Clinton v Jones (1997)

Key Takeaway:

The Court held that the president does not have immunity from a civil action during his term for acts that occurred prior to his taking office.  It is not a violation of separation of powers for a court to proceed in a civil action against the president, especially if the acts in question are unofficial conduct.  The danger of the president, the sole executive, being overwhelmed and overburdened with frivolous lawsuits is countered by the civil rules of procedure which aim to prevent frivolous actions as well as the right of Congress to pass statutes to protect litigants from civil actions during certain time periods.

Key Quotes:

“Respondent is merely asking the courts to exercise their core Article III jurisdiction to decide cases and controversies. Whatever the outcome of this case, there is no possibility that the decision will curtail the scope of the official powers of the Executive Branch. The litigation of questions that relate entirely to the unofficial conduct of the individual who happens to be the President poses no perceptible risk of misallocation of either judicial power or executive power.”

“If the Judiciary may severely burden the Executive Branch by reviewing the legality of the President’s official conduct, and if it may direct appropriate process to the President himself, it must follow that the federal courts have power to determine the legality of his unofficial conduct.”

CLINTON v. JONES

Supreme Court of the United States, 1997

520 U.S. 681

Justice STEVENS delivered the opinion of the Court.

This case raises a constitutional and a prudential question concerning the Office of the President of the United States. Respondent, a private citizen, seeks to recover damages from the current occupant of that office based on actions allegedly taken before his term began. The President submits that in all but the most exceptional cases the Constitution requires federal courts to defer such litigation until his term ends and that, in any event, respect for the office warrants such a stay. Despite the force of the arguments supporting the President’s submissions, we conclude that they must be rejected.

I

Petitioner, William Jefferson Clinton, was elected to the Presidency in 1992, and re-elected in 1996. His term of office expires on January 20, 2001. In 1991 he was the Governor of the State of Arkansas. Respondent, Paula Corbin Jones, is a resident of California. In 1991 she lived in Arkansas, and was an employee of the Arkansas Industrial Development Commission.

On May 6, 1994, she commenced this action in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas by filing a complaint naming petitioner and Danny Ferguson, a former Arkansas State Police officer, as defendants. The complaint alleges two federal claims, and two state–law claims over which the federal court has jurisdiction because of the diverse citizenship of the parties.¹ As the case comes to us, we are required to assume the truth of the detailed—but as yet untested—factual allegations in the complaint.

Those allegations principally describe events that are said to have occurred on the afternoon of May 8, 1991, during an official conference held at the Excelsior Hotel in Little Rock, Arkansas. The Governor delivered a speech at the conference; respondent—working as a state employee—staffed the registration desk. She alleges that Ferguson persuaded her to leave her desk and to visit the Governor in a business suite at the hotel, where he made “abhorrent”² sexual advances that she vehemently rejected. She further claims that her superiors at work subsequently dealt with her in a hostile and rude manner, and changed her duties to punish her for rejecting those advances. Finally, she alleges that after petitioner was elected President, Ferguson defamed her by making a statement to a reporter that implied she had accepted petitioner’s alleged overtures, and that various persons authorized to speak for the President publicly branded her a liar by denying that the incident had occurred.

Respondent seeks actual damages of $75,000 and punitive damages of $100,000. Her complaint contains four counts. The first charges that petitioner, acting under color of state law, deprived her of rights protected by the Constitution, in violation of Rev. Stat. § 1979, 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The second charges that petitioner and Ferguson engaged in a conspiracy to violate her federal rights, also actionable under federal law. See Rev. Stat. § 1980, 42 U.S.C. § 1985. The third is a state common law claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, grounded primarily on the incident at the hotel. The fourth count, also based on state law, is for defamation, embracing both the comments allegedly made to the press by Ferguson and the statements of petitioner’s agents. Inasmuch as the legal sufficiency of the claims has not yet been challenged, we assume, without deciding, that each of the four counts states a cause of action as a matter of law. With the exception of the last charge, which arguably may involve conduct within the outer perimeter of the President’s official responsibilities, it is perfectly clear that the alleged misconduct of petitioner was unrelated to any of his official duties as President of the United States and, indeed, occurred before he was elected to that office.³

***---***

IV

 Petitioner’s principal submission—that “in all but the most exceptional cases,” Brief for Petitioner i, the Constitution affords the President temporary immunity from civil damages litigation arising out of events that occurred before he took office—cannot be sustained on the basis of precedent.

