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An Introduction to the Law of Corporations: Cases and Materials

UFCWU v. Zuckerberg

Demand Futility Standard

For many years, Delaware had two different demand futility standards (Aronson & Rales). Application of the standards depended on the facts presented in the complaint and they could sometimes be confusing. In Zuckerberg the Chancery Court undertook to simplify, without overturning, application of these standards. The Chancery Court's approach was endorsed by the Delaware Supreme Court in this opinion. It's worth keeping in mind that the old standards (Aronson & Rales) are still good law and have not be overruled. Rather, the court has created a new, unified application of those standards that is intended to simplify and improve pleading.

UNITED FOOD AND COMMERCIAL WORKERS UNION AND PARTICIPATING FOOD INDUSTRY EMPLOYERS TRI-STATE PENSION FUND
v.
MARK ZUCKERBERG, et al

 

Supreme Court of Delaware.

September 23, 2021.

MONTGOMERY-REEVES, Justice:

In 2016, the board of directors of Facebook, Inc. ("Facebook") voted in favor of a stock reclassification (the "Reclassification") that would allow Mark Zuckerberg— Facebook's controller, chairman, and chief executive officer—to sell most of his Facebook stock while maintaining voting control of the company. Zuckerberg proposed the Reclassification to allow him and his wife to fulfill a pledge to donate most of their wealth to philanthropic causes. With Zuckerberg casting the deciding votes, Facebook's stockholders approved the Reclassification.

Not long after, numerous stockholders filed lawsuits in the Court of Chancery, alleging that Facebook's board of directors violated their fiduciary duties by negotiating and approving a purportedly one-sided deal that put Zuckerberg's interests ahead of the company's interests. The trial court consolidated more than a dozen of these lawsuits into a single class action. At Zuckerberg's request and shortly before trial, Facebook withdrew the Reclassification and mooted the fiduciary-duty class action. Facebook spent more than $20 million defending against the class action and paid plaintiffs' counsel more than $68 million in attorneys' fees under the corporate benefit doctrine.

Following the settlement, another Facebook stockholder—the United Food and Commercial Workers Union and Participating Food Industry Employers Tri-State Pension Fund ("Tri-State")—filed a derivative complaint in the Court of Chancery. This new action rehashed many of the allegations made in the prior class action but sought compensation for the money Facebook spent in connection with the prior class action.

Tri-State did not make a litigation demand on Facebook's board. Instead, Tri-State pleaded that demand was futile because the board's negotiation and approval of the Reclassification was not a valid exercise of its business judgment and because a majority of the directors were beholden to Zuckerberg. Facebook and the other defendants moved to dismiss Tri-State's complaint under Court of Chancery Rule 23.1, arguing that Tri-State did not make demand or prove that demand was futile. Both sides agreed that the demand futility test established in Aronson v. Lewis applied to Tri-State's complaint.

In October 2020, the Court of Chancery dismissed Tri-State's complaint under Rule 23.1. The court held that exculpated care claims do not excuse demand under Aronson's second prong because they do not expose directors to a substantial likelihood of liability. The court also held that the complaint failed to raise a reasonable doubt that a majority of the demand board lacked independence from Zuckerberg. In reaching these conclusions, the Court of Chancery applied a three-part test for demand futility that blended the Aronson test with the test articulated in Rales v. Blasband.

Tri-State has appealed the Court of Chancery's judgment. For the reasons provided below, this Court affirms the Court of Chancery's judgment. The second prong of Aronson focuses on whether the derivative claims would expose directors to a substantial likelihood of liability. Exculpated claims do not satisfy that standard because they do not expose directors to a substantial likelihood of liability. Further, the complaint does not plead with particularity that a majority of the demand board lacked independence. Thus, the Court of Chancery properly dismissed Tri-State's complaint for failing to make a demand on the board.

