, supra, 356 U.S. at 101, 78 S.Ct. 590 (plurality opinion); accord State v. Rizzo, supra, 303 Conn. at 187–88, 31 A.3d 1094. In other words, the constitutional guarantee against excessive punishment is “not fastened to the obsolete but may acquire meaning as public opinion becomes enlightened by a humane justice.” Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 378, 30 S.Ct. 544, 54 L.Ed. 793 (1910); see also Hall v. Florida, supra, 134 S.Ct. at 1992 (“[t]he [e]ighth [a]mendment's protection of dignity reflects the [n]ation we have been, the [n]ation we are, and the [n]ation we aspire to be”). Because the legal standard is an evolving one, it is both necessary and appropriate for us to consider the issue anew, in light of relevant recent developments, when it is raised.39 See State v. Rizzo, supra, 303 Conn. at 187–88, 31 A.3d 1094.
On only two prior occasions has this court considered in any depth whether capital punishment violates the state constitutional ban on cruel and unusual punishment. See State v. Rizzo, supra, 303 Conn. at 184–201, 31 A.3d 1094; State v. Ross, supra, 230 Conn. at 248–52, 646 A.2d 1318. In those cases, we considered—and at times blurred the lines between—two distinct constitutional challenges: (1) the claim that capital punishment is inherently barbaric punishment and, therefore, offends the constitution at all times and under all circumstances; and (2) the claim that, although capital punishment may once have comported with constitutional requirements, our state's *48 standards of decency have evolved such that execution now constitutes excessive and disproportionate punishment. See State v. Rizzo, supra, 303 Conn. at 187–88, 31 A.3d 1094; State v. Ross, supra, at 248, 250, 646 A.2d 1318. The dissenting justice in Ross likewise challenged capital punishment along both parameters. Compare State v. Ross, supra, at 298, 646 A.2d 1318 (Berdon, J., dissenting in part) (“[t]he punishment of death is inherently degrading to the dignity of a human being”), with id., at 301–313, 646 A.2d 1318 (Berdon, J., dissenting in part) (arguing that, inter alia, public no longer supports death penalty, penalty is unfairly applied, and recent evidence does not bear out deterrent effect).
On only two prior occasions has this court considered in any depth whether capital punishment violates the state constitutional ban on cruel and unusual punishment. See State v. Rizzo, supra, 303 Conn. at 184–201, 31 A.3d 1094; State v. Ross, supra, 230 Conn. at 248–52, 646 A.2d 1318. In those cases, we considered—and at times blurred the lines between—two distinct constitutional challenges: (1) the claim that capital punishment is inherently barbaric punishment and, therefore, offends the constitution at all times and under all circumstances; and (2) the claim that, although capital punishment may once have comported with constitutional requirements, our state's *48 standards of decency have evolved such that execution now constitutes excessive and disproportionate punishment. See State v. Rizzo, supra, 303 Conn. at 187–88, 31 A.3d 1094; State v. Ross, supra, at 248, 250, 646 A.2d 1318. The dissenting justice in Ross likewise challenged capital punishment along both parameters. Compare State v. Ross, supra, at 298, 646 A.2d 1318 (Berdon, J., dissenting in part) (“[t]he punishment of death is inherently degrading to the dignity of a human being”), with id., at 301–313, 646 A.2d 1318 (Berdon, J., dissenting in part) (arguing that, inter alia, public no longer supports death penalty, penalty is unfairly applied, and recent evidence does not bear out deterrent effect).
The majority in Ross—consisting of two members of this court and two Appellate Court judges sitting by designation—focused its attention on the per se question of whether the “imposition of the death penalty invariably constitutes cruel and unusual punishment.” Id., at 245, 646 A.2d 1318. The majority evaluated the **33 constitutionality of the death penalty under the rubric of the six Geisler factors. Id., at 249–52, 646 A.2d 1318. Dispensing with five of the factors in a single paragraph, the majority in Ross afforded each consideration no more than one sentence of attention.40 See id., at 249–50, 646 A.2d 1318. The sixth Geisler factor, which encompasses the full panoply of economic and sociological *49 norms and policy considerations, received only slightly more attention. See id., at 251–52, 646 A.2d 1318.
With respect to the contention that the death penalty is fundamentally offensive to evolving standards of decency, the majority dismissed the claim of the defendant, Michael B. Ross, with a one sentence quote from the New Jersey Supreme Court: “When, in the course of a decade, thirty-seven states call for the death penalty, the probability that the legislature of each state accurately reflects its community's standards approaches certainty.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 251, 646 A.2d 1318 quoting State v. Ramseur, 106 N.J. 123, 173, 524 A.2d 188 (1987). In his lengthy dissent, Justice Berdon lamented that the majority had given so novel and weighty a question such “cursory analysis....”41 State v. Ross, supra, 230 Conn. at 295, 646 A.2d 1318 (Berdon, J., dissenting in part).
With respect to the contention that the death penalty is fundamentally offensive to evolving standards of decency, the majority dismissed the claim of the defendant, Michael B. Ross, with a one sentence quote from the New Jersey Supreme Court: “When, in the course of a decade, thirty-seven states call for the death penalty, the probability that the legislature of each state accurately reflects its community's standards approaches certainty.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 251, 646 A.2d 1318 quoting State v. Ramseur, 106 N.J. 123, 173, 524 A.2d 188 (1987). In his lengthy dissent, Justice Berdon lamented that the majority had given so novel and weighty a question such “cursory analysis....”41 State v. Ross, supra, 230 Conn. at 295, 646 A.2d 1318 (Berdon, J., dissenting in part).
Subsequently, this court reiterated the holding of, or merely cited to Ross, without any further elaboration, in one-half dozen cases presenting facial challenges to the death penalty under the state constitution. See State v. Colon, 272 Conn. 106, 383, 864 A.2d 666 (2004), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 848, 126 S.Ct. 102, 163 L.Ed.2d 116 (2005); State v. Breton, 264 Conn. 327, 418, 824 A.2d 778, cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1055, 124 S.Ct. 819, 157 L.Ed.2d 708 (2003); State v. Reynolds, 264 Conn. 1, 236, 836 A.2d 224 (2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 908, 124 S.Ct. 1614, 158 L.Ed.2d 254 (2004); State v. Cobb, 251 Conn. 285, 497, 743 A.2d 1 (1999), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 841, 121 S.Ct. 106, 148 L.Ed.2d 64 (2000); State v. Webb, 238 Conn. 389, 402–405, 680 A.2d 147 (1996);42 *50 State v. Breton, 235 Conn. 206, 217–18, 663 A.2d 1026 (1995). Accordingly, it was not until 2011, in Rizzo II, that we first seriously explored the scope of the state constitutional ban on cruel and unusual punishment with regard to the modern death penalty. See State v. Rizzo, supra, 303 Conn. at 184–201, 31 A.3d 1094.
In Rizzo II, as in Ross, we had no difficulty rejecting the defendant's facial **34 challenge, reasoning that a penalty that is referenced explicitly in the state constitution cannot have been unconstitutional at all times and under all circumstances. See id., at 188, 646 A.2d 1318. In that case, however, we also recognized that the fact that capital punishment has been practiced throughout much of our state's history and was considered constitutional in 1818 says little about its legal status two centuries later. See id., at 187–88, 646 A.2d 1318. Rather, under the governing legal framework, “we must look beyond historical conceptions to the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.... This is because [t]he standard of extreme cruelty is not merely descriptive, but necessarily embodies a moral judgment. The standard itself remains the same, but its applicability must change as the basic mores of society change.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.; see also People v. Anderson, supra, 6 Cal.3d at 637–39, 100 Cal.Rptr. 152, 493 P.2d 880 (incidental references to death penalty in state constitution merely acknowledge that penalty was in use at time of drafting and do not enshrine its constitutional status as standards of decency evolve); District Attorney v. Watson, supra, 381 Mass. at 660–62, 411 N.E.2d 1274 (interpretation of state constitutional prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment is not static and depends on contemporary moral standards).
