Heart of Atlanta v. U.S. (1964)

Key Takeaway:

The Supreme Court held that Congress may prohibit racial discrimination that affects interstate commerce even if that activity is local in nature.  The test the Court used was whether there was commerce between more than one state and that commerce had a “real and substantial relation to a national interest.”

Key Quotes:

“In short, the determinative test of the exercise of power by the Congress under the Commerce Clause is simply whether the activity sought to be regulated is ‘commerce which concerns more States than one’ and has a real and substantial relation to the national interest.”

“Thus the power of Congress to promote interstate commerce also includes the power to regulate the local incidents thereof, including local activities in both the States of origin and destination, which might have a substantial and harmful effect upon that commerce. One need only examine the evidence which we have discussed above to see that Congress may—as it has—prohibit racial discrimination by motels serving travelers, however ‘local’ their operations may appear.”

HEART OF ATLANTA MOTEL v. UNITED STATES

Supreme Court of the United States, 1964

379 U.S. 241

Mr. Justice CLARK delivered the opinion of the Court

***---***

1. The Factual Background and Contentions of the Parties.

The case comes here on admissions and stipulated facts. Appellant owns and operates the Heart of Atlanta Motel which has 216 rooms available to transient guests. The motel is located on Courtland Street, two blocks from downtown Peachtree Street. It is readily accessible to interstate highways 75 and 85 and state highways 23 and 41. Appellant solicits patronage from outside the State of Georgia through various national advertising media, including magazines of national circulation; it mainains over 50 billboards and highway signs within the State, soliciting patronage for the motel; it accepts convention trade from outside Georgia and approximately 75% of its registered guests are from out of State. Prior to passage of the Act the motel had followed a practice of refusing to rent rooms to Negroes, and it alleged that it intended to continue to do so. In an effort to perpetuate that policy this suit was filed.

The appellant contends that Congress in passing this Act exceeded its power to regulate commerce under Art. I, s 8, cl. 3, of the Constitution of the United States;

***---***

6. The Basis of Congressional Action.

 While the Act as adopted carried no congressional findings the record of its passage through each house is replete with evidence of the burdens that discrimination by race or color places upon interstate commerce. See Hearings before Senate Committee on Commerce on S. 1732, 88th Cong., 1st Sess.; S.Rep. No. 872, supra; Hearings before Senate Committee on the Judiciary on S. 1731, 88th Cong., 1st Sess.; Hearings before House Subcommittee No. 5 of the Committee on the Judiciary on miscellaneous proposals regarding Civil Rights, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 4; H.R.Rep. No. 914, supra. This testimony included the fact that our people have become increasingly mobile with millions of people of all races traveling from State to State; that Negroes in particular have been the subject of discrimination in transient accommodations, having to travel great distances ot secure the same; that often they have been unable to obtain accommodations and have had to call upon friends to put them up overnight, S.Rep. No. 872, supra, at 14—22; and that these conditions had become so acute as to require the listing of available lodging for Negroes in a special guidebook which was itself ‘dramatic testimony to the difficulties’ Negroes encounter in travel. Senate Commerce Committee Hearings, supra, at 692—694. These exclusionary practices were found to be nationwide, the Under Secretary of Commerce testifying that there is ‘no question that this discrimination in the North still exists to a large degree’ and in the West and Midwest as well. Id., at 735, 744. This testimony indicated a qualitative as well as quantitative effect on interstate travel by Negroes. The former was the obvious impairment of the Negro traveler’s pleasure and convenience that resulted when he continually was uncertain of finding lodging. As for the latter, there was evidence that this uncertainty stemming from racial discrimination had the effect of discouraging travel on the part of a substantial portion of the Negro community. Id., at 744. This was the conclusion not only of the Under Secretary of Commerce but also of the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Agency who wrote the Chairman of the Senate Commerce Committee that it was his ‘belief that air commerce is adversely affected by the denial to a substantial segment of the traveling public of adequate and desegregated public accommodations.’ Id., at 12—13. We shall not burden this opinion with further details since the voluminous testimony presents overwhelming evidence that discrimination by hotels and motels impedes interstate travel.