Additionally, this Opinion adopts the Court of Chancery's three-part test for demand futility. When the Court decided Aronson, raising a reasonable doubt that the business judgment standard of review would apply exposed directors to a substantial likelihood of liability for care violations. The General Assembly's enactment of Section 102(b)(7) and other developments in corporate law have weakened the connection between rebutting the business judgment standard and exposing directors to a risk that would sterilize their judgment with respect to a litigation demand. Further, the Aronson test has proved difficult to apply in many contexts, such as where there is turnover on a corporation's board. The Court of Chancery's refined articulation of the Aronson standard helps to address these issues. Nonetheless, this refined standard is consistent with Aronson, Rales, and their progeny. Thus, cases properly applying those holdings remain good law.

  1. RELEVANT FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
  2. The Parties and Relevant Non-Parties

Appellee Facebook is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in California. Facebook is the world's largest social media and networking service and one of the ten largest companies by market capitalization.

Appellant Tri-State has continuously owned stock in Facebook since September 2013.

Appellee Mark Zuckerberg founded Facebook and has served as its chief executive officer since July 2014. Zuckerberg controls a majority of Facebook's voting power and has been the chairman of Facebook's board of directors since January 2012.

Appellee Marc Andreessen has served as a Facebook director since June 2008. Andreessen was a member of the special committee that negotiated and recommended that the full board approve the Reclassification. In addition to his work as a Facebook director, Andreessen is a cofounder and general partner of the venture capital firm Andreessen Horowitz.

Appellee Peter Thiel has served as a Facebook director since April 2005. Thiel voted in favor of the Reclassification. In addition to his work as a Facebook director, Thiel is a partner at the venture capital firm Founders Firm.

Appellee Reed Hastings began serving as a Facebook director in June 2011 and was still a director when Tri-State filed its complaint. Hastings voted in favor of the Reclassification. In addition to his work as a Facebook director, Hastings founded and serves as the chief executive officer and chairman of Netflix, Inc. ("Netflix").

Appellee Erskine B. Bowles began serving as a Facebook director in September 2011 and was still a director when Tri-State filed its complaint. Bowles was a member of the special committee that negotiated and recommended that the full board approve the Reclassification.

Appellee Susan D. Desmond-Hellman began serving as a Facebook director in March 2013 and was still a director when Tri-State filed its complaint. Desmond-Hellman was the chair of the special committee that negotiated and recommended that the full board approve the Reclassification. In addition to her work as a Facebook director, Desmond-Hellman served as the chief executive officer of the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation (the "Gates Foundation") during the events relevant to this appeal.

Sheryl Sandberg has been Facebook's chief operating officer since March 2018 and has served as a Facebook director since January 2012.

Kenneth I. Chenault began serving as a Facebook director in February 2018 and was still a director when Tri-State filed its complaint. Chenault was not a director when Facebook's board voted in favor of the Reclassification in 2016.

Jeffery Zients began serving as a Facebook director in May 2018 and was still a director when Tri-State filed its complaint. Zients was not a director when Facebook's board voted in favor of the Reclassification in 2016.

  1. Zuckerberg Takes the Giving Pledge

According to the allegations in the complaint, in December 2010, Zuckerberg took the Giving Pledge, a movement championed by Bill Gates and Warren Buffet that challenged wealthy business leaders to donate a majority of their wealth to philanthropic causes. Zuckerberg communicated widely that he had taken the pledge and intended to start his philanthropy at an early age.

In March 2015, Zuckerberg began working on an accelerated plan to complete the Giving Pledge by making annual donations of $2 to $3 billion worth of Facebook stock. Zuckerberg asked Facebook's general counsel to look into the plan. Facebook's legal team cautioned Zuckerberg that he could only sell a small portion of his stock—$3 to $4 billion based on the market price—without dipping below majority voting control. To avoid this problem, the general counsel suggested that Facebook could follow the "Google playbook" and issue a new class of non-voting stock that Zuckerberg could sell without significantly diminishing his voting power. The legal team recommended that the board form a special committee of independent directors to review and approve the plan and noted that litigation involving Google's reclassification resulted in a $522 million settlement. Zuckerberg instructed Facebook's legal team to "start figuring out how to make this happen."

  1. The Special Committee Approves the Reclassification

At an August 20, 2015 meeting of Facebook's board, Zuckerberg formally proposed that Facebook issue a new class of non-voting shares, which would allow him to sell a substantial amount of stock without losing control of the company. Zuckerberg also disclosed that he had hired Simpson Thacher & Bartlett LLP ("Simpson Thacher") to give him personal legal advice about "what creating a new class of stock might look like."