In Rizzo II, we also recognized that whether the death penalty constitutes excessive and disproportionate punishment is a subtler and more nuanced question than the majority in Ross had acknowledged. Our understanding of what constitutes excessive punishment is *51 informed not only by the laws on the books, both in Connecticut and elsewhere, but also by developments in how those laws are applied by prosecutors and sentencing juries. See State v. Rizzo, supra, 303 Conn. at 188–98, 31 A.3d 1094. Accordingly, we undertook a more sweeping review of contemporary social mores and the actual implementation of capital punishment at the state, national and even international levels. See id. We ultimately concluded, however, that “there remain[ed] powerful evidence of strong public support for the death penalty in the form of long-standing laws enacted by the democratically elected representatives of this state and other jurisdictions within the United States....” Id., at 198, 31 A.3d 1094. Notwithstanding various indications that there had been a drop off in support for the death penalty, we perceived no “dramatic shift” in the constitutional or legislative landscape. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 191, 31 A.3d 1094.
We first take this opportunity to clarify that, although a sudden sea change in public opinion would be sufficient to demonstrate a constitutionally significant shift in contemporary standards of decency, such a dramatic shift is not necessary for us to recognize that a punishment has become repugnant to the state constitution. If the legally salient metaphor is the evolution of our standards of decency, then a gradual but inexorable extinction may be as significant as the sociological equivalent of the meteor that, it is believed, suddenly ended the reign of the dinosaurs. In any event, new insights into the history of capital punishment in Connecticut, in tandem with the legislature's 2012 decision to abolish the death penalty prospectively, persuade us that we now have not only a clear picture of the long, steady devolution of capital punishment in our state, and, indeed, throughout New England, but also a dramatic and definitive statement by our elected officials *52 that the death penalty no longer can be justified as a necessary or appropriate tool of justice.
This court and the United States Supreme Court have looked to five objective **35 indicia of society's evolving standards of decency: (1) the historical development of the punishment at issue; (2) legislative enactments; (3) the current practice of prosecutors and sentencing juries; (4) the laws and practices of other jurisdictions; and (5) the opinions and recommendations of professional associations.43 See, e.g., Graham v. Florida, supra, 560 U.S. at 61–67, 130 S.Ct. 2011; Atkins v. Virginia, supra, 536 U.S. at 311–16, 122 S.Ct. 2242; Thompson v. Oklahoma, supra, 487 U.S. at 830, 108 S.Ct. 2687; Enmund v. Florida, supra, 458 U.S. at 788–89, 102 S.Ct. 3368; State v. Rizzo, supra, 303 Conn. at 187–96, 31 A.3d 1094. We consider each factor in turn.
....
B
Legislative Enactments
With respect to the second indicator of our evolving standards of decency, both this court and the United States Supreme Court have stated that “the clearest and most reliable objective evidence of contemporary values is the legislation enacted by the country's legislatures.” *60 47 (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Atkins v. Virginia, supra, 536 U.S. at 312, 122 S.Ct. 2242; accord State v. Rizzo, supra, 303 Conn. at 191, 31 A.3d 1094. We last examined the constitutionality of the death penalty in Rizzo II. See State v. Rizzo, supra, 303 Conn. at 184–201, 31 A.3d 1094. At that time, we recognized that, during the preceding decade, (1) the United States Supreme Court had imposed additional restrictions on the range of offenses and offenders constitutionally subject to capital punishment; id., at 188, 31 A.3d 1094; (2) several additional sister states had abolished the death penalty; id., at 190, 31 A.3d 1094; and (3) the number of death sentences imposed and executions carried out in the United States had continued to decline. Id., at 192–93, 31 A.3d 1094. Nevertheless, we concluded “that, as long as there remains powerful evidence of strong public support for the death penalty in the form of long-standing laws enacted by the democratically elected representatives of this state and other jurisdictions within the United States, we will not attempt to discern a contrary view of the public will, or to answer complex policy questions best answered by the legislative process....” Id., at 198, 31 A.3d 1094.
Public Act 12–5 pulled that linchpin out of our decision in Rizzo II. For the first time in our state's history, the governor and a majority of both legislative chambers **40 have now rejected state sanctioned killing and agreed that life imprisonment without the possibility of release *61 is a just and adequate punishment for even the most horrific crimes. For any future crimes, the death penalty has been removed from the list of acceptable punishments that may be imposed in accordance with law.
Public Act 12–5 thus represents the terminus of the four century long devolution of the death penalty in Connecticut. Although the prospective nature of P.A. 12–5 reflects the intent of the legislature that capital punishment shall die with a whimper, not with a bang, its death knell has been rung nonetheless. Our elected representatives have determined that the machinery of death48 is irreparable or, at the least, unbecoming to a civilized modern state. As a ranking member of the Judiciary Committee recognized in 2012, “this law is the best and most recent indication of evolving standards in our society of human decency.”49 55 S. Proc., Pt. 2, 2012 *62 Sess., p. 574, remarks of Senator John A. Kissel. The prospective abolition of the death penalty thus provides strong support for the conclusion that capital punishment no longer comports with contemporary standards of decency and, therefore, constitutes cruel and unusual punishment.
In her dissenting opinion, Chief Justice Rogers takes issue with the conclusion that the prospective repeal of the death penalty indicates that capital punishment no longer comports with our state's evolving standards of decency. She argues that, as a matter of common sense, legislators would not have voted to retain capital punishment on a retroactive basis if they had believed such punishment to be immoral, indecent, or unnecessary. Rather, she speculates that “the reason for the prospective repeal was not that a majority **41 of legislators found the death penalty morally repugnant even for the worst crimes, or that they found life imprisonment an adequate substitute for the death penalty, but that they had determined that the death penalty simply had become impracticable.” Text accompanying footnote 19 of Chief Justice Rogers' dissenting opinion. The most reasonable interpretation of P.A. 12–5, Chief Justice Rogers posits, is that the legislature continues to believe that death is the appropriate punishment for certain crimes but that, for financial and other pragmatic reasons, our elected representatives were forced to accept a less severe form of punishment for the future.
In her dissenting opinion, Chief Justice Rogers takes issue with the conclusion that the prospective repeal of the death penalty indicates that capital punishment no longer comports with our state's evolving standards of decency. She argues that, as a matter of common sense, legislators would not have voted to retain capital punishment on a retroactive basis if they had believed such punishment to be immoral, indecent, or unnecessary. Rather, she speculates that “the reason for the prospective repeal was not that a majority **41 of legislators found the death penalty morally repugnant even for the worst crimes, or that they found life imprisonment an adequate substitute for the death penalty, but that they had determined that the death penalty simply had become impracticable.” Text accompanying footnote 19 of Chief Justice Rogers' dissenting opinion. The most reasonable interpretation of P.A. 12–5, Chief Justice Rogers posits, is that the legislature continues to believe that death is the appropriate punishment for certain crimes but that, for financial and other pragmatic reasons, our elected representatives were forced to accept a less severe form of punishment for the future.
