Justice White

delivered the opinion of the Court.

In order to combat child pornography, Ohio enacted Rev. Code Ann. § 2907.323(A)(3) (Supp. 1989), which provides in pertinent part:

“(A) No person shall do any of the following:

“(3) Possess or view any material or performance that shows a minor who is not the person’s child or ward in a state of nudity, unless one of the following applies:

“(a) The material or performance is sold, disseminated, displayed, possessed, controlled, brought or caused to be brought into this state, or presented for a bona fide artistic, medical, scientific, educational, religious, governmental, judicial, or other proper purpose, by or to a physician, psychologist, sociologist, scientist, teacher, person pursuing bona fide studies or research, librarian, clergyman, prosecutor, judge, or other person having a proper interest in the material or performance.

“(b) The person knows that the parents, guardian, or custodian has consented in writing to the photograph*107ing or use of the minor in a state of nudity and to the manner in which the material or performance is used or transferred.”

Petitioner, Clyde Osborne, was convicted of violating this statute and sentenced to six months in prison, after the Columbus, Ohio, police, pursuant to a valid search, found four photographs in Osborne’s home. Each photograph depicts a nude male adolescent posed in a sexually explicit position.1

The Ohio Supreme Court affirmed Osborne’s conviction, after an intermediate appellate court did the same. State v. Young, 37 Ohio St. 3d 249, 525 N. E. 2d 1363 (1988). Relying on one of its earlier decisions, the court first rejected Osborne’s contention that the First Amendment prohibits the States from proscribing the private possession of child pornography.

Next, the court found that § 2907.323(A)(3) is not unconstitutionally overbroad. In so doing, the court, relying on the statutory exceptions, read § 2907.323(A)(3) as only applying to depictions of nudity involving a lewd exhibition or graphic focus on a minor’s genitals. The court also found that scienter is an essential element of a §2907.323(A)(3) offense. Osborne objected that the trial judge had not insisted that the government prove lewd exhibition and scienter as elements of his crime. The Ohio Supreme Court rejected these contentions because Osborne had failed to object to the *108jury instructions given at his trial and the court did not believe that the failures of proof amounted to plain error.2

The Ohio Supreme Court denied a motion for rehearing, and granted a stay pending appeal to this Court. We noted probable jurisdiction last June. 492 U. S. 904.

I

The threshold question in this case is whether Ohio may constitutionally proscribe the possession and viewing of child pornography or whether, as Osborne argues, our decision in Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U. S. 557 (1969), compels the contrary result. In Stanley, we struck down a Georgia law outlawing the private possession of obscene material. We recognized that the statute impinged upon Stanley’s right to receive information in the privacy of his home, and we found Georgia’s justifications for its law inadequate. Id., at 564-568.3

Stanley should not be read too broadly. We have previously noted that Stanley was a narrow holding, see United States v. 12 200-ft. Reels of Film, 413 U. S. 123, 127 (1973), and, since the decision in that case, the value of permitting child pornography has been characterized as “exceedingly modest, if not de minimis.” New York v. Ferber, 458 U. S. 747, 762 (1982). But assuming, for the sake of argument, that Osborne has a First Amendment interest in viewing and possessing child pornography, we nonetheless find this case distinct from Stanley because the interests underlying child pornography prohibitions far exceed the interests justifying the Georgia law at issue in Stanley. Every court to address the issue has so concluded. See, e. g., People v. Geever, 122 Ill. 2d 313, 327-328, 522 N. E. 2d 1200, 1206-1207 (1988); *109 Felton v. State, 526 So. 2d 635, 637 (Ala. Ct. Crim. App.), aff’d sub nom. Ex parte Felton, 526 So. 2d 638, 641 (Ala. 1988); State v. Davis, 53 Wash. App. 502, 505, 768 P. 2d 499, 501 (1989); Savery v. State, 767 S. W. 2d 242, 245 (Tex. App. 1989); United States v. Boffardi, 684 F. Supp. 1263, 1267 (SDNY 1988).

In Stanley, Georgia primarily sought to proscribe the private possession of obscenity because it was concerned that obscenity would poison the minds of its viewers. 394 U. S., at 565.4 We responded that “[wjhatever the power of the state to control public dissemination of ideas inimical to the public morality, it cannot constitutionally premise legislation on the desirability of controlling a person’s private thoughts.” Id., at 566. The difference here is obvious: The State does not rely on a paternalistic interest in regulating Osborne’s mind. Rather, Ohio has enacted §2907.323(A)(3) in order to protect the victims of child pornography; it hopes to destroy a market for the exploitative use of children.

“It is evident beyond the need for elaboration that a State’s interest in ‘safeguarding the physical and psychological well-being of a minor’ is ‘compelling.’ . . . The legislative judgment, as well as the judgment found in relevant literature, is that the use of children as subjects of pornographic materials is harmful to the physiological, emotional, and mental health of the child. That judgment, we think, easily passes muster under the First Amendment.” Ferber, 458 U. S., at 756-758 (citations omitted). It is also surely reasonable for the State to conclude that it will decrease the production of child pornography if it penalizes those who possess and view the prod*110uct, thereby decreasing demand. In Ferber, where we upheld a New York statute outlawing the distribution of child pornography, we found a similar argument persuasive: “The advertising and selling of child pornography provide an economic motive for and are thus an integral part of the production of such materials, an activity illegal throughout the Nation. Tt rarely has been suggested that the constitutional freedom for speech and press extends its immunity to speech or writing used as an integral part of conduct in violation of a valid criminal statute.’” Id., at 761-762, quoting Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U. S. 490, 498 (1949).

Osborne contends that the State should use other measures, besides penalizing possession, to dry up the child pornography market. Osborne points out that in Stanley we rejected Georgia’s argument that its prohibition on obscenity possession was a necessary incident to its proscription on obscenity distribution. 394 U. S., at 567-568. This holding, however, must be viewed in light of the weak interests asserted by the State in that case. Stanley itself emphasized that we did not “mean to express any opinion on statutes making criminal possession of other types of printed, filmed, or recorded materials .... In such cases, compelling reasons may exist for overriding the right of the individual to possess those materials.” Id., at 568, n. 11.5

Given the importance of the State’s interest in protecting the victims of child pornography, we cannot fault -Ohio for attempting to stamp out this vice at all levels in the distribution chain. According to the State, since the time of our decision in Ferber, much of the child pornography market has been driven underground; as a result, it is now difficult, if not impossible, to solve the child pornography problem by only attacking production and distribution. Indeed, 19 States *111have found it necessary to proscribe the possession of this material.6

Other interests also support the Ohio law. First, as Ferber recognized, the materials produced by child pornographers permanently record the victim’s abuse. The pornography’s continued existence causes the child victims continuing harm by haunting the children in years to come. 458 U. S., at 759. The State’s ban on possession and viewing encourages the possessors of these materials to destroy them. Second, encouraging the destruction of these materials is also desirable because evidence suggests that pedophiles use child pornography to seduce other children into sexual activity.7

Given the gravity of the State’s interests in this context, we find that Ohio may constitutionally proscribe the possession and viewing of child pornography.