A couple of days later, Facebook established a special committee, which was composed of three purportedly-independent directors: Andreessen, Bowles, and Desmond-Hellman (the "Special Committee"). The board charged the Special Committee with evaluating the Reclassification, considering alternatives, and making a recommendation to the full board. The board also authorized the Special Committee to retain legal counsel, financial advisors, and other experts.

Facebook management recommended and the Special Committee hired Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz ("Wachtell") as the committee's legal advisor. Before meeting with the Special Committee, Wachtell called Zuckerberg's contacts at Simpson Thacher to discuss the potential terms of the Reclassification. Simpson Thacher rejected as non-starters several features from the Google playbook, such as a stapling provision that would have required Zuckerberg to sell a share of his voting stock each time that he sold a share of the non-voting stock, and a true-up payment that would compensate Facebook's other stockholders for the dilution of their voting power. By the time Wachtell first met with the Special Committee, the key contours of the Reclassification were already taking shape, and the Special Committee anticipated that the Reclassification would occur. Thus, the Special Committee focused on suggesting changes to the Reclassification rather than considering alternatives or threatening to reject the plan. …

As the negotiations progressed, the Special Committee largely agreed to give Zuckerberg the terms that he wanted and did not consider alternatives or demand meaningful concessions. …

A few weeks later, Zuckerberg published a post on his Facebook page announcing that he planned to begin making large donations of his Facebook stock. The post noted that Zuckerberg intended to "remain Facebook's CEO for many, many years to come" and did not mention that his plan hinged on the Special Committee's approval of the Reclassification. The Special Committee did not try to use the public announcement as leverage to extract more concessions from Zuckerberg. …

On April 13, 2016, the Special Committee recommend that the full board approve the Reclassification. The next day, Facebook's full board accepted the Special Committee's recommendation and voted to approve the Reclassification. Zuckerberg and Sandberg abstained from voting on the Reclassification.

  1. Facebook Settles a Class Action Challenging the Reclassification

On April 27, 2016, Facebook revealed the Reclassification to the public. … On April 29, 2016, the first class action was filed in the Court of Chancery challenging the Reclassification. Several more similar complaints were filed, and in May 2016 the Court of Chancery consolidated thirteen cases into a single class action (the "Reclassification Class Action"). …

On June 24, 2016, Facebook agreed that it would not go forward with the Reclassification while the Reclassification Class Action was pending. The Court of Chancery certified the Reclassification Class Action in April 2017 and tentatively scheduled the trial for September 26, 2017. About a week before the trial was scheduled to begin, Zuckerberg asked the board to abandon the Reclassification. The board agreed, and the next day Facebook filed a Form 8-K with the Securities and Exchange Commission disclosing that the company had abandoned the Reclassification and mooted the Class Action. The Form-8K also disclosed that despite abandoning the Reclassification, Zuckerberg planned to sell a substantial number of shares over the coming 18 months. …

 

  1. Tri-State Files a Class Action Seeking to Recoup the Money that Facebook Spent Defending and Settling the Reclassification Class Action

Facebook spent about $21.8 million defending the Reclassification Class Action, including more than $17 million on attorneys' fees. Additionally, Facebook paid $68.7 million to the plaintiff's attorneys in the Reclassification Class Action to settle a claim under the corporate benefit doctrine.

On September 12, 2018, Tri-State filed a derivative action in the Court of Chancery seeking to recoup the money that Facebook spent defending and settling the Reclassification Class Action. …

The complaint alleged that demand was excused as futile under Court of Chancery Rule 23.1 because "the Reclassification was not the product of a valid exercise of business judgment" and because "a majority of the Board face[d] a substantial likelihood of liability[] and/or lack[ed] independence.” …

Tri-State appeals the Court of Chancery's judgment dismissing the derivative complaint under Rule 23.1 for failing to make a demand on the board or plead with particularity facts establishing that demand would be futile.