We begin by observing that the United States Supreme Court, in *63 Atkins v. Virginia, supra, 536 U.S. 304, 122 S.Ct. 2242 considered and rejected Chief Justice Rogers' argument that a prospective only repeal of a punishment does not indicate that the punishment no longer comports with society's evolving values. See id., at 313–16, 122 S.Ct. 2242 (recognizing emergence of national consensus against executing intellectually disabled, based on decisions of eighteen states to amend their death penalty statutes to exempt such persons from capital punishment, even though majority of those states had done so prospectively only); see also id., at 342–43, 122 S.Ct. 2242 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (criticizing majority for counting among those jurisdictions that no longer permitted execution of intellectually disabled eleven states that had abolished practice only prospectively). Similarly, in Fleming v. Zant, supra, 259 Ga. at 687, 386 S.E.2d 339, the Supreme Court of Georgia concluded that a statute that prohibited the death penalty for mentally disabled individuals on a prospective only basis nevertheless evidenced an evolving societal consensus that the execution of such individuals was inappropriate. See id., at 690 and n. 3, 386 S.E.2d 339. Accordingly, that court concluded that execution of mentally disabled individuals sentenced prior to the effective date of the Georgia statute would be cruel and unusual punishment, in violation of the Georgia constitution. Id., at 690, 386 S.E.2d 339; see also Van Tran v. State, 66 S.W.3d 790, 805 (Tenn.2001) (concluding that statute prohibiting execution of mentally disabled offenders was not intended to apply retroactively but also concluding, under Tennessee constitution, in light of Fleming, that statute evidenced evolving consensus that carrying out any such executions would be cruel and unusual).
More importantly, the voluminous legislative history of P.A. 12–5 simply does not bear out Chief Justice Rogers' interpretation of that act. During the legislative debates, of the three dozen senators and representatives who spoke in favor of P.A. 12–5, nearly every legislator stated that he or she had come to oppose capital *64 punishment as a matter of conscience or principle. Notwithstanding the solely prospective application of P.A. 12–5, numerous legislators declared that they categorically opposed state sanctioned killing or, in a few cases, that they had concluded that life imprisonment without the possibility of release is a more appropriate punishment for capital felons.50 They cited a range of **42 principled objections to the death penalty. Many found unacceptable the possibility that the state might mistakenly execute an innocent person.51 Others condemned *65 capital punishment as incurably arbitrary and discriminatory,52 or came to believe that death sentences retraumatize the families of murder victims.53 In his own **43 remarks, one of the cochairmen of the Judiciary Committee left little doubt as to the primary rationale for *66 the legislation: “This was a matter of conscience for me and I think it's a matter of conscience for everyone in this body, proponents and opponents alike. I want to make that very clear.” 55 S. Proc., Pt. 3, 2012 Sess., pp. 791–92, remarks of Senator Eric D. Coleman. Indeed, many of the senators and representatives who opposed P.A. 12–5 acknowledged that its supporters voted out of a conscientious and moral rejection of capital punishment.54
Notably, although Chief Justice Rogers repeatedly chides the majority for failing to afford adequate deference to the legislative process, she herself is dismissive of legislators' own characterizations of their votes, favoring instead a narrative that is contradicted by the legislative record. It is certainly true, as Chief Justice Rogers emphasizes, that some proponents of the repeal also expressed concerns over monetary or practical challenges facing our state's capital punishment system. The fact that supporters voted to abolish capital punishment for both moral and practical reasons, however, in no way demonstrates that the death penalty continues to comport with contemporary standards of *67 decency in Connecticut. An indecent punishment is no less indecent for the fact that it is also costly and ineffectual.
To our knowledge, not a single legislator has publicly indicated that the decision to repeal the death penalty prospectively while retaining it for those who offended prior to April 25, 2012, embodied the sort of grand financial and pragmatic agreement suggested by Chief Justice Rogers. In fact, comments by Senator Kissel, a ranking member of the Judiciary Committee, directly refute Chief Justice Rogers' theory that the legislative history of the act could support such an interpretation: “[T]his isn't being driven by cost savings. There [is] ... ample testimony, year in and year out, that say[s] we for moral, philosophical, religious reasons, because it doesn't deter crime and all these other factors, say[s] that people stridently oppose this penalty in Connecticut. People will stand up on the floor of the House and the floor of the [Senate] and say, if we had a bill in front of us with complete abolition, I'd support it, but for political reasons or **44 expediency or for whatever reason, that's not the bill the Judiciary Committee gave us. But because this gets us one step closer to full abolition, I'm going to support this at this time.”55 Conn. Joint Standing Committee Hearings, Judiciary, Pt. 9, 2012 Sess., pp. 2766–67. Ultimately, of the three dozen legislators who spoke in favor of P.A. 12–5 during the legislative hearings and debates, only two indicated that they personally supported the repeal primarily for pragmatic reasons.56
*68 Why, then, did a legislature committed to abolishing the death penalty vote to retain it for the handful of inmates already on death row? It is clear from the legislative history of P.A. 12–5, as well as the record of other recent attempts to abolish capital punishment in Connecticut, that, as Senator Kissel indicated, the vast majority of those legislators who voted for P.A. 12–5 would have supported a full repeal but were forced at that time to accept half a loaf because there were not enough votes to pass a full repeal. With regard to the handful of legislators whose support for a repeal was contingent on retaining the death penalty for previous capital felons, the legislative record strongly suggests that they insisted on a prospective only repeal not for the pragmatic and financial reasons offered by Chief Justice Rogers but, rather, for one of two reasons.
*68 Why, then, did a legislature committed to abolishing the death penalty vote to retain it for the handful of inmates already on death row? It is clear from the legislative history of P.A. 12–5, as well as the record of other recent attempts to abolish capital punishment in Connecticut, that, as Senator Kissel indicated, the vast majority of those legislators who voted for P.A. 12–5 would have supported a full repeal but were forced at that time to accept half a loaf because there were not enough votes to pass a full repeal. With regard to the handful of legislators whose support for a repeal was contingent on retaining the death penalty for previous capital felons, the legislative record strongly suggests that they insisted on a prospective only repeal not for the pragmatic and financial reasons offered by Chief Justice Rogers but, rather, for one of two reasons.
First, some legislators opposed retroactive abolition out of a principled belief that the state had made a commitment to families of victims murdered before the passage of P.A 12–5 that the state would pursue the death penalty in those cases. Those legislators felt that the state was morally obliged to honor that prior commitment, even if it had foresworn capital punishment going forward.57 For such legislators, retaining the death *69 penalty on a retroactive basis represented the lesser of two evils. Indeed, at least one legislator **45 speculated that an unwillingness to “up end” victims' expectations was the primary rationale for enacting a prospective only repeal.58 55 S. Proc., Pt. 3, 2012 Sess., p. 720, remarks of Senator Andrew W. Roraback; see also K. Barry, “From Wolves, Lambs (Part II): The Fourteenth Amendment Case for Gradual Abolition of the Death Penalty,” 35 Cardozo L.Rev. 1829, 1837 (2014) (“[p]rospective-only repeal grants the ‘victim's mother’ her pound of flesh and then bids her adieu”). Indeed, at oral argument before this court, the state acknowledged that the legislature indicated that “keeping a promise to the victims” was one of the primary rationales for enacting a prospective only repeal.