Only three sitting Presidents have been defendants in civil litigation involving their actions prior to taking office. Complaints against Theodore Roosevelt and Harry Truman had been dismissed before they took office; the dismissals were affirmed after their respective inaugurations.¹⁵ Two companion cases arising out of an automobile accident were filed against John F. Kennedy in 1960 during the Presidential campaign.¹⁶ After taking office, he unsuccessfully argued that his status as Commander in Chief gave him a right to a stay under the Soldiers’ and Sailors’ Civil Relief Act of 1940, 50 U.S.C.App. §§ 501–525. The motion for a stay was denied by the District Court, and the matter was settled out of court.¹⁷ Thus, none of those cases sheds any light on the constitutional issue before us.

The principal rationale for affording certain public servants immunity from suits for money damages arising out of their official acts is inapplicable to unofficial conduct. In cases involving prosecutors, legislators, and judges we have repeatedly explained that the immunity serves the public interest in enabling such officials to perform their designated functions effectively without fear that a particular decision may give rise to personal liability.¹⁸ We explained in Ferri v. Ackerman, 444 U.S. 193, 100 S.Ct. 402, 62 L.Ed.2d 355 (1979):

“As public servants, the prosecutor and the judge represent the interest of society as a whole. The conduct of their official duties may adversely affect a wide variety of different individuals, each of whom may be a potential source of future controversy. The societal interest in providing such public officials with the maximum ability to deal fearlessly and impartially with the public at large has long been recognized as an acceptable justification for official immunity. The point of immunity for such officials is to forestall an atmosphere of intimidation that would conflict with their resolve to perform their designated functions in a principled fashion.” Id., at 202–204, 100 S.Ct., at 408–409.

That rationale provided the principal basis for our holding that a former President of the United States was “entitled to absolute immunity from damages liability predicated on his official acts,” Fitzgerald, 457 U.S., at 749, 102 S.Ct., at 2701. See id., at 752, 102 S.Ct., at 2702 (citing Ferri v. Ackerman ). Our central concern was to avoid rendering the President “unduly cautious in the discharge of his official duties.” 457 U.S., at 752, n. 32, 102 S.Ct., at 2702, n. 32.¹⁹

This reasoning provides no support for an immunity for unofficial conduct. As we explained in Fitzgerald, “the sphere of protected action must be related closely to the immunity’s justifying purposes.” Id., at 755, 102 S.Ct., at 2704. Because of the President’s broad responsibilities, we recognized in that case an immunity from damages claims arising out of official acts extending to the “outer perimeter of his authority.” Id., at 757, 102 S.Ct., at 2705. But we have never suggested that the President, or any other official, has an immunity that extends beyond the scope of any action taken in an official capacity. See id., at 759, 102 S.Ct., at 2706 (Burger, C. J., concurring) (noting that “a President, like Members of Congress, judges, prosecutors, or congressional aides—all having absolute immunity—are not immune for acts outside official duties”); see also id., at 761, n. 4, 102 S.Ct., at 2707, n. 4.

Moreover, when defining the scope of an immunity for acts clearly taken within an official capacity, we have applied a functional approach. “Frequently our decisions have held that an official’s absolute immunity should extend only to acts in performance of particular functions of his office.” Id., at 755, 102 S.Ct., at 2704. Hence, for example, a judge’s absolute immunity does not extend to actions performed in a purely administrative capacity. See Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 229–230, 108 S.Ct. 538, 545–546, 98 L.Ed.2d 555 (1988). As our opinions have made clear, immunities are grounded in “the nature of the function performed, not the identity of the actor who performed it.” Id., at 229, 108 S.Ct., at 545.

Petitioner’s effort to construct an immunity from suit for unofficial acts grounded purely in the identity of his office is unsupported by precedent.

***---***

VI

Petitioner’s strongest argument supporting his immunity claim is based on the text and structure of the Constitution. He does not contend that the occupant of the Office of the President is “above the law,” in the sense that his conduct is entirely immune from judicial scrutiny.²⁴ The President argues merely for a postponement of the judicial proceedings that will determine whether he violated any law. His argument is grounded in the character of the office that was created by Article II of the Constitution, and relies on separation–of–powers principles that have structured our constitutional arrangement since the founding.

As a starting premise, petitioner contends that he occupies a unique office with powers and responsibilities so vast and important that the public interest demands that he devote his undivided time and attention to his public duties. He submits that—given the nature of the office—the doctrine of separation of powers places limits on the authority of the Federal Judiciary to interfere with the Executive Branch that would be transgressed by allowing this action to proceed.

