Opinion

MOSK, J.

A rock radio station with an extensive teenage audience conducted a contest which rewarded the first contestant to locate a peripatetic disc jockey. Two minors driving in separate automobiles attempted to follow the disc jockey’s automobile to its next stop. In the course of their pursuit, one of the minors negligently forced a car off the highway, killing its sole occupant. In a suit filed by the surviving wife and children of the decedent, the jury rendered a verdict against the radio station. We now must determine whether the station owed decedent a duty of due care.

The facts are not disputed. Radio station KHJ is a successful Los Angeles broadcaster with a large teenage following. At the time of the accident, KHJ commanded a 48 percent plurality of the teenage audience in the Los Angeles area. In contrast, its nearest rival during the same period was able to capture only 13 percent of the teenage listeners. In order to attract an even larger portion of the available audience and thus increase advertising revenue, KHJ inaugurated in July of 1970 a *44promotion entitled “The Super Summer Spectacular.” The “spectacular,” with a budget of approximately $40,000 for the month, was specifically designed to make the radio station “more exciting.” Among the programs included in the “spectacular” was a contest broadcast on July 16, 1970, the date of the accident.

On that day, Donald Steele Revert, known professionally as “The Real Don Steele,” a KHJ disc jockey and television personality, traveled in a conspicuous red automobile to a number of locations in the Los Angeles metropolitan area. Periodically, he apprised KHJ of his whereabouts and his intended destination, and the station broadcast the information to its listeners. The first person to physically locate Steele and fulfill a specified condition received a cash prize.1 In addition, the winning contestant participated in a brief interview on the air with “The Real Don Steele.” The following excerpts from the July 16 broadcast illustrate the tenor of the contest announcements:

“9:30 and The Real Don Steele is back on his feet again with some money and he is headed for the Valley. Thought I would give you a warning so that you can get your kids out of the street.”

“The Real Don Steele is out driving on—could be in your neighborhood at any time and he’s got bread to spread, so be on the lookout for him.”

“The Real Don Steele is moving into Canoga Park—so be on the lookout for him. I’ll tell you what will happen if you get to The Real Don Steele. He’s got twenty-five dollars to give away if you can get it. . . and baby, all signed and sealed and delivered and wrapped up.”

“10:54—The Real Don Steele is in the Valley near the intersection of Topanga and Roscoe Boulevard, right by the Loew’s Holiday Theater— you know where that is at, and he’s standing there with a little money he would like to give away to the first person to arrive and tell him what type car I helped Robert W. Morgan give away yesterday morning at KHJ. What was the make of the car. If you know that, split. Intersection of Topanga and Roscoe Boulevard—right nearby the Loew’s Holiday Theater—you will find The Real Don Steele. Tell him and pick up the bread.”

*45In Van Nuys, 17-year-old Robert Sentner was listening to KHJ in his car while searching for “The Real Don Steele.” Upon hearing that “The Real Don Steele” was proceeding to Canoga Park, he immediately drove to that vicinity. Meanwhile, in Northridge, 19-year-old Marsha Baime heard and responded to the same information. Both of them arrived at the Holiday Theater in Canoga Park to find that someone had already claimed the prize. Without knowledge of the other, each decided to follow the Steele vehicle to its next stop and thus be the first to arrive when the next contest question or condition was announced.

For the next few miles the Sentner and Baime cars jockeyed for position closest td the Steele vehicle, reaching speeds up to 80 miles an hour.2 About a mile and a half from the Westlake offramp the two teenagers heard the following broadcast: “11:13—The Real Don Steele with bread is heading for Thousand Oaks to give it away. Keep listening to KHJ .... The Real Don Steele out on the highway—with bread to give away—be on the lookout, he may stop in Thousand Oaks and may stop along the way .... Looks like it may be a good stop Steele—drop some bread to those folks.”

The Steele vehicle left the freeway at the Westlake offramp. Either Baime or Sentner, in attempting to follow, forced decedent’s car onto the center divider, where it overturned. Baime stopped to report the accident. Sentner, after pausing momentarily to relate the tragedy to a passing peace officer, continued to pursue Steele, successfully located him and collected a cash prize.

Decedent’s wife and children brought an action for wrongful death against Sentner, Baime, RKO General, Inc. as owner of KHJ, and the maker of decedent’s car. Sentner settled prior to the commencement of trial for the limits of his insurance policy. The jury returned a verdict against Baime and KHJ in the amount of $300,000 and found in favor of the manufacturer of decedent’s car. KHJ appeals from the ensuing judgment and from an order denying its motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Baime did not appeal.3

The primary question for our determination is whether defendant owed a duty to decedent arising out of its broadcast of the giveaway *46contest. The determination of duty is primarily a question of law. (Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel & Supply Co. (1963) 59 Cal.2d 295, 307 [29 Cal.Rptr. 33, 379 P.2d 513] (overruled on other grounds in Dillon v. Legg (1968) 68 Cal.2d 728, 748 [69 Cal.Rptr. 72, 441 P.2d 912, 29 A.L.R.3d 1316]).) It is the court’s “expression of the sum total of those considerations of policy which lead the law to say that the particular plaintiff is entitled to protection.” (Prosser, Law of Torts (4th ed. 1971) pp. 325-326.) Any number of considerations may justify the imposition of duty in particular circumstances, including the guidance of history, .our continually refined concepts of morals and justice, the convenience of the rule, and social judgment as to where the lo.ss should fall. (Prosser, Palsgraf Revisited (1953) 52 Mich.L.Rev. 1, 15.) While the question whether, one owes a duty to another must be decided on a case-by-case basis,4 every case is governed by the rule of general application that all persons are required to use ordinary care to prevent others from being injured as the result of their conduct. (Hilyar v. Union Ice Co. (1955) 45 Cal.2d 30, 36 [286 P.2d 21].) However, foreseeability of the risk is a primary consideration in establishing the element of duty. (Dillon v. Legg, supra, 68 Cal.2d 728, 739.) Defendant asserts that the record here does not support a conclusion that a risk of harm to decedent was foreseeable.

While duty is a question of law, foreseeability is a question of fact for the jury. (Wright v. Arcade School Dist. (1964) 230 Cal.App.2d 272, 277 [40 Cal.Rptr. 812].) The verdict in plaintiffs’ favor here necessarily embraced a finding that decedent was exposed to a foreseeable risk of harm. It is' elementary that our review of this finding is limited to the determination whether there is any substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, which will support the conclusion reached by the jury.

We conclude that the record amply supports the finding of foreseeability. These tragic events unfolded in the middle of a Los Angeles summer, a time when young people were free from the constraints of school and responsive to relief from vacation tedium. *47Seeking to attract new listeners, KHJ devised an “exciting” promotion. Money and a small measure of momentary notoriety awaited the swiftest response. It was foreseeable that defendant’s youthful listeners, finding the prize had eluded them at one location, would race to arrive first at the next site and in their haste would disregard the demands of highway safety.

Indeed, “The Real Don Steele” testified that he had in the past noticed vehicles following him from location to location. He was further aware that the same contestants sometimes appeared at consecutive stops. This knowledge is not rendered irrelevant, as defendant suggests, by the absence of any prior injury. Such an argument confuses foreseeability with hindsight, and amounts to a contention that the injuries of the first victim are not compensable. “The mére fact that a particular kind of an accident has not happened before does not... show that such accident is one which might not reasonably have been anticipated.” (Ridley v. Grifall Trucking Co. (1955) 136 Cal.App.2d 682, 686 [289 P.2d 31].) Thus, the fortuitous absence of prior injuiy does not justify relieving defendant from responsibility for the foreseeable consequences of its acts.

It is of no consequence that the harm to decedent was inflicted by third parties acting negligently. Defendant invokes the maxim that an actor is entitled, to assume that others will not act negligently. (Porter v. California Jockey Club, Inc. (1955) 134 Cal.App.2d 158, 160 [285 P.2d 60].) This concept is valid, however, only to the extent the intervening conduct was not to be anticipated. (Premo v. Grigg (1965) 237 Cal.App.2d 192, 195 [46 Cal.Rptr. 683].) If the likelihood that a third person may react in a particular manner is a hazard which makes the actor negligent, such reaction whether innocent or negligent does not prevent the actor from being liable for the harm caused thereby. (Richardson v. Ham (1955) 44 Cal.2d 772, 777 [285 P.2d 269].) Here, reckless conduct by youthful contestants, stimulated by defendant’s broadcast, constituted the hazard to which decedent was exposed.

