7 Privacy, Antitrust, Outside Counsel: October 24, 2022 7 Privacy, Antitrust, Outside Counsel: October 24, 2022
7.1 Privacy 7.1 Privacy
7.1.1. The Privacy Policymaking of State AGs, 92 Notre Dame L. Rev. 747, Danielle Keats Citrona, December, 2016(edited)
7.1.2. A Cyberattack Illuminates the Shaky State of Student Privacy - The New York Times - July 31, 2022
7.1.3. AG Racine Leads Bipartisan Coalition in Suing Google Over Deceptive Location Tracking Practices That Invade Users Privacy, Office of the DC AG, January 24, 2022
7.2 Antitrust 7.2 Antitrust
7.2.1. Wa AG Ferguson investigation shuts down Amazon price-fixing program nationwide - Office of the Washington Attorney General, January 26, 2022
7.2.2. Colorado AG Intervenes in Health Care Merger - Law Week Colorado
7.2.3. Colo. AG Deal Spares FTC 2-2 Split On UnitedHealth Merger - Law360
7.2.4. Review of State AG Big Tech Lawsuits (edited and no footnotes)
7.2.5. 48 attorneys general appeal dismissal of Facebook antitrust suit - The Washington Post
7.2.6. Justice Department Sues to Block Unprecedented Domestic Alliance Between American Airlines and JetBlue OPA Department of Justice
7.2.7. California Files Antitrust Lawsuit Against Amazon- The New York Times - Sept 14, 2022
7.3 Retention of Private Counsel by Attorneys General 7.3 Retention of Private Counsel by Attorneys General
All attorneys general utilize private counsel to represent the state's interest. In most cases it is because the matter is highly routinized (collecting bills for the state), highly specialized (bond counsel) or non repeating specialites (copyright or state owned patents). They are also used to provide legal services to remote geographic areas (rural state institutions) far from the State Capitol and for deep conflicts where outside retention is the only ethical answer.
The manner of selection of these outside counsel varies with the issue and the state. Quite often an assistant attorney general from the civil division will be allowed to keep his or her agency “client” for a period of time upon leaving the office In other instances law firms have such deep relations with the agency who is “paying” for the services that the attorney general accedes to the agency request to utilize the firm.
CONTINGENT COUNSEL
This Chapter primarily deals with retention of private counsel an attorney general in a very different setting, e.g. contingent counsel on national cases. This practice broke into the national legal scene in the 1990's in the Tobacco Cases (see Chapter on Tobacco Cases.) These cases generated an enormous settlement and legal fees of over $1 Billion. The controversial practice has continued with some states never using contingent counsel and some using them as a matter of course.
The ability of attorneys general to retain and control contingent counsel has been the subject of significant litigation and controversy as indicated in the readings of this Chapter. There have been litigation efforts and legislative initiatives by impacted industries designed to eliminate or limit the ability of attorneys general to retain contingent counsel. While these efforts have been generally unnsucessful they did generate a number of applellate decisions, state laws and academic articles that have limited the unfettered authority of attorneys general regarding the retention and supervision of contingent counsel with a clear increase in the transparency of the practice.
7.3.1 RI State v. Lead Industries Ass'n , 951 A.2d 428, (2008) 7.3.1 RI State v. Lead Industries Ass'n , 951 A.2d 428, (2008)
The Rhode Island Supreme Court decision in State v. Lead Industries Association, Inc. is the majority rule. on the ability of state attorneys general to retain contingent counsel as long as the attorney general exercises sufficient control over the counsel so that the litigation does not lose its governmental status.
State v. Lead Industries Ass'n
951 A.2d 428
Nos. 2004-63-M.P., 2006-158-Appeal, 2007-121-Appeal
2008-07-01
Neil Kelly, John McConnell, Fidelma Fitzpatrick, Genevieve Allaire-Johnson, James Lee, Providence, for Plaintiff.
John A. MacFadyen, III, Donald Scott, Pro Hac Vice, Joseph Cavanagh, Laura Ellsworth, Pro Hac Vice, Paul M. Pohl, Pro Hac Vice, Thomas Bender, William Kayatta, Pro Hac Vice, John Tarantino, for Defendants.
Present: WILLIAMS, C.J., FLAHERTY, SUTTELL, and ROBINSON, JJ.
