Oyama v. California (1948)

68 S.Ct. 269

Supreme Court of the United States

OYAMA et al.

v.

STATE OF CALIFORNIA.

No. 44.

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Argued Oct. 22, 1947.

|

Decided Jan. 19, 1948.

Opinion

*635 Mr. Chief Justice VINSON delivered the opinion of the Court.

Petitioners challenge the constitutionality of California’s Alien Land Law¹ as it has been applied in this case to effect an escheat of two small parcels of agricultural land.² One of the petitioners is Fred Oyama, a minor American citizen in whose name title was taken. The other is his father and guardian, Kajiro Oyama, a Japanese citizen not eligible for naturalization,³ who paid the purchase price.

Petitioners press three attacks on the Alien Land Law as it has been applied in this case: first, that it deprives Fred Oyama of the equal protection of the laws and of his privileges as an American citizen; secondly, that it denies Kajiro Oyama equal protection of the laws; and, thirdly, that it contravenes the due process clause by sanctioning a taking of property after expiration of the *636 applicable limitations period. Proper foundation for these claims has been laid in the proceedings below.

 In approaching cases, such as this one, in which federal constitutional rights are asserted, it is incumbent on us to inquire not merely whether those rights have been denied in express terms, but also whether they have been denied in substance and effect. We must review independently both the legal issues and those factual matters with which they are commingled.⁴

In broad outline, the [California] Alien Land Law forbids aliens ineligible for American citizenship to acquire, own, occupy, lease, or transfer agricultural land.⁵ It also provides that any property acquired in violation of the statute shall escheat as of the date of acquisition⁶ and that the same result shall follow any transfer made with ‘intent to prevent, evade or avoid’ escheat.⁷ In addition, that intent is presumed, prima facie, whenever **271 an ineligible alien pays the consideration for a transfer to a citizen or eligible alien.⁸

The first of the two parcels in question, consisting of six acres of agricultural land in southern California, was purchased in 1934, when Fred Oyama was six years old. Kajiro Oyama paid the $4,000 consideration, and the seller executed a deed to Fred. The deed was duly recorded.

Some six months later, the father petitioned the Superior Court for San Diego County to be appointed Fred’s guardian, stating that Fred owned the six acres. After a hearing, the court found the allegations of the petition *637 true and Kajiro Oyama ‘a competent and proper person’ to be appointed Fred’s guardian. The appointment was then ordered, and the father posted the necessary bond.

In 1936 and again in 1937, the father as guardian sought permission to borrow $4,000, payable in six months, for the purpose of financing the next season’s crops and to mortgage the six-acre parcel as security. In each case notice of the petition and date for hearing was published in a newspaper, the court then approved the borrowing as advantageous to Fred Oyama’s estate, and the father posted a bond for $8,000. So far as appears from the record, both loans were obtained, used for the benefit of the estate, and repaid on maturity.

The second parcel, an adjoining two acres, was acquired in 1937, when Fred was nine years old. It was sold by the guardian of another minor, and the court supervising that guardianship confirmed the sale ‘to Fred Oyama’ as highest bidder at a publicly advertised sale. A copy of the court’s order was recorded. Fred’s father again paid the purchase price, $1,500.

From the time of the two transfers until the date of trial, however, Kajiro Oyama did not file the annual reports which the Alien Land Law requires of all guardians of agricultural land belonging to minor children of ineligible aliens.⁹

In 1942, Fred and his family were evacuated from the Pacific Coast along with all other persons of Japanese descent. And in 1944, when Fred was sixteen and still forbidden to return home, the State filed a petition to declare an escheat of the two parcels on the ground that the conveyances in 1934 and 1937 had been with intent to violate and evade the Alien Land Law.

*638 At the trial the only witness, other than a court official testifying to records showing the facts set forth above, was one John Kurfurst, who had been left in charge of the land at the time of the evacuation. He testified that the Oyama family once lived on the land but had not occupied it for several years before the evacuation. After the evacuation, Kurfurst and those to whom he rented the property drew checks to Fred Oyama for the rentals (less expenses), and Kurfurst transmitted them to Fred Oyama through the War Relocation Authority. The canceled checks were returned endorsed ‘Fred Oyama,’ and no evidence was offered to prove that the signatures were not by the son. Moreover, the receipts issued by the War Relocation Authority for the funds transmitted by Kurfurst were for the account of Fred Oyama, and Kurfurst identified a letter signed ‘Fred Oyama’ directing him to turn the property over to a local bank for management.

***

[T]he trial court found as facts that the father had had the beneficial use of the land and that *639 the transfers were subterfuges effected with intent to prevent, evade or avoid escheat. Accordingly, the court entered its conclusion of law that the parcels had vested in the State as of the date of the attempted transfers in 1934 and 1937.

The trial court filed no written opinion but indicated orally that its findings were based primarily on four inferences: (1) the statutory presumption that any conveyance is with ‘intent to prevent, evade or avoid’ escheat if an ineligible alien pays the consideration;¹⁰ (2) an inference of similar intent from the mere fact that the conveyances ran to a minor child;¹¹ (3) an inference of lack of bona fides at the time of the original transactions from the fact that the father thereafter failed to file annual guardianship reports; and (4) an inference from the father’s failure to testify that his testimony would have been adverse to his son’s cause. No countervailing inference was warranted by the exhibits in Fred’s name, the judge said, ‘because there are many instances where there is little in a name.’