We have no dispute with the initial premise of the argument. Former Presidents, from George Washington to George Bush, have consistently endorsed petitioner’s characterization of the office.²⁵ After serving his term, Lyndon Johnson observed: “Of all the 1,886 nights I was President, there were not many when I got to sleep before 1 or 2 a.m., and there were few mornings when I didn’t wake up by 6 or 6:30.”²⁶ In 1967, the Twenty-fifth Amendment to the Constitution was adopted to ensure continuity in the performance of the powers and duties of the office;²⁷ one of the sponsors of that Amendment stressed the importance of providing that “at all times” there be a President “who has complete control and will be able to perform” those duties.²⁸ As Justice Jackson has pointed out, the Presidency concentrates executive authority “in a single head in whose choice the whole Nation has a part, making him the focus of public hopes and expectations. In drama, magnitude and finality his decisions so far overshadow any others that almost alone he fills the public eye and ear.” Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S., at 653, 72 S.Ct., at 879 (concurring opinion). We have, in short, long recognized the “unique position in the constitutional scheme” that this office occupies. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S., at 749, 102 S.Ct., at 2701.²⁹ Thus, while we suspect that even in our modern era there remains some truth to Chief Justice Marshall’s suggestion that the duties of the Presidency are not entirely “unremitting,” United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 30, 34 (No.14,692d) (C.C.Va.1807), we accept the initial premise of the Executive’s argument.

It does not follow, however, that separation–of–powers principles would be violated by allowing this action to proceed. The doctrine of separation of powers is concerned with the allocation of official power among the three coequal branches of our Government. The Framers “built into the tripartite Federal Government ... a self-executing safeguard against the encroachment or aggrandizement of one branch at the expense of the other.” Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S., at 122, 96 S.Ct., at 684.³⁰ Thus, for example, the Congress may not exercise the judicial power to revise final judgments, Plaut v. SpendthriftFarm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 115 S.Ct. 1447, 131 L.Ed.2d 328 (1995),³¹ or the executive power to manage an airport, see Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority v. Citizens for Abatement of Aircraft Noise, Inc., 501 U.S. 252, 276, 111 S.Ct. 2298, 2312, 115 L.Ed.2d 236 (1991) (holding that “[i]f the power is executive, the Constitution does not permit an agent of Congress to exercise it”).³² See J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 406, 48 S.Ct. 348, 351, 72 L.Ed. 624 (1928) (Congress may not “invest itself or its members with either executive power or judicial power”). Similarly, the President may not exercise the legislative power to authorize the seizure of private property for public use. Youngstown, 343 U.S., at 588, 72 S.Ct., at 867. And, the judicial power to decide cases and controversies does not include the provision of purely advisory opinions to the Executive,³³ or permit the federal courts to resolve non justiciable questions.³⁴

Of course the lines between the powers of the three branches are not always neatly defined. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 380–381, 109 S.Ct. 647, 659–660, 102 L.Ed.2d 714 (1989).³⁵ But in this case there is no suggestion that the Federal Judiciary is being asked to perform any function that might in some way be described as “executive.” Respondent is merely asking the courts to exercise their core Article III jurisdiction to decide cases and controversies. Whatever the outcome of this case, there is no possibility that the decision will curtail the scope of the official powers of the Executive Branch. The litigation of questions that relate entirely to the unofficial conduct of the individual who happens to be the President poses no perceptible risk of misallocation of either judicial power or executive power.

Rather than arguing that the decision of the case will produce either an aggrandizement of judicial power or a narrowing of executive power, petitioner contends that—as a byproduct of an otherwise traditional exercise of judicial power—burdens will be placed on the President that will hamper the performance of his official duties. We have recognized that “[e]ven when a branch does not arrogate power to itself ... the separation-of-powers doctrine requires that a branch not impair another in the performance of its constitutional duties.” Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 757, 116 S.Ct. 1737, 1743, 135 L.Ed.2d 36 (1996); see also Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S. 425, 443, 97 S.Ct. 2777, 2790, 53 L.Ed.2d 867 (1977). As a factual matter, petitioner contends that this particular case—as well as the potential additional litigation that an affirmance of the Court of Appeals judgment might spawn—may impose an unacceptable burden on the President’s time and energy, and thereby impair the effective performance of his office.