OPINION
Addressing the issues seriatim for a unanimous Court, Chief Justice Williams authored Tracks I and II and Associate Justices Suttell, Flaherty, and Robinson authored Tracks III, IV, and V, respectively. In this landmark lawsuit, filed in 1999, the then Attorney General, on behalf of the State of Rhode Island (the state), filed suit against various former lead pigment manufacturers and the Lead Industries Association (LIA), a national trade association of lead producers formed in 1928.
After the first trial resulted in a mistrial, a second trial commenced; that second trial, spanning four months, became the longest civil jury trial in the state’s history.1 This monumental lawsuit2 marked the first time in the United States that a trial resulted in a verdict that imposed liability on lead pigment manufacturers for creating a public nuisance.
IV
The Propriety of Contingent Fee Arrangements
Although we are keenly aware of the gravity of the issue and of the fact that thoughtful and potent policy-based arguments have been made on both sides of the issue, in the end we have concluded that, in principle, there is nothing unconstitutional or illegal or inappropriate in a contractual relationship whereby the Attorney General hires outside attorneys on a contingent fee basis to assist in the litigation of certain non-criminal48 matters. Indeed, it is our view that the ability of the Attorney General to enter into such contractual relationships may well, in some circumstances, lead to results that will be beneficial to society — results which otherwise might not have been attainable.49 However, due to the special duty of attorneys general to “seek justice” and their wide discretion with respect to same, such contractual relationships must be accompanied by exacting limitations. In short, it is our view that the Attorney General is not precluded from engaging private counsel pursuant to a contingent fee agreement in order to assist in certain civil litigation, so long as the Office of Attorney General retains absolute and total control over all critical decision-making in any case in which such agreements have been entered into.50 See, e.g., County of Santa Clara v. Superior Court, 161 Cal.App.4th 1140, 74 Cal.Rptr.3d 842, 850 (2008). In our view, it is imperative that the case-management authority of the Attorney General, where a contingent fee agreement is involved, be “final, sole and unreviewable.” Philip Morris Inc. v. Glendening, 349 Md. 660, 709 A.2d 1230, 1243 (1998).51
As we have sought to explain in some detail earlier in this opinion, attorneys general are charged with the special duty to seek justice — a duty which is quite different from the responsibilities of the usual advocate. In accordance with that principle, we wholeheartedly agree with Chief Judge Mikva of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia when he wrote in almost perfervid language:
“Government lawyers * * * should also refrain from continuing litigation that is obviously pointless, that could easily be resolved, and that wastes Court time and taxpayer money. * * * [A] government lawyer has obligations that might sometimes trump the desire to pound an opponent into submission.” Freeport-McMoRan Oil & Gas Co., 962 F.2d at 47, 48.
The usual advocate, on the other hand, is not held to quite such an abnegatory and demanding standard. Accordingly, in order to ensure that a contingent fee agreement is not adverse to the standards that an attorney representing the government must meet, it is vital that the Office of the Attorney General have absolute control over the course of any litigation originating in that office.
At the risk of being repetitive, we would emphasize that the Attorney General’s discretionary decision-making must not be delegated to the control of outside counsel; rather, it is the outside counsel who must serve in a subordinate role. See United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167, 192 (5th Cir.1965) (“[The Attorney General] is the representative of the public in whom is lodged a discretion which is not to be controlled by * * * an interested individual, or by a group of interested individuals * * *.”); People v. Superior Court of Contra Costa County, 19 Cal.3d 255, 137 Cal.Rptr. 476, 561 P.2d 1164, 1172 (1977) (“[The] advantage of public prosecution is lost if those exercising the discretionary duties of the [Attorney General] are subject to conflicting personal interests which might tend to compromise their impartiality.”); see also County of Santa Clara, 74 Cal.Rptr.3d at 850 (holding that the duty of government attorneys to seek justice is not contravened when private counsel, retained on a contingent fee basis, “are merely assisting * * * in the litigation* * * and are explicitly serving in a subordinate role * *
In order to ensure that meaningful decision-making power remains in the hands of the Attorney General, it is our view that, at a bare minimum, the following limitations should be expressly set forth in any contingent fee agreement between that office and private counsel: (1) that the Office of the Attorney General will retain complete control over the course and conduct of the case; (2) that, in a similar vein, the Office of the Attorney General retains a veto power over any decisions made by outside counsel; and (3) that a senior member of the Attorney General’s staff must be personally involved in all stages of the litigation.52
Moreover, not only must the Attorney General have absolute control over all stages of the litigation, but he or she must also appear to the citizenry of Rhode Island and to the world at large to be exercising such control. See Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14, 75 S.Ct. 11, 99 L.Ed. 11 (1954) (“[JJustice must satisfy the appearance of justice.”); see also Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 806, 107 S.Ct. 2124, 95 L.Ed.2d 740 (1987); Marshall v. Jerrico, 446 U.S. 238, 242, 243, 100 S.Ct. 1610, 64 L.Ed.2d 182 (1980); Superior Court of Contra Costa County, 137 Cal.Rptr. 476, 561 P.2d at 1172 (“[I]t is precisely because the prosecutor enjoys such broad discretion that the public he serves and those he accuses may justifiably demand that he perform his functions with the highest degree of integrity and impartiality, and with the appearance thereof.”)(emphasis added).