In holding the trial court’s findings of intent fully justified by the evidence, the Supreme Court of California pointed to the same four inferences…

We agree with petitioners’ first contention, that the Alien Land Law, as applied in this case, deprives Fred Oyama of the equal protection of California’s laws and of his privileges as an American citizen. In our view of the case, the State has discriminated against Fred Oyama; the discrimination is based solely on his parents’ country of origin; and there is absent the compelling justification which would be needed to sustain discrimination of that nature.

 By federal statute, enacted before the Fourteenth Amendment but vindicated by it, the states must accord to all citizens the right to take and hold real property.¹³ California, of course, recognizes both this right and the fact that infancy does not incapacitate a minor from holding realty.¹⁴ It is also established under California law that ineligible aliens may arrange gifts of agricultural land to their citizen children.¹⁵ Likewise, when a minor citizen does become the owner of agricultural land, by gift or otherwise, his father may be appointed guardian of the estate, whether the father be a citizen, an eligible alien, or an ineligible alien.¹⁶ And, **273 once appointed, a guardian is *641 entitled to have custody of the estate and to manage and husband it for the ward’s benefit.¹⁷ To that extent Fred Oyama is ostensibly on a par with minors of different lineage.

At this point, however, the road forks. The California law points in one direction for minor citizens like Fred Oyama, whose parents cannot be naturalized, and in another for all other children—for minor citizens whose parents are either citizens or eligible aliens, and even for minors who are themselves aliens though eligible for naturalization.

 In the first place, for most minors California has the customary rule that where a parent pays for a conveyance to his child there is a presumption that a gift is intended; …When a gift is thus presumed and the deed is recorded in the child’s name, the recording suffices for delivery,¹⁹ and, absent evidence that the gift is disadvantageous, acceptance is also presumed.²⁰ Thus the burden of proving that there was in fact no completed bona fide gift falls to him who would attack its validity.

*642 Fred Oyama, on the other hand, faced at the outset the necessity of overcoming a statutory presumption that conveyances financed by his father and recorded in Fred’s name were not gifts at all. Something very akin to a resulting trust was presumed and, at least prima facie, Fred was presumed to hold title for the benefit of his parent.²¹

In the second place, when it came to rebutting this statutory presumption, Fred Oyama ran into other obstacles which, so far as we can ascertain, do not beset the path of most minor donees in California.

Thus the California courts said that the very fact that the transfer put the land beyond the father’s power to deal with it directly—to deed it away, to borrow money on it, and to make free disposition of it in any other way—showed that the transfer was not complete, that it was merely colorable. The fact that the father attached no strings to the transfer was taken to indicate that he meant, in effect, to acquire the beneficial ownership himself. The California law purports to permit citizen sons to take gifts of agricultural land from their fathers, regardless of the fathers’ nationality. Yet, as indicated by this case, if the father is ineligible for citizenship, facts which would usually be considered indicia of the son’s ownership are used to make that ownership suspect; if the father is not an ineligible alien, however, the same facts would be evidence that a completed gift was intended.

 Furthermore, Fred Oyama had to counter evidence that his father was remiss in his duties as guardian. Acts *643 subsequent to a transfer may, of course, be relevant to indicate a transferor’s intent **274 at the time of the transfer. In this case the trial court itself had reservations as to the evidentiary value of the father’s omissions;²² with these we agree, especially because there was some reason to believe reports were not required of him until 1943,²³ and he had been excluded from the state from 1942 on…

The cumulative effect, we believe, was clearly to discriminate against Fred Oyama…[He] lost his gift, irretrievably and without compensation, solely because of the extraordinary obstacles which the State set before him.

The only basis for this discrimination against an American citizen, moreover, was the fact that his father was Japanese and not American, Russian, Chinese, or English. But for that fact alone, Fred Oyama, now a little over a year from majority, would be the undisputed owner of the eight acres in question.

***

Whenever a Chinese or English parent…uses [their] own funds to buy land in [their] citizen son’s name,…title is presumed to vest in the boy;²⁶ but when Kajiro Oyama arranges a similar transfer to Fred Oyama, the Alien Land Law interposes a presumption just to the contrary. Thus, as between the citizen children of a Chinese or English father and the citizen children of a Japanese father, there is discrimination; as between strangers taking from the same transferors, there appears to be none.

***

*646  There remains the question of whether discrimination between citizens on the basis of their racial descent, as revealed in this case, is justifiable. Here we start with the proposition that only the most exceptional circumstances can excuse discrimination on that basis in the face of the equal protection clause and a federal statute giving all citizens the right to own land.²⁸ In Hirabayashi v. United States this Court… recognized that, as a general rule, ‘Distinctions between citizens solely because of their ancestry are by their very nature odious to a free people whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine of equality.’ [citations omitted].

 The only justification urged upon us by the State is that the discrimination is necessary to prevent evasion of the Alien Land Law’s prohibition against the ownership of agricultural land by ineligible aliens. This reasoning presupposes the validity of that prohibition, a premise which we deem it unnecessary and therefore inappropriate to reexamine in this case. But assuming, for purposes of argument only, that the basic prohibition is constitutional, it does not follow that there is no constitutional *647 limit to the means which may be used to enforce it. In the light most favorable to the State, this case presents a conflict between the State’s right to formulate a policy of landholding within its bounds and the right of American **276 citizens to own land anywhere in the United States. When these two rights clash, the rights of a citizen may not be subordinated merely because of his father’s country of origin.

***

Reversed. 

Mr. Justice BLACK, with whom Mr. Justice DOUGLAS agrees, concurring. [omitted] 

Mr. Justice MURPHY, with whom Mr. Justice RUTLEDGE joins, concurring.  [omitted]

Mr. Justice REED, with whom Mr. Justice BURTON joins, dissenting. [omitted]

Mr. Justice JACKSON, dissenting. [omitted]