It is true, of course, that virtually every act involves some conceivable danger. Liability is imposed only if the risk of harm resulting from the act is deemed unreasonable—i.e., if the gravity and likelihood of the danger outweigh the utility of the conduct involved. (See Prosser, Law of Torts (4th ed. 1971) pp. 146-149.)

*48We need, not belabor the grave danger inherent in the contest broadcast by defendant. The risk of a high speed automobile chase is the risk of death or serious injury. Obviously, neither the entertainment afforded by the contest nor its commercial rewards can justify the creation of such a grave risk. Defendant could have accomplished its objectives of entertaining its listeners and increasing advertising revenues by adopting a contest format which would have avoided danger to the motoring public.

Defendant’s contention that the giveaway contest must be afforded the deference due society’s interest in the First Amendment is clearly without merit. The issue here is civil accountability for the foreseeable results of a broadcast which created an undue risk of harm to decedent. The First Amendment does not sanction the infliction of physical injury merely because achieved by word, rather than act.

We are not persuaded that the imposition of a duty here will lead to unwarranted extensions of liability. Defendant is fearful that entrepreneurs will henceforth be burdened with an avalanche of obligations: an athletic department will owe a duty to an ardent sports fan injured while hastening to purchase one of a limited number of tickets; a department store will be liable for injuries incurred in response to a “while-they-last” sale. This argument, however, suffers from a myopic view of the facts presented here. The giveaway contest was no commonplace invitation to an attraction available on a limited basis. It was a competitive scramble in which the thrill of the chase to be the one and only victor was intensified by the live broadcasts which accompanied the pursuit. In the assertedly analogous situations described by defendant, any haste involved in the purchase of the commodity is an incidental and unavoidable result of the scarcity of the commodity itself. In such situations there is no attempt, as here, to generate a competitive pursuit on public streets, accelerated by repeated importuning by radio to be the very first to arrive at a particular destination. Manifestly the “spectacular” bears little resemblance to daily commercial activities.

Defendant, relying upon the rule stated in section 315 of the Restatement Second of Torts, urges that it owed no duty of care to decedent. The section provides that, absent a special relationship, an actor is under no duty to control the conduct of third parties. As explained hereinafter, this rule has no application if the plaintiff’s complaint, as here, is grounded upon an affirmative act of defendant which created an undue risk of harm. *49The rule stated in section 315 is merely a refinement of the general principle embodied in section 3145 that one is not obligated to act as a “good Samaritan.” (Rest.2d Torts, § 314, com. (a); James, Scope of Duty in Negligence Cases (1953) 47 Nw.U.L.Rev. 778, 803.) This doctrine is rooted in the common law distinction between action and inaction, or misfeasance and nonfeasance. Misfeasance exists when the defendant is responsible for making the plaintiff’s position worse, i.e., defendant has created a risk. Conversely, nonfeasance is found when the defendant has failed to aid plaintiff through beneficial intervention. As section 315 illustrates, liability for nonfeasance is largely limited to those circumstances in which some special relationship can be established. If, on the other hand, the act complained of is one of misfeasance, the question of duty is governed by the standards of ordinary care discussed above.

Here, there can be little doubt that we review an act of misfeasance to which section 315 is inapplicable. Liability is not predicated upon defendant’s failure to intervene for the benefit of decedent but rather upon its creation of an unreasonable risk of harm to him. (See Shafer v. Keeley Ice Cream Co. (1925) 65 Utah 46 [234 P. 300, 38 A.L.R. 1523].)6 Defendant’s reliance upon cases which involve the failure to prevent harm to another is therefore misplaced, e.g., Wright v. Arcade School Dist., supra, 230 Cal.App.2d 272 (school district held free of a duty of care to children injured on their way to and from school).

Finally, we address the propriety of an allegedly erroneous and prejudicial instruction. The challenged instruction, though approved by the trial judge after submission by plaintiffs, was inadvertently omitted from the charge to the jury. Although plaintiffs immediately called the oversight to the judge’s attention, the absence of a court reporter *50prevented verification of the omission until the morning of the jury’s third day of deliberations. Thereupon, the judge recalled the jury, explained his inadvertent error, and read the instruction, which stated: “One who undertakes to direct the action of another has a duty to do so with due care.”

Defendant contends that the instruction was argumentative in that it focused exclusively on KHJ and no other defendant. We need not examine the merit of this assertion for defendant itself requested and received .an instruction to substantially the same effect. That instruction began, “Every person who engages in a business activity which directs or influences the conduct of others and who, while so engaged exercises ordinary care . . . ,”7 It is well settled that a party cannot attack the substance of an instruction if he himself proposed similar instructions. (Smith v. Americania Motor Lodge (1974) 39 Cal.App.3d 1, 7 [113 Cal.Rptr. 771].) For the same reason, we reject defendant’s contentions that there was no support in the record for the challenged instruction and that it was ambiguous.

Additionally, defendant claims .that independent prejudice arose from the tardy and isolated manndr in which the instruction was given. The jury, it is asserted, attached undue importance to the instruction because it was given by itself on the third day of deliberations. We do not agree.

The trial court possesses the inherent right on its own motion to recall the jurors for further instructions. (People v. Wester (1965) 237 Cal.App.2d 232, 238 [46 Cal.Rptr. 699]; People v. Hewitt (1936) 11 Cal.App.2d 197, 199 [53 P.2d 365].) In Davis v. Erickson (1960) 53 Cal.2d 860 [3 Cal.Rptr. 567, 350 P.2d 535], we stated if a court recalls the jury for the purpose of reading unintentionally omitted instructions the danger that the instruction will be overemphasized may be avoided if the court admonishes the jury not to attach any particular emphasis to the fact that it is reading certain instructions which had been inadvertently omitted in its first reading or by rereading all the instructions, Here the prefatory remarks of the trial judge minimized any *51tendency of the jury to be unduly impressed by the circumstances under which the instruction was given.

Moreover, defendant failed to request either additional cautionary instructions or a rereading of all related instructions. Under similar circumstances, it was held in Stoddard v. Rheem (1961) 192 Cal.App.2d 49 [13 Cal.Rptr. 496] that the defendant should not be permitted to stand silently by, giving the appearance of acquiescence in the manner in which an instruction was given and be later heard to complain, too late for curative measures to be taken.

The judgment and the orders appealed from are affirmed. Plaintiffs shall recover their costs on appeal. The parties shall bear their own costs on the cross-appeal.

Wright, C. J., McComb, J., Tobriner, J., Sullivan, J., Clark, J., and Richardson, J., concurred.

*647Bandstra, C.J.

In this case, we are asked to determine whether we should adopt, as a matter of Michigan law, the “limited duty” rule that other jurisdictions have applied with respect to spectator injuries at baseball games. Under that rule, a baseball stadium owner is not liable for injuries to spectators that result from projectiles leaving the field during play if safety screening has been provided behind home plate and there are a sufficient number of protected seats to meet ordinary demand. We conclude that the limited duty doctrine should be adopted as a matter of Michigan law and that there was no evidence presented at trial that defendants failed to meet that duty. Further, we conclude that there is no duty to warn spectators at a baseball game of the well-known possibility that a bat or ball might leave the field. We therefore conclude that there is no evidence to support the verdict rendered on behalf of plaintiffs against defendant and we reverse and remand.

FACTS

Plaintiff Alyssia M. Benejam, a young girl, attended a Tigers game with a friend and members of the friend’s family and was seated quite close to the playing field along the third base line. The stadium was equipped with a net behind home plate, and the net extended part of the way down the first and third base lines. Although Alyssia was behind the net, she was injured when a player’s bat broke and a fragment of it curved around the net.1 There was no evidence, *648and plaintiffs do not contend, that the fragment of the bat went through the net, that there was a hole in the net, or that the net was otherwise defective.

Plaintiffs sued the Tigers, claiming primarily2 that the net was insufficiently long and that warnings about the possibility of projectiles leaving the field were inadequate.3 The Tigers responded with motions before, during, and after trial arguing that, as a matter of law, plaintiffs could not or did not present any viable legal claim. Those motions were all denied by the trial court. Alyssia suffered crushed fingers as a result of the accident and the jury awarded plaintiffs noneconomic damages (past and future) totaling $917,000, lost earning capacity of $56,700 and $35,000 for past and future medical expenses. Damages are not at issue on appeal.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Defendant’s arguments concern the duty of care and duty to warn applicable in this case. Questions regarding the nature and extent of a tortfeasor’s duty are issues of law subject to review de novo. Groncki v Detroit Edison Co, 453 Mich 644, 649; 557 NW2d 289 (1996).