7. The Power of Congress Over Interstate Travel.

 The power of Congress to deal with these obstructions depends on the meaning of the Commerce Clause. Its meaning was first enunciated 140 years ago by the great Chief Justice John Marshall in Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 6 L.Ed. 23 (1824), in these words:

‘The subject to be regulated is commerce; and to ascertain the extent of the power, it becomes necessary to settle the meaning of the word. The counsel for the appellee would limit it to traffic, to buying and selling, or the interchange of commodities but it is something more: it is intercourse between nations, and parts of nations, in all its branches, and is regulated by prescribing rules for carrying on that intercourse. (At 189—190.)

‘To what commerce does this power extend? The constitution informs us, to commerce ‘with foreign nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian tribes.’

‘It has, we believe, been universally admitted, that these words comprehend every species of commercial intercourse. No sort of trade can be carried on to which this power does not extend. (At 193—194.)

‘The subject to which the power is next applied, is to commerce ‘among the several States.’ The word ‘among’ means intermingled.

‘(I)t may very properly be restricted to that commerce which concerns more States than one. The genius and character of the whole government seem to be, that its action is to be applied to all the internal concerns (of the Nation) which affect the States generally; but not to those which are completely within a particular State, which do not affect other States, and with which it is not necessary to interfere, for the purpose of executing some of the general powers of the government. (At 194—195.)

‘We are now arrived at the inquiry—What is this power?

‘It is the power to regulate; that is, to prescribe the rule by which commerce is to be governed. This power, like all others vested in Congress, is complete in itself, may be exercised to its utmost extent, and acknowledges no limitations, other than are prescribed in the constitution. If, as has always been understood, the sovereignty of Congress is plenary as to those objects (specified in the Constitution), the power over commerce is vested in Congress as absolutely as it would be in a single government, having in its constitution the same restrictions on the exercise of the power as are found in the constitution of the United States. The wisdom and the discretion of Congress, their identity with the people, and the influence which their constituents possess at elections, are, in this, as in many other instances, as that, for example, of declaring war, the sole restraints on which they have relied, to secure them from its abuse. They are the restraints on which the people must often rely solely, in all representative governments. (At 196—197.)’

In short, the determinative test of the exercise of power by the Congress under the Commerce Clause is simply whether the activity sought to be regulated is ‘commerce which concerns more States than one’ and has a real and substantial relation to the national interest. Let us now turn to this facet of the problem.

 That the ‘intercourse’ of which the Chief Justice spoke included the movement of persons through more States than one was settled as early as 1849, in the Passenger Cases (Smith v. Turner), 7 How. 283, 12 L.Ed. 702, where Mr. Justice McLean stated: ‘That the transportation of passengers is a part of commerce is not now an open question.’ At 401. Again in 1913 Mr. Justice McKenna, speaking for the Court, said: ‘Commerce among the states, we have said, consists of intercourse and traffic between their citizens, and includes the transportation of persons and porperty.’ Hoke v. United States, 227 U.S. 308, 320, 33 S.Ct. 281, 283, 57 L.Ed. 523. And only four years later in 1917 in Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 37 S.Ct. 192, 61 L.Ed. 442, Mr. Justice Day held for the Court:

‘The transportation of passengers in interstate commerce, it has long been settled, is within the regulatory power of Congress, under the commerce clause of the Constitution, and the authority of Congress to keep the channels of interstate commerce free from immoral and injurious uses has been frequently sustained, and is no longer open to question.’ At 491, 37 S.Ct. at 197.

Nor does it make any difference whether the transportation is commercial in character. Id., at 484—486, 37 S.Ct. at 194—195. In Morgan v. Com. of Virginia, 328 U.S. 373, 66 S.Ct. 1050, 90 L.Ed. 1317 (1946), Mr. Justice Reed observed as to the modern movement of persons among the States:

‘The recent changes in transportation brought about by the coming of automobiles (do) not seem of great significance in the problem. People of all races travel today more extensively than in 1878 when this Court first passed upon state regulation of racial segregation in commerce. (It but) emphasizes the soundness of this Court’s early conclusion in Hall v. De Cuir, 95 U.S. 485 (24 L.Ed. 547).’ At 383, 66 S.Ct. at 1056.