Petitioner’s predictive judgment finds little support in either history or the relatively narrow compass of the issues raised in this particular case. As we have already noted, in the more than 200–year history of the Republic, only three sitting Presidents have been subjected to suits for their private actions.³⁶ See supra, at 1643. If the past is any indicator, it seems unlikely that a deluge of such litigation will ever engulf the Presidency. As for the case at hand, if properly managed by the District Court, it appears to us highly unlikely to occupy any substantial amount of petitioner’s time.

 Of greater significance, petitioner errs by presuming that interactions between the Judicial Branch and the Executive, even quite burdensome interactions, necessarily rise to the level of constitutionally forbidden impairment of the Executive’s ability to perform its constitutionally mandated functions. “[O]ur ... system imposes upon the Branches a degree of overlapping responsibility, a duty of interdependence as well as independence the absence of which ‘would preclude the establishment of a Nation capable of governing itself effectively.’ ” Mistretta, 488 U.S., at 381, 109 S.Ct., at 659 (quoting *703 Buckley, 424 U.S., at 121, 96 S.Ct., at 683). As Madison explained, separation of powers does not mean that the branches “ought to have no partial agency in, or no controul over the acts of each other.”³⁷ The fact that a federal court’s exercise of its traditional Article III jurisdiction may significantly burden the time and attention of the Chief Executive is not sufficient to establish a violation of the Constitution. Two long-settled propositions, first announced by Chief Justice Marshall, support that conclusion.

First, we have long held that when the President takes official action, the Court has the authority to determine whether he has acted within the law. Perhaps the most dramatic example of such a case is our holding that President Truman exceeded his constitutional authority when he issued an order directing the Secretary of Commerce to take possession of and operate most of the Nation’s steel mills in order to avert a national catastrophe. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 72 S.Ct. 863, 96 L.Ed. 1153 (1952). Despite the serious impact of that decision on the ability of the Executive Branch to accomplish its assigned mission, and the substantial time that the President must necessarily have devoted to the matter as a result of judicial involvement, we exercised our Article III jurisdiction to decide whether his official conduct conformed to the law. Our holding was an application of the principle established in Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803), that “[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.” Id., at 177.

 Second, it is also settled that the President is subject to judicial process in appropriate circumstances. Although Thomas Jefferson apparently thought otherwise, Chief Justice Marshall, when presiding in the treason trial of Aaron Burr, ruled that a subpoena duces tecum could be directed to the President. United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 30 (No. 14,692d) (C.C.Va. 1807).³⁸ We unequivocally and emphatically endorsed Marshall’s position when we held that President Nixon was obligated to comply with a subpoena commanding him to produce certain tape recordings of his conversations with his aides. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 94 S.Ct. 3090, 41 L.Ed.2d 1039 (1974). As we explained, “neither the doctrine of separation of powers, nor the need for confidentiality of high-level communications, without more, can sustain an absolute, unqualified Presidential privilege of immunity from judicial process under all circumstances.” Id., at 706, 94 S.Ct., at 3106.³⁹

Sitting Presidents have responded to court orders to provide testimony and other information with sufficient frequency that such interactions between the Judicial and Executive Branches can scarcely be thought a novelty. President Monroe responded to written interrogatories, see Rotunda, Presidents and Ex–Presidents as Witnesses: A Brief Historical Footnote, 1975 U. Ill. L.Forum 1, 5–6, President Nixon—as noted above—produced tapes in response to a subpoena duces tecum, see United States v. Nixon, President Ford complied with an order to give a deposition in a criminal trial, United States v. Fromme, 405 F.Supp. 578 (E.D.Cal.1975), and President Clinton has twice given videotaped testimony in criminal proceedings, see United States v. McDougal, 934 F.Supp. 296 (E.D.Ark.1996); United States v. Branscum, No. LRP–CR–96–49 (E.D. Ark., June 7, 1996). Moreover, sitting Presidents have also voluntarily complied with judicial requests for testimony. President Grant gave a lengthy deposition in a criminal case under such circumstances, 1 R. Rotunda & J. Nowak, Treatise on Constitutional Law § 7.1 (2d ed.1992), and President Carter similarly gave videotaped testimony for use at a criminal trial, id., § 7.1(b) (Supp. 1997).