II

Osborne next argues that even if the State may constitutionally ban the possession of child pornography, his convic*112tion is invalid because §2907.323(A)(3) is unconstitutionally overbroad in that it criminalizes an intolerable range of constitutionally protected conduct.8 In our previous decisions discussing the First Amendment overbreadth doctrine, we have repeatedly emphasized that where a statute regulates expressive conduct, the scope of the statute does not render it unconstitutional unless its overbreadth is not only “real, but substantial as well, judged in relation to the statute’s plainly legitimate sweep. ” Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U. S. 601, 615 (1973). Even where a statute at its margins infringes on protected expression, “facial invalidation is inappropriate if the ‘remainder of the statute . . . covers a whole range of easily identifiable and constitutionally proscribable . . . conduct. . . .’” New York v. Ferber, 458 U. S., at 770, n. 25.

The Ohio statute, on its face, purports to prohibit the possession of “nude” photographs of minors. We have stated that depictions of nudity, without more, constitute protected expression. See Ferber, supra, at 765, n. 18. Relying on this observation, Osborne argues that the statute as written is substantially overbroad. We are skeptical of this claim because, in light of the statute’s exemptions and “proper purposes” provisions, the statute may not be substantially overbroad under our cases.9 However that may be, Os*113borne’s overbreadth challenge, in any event, fails because the statute, as construed by the Ohio Supreme Court on Osborne’s direct appeal, plainly survives overbreadth scrutiny. Under the Ohio Supreme Court reading, the statute prohibits “the possession or viewing of material or performance of a minor who is in a state of nudity, where such nudity constitutes a lewd exhibition or involves a graphic focus on the genitals, and where the person depicted is neither the child nor the ward of the person charged.” 37 Ohio St. 3d, at 252, 525 N. E. 2d, at 1368.10 By limiting the statute’s operation in *114this manner, the Ohio Supreme Court avoided penalizing persons for viewing or possessing innocuous photographs of naked children. We have upheld similar language against overbreadth challenges in the past. In Ferber, we affirmed a conviction under a New York statute that made it a crime to promote the “ ‘lewd exhibition of [a child’s] genitals.’ ” 458 U. S., at 751. We noted that “[t]he term ‘lewd exhibition of the genitals’ is not unknown in this area and, indeed, was given in Miller [v. California, 413 U. S. 15 (1973),] as an example of a permissible regulation.” Id., at 765.11

*115The Ohio Supreme Court also concluded that the State had to establish scienter in order to prove a violation of § 2907.323 (A)(3) based on the Ohio default statute specifying that recklessness applies when another statutory provision lacks an intent specification. See n. 9, supra. The statute on its face lacks a mens rea requirement, but that omission brings into play and is cured by another law that plainly satisfies the requirement laid down in Ferber that prohibitions on child pornography include some element of scienter. 458 U. S., at 765.

Osborne contends that it was impermissible for the Ohio Supreme Court to apply its construction of §2907.323(A)(3) to him — i. e., to rely on the narrowed construction of the statute when evaluating his overbreadth claim. Our cases, however, have long held that a statute as construed “may be applied to conduct occurring prior to the construction, provided such application affords fair warning to the defendant.” Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U. S. 479, 491, n. 7 (1965) (citations omitted).12 In Hamling v. United States, *116418 U. S. 87 (1974), for example, we reviewed the petitioners’ convictions for mailing and conspiring to mail an obscene advertising brochure under 18 U. S. C. § 1461. That statute makes it a crime to mail an “obscene, lewd, lascivious, indecent, filthy or vile article, matter, thing, device, or substance.” In Hamling, for the first time, we construed the term “obscenity” as used in § 1461 “to be limited to the sort of ‘patently offensive representations or depictions of that specific “hard core” sexual conduct given as examples in Miller v. California.’” In light of this construction, we rejected the petitioners’ facial challenge to the statute as written, and we affirmed the petitioners’ convictions under the section after finding that the petitioners had fair notice that their conduct was criminal. 418 U. S., at 114-116.

Like the Hamling petitioners, Osborne had notice that his conduct was proscribed. It is obvious from the face of §2907.323(A) (3) that the goal of the statute is to eradicate child pornography. The provision criminalizes the viewing and possessing of material depicting children in a state of nudity for other than “proper purposes.” The provision appears in the “Sex Offenses” chapter of the Ohio Code. Section 2907.323 is preceded by §2907.322, which proscribes “[p]andering sexually oriented matter involving a minor,” and followed by §2907.33, which proscribes “[deception to obtain matter harmful to juveniles.” That Osborne’s photographs of adolescent boys in sexually explicit situations constitute child pornography hardly needs elaboration. Therefore, although § 2907.323(A)(3) as written may have been imprecise at its fringes, someone in Osborne’s position would not be surprised to learn that his possession of the four photographs at issue in this case constituted a crime.

Because Osborne had notice that his conduct was criminal, his case differs from three cases upon which he relies: Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U. S. 347 (1964), Rabe v. Washing *117 ton, 405 U. S. 313 (1972), and Marks v. United States, 430 U. S. 188 (1977). In Bouie, the petitioners had refused to leave a restaurant after being asked to do so by the restaurant’s manager. Although the manager had not objected when the petitioners entered the restaurant, the petitioners were convicted of violating a South Carolina trespass statute proscribing “ ‘entry upon the lands of another. . . after notice from the owner or tenant prohibiting such entry.’” 378 U. S., at 349. Affirming the convictions, the South Carolina Supreme Court construed the trespass law as also making it a crime for an individual to remain on another’s land after being asked to leave. We reversed the convictions on due process grounds because the South Carolina Supreme Court’s expansion of the statute was unforseeable and therefore the petitioners had no reason to suspect that their conduct was criminal. Id., at 350-352.

Likewise, in Rabe v. Washington, supra, the petitioner had been convicted of violating a Washington obscenity statute that, by its terms, did not proscribe the defendant’s conduct. On the petitioner’s appeal, the Washington Supreme Court nevertheless affirmed the petitioner’s conviction, after construing the Washington obscenity statute to reach the petitioner. We overturned the conviction because the Washington Supreme Court’s broadening of the statute was unexpected; therefore the petitioner had no warning that his actions were proscribed. Id., at 315.

And, in Marks v. United States, supra, we held that the retroactive application of the obscenity standards announced in Miller v. California, 413 U. S. 15 (1973), to the potential detriment of the defendant violated the Due Process Clause because, at the time that the defendant committed the challenged conduct, our decision in Memoirs v. Attorney General of Massachusetts, 383 U. S. 413 (1966), provided the governing law. The defendant could not suspect that his actions would later become criminal when we expanded the range of constitutionally proscribable conduct in Miller.