*70 For other legislators, support for a prospective only repeal appears to have reflected a calculation that they could accommodate the public demand that certain notorious inmates remain on death row; see part III C of this opinion; with little concern that those death sentences ever would be carried out.59 During the debates over P.A. 12–5, many legislators were of the opinion that, once the death penalty had been prospectively abolished, the official policy of the state would then disapprove capital punishment, and it would, therefore, become unconstitutional to execute offenders whose crimes were committed prior to the repeal. It was widely predicted that the individuals already on death row would immediately seek appellate or habeas relief upon passage of a prospective repeal, and that this court would bar all future executions.60 **46 Although *71 not all legislators were in agreement on this point, it is noteworthy that Chief State's Attorney Kane, who heads the Division of Criminal Justice and represents the state in this matter, has himself publicly taken the position that, following a prospective repeal, any efforts to execute those already on death row would be unlikely to pass constitutional muster. See Conn. Joint Standing Committee Hearings, Judiciary, Pt. 8, 2012 Sess., pp. 2601–2602 (“I can't imagine how we would be executing somebody who's on death row today”); id., at pp. 2630–35 (indicating that, after prospective repeal, capital punishment would fail to comport with evolving standards of decency in Connecticut).61
31Some legislators, then, may have seen a prospective repeal as an opportunity to retain the support of constituents committed to the execution of particular residents of death row, while leaving to this court the task of abolishing capital punishment retroactively. Professor Kevin Barry, on whose opinions Chief Justice Rogers repeatedly relies, has argued that adoption of a prospective only repeal represented precisely this sort of “strategic” decision on the part of legislators “to discard the death penalty going forward ... while punting the hard political decisions about what to do with those on death row....” K. Barry, supra, 35 Cardozo L.Rev. at 1836; see also id., at 1834 (noting that abolitionists adopted similar strategy of gradual abolition in movement to end slavery); id., at 1836 (prospective only repeal is politically viable because it removes so-called “ ‘victim's mother’ ” effect). We do not consider such action to evidence legislative endorsement of the death penalty *72 as a fitting and acceptable means of punishment in modern Connecticut.62
31Some legislators, then, may have seen a prospective repeal as an opportunity to retain the support of constituents committed to the execution of particular residents of death row, while leaving to this court the task of abolishing capital punishment retroactively. Professor Kevin Barry, on whose opinions Chief Justice Rogers repeatedly relies, has argued that adoption of a prospective only repeal represented precisely this sort of “strategic” decision on the part of legislators “to discard the death penalty going forward ... while punting the hard political decisions about what to do with those on death row....” K. Barry, supra, 35 Cardozo L.Rev. at 1836; see also id., at 1834 (noting that abolitionists adopted similar strategy of gradual abolition in movement to end slavery); id., at 1836 (prospective only repeal is politically viable because it removes so-called “ ‘victim's mother’ ” effect). We do not consider such action to evidence legislative endorsement of the death penalty *72 as a fitting and acceptable means of punishment in modern Connecticut.62
**47 *73 Lastly, we note that, if the primary concern of the legislature had been with the workability of the death penalty, as Chief Justice Rogers contends, then the legislature certainly could have implemented measures, short of abolition, aimed at removing some of the impediments in the state's capital punishment scheme.63 That option was proposed on several occasions during the hearings and debates on P.A. 12–5 but ultimately rejected.64 The only plausible reading of the legislative history, then, is that the legislature made a principled determination that capital punishment should no longer be the policy of Connecticut.
Turning our attention to the other elected branch of government, we also recognize that the meaning of a statute is revealed not only in the intent of the legislators who draft and enact it, but also in the aspirations of the governor who signs it. As Chief Justice Rogers, writing for the court in Rizzo II, recently explained: “The governor, like our legislators, is an elected representative of the people of the state. Additionally, executive approval ... of legislation is an integral part of the legislative process ... and it is axiomatic that when the governor exercises this power, he or she is acting in a substantive **48 legislative role.... Thus ... a governor's [signing statement issued upon] approval of legislation may provide evidence of the motivations *74 underlying that legislation....” (Citations omitted.) State v. Rizzo, supra, 303 Conn. at 199–200, 31 A.3d 1094. In fact, Chief Justice Rogers observed in this very context that “it may be, at some times, on some subjects, that the [governor] elected by all the people is rather more representative of them all than are the members of either body of the [l]egislature whose constituencies are local and not [statewide]....” (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 201, 31 A.3d 1094. In the present case, Governor Malloy made clear, in signing P.A. 12–5, that his decision to approve legislation abolishing the death penalty was a principled one: “Many of us who have advocated for this position over the years have said there is a moral component to our opposition to the death penalty. For me, that is certainly the case....
“I [have come] to believe that doing away with the be unfairly imposed.”65 Gov. Malloy on Signing Bill To Repeal Capital Punishment (April 25, 2012) (Governor's Statement).
“I [have come] to believe that doing away with the be unfairly imposed.”65 Gov. Malloy on Signing Bill To Repeal Capital Punishment (April 25, 2012) (Governor's Statement).
In conclusion, although support for a legislative compromise as significant and complex as Connecticut's prospective abolition of the death penalty is bound to arise from and reflect a range of sentiments and concerns, the best evidence of legislative intent available *75 to us strongly suggests that both of the elected branches were motivated in no small part by a principled belief that state sanctioned executions are no longer a necessary or appropriate form of punishment, even for the most heinous crimes.
C
Current Practice
3233“Although the clearest and most reliable objective evidence of contemporary values is the legislation enacted by the country's legislatures ... in assessing whether a punishment is constitutionally sound, it also is appropriate for us to consider what is occurring in actual practice.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Rizzo, supra, 303 Conn. at 191, 31 A.3d 1094. “[T]he sentencing decisions that juries have made ... [are] a significant and reliable objective index of contemporary values because [juries are] so directly involved” in the administration of criminal justice. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Enmund v. Florida, supra, 458 U.S. at 794, 102 S.Ct. 3368. For example, “[s]tatistics about the number of executions may inform the consideration whether capital punishment ... is regarded as unacceptable in our society.” Kennedy v. Louisiana, supra, 554 U.S. at 433, 128 S.Ct. 2641; see id. (finding social consensus against capital punishment for crime of child rape); see also **49 Graham v. Florida, supra, 560 U.S. at 64, 74, 130 S.Ct. 2011 (determining that sentence of life imprisonment without possibility of parole is cruel and unusual punishment for juvenile who had committed nonhomicide offense when only 123 people were serving such sentences in eleven jurisdictions nationwide). The number of death sentences actually imposed and carried out is a key barometer of social mores because, although “it is easy for the public to respond to the conviction of a vicious murderer or a serial killer by advocating the ultimate penalty of death, it is far more difficult for society to carry out *76 that penalty by taking the life of that person.” State v. Ross, supra, 230 Conn. at 297, 646 A.2d 1318; see also D. Garland, Peculiar Institution: America's Death Penalty in an Age of Abolition (2010) p. 60. “Although death penalty statutes do remain on the books of many jurisdictions, and public opinion polls show opinion to be divided as to capital punishment as an abstract proposition, the infrequency of its actual application suggests that among those persons called [on] to actually impose or carry out the death penalty it is being repudiated with ever increasing frequency.” People v. Anderson, supra, 6 Cal.3d at 648, 100 Cal.Rptr. 152, 493 P.2d 880; see also District Attorney v. Watson, supra, 381 Mass. at 662, 411 N.E.2d 1274 (prolonged dearth of executions evidences current standards of decency).