*649STANDARD OF CARE/ PROTECTIVE SCREENING

Defendant argues that although there is no Michigan law directly on point, other jurisdictions have balanced the safety benefits of providing a protective screen against the fact that such screening detracts from the allure of attending a live baseball game by placing an obstacle or insulation between fans and the playing field. The rule that emerges in these cases is that a stadium proprietor cannot be liable for spectator injuries if it has satisfied a “limited duty” — to erect a screen that will protect the most dangerous area of the spectator stands, behind home plate, and to provide a number of seats in this area sufficient to meet the ordinary demand for protected seats. In this case, there is no dispute that the Tigers constructed a protective screen behind home plate, and there was no evidence that the screen was insufficient to meet the ordinary demand for protected seating. Defendant argues the circuit court erred in failing to recognize the limited duty doctrine and in denying motions based on that doctrine for summary disposition, a directed verdict, and judgment notwithstanding the verdict.

Plaintiffs argue against application of the limited duty doctrine and contend that, under usual principles of premises liability, the circuit court correctly concluded that a jury question was presented. Defendant (an invitor) had a duty to exercise ordinary care and prudence and maintain premises reasonably safe for invitees like Alyssia. Plaintiffs argue that the jury verdict was supported by sufficient evidence that the defendant failed to fulfill this duty because it did not *650provide a screen extending long enough along the third (and first) base lines.

There is no Michigan case law directly on point.4 Our review of precedents from other jurisdictions finds overwhelming, if not universal,5 support for the limited duty rule that defendant advocates. See, e.g., Lawson v Salt Lake Trappers, Inc, 901 P2d 1013, 1015 (Utah, 1995); Bellezzo v Arizona, 174 Ariz 548, 553-554; 851 P2d 847 (Ariz App, 1993); Arnold, v City of Cedar Rapids, 443 NW2d 332, 333 (Iowa, 1989); Friedman v Houston Sports Ass’n, 731 SW2d 572, 574-575 (Tex App, 1987); Swagger v City of Crystal, 379 NW2d 183, 185 (Minn App, 1986); Rudnick v Golden West Broadcasters, 156 Cal App 3d 793, 796; 202 Cal Rptr 900 (1984).6

*651The logic of these precedents is that there is an inherent risk of objects leaving the playing field that people know about when they attend baseball games. See, e.g., Swagger, supra at 185 (“ ‘[n]o one of ordinary intelligence could see many innings of the ordinary league [baseball] game without coming to a full realization that batters cannot and do not control the direction of the ball’ ”), quoting Brisson v Minneapolis Baseball & Athletic Ass’n, 185 Minn 507, 509-510; 240 NW 903 (1932).7 Also, there is inherent value in having most seats unprotected by a screen because baseball patrons generally want to be involved with the game in an intimate way and are even hoping that they will come in contact with some projectile from the field (in the form of a souvenir baseball). See, e.g., Rudnick, supra at 802 (“the chance to apprehend a misdirected baseball is as much a part of the game as the seventh inning stretch or peanuts and Cracker Jack”). In other words, spectators know about the risk of being in the stands and, in fact, welcome that risk to a certain extent. On the other hand, the area behind home plate is especially dangerous and spectators who want protected seats should be able to find them in this area. Balancing all of these concerns, courts generally have adopted the limited duty doctrine that prevents liability if there are a sufficient *652number of protected seats behind home plate to meet the ordinary demand for that kind of seating. If that seating is provided, the baseball stadium owner has fulfilled its duty and there can be no liability for spectators who are injured by a projectile from the field.

An oft-cited precedent, Akins v Glens Falls City School Dist, 53 NY2d 325; 441 NYS2d 644; 424 NE2d 531 (1981), provides a good illustration of the reasoning employed. There, a spectator at a baseball game was permanently and seriously injured when a sharply hit foul ball struck her in the eye. Id. at 327. As is the case in Michigan,8 New York has disavowed the “assumption of risk” doctrine and thus the Akins court analyzed the situation anew, without reliance on that doctrine. Id. at 329. In doing so, the court reasoned that

an owner of a baseball field is not an insurer of the safety of its spectators. Rather, like any other owner or occupier of land, it is only under a duty to exercise ‘reasonable care under the circumstances’ to prevent injury to those who come to watch the games played on its field. [Id. (citations omitted).]

The court noted that “many spectators prefer to sit where their view of the game is unobstructed by fences or protective netting and the proprietor of a ball park has a legitimate interest in catering to these desires.” Id. at 330. Balancing the interests involved, the court adopted what it considered to be the “majority rule” — “the owner must screen the most dangerous section of the field — the area behind home *653plate — and the screening that is provided must be sufficient for those spectators who may be reasonably anticipated to desire protected seats on an ordinary occasion.” Id. The Akins court reasoned that this rule appropriately recognizes the “practical realities of this sporting event.” Id. at 331.

We find Akins and similar precedents to be well-reasoned and persuasive. It seems axiomatic that baseball fans attend, games knowing that, as a natural result of play, objects may leave the field with the potential of causing injury in the stands. It is equally clear that most spectators, nonetheless, prefer to be as “close to the play” as possible, without an insulating and obstructive screen between them and the action. In contrast, a smaller number of spectators prefer the protection offered by screening. The most dangerous part of the spectator stands is the area in the lower deck behind home plate and along each of the baselines. Certainly home plate is the center of the most activity on the field. Most notably, it is there that pitched balls, traveling at great speeds in a line that would extend into the stands, are often deflected or squarely hit into those stands. Quite logically, the limited duty rule protects a stadium owner that provides screening for this most dangerous area and, in so doing, accommodates baseball patrons who seek protected seating. Because the limited duty rule is based on the desires of spectators, it further makes sense to define the extent of screening that should be provided behind home plate on the basis of consumer demand.

Plaintiffs do nothing to argue substantively against the limited duty rule, but merely argue that baseball stadium cases should be governed by usual invitor-*654invitee principles, not any special “baseball rule.” Thus, plaintiffs argue that the jury properly determined that defendant failed to exercise “ordinary care” and failed to provide “reasonably safe” premises. However, the limited duty rule does not ignore or abrogate usual premises liability principles. Instead, it identifies the duty of baseball stadium proprietors with greater specificity than the usual “ordinary care/reasonably safe” standard provides. The limited duty precedents “do not eliminate the stadium owner’s duty to exercise reasonable care under the circumstances to protect patrons against injury.” Friedman, supra at 574. Rather, these precedents “define that duty so that once the stadium owner has provided ‘adequately screened seats’ for all those desiring them, the stadium owner has fulfilled its duty of care as a matter of law.” Id., quoting McNiel v Ft Worth Baseball Club, 268 SW2d 244, 246 (Tex App, 1954). The limited duty doctrine establishes the “outer limits” of liability and “thereby prevents] a jury from requiring [a stadium owner] to take precautions that are clearly unreasonable.” Bellezzo, supra at 554. By providing greater specificity with regard to the duty imposed on stadium owners, the rule prevents burgeoning litigation that might signal the demise or substantial alteration of the game of baseball as a spectator sport.

We also note that the precedents applying the limited duty rule are consistent with the reasoning of the closest Michigan case available, Ritchie-Gamester v City of Berkley, 461 Mich 73; 597 NW2d 517 (1999). Ritchie is not directly on point because it did not involve a spectator at a sporting event but, instead, considered a person injured while participating in rec*655reational ice skating. See id. at 75. Nonetheless, the analysis in Ritchie is similar to the analysis employed by courts in other jurisdictions as they have developed the limited duty rule with respect to spectator injuries. Ritchie considered whether ordinary principles of negligence should be used to determine whether there was liability for an injury resulting from a collision between skaters or, instead, whether the higher recklessness standard should be used. Id. at 76. In answering this question, the Court first recognized “the everyday reality of participation in recreational activities,” most notably, that “[w]hen people engage in a recreational activity, they have voluntarily subjected themselves to certain risks inherent in that activity.” Id. at 86-87. With this recognition in mind, the Court concluded that a recklessness standard “most nearly comports with the expectations of participants in recreational activities.” Id. at 90. In reaching this conclusion, the Court reasoned:

When a player steps on the field, she must recognize that an injury may occur, but she does not know whether she will be injured, or whether she will inadvertently injure another player. We do not believe that a player expects an iiyury, even if it results from a rule violation, to give rise to liability. Instead, we think it more likely that players participate with the expectation that no liability will arise unless a participant’s actions exceed the normal bounds of conduct associated with the activity.