*118Osborne suggests that our decision here is inconsistent with Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 382 U. S. 87 (1965). We disagree. In Shuttlesworth, the defendant had been convicted of violating an Alabama ordinance that, when read literally, provided that “a person may stand on a public sidewalk in Birmingham only at the whim of any police officer of that city.” Id., at 90. We stated that “[t]he constitutional vice of so broad a provision needs no demonstration.” Ibid. As subsequently construed by the Alabama Supreme Court, however, the ordinance merely made it criminal for an individual who was blocking free passage along a public street to disobey a police officer's order to move. We noted that “[i]t is our duty, of course, to accept this state judicial construction of the ordinance. ... As so construed, we cannot say that the ordinance is unconstitutional, though it requires no great feat of imagination to envisage situations in which such an ordinance might be unconstitutionally applied.” Id., at 91. We nevertheless reversed the defendant’s conviction because it was not clear that the State had convicted the defendant under the ordinance as construed rather than as written. Id., at 91-92.13 Shuttlesworth, then, stands for the proposition that where a State Supreme Court narrows an unconstitutionally overbroad statute, the State must ensure that defendants are convicted under the statute as it is subsequently construed and not as it was originally written; this proposition in no way conflicts with our holding in this case.

Finally, despite Osborne’s contention to the contrary, we do not believe that Massachusetts v. Oakes, 491 U. S. 576 (1989), supports his theory of this case. In Oakes, the petitioner challenged a Massachusetts pornography statute as *119overbroad; since the time of the defendant’s alleged crime, however, the State had substantially narrowed the statute through a subsequent legislative enactment — an amendment to the statute. In a separate opinion, five Justices agreed that the state legislature could not cure the potential over-breadth problem through the subsequent legislative action; the statute was void as written. Id., at 585-586.

Osborne contends that Oakes stands for a similar but distinct proposition that, when faced with a potentially overinclusive statute, a court may not construe the statute to avoid overbreadth problems and then apply the statute, as construed, to past conduct. The implication of this argument is that if a statute is overbroad as written, then the statute is void and incurable. As a result, when reviewing a conviction under a potentially overbroad statute, a court must either affirm or strike down the statute on its face, but the court may not, as the Ohio Supreme Court did in this case, narrow the statute, affirm on the basis of the narrowing construction, and leave the statute in full force. We disagree.

First, as indicated by our earlier discussion, if we accepted this proposition, it would require a radical reworking of our law. Courts routinely construe statutes so as to avoid the statutes’ potentially overbroad reach, apply the statute in that case, and leave the statute in place. In Roth v. United States, 354 U. S. 476 (1957), for example, the Court construed the open-ended terms used in 18 U. S. C. § 1461, which prohibits the mailing of material that is “obscene, lewd, lascivious, indecent, filthy or vile.” Justice Harlan characterized Roth in this way:

“The words of §1461, ‘obscene, lewd, lascivious, indecent, filthy or vile,’ connote something that is portrayed in a manner so offensive as to make it unacceptable under current community mores. While in common usage the words have different shades of meaning, the statute since its inception has always been taken as aimed at obnoxiously debasing portrayals of sex. Although the *120statute condemns such material irrespective of the effect it may have upon those into whose hands it falls, the early case of United States v. Bennet, 24 Fed. Cas. 1093 (No. 14571), put a limiting gloss upon the statutory language: the statute reaches only indecent material which, as now expressed in Roth v. United States, supra, at 489, ‘taken as a whole appeals to prurient interest.’” Manuel Enterprises, Inc. v. Day, 370 U. S. 478, 482-484 (1962) (footnotes omitted; emphasis in original).

See also, Hamling, 418 U. S., at 112 (quoting the above). The petitioner’s conviction was affirmed in Roth, and federal obscenity law was left in force. 354 U. S., at 494.14 We, moreover, have long respected the State Supreme Courts’ ability to narrow state statutes so as to limit the statute’s, scope to unprotected conduct. See, e. g., Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U. S. 629 (1968).

Second, we do not believe that Oakes compels the proposition that Osborne urges us to accept. In Oakes, Justice Scalia, writing for himself and four others, reasoned:

“The overbreadth doctrine serves to protect constitutionally legitimate speech not merely ex post, that is, after the offending statute is enacted, but also ex ante, that is, when the legislature is contemplating what sort of statute to enact. If the promulgation of overbroad laws affecting speech was cost free . . . that is, if no conviction of constitutionally proscribable conduct would be *121lost, so long as the offending statute was narrowed before the final appeal . . . then legislatures would have significantly reduced incentive to stay within constitutional bounds in the first place. When one takes ac-' count of those overbroad statutes that are never challenged, and of the time that elapses before the ones that are challenged are amended to come within constitutional bounds, a substantial amount of legitimate speech would be ‘chilled’. . . .” 491 U. S., at 586 (emphasis in original).

In other words, five of the Oakes Justices feared that if we allowed a legislature to correct its mistakes without paying for them (beyond the inconvenience of passing a new law), we would decrease the legislature’s incentive to draft a narrowly tailored law in the first place.

Legislators who know they can cure their own mistakes by amendment without significant cost may not be as careful to avoid drafting overbroad statutes as they might otherwise be. But a similar effect will not be likely if a judicial construction of a statute to eliminate overbreadth is allowed to be applied in the case before the court. This is so primarily because the legislatures cannot be sure that the statute, when examined by a court, will be saved by a narrowing construction rather than invalidated for overbreadth. In the latter event, there could be no convictions under that law even of those whose own conduct is unprotected by the First Amendment. Even if construed to obviate overbreadth, applying the statute to pending cases might be barred by the Due Process Clause. Thus, careless drafting cannot be considered to be cost free based on the power of the courts to eliminate overbreadth by statutory construction.

There are also other considerations. Osborne contends that when courts construe statutes so as to eliminate over-breadth, convictions of those found guilty of unprotected conduct covered by the statute must be reversed and any fur*122ther convictions for prior reprehensible conduct are barred.15 Furthermore, because he contends that overbroad laws implicating First Amendment interests are nullities and incapable of valid application from the outset, this would mean that judicial construction could not save the statute even as applied to subsequent conduct unprotected by the First Amendment. The overbreadth doctrine, as we have recognized, is indeed “strong medicine,” Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U. S., at 613, and requiring that statutes be facially invalidated whenever overbreadth is perceived would very likely invite reconsideration or redefinition of the doctrine in a way that would not serve First Amendment interests.16

III

Having rejected Osborne’s Stanley and overbreadth arguments, we now reach Osborne’s final objection to his conviction: his contention that he was denied due process because it is unclear that his conviction was based on a finding that each of the elements of § 2907.323(A)(3) was present.17 According *123to the Ohio Supreme Court, in order to secure a conviction under § 2907.323(A)(3), the State must prove both scienter and that the defendant possessed material depicting a lewd exhibition or a graphic focus on genitals. The jury in this case was not instructed that it could convict Osborne only for conduct that satisfied these requirements.

The State concedes the omissions in the jury instructions, but argues that Osborne waived his right to assert this due process challenge because he failed to object when the instructions were given at his trial. The Ohio Supreme Court so held, citing Ohio law. The question before us now, therefore, is whether we are precluded from reaching Osborne’s due process challenge because counsel’s failure to comply with the procedural rule constitutes an independent state-law ground adequate to support the result below. We have no difficulty agreeing with the State that Osborne’s counsel’s failure to urge that the court instruct the jury on scienter constitutes an independent and adequate state-law ground preventing us from reaching Osborne’s due process contention on that point. Ohio law states that proof of scienter is required in instances, like the present one, where a criminal statute does not specify the applicable mental state. See n. 9, supra. The state procedural rule, moreover, serves the State’s important interest in ensuring that counsel do their part in preventing trial courts from providing juries with erroneous instructions.