In the post-Furman era, Connecticut has imposed sustained death sentences at a rate (taken as a percentage of capital eligible convictions) that is among the lowest in the nation. See J. Donohue, “An Empirical Evaluation of the Connecticut Death Penalty System Since 1973: Are There Unlawful Racial, Gender, and Geographic Disparities?,” 11 J. Empirical Legal Stud. 637, 638 (2014). Of the 205 capital eligible murders committed in Connecticut between 1973 and 2007, of which approximately two thirds were charged capitally, only 12 resulted in death sentences. Id., at 641. Indeed, since 1973, whereas juries in states such as Texas and Florida have imposed death sentences at an average rate of approximately two per month, Connecticut juries on average have imposed a death sentence only approximately once every two years.66
Moreover, each of the capital sentences imposed in Connecticut has, in effect, become the equivalent of life imprisonment. As we discussed, there has been an *77 almost complete moratorium on executions in the state since 1960. Connecticut has put only one offender to death over the past fifty-five years, and that was a serial killer who believed that he deserved to die and voluntarily waived his right to further appeals and habeas remedies. L. Goodheart, supra, at pp. 228, 230–31, 244–46. Even then, it took the state more than two decades to carry out his sentence. See id., at p. 248. Nor is there even the remotest likelihood that any of the inmates currently on death row in Connecticut will exhaust their federal and state appeals and habeas remedies any time in the foreseeable future.
Moreover, each of the capital sentences imposed in Connecticut has, in effect, become the equivalent of life imprisonment. As we discussed, there has been an *77 almost complete moratorium on executions in the state since 1960. Connecticut has put only one offender to death over the past fifty-five years, and that was a serial killer who believed that he deserved to die and voluntarily waived his right to further appeals and habeas remedies. L. Goodheart, supra, at pp. 228, 230–31, 244–46. Even then, it took the state more than two decades to carry out his sentence. See id., at p. 248. Nor is there even the remotest likelihood that any of the inmates currently on death row in Connecticut will exhaust their federal and state appeals and habeas remedies any time in the foreseeable future.
34The United States Supreme Court also has recognized that the willingness or reluctance of prosecutors to seek a particular punishment constitutes further objective evidence of whether society considers that punishment to be excessive or disproportionate. See Enmund v. Florida, supra, 458 U.S. at 796, 102 S.Ct. 3368. This is because prosecutors “represent society's interest in punishing crime....” Id. In **50 Connecticut, Chief State's Attorney Kane, testifying before the legislature prior to the enactment of P.A. 12–5, strongly suggested that, following the prospective repeal of the death penalty, he no longer would consider it appropriate to seek the death penalty for eligible crimes. See Conn. Joint Standing Committee Hearings, Judiciary, Pt. 8, 2012 Sess., pp. 2602, 2633. At neither the charging nor the sentencing stages, then, have the key decision makers in our state's capital punishment system demonstrated that the death penalty continues to comport with contemporary standards of decency in Connecticut.
...
F
Conclusion
3637In conclusion, we are aware that the issue of whether the death penalty **55 is an appropriate punishment for the most heinous crimes is one about which people of good faith continue to disagree. Nevertheless, our review of the five objective indicia that have been deemed relevant under both the federal and state constitutions compels *86 the conclusion that, following the enactment of P.A. 12–5, Connecticut's capital punishment scheme no longer comports with our state's contemporary standards of decency.88 It therefore offends the state constitutional prohibition against excessive and disproportionate punishment.89
III
THE DEATH PENALTY IS DEVOID OF ANY LEGITIMATE PENOLOGICAL JUSTIFICATIONS
As the constitution requires, we next consider whether, on the basis of our independent review of *87 the available evidence executing those individuals who committed capital felonies prior to the enactment of P.A. 12–5 would serve any legitimate penological purpose. In light of the history and desuetude of the death penalty in Connecticut over the past one-half century, culminating in its prospective abolition in 2012, we conclude that capital punishment no longer measurably contributes to any legitimate penological goal.
Enforcing the criminal law means marshaling the awesome coercive power of the state to deprive its own citizens of the life, liberty, or property to which they are otherwise naturally entitled. See, e.g., Stutson v. United States, 516 U.S. 193, 196, 116 S.Ct. 600, 133 L.Ed.2d 571 (1996); State v. Vumback, 247 Conn. 929, 933, 719 A.2d 1172 (1998) (Berdon, J., dissenting from the denial of certification to appeal). The death penalty represents the most extreme exercise of this power. See, e.g., State v. Rizzo, supra, 266 Conn. at 227, 833 A.2d 363. Such a deprivation must, of course, be justified, and society traditionally has recognized **56 four principal justifications for the imposition of criminal sanctions. Criminal penalties may be imposed (1) to deter the perpetrator and others from committing crimes (deterrence), (2) to punish the perpetrator and give voice to the moral outrage experienced by the victim and society at large (retribution), (3) to prevent the perpetrator from committing additional offenses (incapacitation), or (4) to transform the perpetrator into a better, more law-abiding citizen (rehabilitation). See, e.g., Graham v. Florida, supra, 560 U.S. at 71–74, 130 S.Ct. 2011. “A sentence lacking any legitimate penological justification is by its nature disproportionate to the offense.” Id., at 71, 130 S.Ct. 2011. Neither the federal nor the state constitution will permit the imposition of a sanction “so totally without penological justification that it results in the gratuitous infliction of suffering.” Gregg v. Georgia, supra, 428 U.S. at 183, 96 S.Ct. 2909 (opinion announcing judgment).
...
...
D
Conclusion
44For all of these reasons, the death penalty no longer serves any legitimate penological goal in our state. As Judge Kozinski concludes, “we have little more than an illusion of a death penalty in this country. To be sure, we have capital trials; we have convictions and death sentences imposed; we have endless and massively costly reviews by the state and federal courts; *119 and we do have a small number of people executed each year. But the number of executions compared to the number of people who have been sentenced to death is minuscule, and the gap is widening every year. Whatever purposes the death penalty is said to serve—deterrence, retribution, assuaging the pain suffered by victims' families—these purposes are not served by the system as it now operates.” (Footnotes omitted.) A. Kozinski & S. Gallagher, supra, 46 Case W. Res. L.Rev. at 3–4. We therefore conclude that, following the enactment of P.A. 12–5, capital punishment also violates article first, §§ 8 and 9, of the Connecticut constitution because it no longer serves any legitimate penological purpose.110
**74 *120 IV
RESPONSE TO THE DISSENTING JUSTICES
Lastly, we take this opportunity to address briefly certain general arguments that the dissenting justices have raised. Although we recognize and respect that their opinions are grounded in a principled and commendable commitment to judicial restraint, we find them to be unpersuasive and, in a few instances, somewhat troubling.
...
B
Connecticut's Historical Acceptance of Capital Punishment
50We next address the argument of the dissenting justices that capital punishment cannot now offend the constitution of Connecticut because (1) there are references to capital punishment in the text of both the 1818 and 1965 state constitutions, (2) the framers of the 1818 constitution believed that the death penalty was an appropriate punishment for the most serious crimes, and (3) in 1965, the constitutional convention declined to adopt a constitutional provision that would have *130 prohibited capital punishment. The premises of the dissents' argument are undoubtedly true. The conclusion is not.
50We next address the argument of the dissenting justices that capital punishment cannot now offend the constitution of Connecticut because (1) there are references to capital punishment in the text of both the 1818 and 1965 state constitutions, (2) the framers of the 1818 constitution believed that the death penalty was an appropriate punishment for the most serious crimes, and (3) in 1965, the constitutional convention declined to adopt a constitutional provision that would have *130 prohibited capital punishment. The premises of the dissents' argument are undoubtedly true. The conclusion is not.