:H * *

Consequently, we believe that the line of liability for recreational activities should be drawn at recklessness. [Id. at 94.]

The Court further reasoned that an ordinary negligence standard would unduly restrict people in the *656enjoyment of recreational skating by promoting a potentially debilitating threat of litigation. Id. at 92-93, n 13.

The Court’s reasoning in Ritchie is similar to that employed by the limited duty precedents described above. For most fans, the everyday reality of attending a baseball game includes voluntarily subjecting oneself to the risk that a ball or bat might leave the field and cause injury. The limited duty rule comports more nearly with that everyday reality than would usual invitor-invitee principles of liability. While requiring that protected seats be provided for those who want them, the limited duty rule leaves the baseball stadium owner free, without fear of liability, to accommodate the majority of fans who prefer unobstructed and uninsulated contact with the game. Under usual invitor-invitee principles of liability, fear of litigation would likely require screening far in excess of that required to meet the desires of baseball fans.

This case, tried under usual invitor-invitee principles of liability, provides a good example. Plaintiff’s expert' testified that, on the basis of his review of accidents occurring over time in the spectator stands between first base and third base, reasonable safety precautions would include screening in that entire area. In another case, where an injury occurred farther down the baseline, testimony and argument would likely be adduced to support a further extension as “reasonably necessary” to protect fans. The logical result of having these cases governed by usual invitor-invitee principles of liability would be that warned against in Akins, supra at 331: “[Ejvery spectator injured by a foul ball, no matter where he is *657seated or standing in the ball park, would have an absolute right to go to the jury on every claim of negligence.”

*658Applying the limited duty rule here, we conclude that plaintiffs have failed to provide any proof sufficient to find that liability could be imposed. Clearly, there was a screen behind home plate and there was no proof whatsoever that persons wanting seats protected by the screen could not be accommodated. To the contrary, uncontested testimony by Tigers picket personnel established that protected seating is generally open and available to fans who want it. Accordingly, we conclude that the screening provided by defendant was sufficient under the limited duty doctrine applicable in this case.

*657Both because the limited duty doctrine represents a good .accommodation of the interests that must be balanced in this case and because it is consistent with the reasoning employed in Ritchie, we adopt that doctrine as a matter of Michigan law.9 Specifically, we hold that a baseball stadium owner that provides screening behind home plate sufficient to meet ordi*658nary demand for protected seating has fulfilled its duty with respect to screening and cannot be subjected to liability for injuries resulting to a spectator by an object leaving the playing field.10 We do not today hold that a baseball stadium operator that does not provide this level of protection can be held liable. For reasons previously noted, there may be an argument that would prevent the imposition of liability in that situation as well.11 In any event, that is not the situation presented on this appeal and we express no opinion regarding the merits of any such argument.

DUTY TO WARN

Plaintiffs also argue that defendant failed to provide an adequate warning regarding the possibility that some object might come flying off the field and cause injury in the stands. However, we conclude that *659defendant did not have any duty to warn regarding this well-known risk.

Plaintiffs rely primarily on Falkner v John E Fetzer, Inc, 113 Mich App 500; 317 NW2d 337 (1982). While acknowledging the “generally accepted proposition that there is no duty to warn of the risk of being hit by batted balls when attending a baseball game, because the risk is obvious,” the Falkner panel nonetheless reasoned that “plaintiffs presented an apparently unique record in an attempt to demonstrate that the magnitude of the risk involved is much greater than commonly believed” and, therefore, reasoned that it was “proper to submit to the jury the question whether it would be reasonable to require defendant to warn spectators of the unexpectedly high degree of risk.” Id. at 502-503. The opinion does not indicate why the record before the panel was “unique.” In any event, we conclude that Falkner cannot reasonably be understood as suggesting that, in all cases, baseball stadiums have a duty to warn spectators of the risk that objects from the field might cause injury.

As discussed above, one of the premises of the universally adopted limited duty rule for protective screening is the fact that baseball spectators generally know that attending a game involves risks from off-field projectiles. Accordingly, precedents from other jurisdictions conclude that there is no duty to warn regarding this risk. See, e.g., City of Milton 'v Brox-son, 514 So 2d 1116, 1118-1119 (Fla App, 1987); Friedman, supra at 575; Stradtner v Cincinnati Reds, Inc, 39 Ohio App 2d 199; 316 NE2d 924 (1972); Baker v Topping, 15 AD2d 193, 196; 222 NYS2d 658 (1961); Anderson v Kansas City Baseball Club, 231 SW2d 170 (Mo, 1950); Hunt v Thomasville Baseball Co, 80 *660Ga App 572, 573; 56 SE2d 828 (1949). See also, generally, Neinstein v Los Angles Dodgers, Inc, 185 Cal App 3d 176, 184; 229 Cal Rptr 612 (1986). As noted by one court, “[i]t would have been absurd, and no doubt would have been resented by many patrons, if the ticket seller, or other employees, had warned each person entering the park that he or she would be imperiled by vagrant baseballs . . . .” Keys v Alamo City Baseball Co, 150 SW2d 368, 371 (Tex App, 1941).We find these precedents to be compelling and persuasive. Further, having concluded that the limited duty rule should be adopted in Michigan partly on the premise that spectators know about the dangers of objects leaving the field, it would be inconsistent to impose a duty to warn of those dangers. Finally, to impose such a duty would be contrary to the many Michigan precedents decided since Falkner, regarding “open and obvious dangers,” with respect to which there is no duty to warn. See, e.g., Riddle v McLouth Steel Products Corp, 440 Mich 85, 96; 485 NW2d 676 (1992); Arias v Talon Development Group, Inc, 239 Mich App 265, 267; 608 NW2d 484 (2000); Hughes v PMG Bldg, Inc, 227 Mich App 1, 10; 574 NW2d 691 (1997); Novotney v Burger King Corp (On Remand), 198 Mich App 470, 472-473; 499 NW2d 379 (1993). Falkner has been described as the lone case that supports a duty to warn in this context. Friedman, supra at 575. To the extent that it might be read as stating a general rule requiring a duty to warn in all cases, rather than a limited rule applicable only to the “unique record” presented, we decline to follow Falkner. We conclude that defendant had no duty to warn plaintiffs regarding the well-known risk that *661some object might leave the playing field and cause injury.12

Having concluded that, under the facts of this case, defendant did not breach any duty to provide screening and was under no duty to provide a warning to plaintiffs regarding the risk of injury from objects leaving the field, we reverse the jury verdict and remand this matter for entry of an order finding no cause of action against defendant. We need not consider other arguments advanced by defendant in support of that result.13

We reverse and remand. We do not retain jurisdiction.

RUDMAN, J.

[¶ 1] Thelma Cyr, the personal representative for the estate of her daughter, Rachelle Williams, appeals from a summary judgment entered in the Superior Court (Androscoggin County, Mead, C.J.) in favor of Adamar Associates. Cyr contends that she is entitled to recover from Ada-mar Associates for the wrongful death of Williams. We disagree and affirm the judgment.

*604[¶ 2] On Sunday, November 5, 1995, Rachelle Williams was a registered guest at the Ramada Inn in Lewiston. The Ramada is a facility owned and operated by Adamar Associates. Williams and some of her colleagues from Pizza Hut were in Lewiston for a seminar. That evening, Williams and her co-workers socialized in the Ramada lounge. While in the lounge, Williams noticed that a man, later discovered to be Lloyd Franklin Millett, was staring at her. Around 11:00 P.M., Williams placed a twenty dollar bill on the table and told her colleagues to pay for the beer that she had just ordered because she was going to the ladies’ room and would return shortly. Williams also left her cigarettes and lighter at the table in the lounge.

[¶ 3] Williams never returned to the lounge. Her corpse was found the next day in a field adjacent to the Ramada parking lot. Ramada did not own the field. Williams had been raped, assaulted and strangled to death; her injuries were consistent with a struggle. Lloyd Franklin Millett later pleaded guilty to murdering Williams.

[¶ 4] When reviewing the grant of a summary judgment, we examine the evidence in “a light most favorable to the party against whom the judgment has been granted.” See Nevin v. Union Trust Company, 1999 ME 47, ¶ 5, 726 A.2d 694, 696. We will affirm the grant of a summary judgment if, upon an independent review of the record, the evidence manifests that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Landry v. Leonard, 1998 ME 241, ¶ 4, 720 A.2d 907, 908.