  1. STANDARD OF REVIEW

"A cardinal precept" of Delaware law is "that directors, rather than shareholders, manage the business and affairs of the corporation." This precept is reflected in Section 141(a) of the Delaware General Corporation Law ("DGCL"), which provides that "[t]he business and affairs of every corporation organized under this chapter shall be managed by or under the direction of a board of directors except as may be otherwise provided in this chapter or in [a corporation's] certificate of incorporation." The board's authority to govern corporate affairs extends to decisions about what remedial actions a corporation should take after being harmed, including whether the corporation should file a lawsuit against its directors, its officers, its controller, or an outsider.

"In a derivative suit, a stockholder seeks to displace the board's [decision-making] authority over a litigation asset and assert the corporation's claim." Thus, "[b]y its very nature[,] the derivative action" encroaches "on the managerial freedom of directors" by seeking to deprive the board of control over a corporation's litigation asset. "In order for a stockholder to divest the directors of their authority to control the litigation asset and bring a derivative action on behalf of the corporation, the stockholder must" (1) make a demand on the company's board of directors or (2) show that demand would be futile. The demand requirement is a substantive requirement that "`[e]nsure[s] that a stockholder exhausts his intracorporate remedies,' `provide[s] a safeguard against strike suits,' and `assure[s] that the stockholder affords the corporation the opportunity to address an alleged wrong without litigation and to control any litigation which does occur.'"

Court of Chancery Rule 23.1 implements the substantive demand requirement at the pleading stage by mandating that derivative complaints "allege with particularity the efforts, if any, made by the plaintiff to obtain the action the plaintiff desires from the directors or comparable authority and the reasons for the plaintiff's failure to obtain the action or for not making the effort." To comply with Rule 23.1, the plaintiff must meet "stringent requirements of factual particularity that differ substantially from . . . permissive notice pleadings." When considering a motion to dismiss a complaint for failing to comply with Rule 23.1, the Court does not weigh the evidence, must accept as true all of the complaint's particularized and well-pleaded allegations, and must draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor.

The plaintiff in this action did not make a pre-suit demand. Thus, the question before the Court is whether demand is excused as futile. This Court has articulated two tests to determine whether the demand requirement should be excused as futile: the Aronson test and the Rales test. The Aronson test applies where the complaint challenges a decision made by the same board that would consider a litigation demand. Under Aronson, demand is excused as futile if the complaint alleges particularized facts that raise a reasonable doubt that "(1) the directors are disinterested and independent[,] [or] (2) the challenged transaction was otherwise the product of a valid business judgment." This reflects the "rule . . . that where officers and directors are under an influence which sterilizes their discretion, they cannot be considered proper persons to conduct litigation on behalf of the corporation. Thus, demand would be futile."

The Rales test applies in all other circumstances. Under Rales, demand is excused as futile if the complaint alleges particularized facts creating a "reasonable doubt that, as of the time the complaint is filed," a majority of the demand board "could have properly exercised its independent and disinterested business judgment in responding to a demand."  "Fundamentally, Aronson and Rales both `address the same question of whether the board can exercise its business judgment on the corporat[ion]'s behalf' in considering demand." For this reason, the Court of Chancery has recognized that the broader reasoning of Rales encompasses Aronson, and therefore the Aronson test is best understood as a special application of the Rales test.

While Delaware law recognizes that there are circumstances where making a demand would be futile because a majority of the directors "are under an influence which sterilizes their discretion" and "cannot be considered proper persons to conduct litigation on behalf of the corporation," the demand requirement is not excused lightly because derivative litigation upsets the balance of power that the DGCL establishes between a corporation's directors and its stockholders. Thus, the demand-futility analysis provides an important doctrinal check that ensures the board is not improperly deprived of its decision-making authority, while at the same time leaving a path for stockholders to file a derivative action where there is reason to doubt that the board could bring its impartial business judgment to bear on a litigation demand.

In this case, Tri-State alleged that demand was excused as futile for several reasons, including that the board's negotiation and approval of the Reclassification would not be "protected by the business judgment rule" because "[t]heir approval was not fully informed" or "duly considered," and that a majority of the directors on the Demand Board lacked independence from Zuckerberg. The Court of Chancery held that Tri-State failed to plead with particularity facts establishing that demand was futile and dismissed the complaint because it did not comply with Court of Chancery Rule 23.1.