V
7.3.2. DeSantis taps D.C. law firm billing $725 an hour to defend culture war laws, Orlando Sentinel, Jun 17, 2022
7.3.3. "SC Gov MacMaster Objects to Plutonium Settlement and $75 million legal fees," Charlotte Observer, (August 31, 2020)
Charlotte Observer, August 31, 2020
- Original: https://www.thestate.com/news/politics-government/politics-columns-blogs/the-buzz/article245377595.html
- Archival link not available.
7.3.4. NC Attorney General brings in national law firm for PFAS investigation, X, Chemours, Posted August 12, 2020
WRAL.com
Aug. 12, 2020
7.3.5. New Mexico Attorney General [Hector Balderas] unveils changes on hiring private lawyers, KOB Eyewitness News 4, March 30, 2015
Attorney general unveils changes on hiring private lawyers
Posted at: 03/30/2015 8:07 AM Updated at: 03/30/2015 9:13 PM
By: Ryan Luby, KOB Eyewitness News 4
New Mexico Attorney General Hector Balderas wants to curtail questions of influence involving private lawyers who want to benefit from a private-public partnership.
Balderas announced new reforms on hiring private lawyers to file lawsuits on behalf of the Attorney General's Office.
Under Balderas's new process, which resulted from an internal office-wide review, he'll decide on the merits of a possible case involving outside counsel himself. If he chooses to pursue it, his office will determine if it's cost-effective. Then, his office would require attorneys to competitively bid to get involved.
"I only want to pursue cases that protect taxpayers, where we're able to secure adequate recovery for the state of New Mexico," he said.
The move comes after a New York Times story in December that showed how more attorney generals were hiring private law firms to file lawsuits. The story, which featured former New Mexico Attorney General Gary King, reported that private lawyers search public records for potential cases then approach attorneys general.
State officials hire the firms to do the necessary legwork, and in return, the firms get a percentage of any money won in court cases.
"If there's not a strong process of internal controls and a competitive bidding process that's transparent, any elected official then could be subject to undue influence," Balderas said.
According to staff, the New Mexico Attorney General's office has eight contracts with outside counsel at the moment.
The Associated Press contributed to this report.
Ryan Luby, Attorney general [Hector Balderas] unveils changes on hiring private lawyers, KOB Eyewitness News 4, March 30, 2015 (Links to an external site.)
7.3.6. American Legislative Exchange Council, Private Attorney General Retention Sunshine Act
The American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC) is a national conservative think tank that engages in advocacy in state legislatures. ALEX has proposed model legislation that limits the unfettered ability of attorneys general to retain contingent counsel.
American Legislative Exchange Council, Private Attorney General Retention Sunshine Act(Links to an external site.)
- Approved by ALEC Board of Directors on September 1998.
- Amended by ALEC Board of Directors in 2005.
- Reapproved by ALEC Board of Directors on January 28, 2013.
- Reapproved by ALEC Board of Directors on September 18, 2018.
Links:
7.3.7 Supplemental Readings 7.3.7 Supplemental Readings
7.3.7.1. NEA complaint filed JetBlue American (Supplemental)
7.3.7.2. "It's the 90's, Counselor: 'Superfluous' Fees Denied" David Margolick, New York Times, Aug. 14, 1992
New York Times, Aug. 14, 1992