It is certainly the case that, although Connecticut has steadily reduced the number of crimes subject to capital punishment over the past four centuries, the death penalty has continued during that period to be authorized by statute, and it is referenced in our state constitution. There also is little doubt that the framers of the state constitution considered the death penalty to be an acceptable form of punishment, under certain circumstances and if properly applied. Although the dissenting justices reiterate these facts throughout their opinions, they fail to explain exactly how our state's historical acceptance of the death penalty answers the primary question presented by this appeal, namely, whether, following the enactment of P.A. 12–5, capital punishment now constitutes excessive and disproportionate punishment when viewed through the lens of our state's contemporary standards of decency.
As we have explained, the constitutionally relevant inquiry is whether the death penalty, as currently administered in Connecticut, and following the enactment of P.A. 12–5, offends our state's evolving standards of decency, and whether that punishment continues to satisfy any legitimate penological objective. Although the fact that the death penalty was considered acceptable 50 or 200 years ago might be **80 relevant to a challenge contending that capital punishment is inherently unconstitutional; see State v. Ross, supra, 230 Conn. at 249–50, 646 A.2d 1318; it says little about whether capital punishment is constitutional today, in light of our legislature's most recent pronouncement on the issue, and given what we now understand and what our elected officials have determined regarding capital punishment's lack of deterrent value, the potential for irredeemable error, a pattern of persistently arbitrary and discriminatory application, *131 and our state's inability to administer the death penalty in a way that affords closure and solace to the families of the victims.
As the Supreme Court of California has recognized, incidental references to the death penalty in a state constitution merely acknowledge that the penalty was in use at the time of drafting; they do not forever enshrine the death penalty's constitutional status as standards of decency continue to evolve: “It has been suggested that we are ... restrained from considering whether capital punishment is proscribed by [the state constitutional prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment] since the death penalty is expressly or impliedly recognized in several other provisions of the California constitution. We perceive no possible conflict or repugnance between those provisions ... however, for none of the incidental references to the death penalty purport to give its existence constitutional stature. They do no more than recognize its existence at the time of their adoption. Thus, the bail clause of [the California constitution] restricts the right to bail in capital cases ... [and] the due process clause ... ensures that life will not be taken without due process.... None of these provisions can be construed as an affirmative exemption of capital punishment from the compass of the cruel or unusual punishment clause of [the California constitution].” (Footnote omitted.) People v. Anderson, supra, 6 Cal.3d at 637–38, 100 Cal.Rptr. 152, 493 P.2d 880. The United States Supreme Court likewise has indicated that the mere fact that the federal constitution makes reference to capital crimes does not mean that contemporary standards of decency may not evolve to the point that the death penalty is no longer constitutionally permissible. See Gregg v. Georgia, supra, 428 U.S. at 176–82, 96 S.Ct. 2909 (opinion announcing judgment).
As the Supreme Court of California has recognized, incidental references to the death penalty in a state constitution merely acknowledge that the penalty was in use at the time of drafting; they do not forever enshrine the death penalty's constitutional status as standards of decency continue to evolve: “It has been suggested that we are ... restrained from considering whether capital punishment is proscribed by [the state constitutional prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment] since the death penalty is expressly or impliedly recognized in several other provisions of the California constitution. We perceive no possible conflict or repugnance between those provisions ... however, for none of the incidental references to the death penalty purport to give its existence constitutional stature. They do no more than recognize its existence at the time of their adoption. Thus, the bail clause of [the California constitution] restricts the right to bail in capital cases ... [and] the due process clause ... ensures that life will not be taken without due process.... None of these provisions can be construed as an affirmative exemption of capital punishment from the compass of the cruel or unusual punishment clause of [the California constitution].” (Footnote omitted.) People v. Anderson, supra, 6 Cal.3d at 637–38, 100 Cal.Rptr. 152, 493 P.2d 880. The United States Supreme Court likewise has indicated that the mere fact that the federal constitution makes reference to capital crimes does not mean that contemporary standards of decency may not evolve to the point that the death penalty is no longer constitutionally permissible. See Gregg v. Georgia, supra, 428 U.S. at 176–82, 96 S.Ct. 2909 (opinion announcing judgment).
It may well be that, at bottom, the opposition of the dissenting justices reflects their disapproval of the *132 evolving standards of decency test itself, a legal standard according to which a penalty that once passed constitutional muster may, within a relatively brief span of time, come to be deemed cruel and unusual. See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, supra, 543 U.S. at 574–75, 578, 125 S.Ct. 1183 (overruling Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 109 S.Ct. 2969, 106 L.Ed.2d 306 [ (1989) ], in prohibiting execution of individuals who were under eighteen years old when they committed capital crime); Atkins v. Virginia, supra, 536 U.S. at 321, 122 S.Ct. 2242 (overruling Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 109 S.Ct. 2934, 106 L.Ed.2d 256 [ (1989) ], in holding that execution of intellectually disabled individuals is unconstitutional). But that is the law of the land, both federally and in Connecticut. In the case of the death penalty, the past several years have witnessed dramatic changes in the legal landscape, most significant of which was the decision by the elected branches to abolish capital punishment for all future offenses. Whatever role the death penalty may once have played in our system of justice, it is clear that our elected representatives, acting on behalf of the people of this state, have repudiated the **81 death penalty as a sentencing option unworthy of continued support.115
C
Whether Deference to the Legislature Requires That We Uphold P.A. 12–5
51We next address the argument of the dissenting justices that, in holding that the death penalty now violates the constitution of Connecticut, we have failed to pay adequate deference to the will of the legislature. Each *133 of the dissenting justices argues, in essence, that a reviewing court is bound to accept what the dissenting justices maintain to be the judgment of the legislature—that the death penalty comports with contemporary standards of decency and serves legitimate penological interests—and that to do otherwise is to usurp the proper role of the legislature in order to advance judges' personal moral agendas.116 We already have rejected this argument in State v. Ross, supra, 230 Conn. at 248–49, 646 A.2d 1318, however, recognizing that it fundamentally misunderstands the well established function and role of judicial review in the capital sentencing context.
51We next address the argument of the dissenting justices that, in holding that the death penalty now violates the constitution of Connecticut, we have failed to pay adequate deference to the will of the legislature. Each *133 of the dissenting justices argues, in essence, that a reviewing court is bound to accept what the dissenting justices maintain to be the judgment of the legislature—that the death penalty comports with contemporary standards of decency and serves legitimate penological interests—and that to do otherwise is to usurp the proper role of the legislature in order to advance judges' personal moral agendas.116 We already have rejected this argument in State v. Ross, supra, 230 Conn. at 248–49, 646 A.2d 1318, however, recognizing that it fundamentally misunderstands the well established function and role of judicial review in the capital sentencing context.
We begin by reiterating that, although the legislature voted to abolish capital punishment on a solely prospective basis, this by no means reflects or embodies a determination that the death penalty remains consonant with contemporary standards of decency and continues to serve the goal of deterrence or retribution. The prospective nature of P.A. 12–5 instead appears to reflect a belief on the part of some legislators that prior commitments the state has made to relatives of murder victims justify the retention of capital punishment for use in those cases. Capital punishment may, in other words, simply be the lesser of two evils. Public Act 12–5 also likely reflects a purely political decision to placate the public's desire to exact vengeance on certain notorious inmates, while passing along to this court the task of finally decommissioning the state's machinery of death. There is abundant evidence in the legislative history to support both of these interpretations. See parts II B and III C of this opinion.