On appeal, Tri-State raises two issues with the Court of Chancery's demand-futility analysis. First, Tri-State argues that the Court of Chancery erred by holding that exculpated care violations do not satisfy the second prong of the Aronson test. Second, Tri-State argues that its complaint contained particularized allegations establishing that a majority of the directors on the Demand Board were beholden to Zuckerberg. …

 

  1. This Court adopts the Court of Chancery's three-part test for demand futility

This [first] issue raises one more question—whether the three-part test for demand futility the Court of Chancery applied below is consistent with Aronson, Rales, and their progeny. The Court of Chancery noted that turnover on Facebook's board, along with a director's decision to abstain from voting on the Reclassification, made it difficult to apply the Aronson test to the facts of this case:

The composition of the Board in this case exemplifies the difficulties that the Aronson test struggles to overcome. The Board has nine members, six of whom served on the Board when it approved the Reclassification. Under a strict reading of Rales, because the Board does not have a new majority of directors, Aronson provides the governing test. But one of those six directors abstained from the vote on the Reclassification, meaning that the Aronson analysis only has traction for five of the nine. Aronson does not provide guidance about what to do with either the director who abstained or the two directors who joined the Board later. The director who abstained from voting on the Reclassification suffers from other conflicts that renders her incapable of considering a demand, yet a strict reading of Aronson only focuses on the challenged decision and therefore would not account for those conflicts. Similarly, the plaintiff alleges that one of the directors who subsequently joined the Board has conflicts that render him incapable of considering a demand, but a strict reading of Aronson would not account for that either. Precedent thus calls for applying Aronson, but its analytical framework is not up to the task. The Rales test, by contrast, can accommodate all of these considerations.

The court also suggested that in light of the developments discussed above, "Aronson is broken in its own right because subsequent jurisprudential developments have rendered non-viable the core premise on which Aronson depends—the notion that an elevated standard of review standing alone results in a substantial likelihood of liability sufficient to excuse demand. Perhaps the time has come to move on from Aronson entirely."

To address these concerns, the Court of Chancery applied the following three-part test on a director-by-director basis to determine whether demand should be excused as futile:

(i) whether the director received a material personal benefit from the alleged misconduct that is the subject of the litigation demand;

(ii) whether the director would face a substantial likelihood of liability on any of the claims that are the subject of the litigation demand; and

(iii) whether the director lacks independence from someone who received a material personal benefit from the alleged misconduct that is the subject of the litigation demand or who would face a substantial likelihood of liability on any of the claims that are the subject of the litigation demand.

This approach treated "Rales as the general demand futility test," while "draw[ing] upon Aronson-like principles when evaluating whether particular directors face a substantial likelihood of liability as a result of having participated in the decision to approve the Reclassification."

This Court adopts the Court of Chancery's three-part test as the universal test for assessing whether demand should be excused as futile. When the Court decided Aronson, it made sense to use the standard of review to assess whether directors were subject to an influence that would sterilize their discretion with respect to a litigation demand. Subsequent changes in the law have eroded the ground upon which that framework rested. Those changes cannot be ignored, and it is both appropriate and necessary that the common law evolve in an orderly fashion to incorporate those developments. The Court of Chancery's three-part test achieves that important goal. Blending the Aronson test with the Rales test is appropriate because "both `address the same question of whether the board can exercise its business judgment on the corporat[ion]'s behalf' in considering demand"; and the refined test does not change the result of demand-futility analysis.

Further, the refined test "refocuses the inquiry on the decision regarding the litigation demand, rather than the decision being challenged." Notwithstanding text focusing on the propriety of the challenged transaction, this approach is consistent with the overarching concern that Aronson identified: whether the directors on the demand board "cannot be considered proper persons to conduct litigation on behalf of the corporation" because they "are under an influence which sterilizes their discretion." The purpose of the demand-futility analysis is to assess whether the board should be deprived of its decision-making authority because there is reason to doubt that the directors would be able to bring their impartial business judgment to bear on a litigation demand. That is a different consideration than whether the derivative claim is strong or weak because the challenged transaction is likely to pass or fail the applicable standard of review. It is helpful to keep those inquiries separate. And the Court of Chancery's three-part test is particularly helpful where, like here, board turnover and director abstention make it difficult to apply the Aronson test as written.