With respect to the trial court’s failure to instruct on lewdness, however, we reach a different conclusion: Based upon our review of the record, we believe that counsel’s failure to object on this point does not prevent us from considering Osborne’s constitutional claim. Osborne’s trial was brief: The State called only the two arresting officers to the stand; the defense summoned only Osborne himself. Right before trial, Osborne’s counsel moved to dismiss the case, contending *124that § 2907.323(A)(3) is unconstitutionally overbroad. Counsel stated:

“I’m filing a motion to dismiss based on the fact that [the] statute is void for vagueness, overbroad . . . The statute’s overbroad because ... a person couldn’t have pictures of his own grandchildren; probably couldn’t even have nude photographs of himself.

“Judge, if you had some nude photos of yourself when you were a child, you would probably be violating the law ....

“So grandparents, neighbors, or other people who happen to view the photograph are criminally liable under the statute. And on that basis I’m going to ask the Court to dismiss the case.” Tr. 3-4.

The prosecutor informed the trial judge that a number of Ohio state courts had recently rejected identical motions challenging § 2907.323(A)(3). Tr. 5-6. The court then overruled the motion. Id., at 7. Immediately thereafter, Osborne’s counsel proposed various jury instructions. Ibid.

Given this sequence of events, we believe that we may reach Osborne’s due process claim because we are convinced that Osborne’s attorney pressed the issue of the State’s failure of proof on lewdness before the trial court and, under the circumstances, nothing would be gained by requiring Osborne’s lawyer to object a second time, specifically to the jury instructions. The trial judge, in no uncertain terms, rejected counsel’s argument that the statute as written was overbroad. The State contends that counsel should then have insisted that the court instruct the jury on lewdness because, absent a finding that this element existed, a conviction would be unconstitutional. Were we to accept this position, we would “Torce resort to an arid ritual of meaningless form,’. . . and would further no perceivable state interest.” James v. Kentucky, 466 U. S. 341, 349 (1984), quoting Staub v. City of Baxley, 355 U. S. 313, 320 (1958), and citing Henry *125v. Mississippi, 379 U. S. 443, 448-449 (1965). As Justice Holmes warned us years ago, “[w]hatever springes the State may set for those who are endeavoring to assert rights that the State confers, the assertion of federal rights, when plainly and reasonably made, is not to be defeated under the name of local practice.” Davis v. Wechsler, 263 U. S. 22, 24 (1923).

Our decision here is analogous to our decision in Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U. S. 415 (1965). In that case, the Alabama Supreme Court had held that a defendant had waived his Confrontation Clause objection to the reading into evidence of a confession that he had given. Although not following the precise procedure required by Alabama law,18 the defendant had unsuccessfully objected to the prosecution’s use of the confession. We followed “our consistent holdings that the adequacy of state procedural bars to the assertion of federal questions is itself a federal question” and stated that “[i]n determining the sufficiency of objections we have applied the general principle that an objection which is ample and timely to bring the alleged federal error to the attention of the trial court and enable it to take appropriate corrective action is sufficient to serve legitimate state interests, and therefore sufficient to preserve the claim for review here.” Id., at 422. Concluding that “[n]o legitimate state interest would have been served by requiring repetition of a patently futile objection,” we held that the Alabama procedural ruling did not preclude our consideration of the defendant’s constitutional claim. Id., at 421-422. We reach a similar conclusion in this case.

IV

To conclude, although we find Osborne’s First Amendment arguments unpersuasive, we reverse his conviction and re*126mand for a new trial in order to ensure that Osborne’s conviction stemmed from a finding that the State had proved each of the elements of § 2907.323(A)(3).

So ordered.

Justice Blackmun,

concurring.

I join the Court’s opinion. I write separately only to express my agreement with Justice Brennan, see post, at 146, n. 20, that this Court’s ability to entertain Osborne’s due process claim premised on the failure of the trial court to charge the “lewd exhibition” and “graphic focus” elements does not depend upon his objection to this failure at trial.

Justice Brennan,

with whom Justice Marshall and Justice Stevens join,-dissenting.

I agree with the Court that appellant’s conviction must be reversed. I do not agree, however, that Ohio is free on remand to retry him under Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §2907.323(A)(3) (Supp. 1989) as it currently exists. In my view, the state law, even as construed authoritatively by the Ohio Supreme Court, is still fatally overbroad, and our decision in Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U. S. 557 (1969), prevents the State from criminalizing appellant’s possession of the photographs at issue in this case. I therefore respectfully dissent.

I

A

As written, the Ohio statute is plainly overbroad. Section 2907.323(A)(3) makes it a crime to “[pjossess or view any material or performance that shows a minor who is not the person’s child or ward in a state of nudity.” Another section defines “nudity” as

“the showing, representation, or depiction of human male or female genitals, pubic area, or buttocks with less than a full, opaque covering, or of a female breast with less than a full opaque covering of any portion thereof *127below the top of the nipple, or of covered male genitals in a discernibly turgid state.” §2907.01(H).

In short, §§2907.323 and 2907.01(H) use simple nudity, without more, as a way of defining child pornography.1 But as our prior decisions have made clear, “ ‘nudity alone’ does not place otherwise protected material outside the mantle of the First Amendment.” Schad v. Mount Ephraim, 452 U. S. 61, 66 (1981) (quoting Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U. S. 153, 161 (1974)); see also FW/PBS, Inc. v. Dallas, 493 U. S. 215, 224 (1990) (plurality opinion); id., at 238, n. 1 (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment); Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U. S. 922, 932-933 (1975); Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U. S. 546, 557-558 (1975); California v. LaRue, 409 U. S. 109, 118 (1972). In Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U. S. 205, 213 (1975), for example, we invalidated an ordinance that “would [have] bar[red] a film containing a picture of a baby’s buttocks, the nude body of a war victim, or scenes from a culture in which nudity is indigenous. The ordinance also might [have] prohibited] newsreel scenes of the opening of an art exhibit as well as shots of bathers on a beach.” The Ohio law as written has the same broad coverage and is similarly unconstitutional.2

*128B

Wary of the statute’s use of the “nudity” standard, the Ohio Supreme Court construed § 2907.323(A)(3) to apply only “where such nudity constitutes a lewd exhibition or involves a graphic focus on the genitals.” State v. Young, 37 Ohio St. 3d 249, 252, 525 N. E. 2d 1363, 1368 (1988). The “lewd exhibition” and “graphic focus” tests not only fail to cure the over-breadth of the statute, but they also create a new problem of vagueness.

1

The Court dismisses appellant’s overbreadth contention in a single cursory paragraph. Relying exclusively on our previous decision in New York v. Ferber, 458 U. S. 747 (1982),3 *129the majority reasons that the “lewd exhibition” standard adequately narrows the statute’s ambit because “[w]e have upheld similar language against overbreadth challenges in the past.” Ante, at 114. The Court’s terse explanation is unsatisfactory, since Ferber involved a law that differs in crucial respects from the one here.