 In sum, “[i]t is settled law that the separation-of-powers doctrine does not bar every exercise of jurisdiction over the President of the United States.” Fitzgerald, 457 U.S., at 753–754, 102 S.Ct., at 2703. If the Judiciary may severely burden the Executive Branch by reviewing the legality of the President’s official conduct, and if it may direct appropriate process to the President himself, it must follow that the federal courts have power to determine the legality of his unofficial conduct. The burden on the President’s time and energy that is a mere byproduct of such review surely cannot be considered as onerous as the direct burden imposed by judicial review and the occasional invalidation of his official actions.⁴⁰ We therefore hold that the doctrine of separation of powers does not require federal courts to stay all private actions against the President until he leaves office.

The reasons for rejecting such a categorical rule apply as well to a rule that would require a stay “in all but the most exceptional cases.” Brief for Petitioner i. Indeed, if the Framers of the Constitution had thought it necessary to protect the President from the burdens of private litigation, we think it far more likely that they would have adopted a categorical rule than a rule that required the President to litigate the question whether a specific case belonged in the “exceptional case” subcategory. In all events, the question whether a specific case should receive exceptional treatment is more appropriately the subject of the exercise of judicial discretion than an interpretation of the Constitution. Accordingly, we turn to the question whether the District Court’s decision to stay the trial until after petitioner leaves office was an abuse of discretion.

***---***

VIII

We add a final comment on two matters that are discussed at length in the briefs: the risk that our decision will generate a large volume of politically motivated harassing and frivolous litigation, and the danger that national security concerns might prevent the President from explaining a legitimate need for a continuance.

We are not persuaded that either of these risks is serious. Most frivolous and vexatious litigation is terminated at the pleading stage or on summary judgment, with little if any personal involvement by the defendant. See Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. 12, 56. Moreover, the availability of sanctions provides a significant deterrent to litigation directed at the President in his unofficial capacity for purposes of political gain or harassment.⁴² History indicates that the likelihood that a significant number of such cases will be filed is remote. Although scheduling problems may arise, there is no reason to assume that the district courts will be either unable to accommodate the President’s needs or unfaithful  to the tradition—especially in matters involving national security—of giving “the utmost deference to Presidential responsibilities.”⁴³ Several Presidents, including petitioner, have given testimony without jeopardizing the Nation’s security. See supra, at 1649. In short, we have confidence in the ability of our federal judges to deal with both of these concerns.

If Congress deems it appropriate to afford the President stronger protection, it may respond with appropriate legislation. As petitioner notes in his brief, Congress has enacted more than one statute providing for the deferral of civil litigation to accommodate important public interests. Brief for Petitioner 34–36. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 362 (litigation against debtor stayed upon filing of bankruptcy petition); Soldiers’ and Sailors’ Civil Relief Act of 1940, 50 U.S.C.App. §§ 501–525 (provisions governing, inter alia, tolling or stay of civil claims by or against military personnel during course of active duty). If the Constitution embodied the rule that the President advocates, Congress, of course, could not repeal it. But our holding today raises no barrier to a statutory response to these concerns.

The Federal District Court has jurisdiction to decide this case. Like every other citizen who properly invokes that jurisdiction, respondent has a right to an orderly disposition of her claims. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.

It is so ordered.

Justice BREYER, concurring in the judgment.

I agree with the majority that the Constitution does not automatically grant the President an immunity from civil lawsuits based upon his private conduct. Nor does the “doctrine of separation of powers ... require federal courts to stay” virtually “all private actions against the President until he leaves office.” Ante, at 1650. Rather, as the Court of Appeals stated, the President cannot simply rest upon the claim that a private civil lawsuit for damages will “interfere with the constitutionally assigned duties of the Executive Branch ... without detailing any specific responsibilities or explaining how or the degree to which they are affected by the suit.” 72 F.3d 1354, 1361 (C.A.8 1996). To obtain a postponement the President must “bea [r] the burden of establishing its need.” Ante, at 1651.

In my view, however, once the President sets forth and explains a conflict between judicial proceeding and public duties, the matter changes. At that point, the Constitution permits a judge to schedule a trial in an ordinary civil damages action (where postponement normally is possible without overwhelming damage to a plaintiff) only within the constraints of a constitutional principle—a principle that forbids a federal judge in such a case to interfere with the President’s discharge of his public duties. I have no doubt that the Constitution contains such a principle applicable to civil suits, based upon Article II’s vesting of the entire “executive Power” in a single individual, implemented through the Constitution’s structural separation of powers, and revealed both by history and case precedent.

 ***---***