Finally, because the three-part test is consistent with and enhances Aronson, Rales, and their progeny, the Court need not overrule Aronson to adopt this refined test, and cases properly construing Aronson, Rales, and their progeny remain good law.

Accordingly, from this point forward, courts should ask the following three questions on a director-by-director basis when evaluating allegations of demand futility:

(i) whether the director received a material personal benefit from the alleged misconduct that is the subject of the litigation demand;

(ii) whether the director faces a substantial likelihood of liability on any of the claims that would be the subject of the litigation demand; and

(iii) whether the director lacks independence from someone who received a material personal benefit from the alleged misconduct that would be the subject of the litigation demand or who would face a substantial likelihood of liability on any of the claims that are the subject of the litigation demand.

If the answer to any of the questions is "yes" for at least half of the members of the demand board, then demand is excused as futile. It is no longer necessary to determine whether the Aronson test or the Rales test governs a complaint's demand-futility allegations.

The Demand Board was composed of nine directors.  Tri-State concedes on appeal that two of those directors, Chenault and Zients, could have impartially considered a litigation demand.  And Facebook does not argue on appeal that Zuckerberg, Sandberg, or Andreessen could have impartially considered a litigation demand. Thus, in order to show that demand is futile, Tri-State must sufficiently allege that two of the following directors could not impartially consider demand:  Thiel, Hastings, Bowles, and Desmond-Hellmann.  

 

  1. Hastings

The complaint does not raise a reasonable doubt that Hastings lacked independence from Zuckerberg. According to the complaint, Hastings was not independent because:

  • "Netflix purchased advertisements from Facebook at relevant times," and maintains "ongoing and potential future business relationships with" Facebook.
  • According to an article published by The New York Times,Facebook gave to Netflix and several other technology companies "more intrusive access to users' personal data than it ha[d] disclosed, effectively exempting those partners from privacy rules."
  • "Hastings (as a Netflix founder) is biased in favor of founders maintaining control of their companies."
  • "Hastings has . . . publicly supported large philanthropic donations by founders during their lifetimes. Indeed, both Hastings and Zuckerberg have been significant contributors . . . [to] a well-known foundation known for soliciting and obtaining large contributions from company founders and which manages donor funds for both Hastings . . . and Zuckerberg . . . ."

These allegations do not raise a reasonable doubt that Hastings was beholden to Zuckerberg. Even if Netflix purchased advertisements from Facebook, the complaint does not allege that those purchases were material to Netflix or that Netflix received anything other than arm's length terms under those agreements. Similarly, the complaint does not make any particularized allegations explaining how obtaining special access to Facebook user data was material to Netflix's business interests, or that Netflix used its special access to user data to obtain any concrete benefits in its own business.

Further, having a bias in favor of founder-control does not mean that Hastings lacks independence from Zuckerberg. Hastings might have a good-faith belief that founder control maximizes a corporation's value over the long-haul. If so, that good-faith belief would play a valid role in Hasting's exercise of his impartial business judgment.

Finally, alleging that Hastings and Zuckerberg have a track record of donating to similar causes falls short of showing that Hastings is beholden to Zuckerberg. As the Court of Chancery noted below, "[t]here is no logical reason to think that a shared interest in philanthropy would undercut Hastings' independence. Nor is it apparent how donating to the same charitable fund would result in Hastings feeling obligated to serve Zuckerberg's interests." Accordingly, the Court affirms the Court of Chancery's holding that the complaint does not raise a reasonable doubt about Hastings's independence.