If we assume, for the sake of argument, however, that a majority of the legislature has in fact determined that capital punishment remains a morally acceptable punishment that serves legitimate penological interests, *134 the question arises as to the proper scope of this court's review. It is well established that, under both the federal and state constitutions, a criminal sentence challenged as unconstitutionally excessive or disproportionate must undergo two stages of judicial review. First, the reviewing court determines whether the punishment offends contemporary standards of decency, as evidenced by the various factors discussed in part II of this opinion. Legislative enactments are one of those considerations, but certainly not the only one. Second, the court is required to exercise its own independent judgment as to whether the punishment remains suitable to the crime and continues to serve any legitimate penological purpose. As the United States Supreme Court explained in Atkins v. Virginia, supra, 536 U.S. at 304, 122 S.Ct. 2242 although the current legislative judgment is of great importance, “the [c]onstitution **82 contemplates that in the end our own judgment will be brought to bear on the question of the acceptability of the death penalty under the [e]ighth [a]mendment.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 312, 122 S.Ct. 2242. A punishment, therefore, must satisfy both levels of review to survive constitutional scrutiny. Such scrutiny is especially critical in the present case because, to our knowledge, we are the first court in the modern era to comprehensively address the issue of whether the death penalty can remain consonant with society's evolving standards of decency and serve legitimate penological interests following a prospective only repeal.
Although Chief Justice Rogers concedes, as she must, that a challenged punishment is subject to this type of close judicial scrutiny, she nevertheless maintains that, because the constitutional authority to define crimes and to fix the degree and method of punishment belongs to the legislature, once the legislature has determined that a particular punishment is appropriate and morally acceptable, that determination is, essentially, dispositive. *135 If that were the case, then judicial review would be a weak tea indeed. When an appellate court is asked to pass on the constitutionality of a mode of punishment, it is, almost invariably, after a defendant has been found guilty of a crime and sentenced in accordance with a duly enacted penal statute. If the fact that an elected legislature had authorized and enacted the punishment in question were enough to insulate it from judicial scrutiny, then the freedom from cruel and unusual punishment would be a hollow one. See People v. Anderson, supra, 6 Cal.3d at 640, 100 Cal.Rptr. 152, 493 P.2d 880 (“[w]ere it otherwise, the [l]egislature would ever be the sole judge of the permissible means and extent of punishment and ... the [c]onstitution would be superfluous” [citation omitted] ). “We know that the [f]ramers did not envision so narrow a role for this basic guaranty of human rights.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) District Attorney v. Watson, supra, 381 Mass. at 662, 411 N.E.2d 1274.
In dismissing the United States Supreme Court's repeated statements as to the importance of this independent judicial review process, Chief Justice Rogers fails to explain why the high court would continue to emphasize that “[t]he [c]onstitution contemplates that in the end our own judgment will be brought to bear on the question of the acceptability of the death penalty”; (internal quotation marks omitted) Hall v. Florida, supra, 134 S.Ct. at 1999; and that “[t]hat exercise of independent judgment is the [c]ourt's judicial duty”; id., at 2000; if that were not the law. Instead, Chief Justice Rogers merely queries how truly independent judicial review of an allegedly cruel and unusual punishment can be reconciled with the observation by that court, in a 1989 decision, that, “ ‘[i]n determining what standards have “evolved” ... [the court has] looked not to [its] own conceptions of decency, but to those of modern American society as a whole.’ ” Footnote 33 of Chief Justice Rogers' dissenting opinion, quoting *136 Stanford v. Kentucky, supra, 492 U.S. at 369, 109 S.Ct. 2969. Of course, we do not disagree with the cited language from Stanford insofar as independent judicial review must stand on the court's principled consideration of the available evidence regarding a punishment's penological merits, rather than the personal predilections of individual judges. The short answer to Chief Justice Rogers' question, however, is that Stanford, which was an outlier at the time it was decided, subsequently was overruled by Roper v. Simmons, supra, 543 U.S. at 574–75, 578, 125 S.Ct. 1183 and is no longer good law. See **83 id., at 574, 125 S.Ct. 1183 (overruling holding of Stanford that persons under eighteen years of age at time of capital offense may be executed and explaining that, “to the extent Stanford was based on a rejection of the idea that [the] [c]ourt is required to bring its independent judgment to bear on the proportionality of the death penalty for a particular class of crimes or offenders ... it suffices to note that this rejection was inconsistent with prior [e]ighth [a]mendment decisions” [citations omitted] ). In fact, in Roper, the court took pains to reiterate that “[t]he beginning point is a review of objective indicia of consensus, as expressed in particular by the enactments of legislatures that have addressed the question. These data give us essential instruction. We then must determine, in the exercise of our own independent judgment, whether the death penalty is a disproportionate punishment....” (Emphasis added.) Id., at 564, 125 S.Ct. 1183.
Although Chief Justice Rogers concedes, as she must, that a challenged punishment is subject to this type of close judicial scrutiny, she nevertheless maintains that, because the constitutional authority to define crimes and to fix the degree and method of punishment belongs to the legislature, once the legislature has determined that a particular punishment is appropriate and morally acceptable, that determination is, essentially, dispositive. *135 If that were the case, then judicial review would be a weak tea indeed. When an appellate court is asked to pass on the constitutionality of a mode of punishment, it is, almost invariably, after a defendant has been found guilty of a crime and sentenced in accordance with a duly enacted penal statute. If the fact that an elected legislature had authorized and enacted the punishment in question were enough to insulate it from judicial scrutiny, then the freedom from cruel and unusual punishment would be a hollow one. See People v. Anderson, supra, 6 Cal.3d at 640, 100 Cal.Rptr. 152, 493 P.2d 880 (“[w]ere it otherwise, the [l]egislature would ever be the sole judge of the permissible means and extent of punishment and ... the [c]onstitution would be superfluous” [citation omitted] ). “We know that the [f]ramers did not envision so narrow a role for this basic guaranty of human rights.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) District Attorney v. Watson, supra, 381 Mass. at 662, 411 N.E.2d 1274.
In dismissing the United States Supreme Court's repeated statements as to the importance of this independent judicial review process, Chief Justice Rogers fails to explain why the high court would continue to emphasize that “[t]he [c]onstitution contemplates that in the end our own judgment will be brought to bear on the question of the acceptability of the death penalty”; (internal quotation marks omitted) Hall v. Florida, supra, 134 S.Ct. at 1999; and that “[t]hat exercise of independent judgment is the [c]ourt's judicial duty”; id., at 2000; if that were not the law. Instead, Chief Justice Rogers merely queries how truly independent judicial review of an allegedly cruel and unusual punishment can be reconciled with the observation by that court, in a 1989 decision, that, “ ‘[i]n determining what standards have “evolved” ... [the court has] looked not to [its] own conceptions of decency, but to those of modern American society as a whole.’ ” Footnote 33 of Chief Justice Rogers' dissenting opinion, quoting *136 Stanford v. Kentucky, supra, 492 U.S. at 369, 109 S.Ct. 2969. Of course, we do not disagree with the cited language from Stanford insofar as independent judicial review must stand on the court's principled consideration of the available evidence regarding a punishment's penological merits, rather than the personal predilections of individual judges. The short answer to Chief Justice Rogers' question, however, is that Stanford, which was an outlier at the time it was decided, subsequently was overruled by Roper v. Simmons, supra, 543 U.S. at 574–75, 578, 125 S.Ct. 1183 and is no longer good law. See **83 id., at 574, 125 S.Ct. 1183 (overruling holding of Stanford that persons under eighteen years of age at time of capital offense may be executed and explaining that, “to the extent Stanford was based on a rejection of the idea that [the] [c]ourt is required to bring its independent judgment to bear on the proportionality of the death penalty for a particular class of crimes or offenders ... it suffices to note that this rejection was inconsistent with prior [e]ighth [a]mendment decisions” [citations omitted] ). In fact, in Roper, the court took pains to reiterate that “[t]he beginning point is a review of objective indicia of consensus, as expressed in particular by the enactments of legislatures that have addressed the question. These data give us essential instruction. We then must determine, in the exercise of our own independent judgment, whether the death penalty is a disproportionate punishment....” (Emphasis added.) Id., at 564, 125 S.Ct. 1183.