[¶ 5] Cyr asserts that the Ramada breached its duty of care to Williams because Millett’s attack was foreseeable and because the Ramada’s inadequate security precautions proximately caused Williams’ death. Although an innkeeper has a duty to protect its patrons from foreseeable injuries, the innkeeper is not hable for the resulting injuries unless the innkeeper’s conduct, or lack thereof, is found to be the proximate cause of the patron’s injuries. See Brewer v. Roosevelt Motor Lodge, 295 A.2d 647, 651 (Me.1972).

[¶ 6] Proximate cause is an action occurring in a natural and continuous sequence, uninterrupted by an intervening cause, that produces an injury that would not have occurred but for the action. See Webb v. Haas, 1999 ME 74, ¶ 20, 728 A.2d 1261, 1267. “A negligent act is the proximate cause of an injury only if the actor’s conduct is a substantial factor in bringing about the harm,” See id. Although proximate cause is usually a question of fact for the jury, the court has a duty to direct a verdict for the defendant if the jury’s determination of proximate cause would be based on speculation or conjecture. See Webb, ¶ 20, 728 A.2d at 1267.

[¶7] In the present case, no evidence exists to support a conclusion that the Ramada proximately caused Williams’ death. Although it would not be unreasonable to assume that Millet abducted Williams from the Ramada’s premises, the evidence does not reveal whether Williams voluntarily left the Ramada property with Millet or whether he abducted her. The lack of such evidence and the discovery of Williams’ body on property not owned by the Ramada manifest that the relation between the Ramada’s security measures and Williams’ death is too uncertain and tenuous to hold Adamar liable.

[¶ 8] Adamar was entitled to a judgment as a matter of law because without any evidence for the jury to consider regarding the circumstances leading to the assault, the jury would be basing its determination of liability on pure conjecture. See Webb, ¶ 20, 728 A.2d at 1267; Champagne v. Mid-Maine Med. Ctr., 1998 ME 87, ¶ 10, 711 A.2d 842, 846 (quoting the Restatement (SECOND) op Torts, § 433B, cmt. a, at 442 (1965), “[t]he mere possibility of such causation is not enough; and when the matter remains one of pure speculation or *605conjecture, or the probabilities are at best evenly balanced, it becomes the duty of the court to direct a verdict for the defendant”); Hersum v. Kennebec Water District, 151 Me. 256, 263, 117 A.2d 334, 338 (1955) (stating that “[i]f, when examined in the light of the known facts, two or more theories remain equally probable and equally consistent with the evidence, the selection of one to the exclusion of others would rest upon mere surmise and conjecture”). There being no genuine issues of material fact and no evidence of proximate cause, the trial court properly entered a summary judgment in favor of Adamar.

The entry is:

Judgment affirmed.

Sognier, Judge.

This wrongful death action arising out of an automobile collision was brought by William 0. Stubblefield, individually and as administrator of the estate of his minor child, and by Linda P. Standley, individually and as natural mother of the deceased minor child. Suit was filed originally against multiple defendants, but during trial plaintiffappellees voluntarily dismissed their complaint against all defendants except appellant Ford Motor Company. The sole theory of liability against Ford was its alleged negligence in the design of the automobile in which 15-year-old Terri Stubblefield was a passenger when she was fatally injured. William O. Stubblefield prayed for recovery in his individual capacity for medical, hospital and funeral expenses, and in *332his capacity as administrator sought damages for personal injury, pain and suffering and an award of punitive damages and expenses of litigation. Linda P. Standley sought damages for the wrongful death of her daughter. The death resulted from injuries sustained in a collision occurring July 10, 1977, when the 1975 Ford Mustang II in which Terri Stubblefield was riding was struck from behind while stopped in traffic by another car traveling at an estimated speed of 56 to 65 m.p.h. A “ball of fire” engulfed the rear of the Mustang II at impact and Terri, who was sitting in the back seat, was severely burned.

The question presented to the jury was whether Ford, through the negligent design and placement of its fuel system in the 1975 Mustang II, exposed the occupants of this automobile to unreasonable risk of injury and, insofar as punitive damages were concerned, whether Ford’s management acted with that entire want of care which would give rise to conscious indifference to the consequences in marketing the automobile. The jury found in favor of appellees on all counts. Ford appeals the judgment entered on the verdict, enumerating as error the failure of the trial court to direct a verdict in its favor on the issues of negligence and causation, liability for punitive damages, and expenses of litigation including attorney fees; and in refusing to grant a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, or in the alternative a new trial, on these issues. In particular, Ford contends that the improper admission of the following evidence was harmful and prejudicial: (1) permitting appellees’ expert witnesses to express opinions as to the ultimate issue in the case that Ford had acted negligently, deliberately and callously; (2) permitting these experts to read selectively from Ford documents and give their opinions as to the intent of the authors; (3) admitting into evidence an irrelevant transcript of a so-called “Nixon tape,” without proper foundation, for the purpose of prejudicing the jury; and (4) admitting tests, reports, documents, films and other materials generated after tbe date of manufacture of the 1975 Mustang II, or pertaining to vehicles dissimilar to the 1975 Mustang II.

1. Appellees presented copious documentary exhibits, internal memoranda and confidential corporate reports reflecting the course of Ford’s research and development of the Mustang II, which were explained and interpreted to the jury by two expert witnesses. Ford does not challenge the expertise of these witnesses, Frederick Arndt (automobile engineering) and Dr. Leslie Ball (systems safety analysis), on their respective subject matters but insists that their testimony presented conclusions as to the ultimate issue which jurors could ordinarily draw for themselves, and was therefore outside the parameters of the rule set forth in Smith v. State, 247 Ga. 612, 619 (277 SE2d 678) (1981) in regard to the admissibility of such evidence.

“The opinions of experts on any question of science, skill, trade *333or like questions shall always be admissible; and such opinions may be given on the facts as proved by other witnesses.” OCGA § 24-9-67. The negligence issue in this case turned on an evaluation of mass production engineering design and policy objectives. Dr. Ball explained that a safety systems program is divided into several functions and procedures such as (1) the setting of policies and objectives, generally imposed by management; (2) the development of the program; (3) the release to production, at which point catastrophic hazards are reviewed in conjunction with recommended controls; (4) production activities and quality control; (5) support activities (warnings, instructions, etc.); and (6) response to user experience. In his function as a safety systems scientist, Dr. Ball studied hundreds of Ford’s technical internal documents recording decisions and recommendations from various engineers and executives in regard to design of the Mustang II dating from 1968 to 1977, and determined how each fit within the analysis as a constituent factor in Ford’s organization in the six categories of safety management functions. After giving a detailed analysis, Dr. Ball was asked to give his opinion as to whether he thought Ford had responded reasonably in its decision making process from the standpoint of safety science management, and he was of the opinion that it had not.

Mr. Arndt, who had worked in research projects devoted specifically to the motor vehicle “crash fire problem,” reviewed a multitude of crash tests and internal Ford memoranda, using his engineering expertise to simplify technical terms and explain such factors as the formation of vapor clouds and resulting fireballs; friction ignition; basic crash mechanics; crash similarities between 1974, 1975 and 1976 Mustang II’s; characteristic fuel tank crush features of that model; the predictable role of axle-housing intrusion; various types of crash tests (sled, moving barrier, fixed barrier, actual); corresponding crash standards; inertial forces upon the fuel in the fuel tank during the collision phase (accelerative followed by decelerative) and their relationship to tank penetrations caused by axle-housing intrusion; available design alternatives and solutions, and the effects of each. After this analysis Mr. Ardnt stated that in his opinion the design utilized by Ford in the Mustang II was not reasonably safe.

The jury was required to determine from this complicated decision-making process, described by Ford as “a morass of conceptual, political and practical issues,” whether the design of the Mustang II was unsafe, and if so, whether Ford had knowledge of the hazardous aspects and under the circumstances acted reasonably in marketing the automobile without changing the design. The opinions which Dr. Ball and Mr. Arndt offered the jury were not mere speculations regarding Ford’s intent, but were based upon their professional analyses of the process by which the corporate decisions regarding the 1975 *334Mustang II were made. Our review of the voluminous documentary evidence and testimony convinces us that without the extensive and detailed analyses provided by these experts, together with their opinions based upon these constituent factors which must be deemed highly technical, sophisticated and peculiarly within the specialized science of these experts, the ultimate issue would have been “ ‘beyond the ken of the average layman.’ ” Smith v. State, 247 Ga. at 619, supra. Accord Bethea v. State, 251 Ga. 328 (10) (304 SE2d 713) (1983). Accordingly, we find no abuse of discretion in the admission of their opinions. See Coursey Bldg. Assoc. v. Baker, 165 Ga. App. 521 (2) (301 SE2d 688) (1983); Pembrook Mgt. v. Cossaboon, 157 Ga. App. 675 (5) (278 SE2d 100) (1981).