The New York law at issue in Ferber criminalized the use of a child in a “‘[sjexual performance,”’ defined as “‘any performance or part thereof which includes sexual conduct by a child less than sixteen years of age.’” 458 U. S., at 751 (quoting N. Y. Penal Law § 263.00(1) (McKinney 1980)). “‘ “Sexual conduct’”” was in turn defined as “‘actual or simulated sexual intercourse, deviate sexual intercourse, sexual bestiality, masturbation, sado-masochistic abuse, or lewd exhibition of the genitals.’” 458 U. S., at 751 (quoting §263.00 (3)). Although we acknowledged that “nudity, without more[,] is protected expression,” id., at 765, n. 18, we found that the statute was not overbroad because only “a tiny fraction of materials within the statute’s reach” was constitutionally protected. Id., at 773; see also id., at 776 (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment). We therefore upheld the conviction of a bookstore proprietor who sold films depicting young boys masturbating.

The Ohio law is distinguishable for several reasons. First, the New York statute did not criminalize materials with a “graphic focus” on the genitals, and, as discussed further below, Ohio’s “graphic focus” test is impermissibly capacious. Even setting aside the “graphic focus” element, the Ohio Supreme Court’s narrowing construction is still overbroad because it focuses on “lewd exhibitions of nudity” rather than “lewd exhibitions of the genitals” in the context of sexual conduct, as in the New York statute at issue in Ferber.4 *130Ohio law defines “nudity” to include depictions of pubic areas, buttocks, the female breast, and covered male genitals “in a discernibly turgid state,” as well as depictions of the genitals. On its face, then, the Ohio law is much broader than New York’s.

In addition, whereas the Ohio Supreme Court’s interpretation uses the “lewd exhibition of nudity” test standing alone, the New York law employed the phrase “‘lewd exhibition of *131the genitals’” in the context of a longer list of examples of sexual conduct: ‘“actual or simulated sexual intercourse, deviate sexual intercourse, sexual bestiality, masturbation, [and] sado-masochistic abuse.’” 458 U. S., at 751. This syntax was important to our decision in Ferber. We recognized the potential for impermissible applications of the New York statute, see id., at 773, but in view of the examples of “sexual conduct” provided by the statute, we were willing to assume that the New York courts would not “widen the possibly invalid reach of the statute by giving an expansive construction to the proscription on ‘lewd exhibition^] of the genitals.’” Ibid, (emphasis added). In the Ohio statute, of course, there is no analog to the elaborate definition of “sexual conduct” to serve as a similar limit. Hence, while the New York law could be saved at least in part by the notion of ejusdem generis, see 2A C. Sands, Sutherland on Statutory Construction §47.17, p. 166 (4th ed. 1984), the Ohio Supreme Court’s construction of its law cannot.

Indeed, the broad definition of nudity in the Ohio statutory scheme means that “child pornography” could include any photograph depicting a “lewd exhibition” of even a small portion of a minor’s buttocks or any part of the female breast below the nipple. Pictures of topless bathers at a Mediterranean beach, of teenagers in revealing dresses, and even of toddlers romping unclothed, all might be prohibited.5 Fur*132thermore, the Ohio law forbids not only depictions of nudity per se, but also depictions of the buttocks, breast, or pubic area with less than a “full, opaque covering.” Thus, pictures of fashion models wearing semitransparent clothing might be illegal,6 as might a photograph depicting a fully clad male that nevertheless captured his genitals “in a discernibly turgid state.” The Ohio statute thus sweeps in many types of materials that are not “child pornography,” as we used that term in Ferber, but rather that enjoy full First Amendment protection.

It might be objected that many of these depictions of nudity do not amount to “lewd exhibitions.” But in the absence of any authoritative definition of that phrase by the Ohio Supreme Court, we cannot predict which ones. Many would characterize a photograph of a seductive fashion model or alluringly posed adolescent on a topless European beach as “lewd,” although such pictures indisputably enjoy constitutional protection. Indeed, some might think that any nudity, especially that involving a minor, is by definition “lewd,” yet this Court has clearly established that nudity is not ex-*133eluded automatically from the scope of the First Amendment. The Court today is unable even to hazard a guess as to what a “lewd exhibition” might mean; it is forced to rely entirely on an inapposite case — Ferber—that simply did not discuss, let alone decide, the central issue here.

The Ohio Supreme Court provided few clues as to the meaning of the phrase “lewd exhibition of nudity.” The court distinguished “child pornography” from “obscenity,” see 37 Ohio St. 3d, at 257, 525 N. E. 2d, at 1372, thereby implying that it did not believe that an exhibition was required to be “obscene” in order to qualify as “lewd.”7 But it supplied no authoritative definition — a disturbing omission in light of the absence of the phrase “lewd exhibition” from the statutory definition section of the Sex Offenses chapter of the Ohio Revised Code. See §2907.01.8 In fact, the word *134“lewd” does not appear in the statutory definition of any crime involving obscenity or other sexually oriented materials in the Ohio Revised Code. See §§2907.31-2907.35. *135Thus, when the Ohio Supreme Court grafted the “lewd exhibition” test onto the definition of nudity, it was venturing into uncharted territory.9

Moreover, there is no longstanding, commonly understood definition of “lewd” upon which the Ohio Supreme Court’s construction might be said to draw that can save the “lewd exhibition” standard from impermissible vagueness.10 At *136common law, the term “lewd” included “any gross indecency so notorious as to tend to corrupt community morals,” Collins v. State, 160 Ga. App. 680, 682, 288 S. E. 2d 43, 45 (1981), an approach that was “subjective” and dependent entirely on a speaker’s “social, moral, and cultural bias.” Morgan v. Detroit, 389 F. Supp. 922, 930 (ED Mich. 1975).11 Not surprisingly, States with long experience in applying indecency laws have learned that the word “lewd” is “too indefinite and uncertain to be enforceable.” Courtemanche v. State, 507 S. W. 2d 545, 546 (Tex. Cr. App. 1974). See also Attwood v. Purcell, 402 F. Supp. 231, 235 (Ariz. 1975); District of Columbia v. Walters, 319 A. 2d 332, 335-336 (D. C. 1974). The term is often defined by reference to such pejorative synonyms as “‘lustful, lascivious, unchaste, wanton, or loose in morals and conduct.’” People v. Williams, 59 Cal. App. 3d 225, 229, 130 Cal. Rptr. 460, 462 (1976). But “the very phrases and synonyms through which meaning is purportedly ascribed serve to obscure rather than clarify.” State v. Kueny, 215 N. W. 2d 215, 217 (Iowa 1974). “To instruct the jury that a ‘lewd or dissolute’ act is one which is morally ‘loose,’ or ‘lawless,’ or ‘foul’ piles additional un*137certainty upon the already vague words of the statute. In short, vague statutory language is not rendered more precise by defining it in terms of synonyms of equal or greater uncertainty.” Pryor v. Municipal Court for Los Angeles, 25 Cal. 3d 238, 249, 599 P. 2d 636, 642 (1979).