The same interest in protecting interstate commerce which led Congress to deal with segregation in interstate carriers and the white-slave traffic has prompted it to extend the exercise of its power to gambling, Lottery Case (Champion v Ames), 188 U.S. 321, 23 S.Ct. 321, 47 L.Ed. 492 (1903); to criminal enterprises, Brooks v. United States, 267 U.S. 432, 45 S.Ct. 345, 69 L.Ed. 699 (1925); to deceptive parctices in the sale of products, Federal Trade Comm. v. Mandel Bros., Inc., 359 U.S. 385, 79 S.Ct. 818, 3 L.Ed.2d 893 (1959); to fraudulent security transactions, Securities & Exchange Comm. v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 73 S.Ct. 981, 97 L.Ed. 1494 (1953); to misbranding of drugs, Weeks v. United States, 245 U.S. 618, 38 S.Ct. 219, 62 L.Ed. 513 (1918); to wages and hours, United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 657, 61 S.Ct. 451, 85 L.Ed. 609 (1941); to members of labor unions, National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 57 S.Ct. 615, 81 L.Ed. 893 (1937); to crop control, Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 63 S.Ct. 82, 87 L.Ed. 122 (1942); to discrimination against shippers, United States v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 333 U.S. 169, 68 S.Ct. 494, 92 L.Ed. 618 (1948); to the protection of small business from injurious price cutting, Moore v. Mead’s Fine Bread Co., 348 U.S. 115, 75 S.Ct. 148, 99 L.Ed. 145 (1954); to resale price maintenance, Hudson Distributors, Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 377 U.S. 386, 84 S.Ct. 1273, 12 L.Ed.2d 394 (1964), Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384, 71 S.Ct. 745, 95 L.Ed. 1035 (1951); to professional football, Radovich v. National Football League, 352 U.S. 445, 77 S.Ct. 390, 1 L.Ed.2d 456 (1957); and to racial discrimination by owners and managers of terminal restaurants, Boynton v. Com. of Virginia, 364 U.S. 454, 81 S.Ct. 182, 5 L.Ed.2d 206 (1960).

 That Congress was legislating against moral wrongs in many of these areas rendered its enactments no less valid. In framing Title II of this Act Congress was also dealing with what it considered a moral problem. But that fact does not detract from the overwhelming evidence of the disruptive effect that racial discrimination has had on commercial intercourse. It was this burden which empowered Congress to enact appropriate legislation, and, given this basis for the exercise of its power, Congress was not restricted by the fact that the particular obstruction to interstate commerce with which it was dealing was also deemed a moral and social wrong.

It is said that the operation of the motel here is of a purely local character. But, assuming this to be true, ‘(i)f it is interstate commerce that feels the pinch, it does not matter how local the operation which applies the squeeze.’ United States v. Women’s Sportswear Mfg. Ass’n, 336 U.S. 460, 464, 69 S.Ct. 714, 716, 93 L.Ed. 805 (1949). See National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., supra. As Chief Justice Stone put it in United States v. Darby, supra:

‘The power of Congress over interstate commerce is not confined to the regulation of commerce among the states. It extends to those activities intrastate which so affect interstate commerce or the exercise of the power of Congress over it as to make regulation of them appropriate means to the attainment of a legitimate end, the exercise of the granted power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 421, 4 L.Ed. 579.’ 312 U.S. at 118, 61 S.Ct. at 459.

Thus the power of Congress to promote interstate commerce also includes the power to regulate the local incidents thereof, including local activities in both the States of origin and destination, which might have a substantial and harmful effect upon that commerce. One need only examine the evidence which we have discussed above to see that Congress may—as it has—prohibit racial discrimination by motels serving travelers, however ‘local’ their operations may appear.

 Nor does the Act deprive appellant of liberty or property under the Fifth Amendment. The commerce power invoked here by the Congress is a specific and plenary one authorized by the Constitution itself. The only questions are: (1) whether Congress had a rational basis for finding that racial discrimination by motels affected commerce, and (2) if it had such a basis, whether the means it selected to eliminate that evil are reasonable and appropriate. If they are, appellant has no ‘right’ to select its guests as it sees fit, free from governmental regulation.