2. Ford contends that the trial court erred in denying its motions for directed verdict, judgment notwithstanding the verdict, and a new trial because sufficient competent evidence was not presented to support the verdict on the issue of negligence or to establish that any act or omission on its part was the proximate cause of appellees’ alleged damages. Ford relies on evidence that it tested and experimented with several devices to protect the fuel tank from rear-end impact hazards, but was unable to develop an acceptable design alternative to improve fuel system integrity prior to the sale of appellees’ vehicle in September of 1974. However, the evidence also showed that a management decision was made during that time period to delay implementation of protective hardware for the Mustang II’s fuel tank until “required by law,” even though the body design and fuel tank location of both the Pinto and the Mustang II caused the fuel tank to jam into the rear axle when struck from behind. Ford’s internal documents referred to this as a “failure mode,” and the problem was known and documented as early as 1968 when Ford analyzed the hazard of post-crash, fuel-fed automobile fires as shown by accident data. When Ford engineers sought guidance from company management as to what should be done, Ford’s executives decided to “defer adoption” of any protective devices until 1976, enabling it to “realize a design cost savings of $20.9 million as compared to incorporation in 1974.” A directive was issued implementing this decision which stated that “actual hardware will not be added until required by law . . .” Ford finally adopted a polyethylene shield which was installed in the fall of 1976 on the 1977 model Mustang II, but no effort was made to inform owners of older models of the dangers of post-collision fire.

The instant case was tried on a theory of negligence rather than of strict liability (see OCGA § 51-1-11).1 Appellees alleged that Ford *335was negligent in designing the 1975 Mustang II automobile and in failing to warn of a danger of which it had knowledge. A definition of negligence quoted with approval by our Supreme Court is “ ‘the failure to observe, for the protection of the interests of another person, that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury.’ [Cit.]” Ford Motor Co. v. Carter, 239 Ga. 657, 662 (238 SE2d 361) (1977). “ ‘If a manufacturer does everything necessary to make the machine function properly for the purpose for which it is designed, if the machine is without any latent defect, and if its functioning creates no danger or peril that is not known to the user, then the manufacturer has satisfied the law’s demands.’ ” Stovall & Co. v. Tate, 124 Ga. App. 605, 610 (184 SE2d 834) (1971). See Poppell v. Waters, 126 Ga. App. 385, 387 (1) (190 SE2d 815) (1972). “However, the converse of such rule is also true, if in the normal functioning of the product as designed, such function creates a danger or peril that is not known to the user or bystander, then the manufacturer is liable for injuries proximately caused by such danger.” Eldridge, Prods. Liability in Ga., 34, § 2-21, Negligent Design (citing Stovall, Poppell, supra). Thus, the manufacturer of a product which, to its actual or constructive knowledge, involves danger to users, has a duty to give warning of such danger. Beam v. Omark Indus., 143 Ga. App. 142, 145 (237 SE2d 607) (1977).

Ford argues that its liability should extend only to a use of its product that could be reasonably contemplated and anticipated and that the collision in the instant case, albeit without any volition on the part of the injured party, constituted such a misuse of the product that Ford had no legal duty to foresee or to guard against it. We do not agree.

It is true that when the use to which a product was being put at the time of injury is not that originally intended by the manufacturer, liability of the manufacturer depends initially upon the foreseeability of that particular use. Cf. Union Carbide v. Holton, 136 Ga. App. 726, 729 (222 SE2d 105) (1975). However, it is likewise true that ‘“[t]he maker of an article for sale or use by others must use reasonable care and skill in designing it ... so that it is reasonably safe for the purposes for which it is intended, and for other uses which are foreseeably probable. . . .’” (Emphasis supplied.) Friend v. Gen. Motors Corp., 118 Ga. App. 763, 764 (165 SE2d 734) (1968). See Ford Motor Co. v. Lee, 137 Ga. App. 486, 487 (1) (224 SE2d 168) (1976), aff’d in part, rev’d in part on other grounds, 237 Ga. 554 (220 SE2d 379) (1976); Ford Motor Co. v. Hanley, 128 Ga. App. 311, 316 (6) (196 *336SE2d 454) (1973); Gen. Motors Corp. v. Jenkins, 114 Ga. App. 873, 876 (2) (152 SE2d 796) (1966). Thus, “one placing in the channels of commerce an item containing a defect which under foreseeable conditions is likely to cause injury may be negligent because of failure to warn the prospective purchaser.” Evershine Prods. v. Schmitt, 130 Ga. App. 34, 37 (3) (202 SE2d 228) (1973).

Vehicular collision is an event which is foreseeable by the manufacturer. Hanley; Friend, supra; Rozier v. Ford Motor Co., 573 F2d 1332, 1347-1348 (5th Cir. 1978). Accordingly, an automobile manufacturer may be held liable for negligently producing a vehicle with a defect which causes injury when activated by a foreseeable collision. Such manufacturer may be subject to liability for failing to adequately warn the user of the known or foreseen danger if there is no reason to believe the user will realize the dangerous condition. See J. C. Lewis Motor Co. v. Williams, 85 Ga. App. 538, 541-542 (69 SE2d 816) (1952). See also Stewart Oil Co. v. Bryant, 93 Ga. App. 191 (1) (91 SE2d 48) (1956); Moody v. Martin Motor Co., 76 Ga. App. 456, 459-461 (46 SE2d 197) (1948).

Whether or not Ford was negligent in designing this automobile and in other particulars, and whether negligence on the part of Ford was the proximate cause of appellees’ injuries, were questions for the jury. See Beam, supra at 144-145; Long Mfg. v. Grady Tractor Co., 140 Ga. App. 320, 321 (1) (231 SE2d 105) (1976); McClurd v. Reddick, 135 Ga. App. 136, 137 (1) (217 SE2d 163) (1975); Ford Motor Co. v. Hanley, supra at 317 (6); Charles Seago &c. Co. v. Mobile Homes, 128 Ga. App. 261, 264 (196 SE2d 346) (1973); J. C. Lewis Motor Co., supra at 543. Cf. Firestone Tire &c. Co. v. King, 145 Ga. App. 840, 842 (244 SE2d 905) (1978).

“A direction of verdict is proper only where there is no conflict in the evidence as to any material issue; and the evidence introduced, with all reasonable deductions therefrom, shall demand a particular verdict. [Cits.]” Ford Motor Co. v. Lee, supra at 489 (7). The evidence showing knowledge on the part of Ford of a potentially unsafe condition and the marketing of the product with such knowledge and without adequate warning to users was sufficient to carry the issues of negligence and proximate cause to the jury. The trial court did not err in failing to direct a verdict for Ford, or in denying Ford’s motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, or in refusing to grant a new trial on the ground that there was no evidence of negligence. Id.; Firestone Tire Co. v. King, supra.

3. We find no merit in Ford’s objections to the admission in evidence of a transcript of a taped conversation between Richard M. Nixon, then President of the United States, Lee lococca, then president of Ford, and Henry Ford on the grounds that (a) there was no showing of inaccessibility of the tape itself, thus violating the “best *337evidence” rule; (b) that there was no showing of the reliability or authenticity of the transcript; and (c) that the transcript was prejudicial and contained hearsay and irrelevant material.

(a) Regulations issued pursuant to Section 103 of the Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act, Pub. L. 93-526, 88 Stat. 1695 (1974) (see 44 USC § 2107, note), expressly provide for archival processing of the “Nixon” tapes, including “reproducing and transcribing tape recordings” which are under the “exclusive legal custody and control” of the Administrator of General Services. 41 CFR §§ 105-63.103; 105-63.104 (h). Under 41 CFR § 105-63.404 (a) (3), “[t]he original tape recordings shall not be available for public access.” Although, as Ford argues, 41 CFR § 105-63.404 (a) (3) provides that the Administrator will duplicate the original tape for “public and official reference use” (emphasis supplied), a reading of the regulations indicates that such duplicate copies are intended for use by researchers (in order to avoid wear and tear on the original tape) and that the duplicates are to be made available to researchers only in the National Archives Building in Washington, D.C., or at other reference locations established by the Administrator. 41 CFR §§ 105-63.403; 105-63.404 (c). Thus, the original tape’s inaccessibility is the result of federal regulation and appellees were further limited by those regulations to production of only a transcript of the original tape.

