State v. Santiago, 318 Conn. 1, 18 n.14 (2015)

In some of our decisions, we have utilized the multifactor Geisler analysis to flesh out the general nature and parameters of the state constitutional provision at issue. Having done so, we proceeded to resolve the appellant's particular constitutional challenge according to the legal test and framework relevant and suited to that area of the law, rather than performing the substantive legal analysis under the somewhat artificial auspices of the six Geisler factors. See, e.g., State v. Linares, 232 Conn. 345, 379–87, 655 A.2d 737 (1995) (concluding, on basis of Geisler factors, that state constitution affords expansive protection to free speech in public places but then concluding that challenged statute did not infringe impermissibly on those protections under facts presented). In other cases, by contrast, we have used the Geisler framework to perform the actual substantive legal analysis. See, e.g., State v. Rizzo, 303 Conn. 71, 135–45, 31 A.3d 1094 (2011) (Rizzo II ) (evaluating challenges to death penalty according to six Geisler factors), cert. denied, ––– U.S. ––––, 133 S.Ct. 133, 184 L.Ed.2d 64 (2012); see also State v. Ross, supra, 230 Conn. at 249–51, 646 A.2d 1318. In the present case, we follow the former approach because, as we explain more fully hereinafter, the constitutionality of a criminal sanction, like the constitutionality of a limitation on the free expression at issue in Linares, is governed by its own distinct legal rules and standards. Accordingly, assuming that the Geisler framework is even applicable to the ultimate question of whether the death penalty now constitutes excessive and disproportionate punishment following the enactment of P.A. 12–5; cf. Kerrigan v. Commissioner of Public Health, 289 Conn. 135, 227, 957 A.2d 407 (2008) (undertaking Geisler analysis following conclusion that plaintiffs met state constitutional standard applicable for determining quasi-suspect class status); our consideration of the relevant Geisler factors is interwoven into our application of the legal framework that properly governs such challenges. See parts II and III of this opinion.