In reality, the United States Supreme Court has, on multiple occasions, held that punishments that were duly enacted by democratically elected legislatures were nevertheless unconstitutionally excessive and disproportionate under this standard. See, e.g., Hall v. Florida, supra, 134 S.Ct. at 1990, 2001 (holding that Florida law foreclosing further exploration of capital defendant's intellectual disability if his IQ score is more than seventy violated eighth amendment); *137 Thompson v. Oklahoma, supra, 487 U.S. at 838, 108 S.Ct. 2687 (declaring as unconstitutional death penalty for offender who was under sixteen years old when he committed capital offense). Indeed, there are numerous cases in which that court and other federal and state courts have held democratically enacted criminal sanctions to be devoid of penological value, and thus unconstitutionally excessive, without relying on any predicate finding that those sanctions had lost their popular support. See, e.g., Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 281, 292–94, 303, 103 S.Ct. 3001, 77 L.Ed.2d 637 (1983) (concluding that courts are competent to apply “generally accepted criteria” to assess independently relative severity of criminal offenses and sentences for purposes of eighth amendment proportionality analysis, and holding that sentence of life imprisonment for writing $100 check with intent to defraud was unconstitutionally excessive); Furman v. Georgia, supra, 408 U.S. at 239–40, 92 S.Ct. 2726 (holding death penalty unconstitutional as then applied in Georgia and Texas, even though forty-one state legislatures had approved of its use and polling data was mixed); Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667, 82 S.Ct. 1417, 8 L.Ed.2d 758 (1962) (holding that California statute authorizing jail sentence for narcotics addiction inflicted cruel and unusual punishment in violation of eighth and fourteenth amendments); Weems v. United States, supra, 217 U.S. at 357–58, 367, 377, 30 S.Ct. 544 (concluding that traditional Philippine punishment of years of hard and painful labor was unconstitutionally excessive punishment for crime of falsifying public document, even if punishment conformed to customs, habits, and prejudices of resident population, and that punishment would have been excessive even if authorized by federal law); People v. Anderson, supra, 6 Cal.3d at 641, 100 Cal.Rptr. 152, 493 P.2d 880 (holding that capital punishment violated state constitution and explaining that court “would abdicate [its] responsibility to examine independently the question were [its] inquiry to begin and end with the fact that *138 statutory provisions authorizing [the] imposition of the death penalty have been recently enacted”); see also Kennedy v. Louisiana, supra, 554 U.S. at 461, 128 S.Ct. 2641 (Alito, J., dissenting) (indicating that court had exercised its own independent judgment in holding that death **84 penalty was excessive and disproportionate penalty for rape of child); Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 945, 129 S.Ct. 1, 171 L.Ed.2d 932 (2008) (Scalia, J., respecting the denial of rehearing) (observing that court in Kennedy had exercised its own judgment while noting that parties had failed to call court's attention to fact that Congress and the president recently had reauthorized death penalty for military personnel convicted of child rape). Despite her attempt to distinguish each of these cases, Chief Justice Rogers simply cannot wipe away a century of eighth amendment jurisprudence.
Nor has the United States Supreme Court ever reviewed an eighth amendment challenge under the highly deferential rational basis standard that Chief Justice Rogers would apparently have this court apply. As Justice White explained in Furman, “[j]udicial review, by definition, often involves a conflict between judicial and legislative judgment as to what the [c]onstitution means or requires.... It seems conceded by all that ... there are punishments that the [eighth] [a]mendment would bar whether legislatively approved or not. Inevitably, then, there will be occasions when [the court] will differ with Congress or state legislatures with respect to the validity of punishment.” Furman v. Georgia, supra, 408 U.S. at 313–14, 92 S.Ct. 2726 (White, J., concurring). Chief Justice Rogers may not agree that courts should play such a critical role in securing the people's freedom from cruel and unusual punishment, but that is the law of the land. See Glossip v. Gross, supra, 135 S.Ct. at 2776 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (court, not legislature, ultimately must determine whether capital punishment comports with evolving standards of decency because “[these] *139 are quintessentially judicial matters ... [that] concern the infliction—indeed the unfair, cruel, and unusual infliction—of a serious punishment [on] an individual”).
Finally, it would be difficult to imagine a case in which the argument for legislative deference is weaker than in the present case. The death penalty is a punishment that Connecticut has imposed on fewer than two dozen occasions over the past one-half century, and it has been carried out only once during that time frame. The penalty has been abolished by most of our neighboring states, and, after years of repeal efforts, our legislature and governor have now followed suit, abolishing it for all future crimes. Capital punishment has been preserved, then, only on a provisional basis, and only for a handful of current death row inmates. Moreover, the legislative history suggests that many legislators would have supported a full repeal and that those who voted to retain the death penalty on a retroactive basis may well have done so in the belief that this court would not permit any further executions to be carried out, as this state's chief prosecutor himself predicted. See part II B of this opinion; see also footnotes 1, 59 and 60 of this opinion and accompanying text. In short, the legislature could not have come any closer to fully abolishing capital punishment without actually doing so. We perceive no ringing legislative endorsement of the death penalty in Connecticut.
Finally, it would be difficult to imagine a case in which the argument for legislative deference is weaker than in the present case. The death penalty is a punishment that Connecticut has imposed on fewer than two dozen occasions over the past one-half century, and it has been carried out only once during that time frame. The penalty has been abolished by most of our neighboring states, and, after years of repeal efforts, our legislature and governor have now followed suit, abolishing it for all future crimes. Capital punishment has been preserved, then, only on a provisional basis, and only for a handful of current death row inmates. Moreover, the legislative history suggests that many legislators would have supported a full repeal and that those who voted to retain the death penalty on a retroactive basis may well have done so in the belief that this court would not permit any further executions to be carried out, as this state's chief prosecutor himself predicted. See part II B of this opinion; see also footnotes 1, 59 and 60 of this opinion and accompanying text. In short, the legislature could not have come any closer to fully abolishing capital punishment without actually doing so. We perceive no ringing legislative endorsement of the death penalty in Connecticut.
V
CONCLUSION
In prospectively abolishing the death penalty, the legislature did not simply express the will of the people that it no longer makes sense to maintain the costly and unsatisfying charade of a capital punishment scheme in which no one ever receives the ultimate punishment. Public Act 12–5 also held a mirror up to Connecticut's *140 long, troubled history with capital **85 punishment: the steady replacement by more progressive forms of punishment; the increasing inability to achieve legitimate penological purposes; the freakishness with which the sentence of death is imposed; the rarity with which it is carried out; and the racial, ethnic, and socio-economic with our abiding freedom from cruel and unusual punishment, we hold that capital punishment, as currently applied, violates the constitution of Connecticut.
The judgment is reversed with respect to the imposition of a sentence of death and the case is remanded with direction to impose a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of release; the judgment is affirmed in all other respects.
The judgment is reversed with respect to the imposition of a sentence of death and the case is remanded with direction to impose a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of release; the judgment is affirmed in all other respects.
In this opinion NORCOTT, EVELEIGH and McDONALD, Js., concurred.
(footnotes omitted.)
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