(b) The transcript of the tape was authenticated by the official seal of the National Archives of the United States. “44 U.S.C. § 2112 (b) provides: ‘There shall be an official seal for the National Archives of the United States which shall be judicially noticed. [Emphasis by the court.] When a copy or reproduction, furnished under this section, is authenticated by the official seal and certified by the Administrator, the copy or reproduction shall be admitted in evidence equally with the original from which it was made.’ ” McDaniel v. Gangarosa, 126 Ga. App. 666, 668 (1) (191 SE2d 578) (1972). These laws are controlling as to the admissibility of such evidence. Id. We find no merit in Ford’s remaining arguments concerning the authenticity of the evidence. Therefore, Ford’s objections directed to the authenticity or reliability of the transcript were overruled properly.

(c) Nor was this transcript inadmissible on grounds of irrelevance or prejudice. While there was no specific discussion among the participants as to fuel system integrity, the meeting took place just one day after the decision of Ford’s management to defer the adoption of protective devices for the fuel tanks until required by law, and the gist of the taped conversation concerned the necessity for the Department of Transportation to “cool it” as to safety requirements and how the government might make those standards more responsive to the auto makers’ cost effectiveness.

*338“Any evidence is relevant which logically tends to prove or disprove any material fact which is at issue in the case, and every act or circumstance serving to elucidate or throw light upon a material issue or issues is relevant. [Cit.] Moreover, where the relevancy or competency of evidence is doubtful, it should be admitted and its weight left to the determination of the jury. [Cits.]” Kelly v. Floor Bazaar, 153 Ga. App. 163, 165 (264 SE2d 697) (1980). Accord Lloyd v. Stone Mtn. Mem. Assn., 165 Ga. App. 679 (1) (302 SE2d 602) (1983); Southern Bell &c. Co. v. Coastal Transmission Svc., 167 Ga. App. 611 (4) (307 SE2d 83) (1983). Also, since punitive damages were sought, one of the material facts at issue in this case was whether Ford acted with conscious disregard for the consequences when making policy decisions as to fuel tank safety on the Mustang II, and this conversation clearly served to “elucidate or throw light upon” that question.

Moreover, Ford has failed to point out in the record which portions of the tape transcript it considers irrelevant, or how admission of such portions was harmful. Indeed, the only harm theorized by Ford is that any evidence that Ford officials met with former President Nixon must be considered extremely prejudicial and inflammatory because this case would thus be associated with the Watergate scandal. We do not agree. “In general, in cases of doubt as to the admissibility of evidence, where the evidence can tend to have any relevancy to the issues at hand and such evidence is not decidedly prejudicial and immaterial, it ought to be admitted, and be left to the jury to judge its significance, weight and credibility as with all other evidence in the case.” Ingle v. Swish Mfg. Southeast, 164 Ga. App. 469, 472 (4) (297 SE2d 506) (1982). Therefore, the trial court did not err in admitting the transcript.

4. Similarly, we conclude that evidence relating to crash tests on vehicles other than the 1975 Mustang II, a composite videotape, and related exhibits and internal documents objected to by Ford as irrelevant and prejudicial were admissible within the purview of OCGA § 24-2-1, and the cases cited in Division 3c. “Admissibility of evidence is a matter which rests largely within the sound discretion of the trial court, and if an item of evidence has a tendency to help establish a fact in issue, that is sufficient to make it relevant and admissible. [Cit.]” Lewis v. State, 158 Ga. App. 586, 587 (1) (281 SE2d 331) (1981). Relevancy must be determined from the facts of each particular case, and we deem the trial court to have been correct here. See Glo-Ann Plastic Indus. v. Peak Textiles, 134 Ga. App. 924 (1) (216 SE2d 715) (1975).

The purpose of tendering earlier Pinto tests was to show that this model, from which the Mustang II evolved, had the same “failure mode” which occurred in the instant collision, thereby putting Ford on notice of the safety problem. Ford’s assertions of prejudicial pre*339trial publicity in regard to the Pinto are not evidenced in the record. Likewise, crash tests and other exhibits created by Ford after the date of manufacture of the 1975 Mustang II exhibited the same characteristics of crush and collapse from rear-end impact, and also showed Ford’s knowledge of the hazard at a point in time prior to the collision in which Terri Stubblefield was fatally injured.

After viewing the composite videotape in advance of trial to provide Ford’s counsel the opportunity to challenge its authenticity, the trial court ruled it admissible if a proper foundation was laid. A foundation was laid for each segment of the tape outside the presence of the jury, and it was then presented to illustrate the dynamics of a typical post-collision, fuel-fed fire to substantiate the testimony that the fire in issue was “typical.” Other segments were displayed to aid the jury in understanding Mr. Arndt’s testimony about what these tests demonstrated. A fuel tank shield which was not developed and used until 1978 was identified only as an example of such a safety device.

All of these exhibits were relevant to the issue of Ford’s continuing negligence in regard to its knowledge of the safety hazard, its failure to warn the public of the danger and its continued marketing of the dangerous product, as well as to the issue of callous disregard upon which basis punitive damages were sought. Skil Corp. v. Lugsdin, 168 Ga. App. 754 (1) (309 SE2d 921) (1983). “It follows that, where evidence is pertinent and admissible, it can not be excluded merely because it tends to damage or impair the cause of the party against whom it is being introduced. Since a party is entitled to plead a material matter, the fact that proof of it would be prejudicial does not render the evidence inadmissible.” Ludwig v. J. J. Newberry Co., 78 Ga. App. 871, 874 (1(a)) (52 SE2d 485) (1949). “Evidence of other transactions or occurrences is admissible if it is relevant to the particular instance and does not place too great a danger of undue consumption of time, confusion of issues, undue prejudice or unfair surprise. [Cits.]” Charles Parrott & Assoc. v. Hunt, 167 Ga. App. 106, 109 (2) (305 SE2d 879) (1983).

5. Nor do we agree that certain excerpts from the trial court’s charge constituted an expression of its opinion. The record reflects that upon Ford’s objections, the court changed the charges as requested by Ford, and that the jury was specifically instructed that nothing the court had said or done should be construed as an expression of opinion by the court. “ ‘A charge of a correct principle of law applicable to the case on trial does not constitute error requiring the reversal of the case as an expression of an opinion of what has been proved, under [OCGA § 9-10-7], where the whole charge when construed together shows that the matters assumed to be proven in the charge complained of were left to the jury on the question of whether *340or not such facts had been established by the evidence.’ [Cit.]” First Fed. Savings &c. Assn. v. Commercial &c. Ins. Co., 115 Ga. App. 756, 760 (2) (156 SE2d 101) (1967).

6. Ford complains that the form of the verdict submitted to the jury effectively compelled them to award exemplary damages for appellees if they found aggravating circumstances. The interrogatory form objected to provided as follows: “Do you find from the evidence that the conduct of Ford Motor Company was attended by such aggravating circumstances as to show a conscious indifference to the consequences so that the plaintiff, William 0. Stubblefield, as Administrator of the Estate of Terri J. Stubblefield, is entitled to recover additional or exemplary damages to deter Ford Motor Company from repeating such conduct? ... If your answer is ‘yes,’ what amount do you find to be sufficient to keep Ford Motor Company from repeating such conduct?” Specifically, Ford asserts that the language “is entitled” contravenes the discretionary wording of OCGA § 51-12-5 that “the jury may give additional damages.” (Emphasis supplied.) We do not think this question erroneously persuaded the jury that they had no choice but to award punitive damages, particularly when read in context with the entire verdict form. Moreover, as conceded by Ford, the jury was correctly instructed on the circumstances under which OCGA § 51-12-5 authorizes an award of additional damages, and the wording of the interrogatory was not inconsistent with those principles.

7. Ford urges that the award of $8 million as punitive damages to William O. Stubblefield as administrator of the estate of Terri J. Stubblefield was so shockingly excessive and so resulted from the bias and prejudice of the jury that the trial court abused its discretion by denying Ford’s motion for a new trial on this ground. Ford argues that no appellate court in any jurisdiction has ever approved an award of this magnitude in any personal injury suit arising out of a manufacturer’s negligence.