There is nothing novel about such legislation. Thirty-two States⁸ now have it on their books either by statute or executive order and many cities provide such regulation. Some of these Acts go back fourscore years. It has been repeatedly held by this Court that such laws do not violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Perhaps the first such holding was in the Civil Rights Cases themselves, where Mr. Justice Bradley for the Court inferentially found that innkeepers, ‘by the laws of all the States, so far as we are aware, are bound, to the extent of their facilities, to furnish proper accommodation to all unobjectionable persons who in good faith apply for them.’ 109 U.S. at 25, 3 S.Ct. at 31.

As we have pointed out, 32 States now have such provisions and no case has been cited to us where the attack on a state statute has been successful, either in federal or state courts. Indeed, in some cases the Due Process and Equal Protection Clause objections have been specifically discarded in this Court. Bob-Lo Excursion Co. v. People of State of Michigan, 333 U.S. 28, 34, 68 S.Ct. 358, 361, 92 L.Ed. 455, n. 12 (1948). As a result the constitutionality of such state statutes stands unquestioned. ‘The authority of the Federal government over interstate commerce does not differ,’ it was held in United States v. Rock Royal Co-op., Inc., 307 U.S. 533, 59 S.Ct. 993, 83 L.Ed. 1446 (1939), ‘in extent or character from that retained by the states over intrastate commerce.’ At 569—570, 59 S.Ct. at 1011. See also Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U.S. 503, 64 S.Ct. 641, 88 L.Ed. 892 (1944).

 It is doubtful if in the long run appellant will suffer economic loss as a result of the Act. Experience is to the contrary where discrimination is completely obliterated as to all public accommodations. But whether this be true or not is of no consequence since this Court has specifically held that the fact that a ‘member of the class which is regulated may suffer economic losses not shared by others has never been a barrier’ to such legislation. Bowles v. Willingham, supra, at 518, 64 S.Ct. at 649. Likewise in a long line of cases this Court has rejected the claim that the prohibition of racial discrimination in public accommodations interferes with personal liberty. See District of Columbia v. John R. Thompson Co., 346 U.S. 100, 73 S.Ct. 1007, 97 L.Ed. 1480 (1953), and cases there cited, where we concluded that Congress had delegated law-making power to the District of Columbia ‘as broad as the police power of a state’ which included the power to adopt a ‘law prohibiting discriminations against Negroes by the owners and managers of restaurants in the District of Columbia.’ At 110, 73 S.Ct. at 1013. Neither do we find any merit in the claim that the Act is a taking of property without just compensation. The cases are to the contrary.

 We find no merit in the remainder of appellant’s contentions, including that of ‘involuntary servitude.’ As we have seen, 32 States prohibit racial discrimination in public accommodations. These laws but codify the common-law innkeeper rule which long predated the Thirteenth Amendment. It is difficult to believe that the Amendment was intended to abrogate this principle. Indeed, the opinion of the Court in the Civil Rights Cases is to the contrary as we have seen, it having noted with approval the laws of ‘all the States’ prohibiting discrimination. We could not say that the requirements of the Act in this regard are in any way ‘akin to African slavery.’ Butler v. Perry, 240 U.S. 328, 332, 36 S.Ct. 258, 259, 60 L.Ed. 672 (1916).

 We, therefore, conclude that the action of the Congress in the adoption of the Act as applied here to a motel which concededly serves interstate travelers is within the power granted it by the Commerce Clause of the Constitution, as interpreted by this Court for 140 years. It may be argued that Congress could have pursued other methods to eliminate the obstructions it found in interstate commerce caused by racial discrimination. But this is a matter of policy that rests entirely with the Congress not with the courts. How obstructions in commerce may be removed—what means are to be employed—is within the sound and exclusive discretion of the Congress. It is subject only to one caveat—that the means chosen by it must be reasonably adapted to the end permitted by the Constitution. We cannot say that its choice here was not so adapted. The Constitution requires no more.

Affirmed.