The Ohio Supreme Court, moreover, did not specify the perspective from which “lewdness” is to be determined. A “reasonable” person’s view of “lewdness”? A reasonable pedophile’s? An “average” person applying contemporary local community standards? Statewide standards? Nationwide standards? Cf. Sable Communications of California, Inc. v. FCC, 492 U. S. 115, 133-134 (1989); Pope v. Illinois, 481 U. S. 497, 500-501 (1987); Pinkus v. United States, 436 U. S. 293, 302-303 (1978); Smith v. United States, 431 U. S. 291, 300, n. 6 (1977); Miller v. California, 413 U. S. 15, 24 (1973); Mishkin v. New York, 383 U. S. 502, 508 (1966). In sum, the addition of a “lewd exhibition” standard does not narrow adequately the statute’s reach. If anything, it creates a new problem of vagueness, affording the public little notice of the statute’s ambit and providing an avenue for “ ‘policemen, prosecutors, and juries to pursue their personal predilections.’” Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U. S. 352, 358 (1983) (quoting Smith v. Goguen, 415 U. S. 566, 575 (1974)); see also Houston v. Hill, 482 U. S. 451, 465, and n. 15 (1987).12 Given the important First Amendment interests *138at issue, the vague, broad sweep of the “lewd exhibition” language means that it cannot cure § 2907.323(A)(3)’s overbreadth.

2

The Ohio Supreme Court also added a “graphic focus” element to the nudity definition. This phrase, a stranger to obscenity regulation, suffers from the same vagueness difficulty as “lewd exhibition.” Although the Ohio Supreme Court failed to elaborate what a “graphic focus” might be, the test appears to involve nothing more than a subjective estimation of the centrality or prominence of the genitals in a picture or other representation. Not only is this factor dependent on the perspective and idiosyncrasies of the observer, it also is unconnected to whether the material at issue merits constitutional protection. Simple nudity, no matter how prominent or “graphic,” is within the bounds of the First Amendment. Michelangelo’s “David” might be said to have a “graphic focus” on the genitals, for it plainly portrays them in a manner unavoidable to even a casual observer. Similarly, a painting of a partially clad girl could be said to involve a “graphic focus,” depending on the picture’s lighting and emphasis,13 as could the depictions of nude children on the friezes that adorn our courtroom. Even a photograph of a child running naked on the beach or playing in the bathtub might run afoul of the law, depending on the focus and camera angle.

In sum, the “lewd exhibition” and “graphic focus” tests are too vague to serve as any workable limit. Because the stat*139ute, even as construed authoritatively by the Ohio Supreme Court, is impermissibly overbroad, I would hold that appellant cannot be retried under it.14

II

Even if the statute was not overbroad, our decision in Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U. S. 557 (1969), forbids the criminalization of appellant’s private possession in his home of the materials at issue. “If the First Amendment means anything, it means that the State has no business telling a mán, sitting alone in his own house, what books he may read or what films he may watch.” Id., at 565. Appellant was convicted for possessing four photographs of nude minors, seized from a desk drawer in the bedroom of his house during a search executed pursuant to a warrant. Appellant testified that he had been given the pictures in his home by a friend. There was no evidence that the photographs had been produced commercially or distributed. All were kept in an album that appellant had assembled for his personal use and had possessed privately for several years.

In these circumstances, the Court’s focus on Ferber rather than Stanley is misplaced. Ferber held only that child pornography is “a category of material the production and distribution of which is not entitled to First Amendment protection,” 458 U. S., at 765 (emphasis added); our decision did not extend to private possession. The authority of a State to regulate the production and distribution of such materials is *140not dispositive of its power to penalize possession.15 Indeed, in Stanley we assumed that the films at issue were obscene and that their production, sale, and distribution thus could have been prohibited under our decisions. See 394 U. S., at 559, n. 2. Nevertheless, we reasoned that although the States “retain broad power to regulate obscenity” — and child pornography as well — “that power simply does not extend to mere possession by the individual in the privacy of his own home.” Id., at 568. Ferber did nothing more than place child pornography on the same level of First Amendment protection as obscene adult pornography, meaning that its production and distribution could be proscribed. The distinction established in Stanley between what materials may be regulated and how they may be regulated still stands. See United States v. Miller, 776 F. 2d 978, 980, n. 4 (CA11 1985) (per curiam); People v. Keyes, 135 Misc. 2d 993, 995, 517 N. Y. S. 2d 696, 698 (1987). As Justice White remarked in a different context: “The personal constitutional rights of those like Stanley to possess and read obscenity in their homes and their freedom of mind and thought do not depend on whether the materials are obscene or whether obscenity is constitutionally protected. Their rights to have and view that material in private are independently saved by *141the Constitution.” United States v. Reidel, 402 U. S. 351, 356 (1971).

The Court today finds Stanley inapposite on the ground that “the interests underlying child pornography prohibitions far exceed the interests justifying the Georgia law at issue in Stanley.” Ante, at 108. The majority’s analysis does not withstand scrutiny.16 While the sexual exploitation of children is undoubtedly a serious problem, Ohio may employ other weapons to combat it. Indeed, the State already has enacted a panoply of laws prohibiting the creation, sale, and distribution of child pornography and obscenity involving minors. See n. 1, supra. Ohio has not demonstrated why these laws are inadequate and why the State must forbid mere possession as well.

The Court today speculates that Ohio “will decrease the production of child pornography if it penalizes those who *142possess and view the product, thereby decreasing demand.” Ante, at 109-110. Criminalizing possession is thought necessary because “since the time of our decision in Ferber, much of the child pornography market has been driven underground; as a result, it is now difficult, if not impossible, to solve the child pornography problem by only attacking production and distribution.” Ante, at 110-111. As support, the Court notes that 19 States have “found it necessary” to prohibit simple possession. Ibid. Even were I to accept the Court’s empirical assumptions,171 would find the Court’s *143approach foreclosed by Stanley, which rejected precisely the same contention Ohio makes today:

“[W]e are faced with the argument that prohibition of possession of obscene materials is a necessary incident to Statutory schemes prohibiting distribution. That argument is based on alleged difficulties of proving an intent to distribute or in producing evidence of actual distribution. We are not convinced that such difficulties exist, but even if they did we do not think that they would justify infringement of the individual’s right to read or observe what he pleases. Because that right is so fundamental to our scheme of individual liberty, its restriction may not be justified by the need to ease the administration of otherwise valid criminal laws.” 394 U. S., at 567-568.

At bottom, the Court today is so disquieted by the possible exploitation of children in the production of the pornography that it is willing to tolerate the imposition of criminal penalties for simple possession,18 While I share the majority’s *144concerns, I do not believe that it has struck the proper balance between the First Amendment and the State’s interests, especially in light of the other means available to Ohio to *145protect children from exploitation and the State’s failure to demonstrate a causal link between a ban on possession of child pornography and a decrease in its production.19 “The existence of the State’s power to prevent the distribution of obscene matter” — and of child pornography — “does not mean that there can be no constitutional barrier to any form of practical exercise of that power.” Smith v. California, 361 U. S. 147, 155 (1959).