We note initially that while there was a wrongful death award made to the mother, punitive damages are not available in a wrongful death claim, Truelove v. Wilson, 159 Ga. App. 906, 907 (2) (285 SE2d 556) (1981), since the Georgia statute (OCGA § 51-4-1 (1); see also OCGA §§ 51-4-4; 19-7-1), to the extent it permits recovery of more than the actual loss to the survivor, is itself punitive. Engle v. Finch, 165 Ga. 131, 134 (139 SE 868) (1927); Savannah Elec. Co. v. Bell, 124 Ga. 663, 668 (4) (53 SE 109) (1905); Roescher v. Lehigh Acres Dev., 125 Ga. App. 420 (188 SE2d 154) (1972); Collins v. McPherson, 91 Ga. App. 347, 351 (2(a)) (85 SE2d 552) (1954). However, Ford does not dispute the mother’s award and we are dealing here only with the exemplary damages sought by the administrator of the estate in connection with the injuries, pain and suffering of the deceased minor *341child, which may be awarded by the jury under OCGA § 51-12-5 “where there are aggravating circumstances either in the act or in the intention.” Colonial Stores v. Fishel, 160 Ga. App. 739, 742 (3) (288 SE2d 21) (1981). In this connection, “[w]here a plaintiff pleads and proves actual pecuniary loss for which he or she seeks compensatory damages, and the tort complained of is of such an aggravated nature to warrant a charge on punitive damages [OCGA § 51-12-5], it is permissible for the jury to award both compensatory damages for the injury done and additional or punitive damages to either compensate for wounded feelings or to deter the defendant from similar, wrongful conduct.” Woodbury v. Whitmire, 246 Ga. 349, 351 (3) (271 SE2d 491) (1980). “In such cases the award is not measured as compensation, but is fixed in an amount necessary to deter future acts. The rule which requires the amount of punitive damages to evidence a reasonable proportion to the extent of the injury applies to exemplary damages for wounded feelings. [Cit.] The amount, as measured by the enlightened conscience of an impartial jury, which would be required to deter future acts necessarily depends upon the facts of the particular case.” Smith v. Milikin, 247 Ga. 369, 371-372 (3) (276 SE2d 35) (1981). (Emphasis supplied.)

The evidence here was sufficient to authorize the jury to find that the sum of $8 million was an amount necessary to deter Ford from repeating its conduct; that is, its conscious decisions to defer implementation of safety devices in order to protect its profits. One internal memo estimated that “the total financial effect of the Fuel System Integrity program [would] reduce Company profits over the 1973-1976 cycle by $(109) million,” and recommended that Ford “defer adoption of the [safety measures] on all affected cars until 1976 to realize a design cost savings of $20.9 million compared to 1974.” Another Ford document referred to a $2 million cost differential as “marginal.” “Unless a jury verdict is palpably unreasonable or excessive, or the product of bias, it will not be disturbed on appeal. OCGA § 13-6-4 . . . [Cits.].” Thompson Enterprises v. Coskrey, 168 Ga. App. 181, 186 (3) (308 SE2d 399) (1983). “In discussing when a verdict máy be found so excessive as to infer undue bias or prejudice, courts have said such a verdict must ‘carry its death warrant upon its face,’ be ‘monstrous indeed,’ ‘must shock,’ or ‘appear exorbitant.’ Fields v. Jackson, 102 Ga. App. 117, at 122 (115 SE2d 877) (1960). It is also true in considering excessiveness that an appellate court ‘. . . does not have the broad discretionary powers invested in trial courts to set aside verdicts, and where the trial court before whom the witnesses appeared had the opportunity of personally observing the witnesses . . . has approved the verdict, this court is without power to interfere unless it is clear from the record that the verdict of the jury was prejudiced or biased or was procured by corrupt means.’ [Cit.] *342The excessiveness of the verdict was raised below on motion for new trial and overruled by the judge who had presided over the . . . trial. As said in Adkins v. Williams, 23 Ga. 222, 224 (1857), ‘The Court below, did not think the damages excessive. And the Court trying the case, must receive more light on the question of excessive damages, than it can impart to any other Court.’ Considering all of the circumstances in this case, we do not find the trial court erred in declining to find the verdict excessive.” Smith v. Milikin, supra at 372.

8. Ford contends that the trial court erred by charging the jury that attorney fees and expenses of litigation might be awarded if Ford were found to have been stubbornly litigious or to have caused the appellees unnecessary trouble and expense. Ford also contends that the trial court erred by submitting this issue to the jury and further contends that the resulting award of attorney fees was excessive and unsupported by the evidence.

(a) The trial court instructed the jury: “Attorney’s fees and the expenses of litigation may be awarded where the defendant has acted in bad faith in the transaction and dealings out of which the cause of action arose, or has been stubbornly litigious or has caused plaintiffs unnecessary trouble and expense.” The trial court’s charge was predicated upon and substantially quoted the provisions of the statute authorizing recovery of expenses of litigation, OCGA § 13-6-11, as it has been applied by the case law. However, Ford contends that there was no evidence to support an award of litigation expenses on two of the grounds charged — stubborn litigiousness and causing unnecessary trouble and expense — and argues that appellees conceded as much at trial by stating that their claim for litigation expenses was based upon the ground of bad faith. Thus, Ford contends the trial court erred by giving a charge that was, at least in part, inapplicable.

We first note that to authorize a recovery for expenses of litigation, “[i]t is only necessary for the plaintiff to show that one of the three conditions required by the statute exists. [Cit.]” Franchise Enterprises v. Ridgeway, 157 Ga. App. 458, 460 (2) (278 SE2d 33) (1981). See Allen v. Brackett, 165 Ga. App. 415, 421 (3) (301 SE2d 486) (1983). It does not constitute reversible error for a charge to quote an inapplicable section of a correct statement of the law, “ ‘unless it further appears that the inapplicable part was calculated to mislead the jury and affect their verdict erroneously, or unless it should appear that the inapplicable part prejudiced the rights of the complainant.’ [Cit.] In the instant case, it would appear that ‘[t]he excerpt complained of could not have been prejudicial inasmuch as the court was stating a principle of law in the abstract . . .’ [Cit.]” Habersham Mem. Park v. Moore, 164 Ga. App. 676, 681-682 (5) (297 SE2d 315) (1982). See also Adams v. Cowart, 224 Ga. 210, 214 (5) (160 SE2d 805) (1968).

*343Decided June 13, 1984

Rehearing denied June 26, 1984

Ben L. Weinberg, Jr., John E. Talmadge, M. Diane Owens, for appellant.

Foy R. Devine, Albert Sidney Johnson, Irwin W. Stolz, Jr., Wade H. Watson III, Seaton D. Purdom, for appellees.

(b) The jury may allow expenses of litigation including attorney fees where the defendant has acted in bad faith in the transaction out of which the cause of action arose. Smith v. Milikin, supra at 371; Ponce de Leon &c. v. DiGirolamo, 238 Ga. 188, 190 (2) (232 SE2d 62) (1977). The evidence in the instant case amply authorized an award of litigation expenses on this basis as Ford was shown to have actual knowledge before the sale of a defect in its product from which it could have reasonably foreseen injury of the specific type sustained here. See Windham v. Winters, 148 Ga. App. 861 (253 SE2d 247) (1979); Clark v. Aenchbacher, 143 Ga. App. 282 (2) (238 SE2d 442) (1977); Thibadeau Co. v. McMillan, 132 Ga. App. 842, 843 (2) (209 SE2d 236) (1974). Ford’s own documents disclosed its knowledge that if certain automobiles were struck from the rear they would burn, with a strong probability of resulting injury to the occupants; nevertheless, Ford management decided not to correct this defect or warn the owners of the danger created thereby. The evidence further authorized a finding that Ford weighed the costs of corrective action against the benefit of profits and deliberately decided to market the 1975 Mustang II with clear knowledge of the danger. Thus, we note that the same evidence which authorized the verdict for punitive damages — that Ford had actual knowledge before the sale of the automobile of a condition presenting a danger to users — also authorized the jury to find that Ford acted in bad faith in placing such a vehicle in the channels of commerce. DiGirolamo, supra. The trial court did not err in submitting the issue of bad faith to the jury. Ga.-Car. Brick &c. Co. v. Brown, 153 Ga. App. 747, 749 (2) (266 SE2d 531) (1980); Windham, supra at 862. We have carefully examined the expert testimony and find that the amount of the award of attorney fees and expenses was based on and supported by competent and sufficient evidence, and we will not disturb it. See Ken-Mar Constr. Co. v. Bowen, 245 Ga. 676 (266 SE2d 796) (1980); Hall v. Robinson, 165 Ga. App. 410, 411 (2) (300 SE2d 521) (1983). We find no grounds for reversal for any reason assigned.

Judgment affirmed.

McMurray, C. J., and Deen, P. J., concur.