  1. Thiel

The complaint does not raise a reasonable doubt that Thiel lacked independence from Zuckerberg. According to the complaint, Thiel was not independent because:

  • "Thiel was one of the early investors in Facebook," is "its longest-tenured board member besides Zuckerberg," and "has . . . been instrumental to Facebook's business strategy and direction over the years."
  • "Thiel has a personal bias in favor of keeping founders in control of the companies they created ..."
  • The venture capital firm at which Thiel is a partner, Founders Fund, "gets `good deal flow'" from its "high-profile association with Facebook."
  • "According to Facebook's 2018 Proxy Statement, the Facebook shares owned by the Founders Fund (i.e.,by Thiel and Andreessen) will be released from escrow in connection with" an acquisition.
  • "Thiel is Zuckerberg's close friend and mentor."
  • In October 2016, Thiel made a $1 million donation to an "organization that paid [a substantial sum to] Cambridge Analytica" and "cofounded the Cambridge Analytica-linked data firm Palantir.” Even though "[t]he Cambridge Analytica scandal has exposed Facebook to regulatory investigations" and litigation, Zuckerberg did not try to remove Thiel from the board.
  • Similarly, Thiel's "acknowledge[ment] that he secretly funded various lawsuits aimed at bankrupting [the] news website Gawker Media" lead to "widespread calls for Zuckerberg to remove Thiel from Facebook's Board given Thiel's apparent antagonism toward a free press." Zuckerberg ignored those calls and did not seek to remove Thiel from Facebook's board.

These allegations do not raise a reasonable doubt that Thiel is beholden to Zuckerberg. The complaint does not explain why Thiel's status as a long-serving board member, early investor, or his contributions to Facebook's business strategy make him beholden to Zuckerberg. And for the same reasons provided above, a director's good faith belief that founder controller maximizes value does not raise a reasonable doubt that the director lacks independence from a corporation's founder.

While the complaint alleges that Founders Fund "gets `good deal flow'" from Thiel's "high-profile association with Facebook," the complaint does not identify a single deal that flowed to—or is expected to flow to—Founders Fund through this association, let alone any deals that would be material to Thiel's interests. The complaint also fails to draw any connection between Thiel's continued status as a director and the vesting of Facebook stock related to the acquisition. And alleging that Thiel is a personal friend of Zuckerberg is insufficient to establish a lack of independence.

The final pair of allegations suggest that because "Zuckerberg stood by Thiel" in the face of public scandals, "Thiel feels a sense of obligation to Zuckerberg." These allegations can only raise a reasonable doubt about Thiel's independence if remaining a Facebook director was financially or personally material to Thiel. As the Court of Chancery noted below, given Thiel's wealth and stature, "[t]he complaint does not support an inference that Thiel's service on the Board is financially material to him. Nor does the complaint sufficiently allege that serving as a Facebook director confers such cachet that Thiel's independence is compromised." Accordingly, this Court affirms the Court of Chancery's holding that the complaint does not raise a reasonable doubt about Thiel's independence.

  1. Bowles

The complaint does not raise a reasonable doubt that Bowles lacked independence from Zuckerberg. According to the complaint, Thiel was not independent because:

  • "Bowles is beholden to the entire board" because it granted "a waiver of the mandatory retirement age for directors set forth in Facebook's Corporate Governance Guidelines," allowing "Bowles to stand for reelection despite having reached 70 years old before" the May 2018 annual meeting.
  • "Morgan Stanley—a company for which [Bowles] . . . served as a longstanding board member at the time (2005-2017)—directly benefited by receiving over $2 million in fees for its work . . . in connection with the Reclassification . . . ."
  • Bowles "ensured that Evercore and his close friend Altman financially benefitted from the Special Committee's engagement" without properly vetting Evercore's competency or considering alternatives.

These allegations do not raise a reasonable doubt that Bowles is beholden to Zuckerberg or the other members of the Demand Board. The complaint does not make any particularized allegation explaining why the board's decision to grant Bowles a waiver from the mandatory retirement age would compromise his ability to impartially consider a litigation demand or engender a sense of debt to the other directors. For example, the complaint does not allege that Bowles was expected to do anything in exchange for the waiver, or that remaining a director was financially or personally material to Bowles.

The complaint's allegations regarding Bowles's links to financial advisors are similarly ill-supported. None of these allegations suggest that Bowles received a personal benefit from the Reclassification, or that Bowles's ties to these advisors made him beholden to Zuckerberg as a condition of sending business to Morgan Stanley, Evercore, or his "close friend Altman." Accordingly, this Court affirms the Court of Chancery's holding that the complaint does not raise a reasonable doubt about Bowles's independence.

For the reasons provided above, the Court of Chancery's judgment is affirmed.