Ill

Although I agree with the Court’s conclusion that appellant’s conviction must be reversed because of a violation of due process, I do not subscribe to the Court’s reasoning regarding the adequacy of appellant’s objections at trial. See ante, at 122-125. The majority determines that appellant’s due process rights were violated because the jury was not instructed according to the interpretation of § 2907.323(A)(3) adopted by the Ohio Supreme Court on appeal. That is to say, the jury was not told that “the State must prove both scienter and that the defendant posssessed material depicting a lewd exhibition or a graphic focus on genitals.” Ante, at 123. The Court finds that appellant’s challenge to the trial court’s failure to charge the “lewd exhibition” and “graphic focus” elements is properly before us, because appellant objected at trial to the overbreadth of § 2907.323(A)(3). See *146 ante, at 123-124. I agree with the Court’s conclusion that we may reach the merits of appellant’s claim on this point.20

But the Court does not rest there. Instead, in what is apparently dictum given its decision to reverse appellant’s conviction on the basis of the first due process claim, the Court maintains that a separate due process challenge by appellant arising from the Ohio Supreme Court’s addition of a scienter element is procedurally barred because appellant failed to ob-. ject at trial to the absence of a scienter instruction. The Court maintains that §2907.323(A)(3) must be interpreted in light of § 2901.21(B) of the Ohio Revised Code, which provides that recklessness is the appropriate mens rea where a statute ‘“neither specifies culpability nor plainly indicates a purpose to impose strict liability.’” Ante, at 113, n. 9, and *147122-123. I cannot agree with this gratuitous aspect of the Court’s reasoning.

First, the overbreadth contention voiced by appellant must be read as fairly encompassing an objection both to the lack of an intent requirement and to the definition of “nudity.” Appellant objected to, inter alia, the criminalization of the “mere possession or viewing of a photograph,” without the need for the State to show additional elements. Tr. 4. A natural inference from this language is that intent is one of the additional elements that the State should have been required to prove. There is no need to demand any greater precision from a criminal defendant, and in my judgment the overbreadth challenge was sufficient, as a matter of federal law, to preserve the due process claim arising from the addition of a scienter element. As the majority acknowledges, our decision in Ferber mandated that “prohibitions on child pornography include some element of scienter.” Ante, at 115 (citing Ferber, 458 U. S., at 765). In Ferber we recognized that adding an intent requirement was part of the process of narrowing an otherwise overbroad statute, and appellant’s contention that the statute was overbroad should be interpreted in that light. I find the Ohio Supreme Court’s logic internally contradictory: In one breath it adopted a scienter requirement of recklessness to narrow the statute in response to appellant’s overbreadth challenge, and then, in the next breath, it insisted that appellant had failed to object to the lack of a scienter element.

Second, even if appellant had failed to object at trial to the failure of the jury instructions to include a scienter element, I cannot agree with the reasoning of the Ohio Supreme Court, unquestioned by the majority today, that “the omission of the element of recklessness [did] not constitute plain error.” 37 Ohio St. 3d, at 254, 525 N. E. 2d, at 1370. To the contrary, a judge’s failure to instruct the jury on every element of an offense violates a “‘bedrock, “axiomatic and elementary” [constitutional] principle,’” Francis v. Franklin, 471 U. S. *148307, 313 (1985) (quoting In re Winship, 397 U. S. 358, 363 (1970)), and is cognizable on appeal as plain error. Cf. Carella v. California, 491 U. S. 263, 268-269 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment); Rose v. Clark, 478 U. S. 570, 580, n. 8 (1986)); Connecticut v. Johnson, 460 U. S. 73, 85-86 (1983) (plurality opinion); Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307, 320, n. 14 (1979). “[W]here the error is so fundamental as not to submit to the jury the essential ingredients of the only offense on which the conviction could rest,... it is necessary to take note of it on our own motion.” Screws v. United States, 325 U. S. 91, 107 (1945) (plurality opinion).

Thus, I would find properly before us appellant’s due process challenge arising from the addition of the scienter element, as well as his claim stemming from the creation of the “lewd exhibition” and “graphic focus” tests.

IV

When speech is eloquent and the ideas expressed lofty, it is easy to find restrictions on them invalid. But were the First Amendment limited to such discourse, our freedom would be sterile indeed. Mr. Osborne’s pictures may be distasteful, but the Constitution guarantees both his right to possess them privately and his right to avoid punishment under an overbroad law. I respectfully dissent.

*162Justice O’Connor

delivered the opinion of the Court.

Petitioners were convicted of manufacturing and conspiring to manufacture “Euphoria,” a drug temporarily designated as a schedule I controlled substance pursuant to § 201(h) of the Controlled Substances Act, 98 Stat. 2071, 21 U. S. C. § 811(h). We consider whether § 201(h) unconstitutionally delegates legislative power to the Attorney General and whether the Attorney General’s subdelegation to the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) was authorized by statute.

I

In 1970, Congress enacted the Controlled Substances Act (Act), 84 Stat. 1242, as amended, 21 U. S. C. §801 et seq. The Act establishes five categories or “schedules” of controlled substances, the manufacture, possession, and distribution of which the Act regulates or prohibits. Violations involving schedule I substances carry the most severe penalties, as these substances are believed to pose the most serious threat to public safety. Relevant here, § 201(a) of the Act authorizes the Attorney General to add or remove substances, or to move a substance from one schedule to another. § 201(a), 21 U. S. C. § 811(a).

When adding a substance to a schedule, the Attorney General must follow specified procedures. First, the Attorney General must request a scientific and medical evaluation from the Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS), together with a recommendation as to whether the substance should be controlled. A substance cannot be scheduled if the Secretary recommends against it. § 201(b), 21 U. S. C. § 811(b). Second, the Attorney General must consider eight factors with respect to the substance, including its potential for abuse, scientific evidence of its pharmacological effect, its psychic or physiological dependence liability, and whether the substance is an immediate precursor of a substance already controlled. § 201(c), 21 U. S. C. § 811(c). Third, the Attorney General must comply with the notice-and-hearing *163provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U. S. C. §§551-559, which permit comment by interested parties. § 201(a), 21 U. S. C. § 811(a). In addition, the Act permits any aggrieved person to challenge the scheduling of a substance by the Attorney General in a court of appeals. §507, 21 U. S. C. §877.

It takes time to comply with these procedural requirements. From the time when law enforcement officials identify a dangerous new drug, it typically takes 6 to 12 months to add it to one of the schedules. S. Rep. No. 98-225, p. 264 (1984). Drug traffickers were able to take advantage of this time gap by designing drugs that were similar in pharmacological effect to scheduled substances but differed slightly in chemical composition, so that existing schedules did not apply to them. These “designer drugs” were developed and widely marketed long before the Government was able to schedule them and initiate prosecutions. See ibid.

To combat the “designer drug” problem, Congress in 1984 amended the Act to create an expedited procedure by which the Attorney General can schedule a substance on a temporary basis when doing so is “necessary to avoid an imminent hazard to the public safety.” §201(h), 21 U. S. C. § 811(h). Temporary scheduling under § 201(h) allows the Attorney General to bypass, for a limited time, several of the requirements for permanent scheduling. The Attorney General need consider only three of the eight factors required for permanent scheduling. § 201(h)(3), 21 U. S. C. § 811(h)(3). Rather than comply with the APA notice-and-hearing provisions, the Attorney General need provide only a 30-day notice of the proposed scheduling in the Federal Register. § 201(h)(1), 21- U. S. C. § 811(h)(1). Notice also must be transmitted to the Secretary of HHS, but the Secretary’s prior approval of a proposed scheduling order is not required. See § 201(h)(4), 21 U. S. C. § 811(h)(4). Finally, § 201(h)(6), 21 U. S. C. § 811(h)(6), provides that an order to schedule a substance temporarily “is not subject to judicial review.”

*164Because it has fewer procedural requirements, temporary scheduling enables the Government to respond more quickly to the threat posed by dangerous new drugs. A temporary scheduling order can be issued 30 days after a new drug is identified, and the order remains valid for one year. During this 1-year period, the Attorney General presumably will initiate the permanent scheduling process, in which case the temporary scheduling order remains valid for an additional six months. § 201(h)(2), 21 U. S. C. § 811(h)(2).

The Attorney General promulgated regulations delegating to the DEA his powers under the Act, including the power to schedule controlled substances on a temporary basis. See 28 CFR § 0.100(b) (1990). Pursuant to that delegation, the DEA Administrator issued an order scheduling temporarily 4-methylaminorex, known more commonly as “Euphoria,” as a schedule I controlled substance. 52 Fed. Reg. 38225 (1987). The Administrator subsequently initiated formal rulemaking procedures, following which Euphoria was added permanently to schedule I.

While the temporary scheduling order was in effect, DEA agents, executing a valid search warrant, discovered a fully operational drug laboratory in Daniel and Lyrissa Touby’s home. The Toubys were indicted for manufacturing and conspiring to manufacture Euphoria. They moved to dismiss the indictment on the grounds that § 201(h) unconstitutionally delegates legislative power to the Attorney General, and that the Attorney General improperly delegated his temporary scheduling authority to the DEA. The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey denied the motion to dismiss, 710 F. Supp. 551 (1989); and the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed petitioners’ subsequent convictions, 909 F. 2d 759 (1990). We granted certiorari, 498 U. S. 1046 (1991), and now affirm.

II

The Constitution provides that “[a]ll legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United *165States.” U. S. Const., Art. I, § 1. From this language the Court has derived the nondelegation doctrine: that Congress may not constitutionally delegate its legislative power to another branch of Government. “The nondelegation doctrine is rooted in the principle of separation of powers that underlies our tripartite system of Government.” Mistretta v. United States, 488 U. S. 361, 371 (1989).

We have long recognized that the nondelegation doctrine does not prevent Congress from seeking assistance, within proper limits, from its coordinate Branches. Id., at 372. Thus, Congress does not violate the Constitution merely because it legislates in broad terms, leaving a certain degree of discretion to executive or judicial actors. So long as Congress “lay[s] down by legislative act an intelligible principle to which the person or body authorized to [act] is directed to conform, such legislative action is not a forbidden delegation of legislative power.” J. W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U. S. 394, 409 (1928).

Petitioners wisely concede that Congress has set forth in § 201(h) an “intelligible principle” to constrain the Attorney General’s discretion to schedule controlled substances on a temporary basis. We have upheld as providing sufficient guidance statutes authorizing the War Department to recover “excessive profits” earned on military contracts, see Lichter v. United States, 334 U. S. 742, 778-786 (1948); authorizing the Price Administrator to fix “fair and equitable” commodities prices, see Yakus v. United States, 321 U. S. 414, 426-427 (1944); and authorizing the Federal Communications Commission to regulate broadcast licensing in the “public interest,” see National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U. S. 190, 225-226 (1943). In light of these precedents, one cannot plausibly argue that § 201(h)’s “imminent hazard to the public safety” standard is not an intelligible principle.

Petitioners suggest, however, that something more than an “intelligible principle” is required when Congress authorizes another Branch to promulgate regulations that con*166template criminal sanctions. They contend that regulations of this sort pose a heightened risk to individual liberty and that Congress must therefore provide more specific guidance. Our cases are not entirely clear as to whether more specific guidance is in fact required. Compare Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U. S. 245, 249-250 (1947), cited in Mistretta, supra, at 373, n. 7, with Yakus, supra, at 423-427, and United States v. Grimaud, 220 U. S. 506, 518, 521 (1911). We need not resolve the issue today. We conclude that § 201(h) passes muster even if greater congressional specificity is required in the criminal context.

Although it features fewer procedural requirements than the permanent scheduling statute, § 201(h) meaningfully constrains the Attorney General’s discretion to define criminal conduct. To schedule a drug temporarily, the Attorney General must find that doing so is “necessary to avoid an imminent hazard to the public safety.” § 201(h)(1), 21 U. S. C. § 811(h)(1). In making this determination, he is “required to consider” three factors: the drug’s “history and current pattern of abuse”; “[t]he scope, duration, and significance of abuse”; and “[w]hat, if any, risk there is to the public health.” §§201(c)(4)-(6), 201(h)(3), 21 U. S. C. §§ 811(c)(4)-(6), 811(h)(3). Included within these factors are three other factors on which the statute places a special emphasis: “actual abuse, diversion from legitimate channels, and clandestine importation, manufacture, or distribution.” § 201(h)(3), 21 U. S. C. § 811(h)(3). The Attorney General also must publish 30-day notice of the proposed scheduling in the Federal Register, transmit notice to the Secretary of HHS, and “take into consideration any comments submitted by the Secretary in response.” §§ 201(h)(1), 201(h)(4), 21 U. S. C. §§ 811(h)(1), 811(h)(4).

In addition to satisfying the numerous requirements of § 201(h), the Attorney General must satisfy the requirements of § 202(b), 21 U. S. C. § 812(b). This section identifies the criteria for adding a substance to each of the five schedules. *167As the United States acknowledges in its brief, § 202(b) speaks in mandatory terms, drawing no distinction between permanent and temporary scheduling. With exceptions not pertinent here, it states that “a drug or other substance may not be placed in any schedule unless the findings required for such schedule are made with respect to such drug or other substance.” §202(b), 21 U. S. C. § 812(b). Thus, apart from the “imminent hazard” determination required by § 201(h), the Attorney General, if he wishes to add temporarily a drug to schedule I, must find that it “has a high potential for abuse,” that it “has no currently accepted medical use in treatment in the United States,” and that “[t]here is a lack of accepted safety for use of the drug . . . under medical supervision.” § 202(b)(1), 21 U. S. C. § 812(b)(1).

It is clear that in §§ 201(h) and 202(b) Congress has placed multiple specific restrictions on the Attorney General’s discretion to define criminal conduct. These restrictions satisfy the constitutional requirements of the nondelegation doctrine.

Petitioners point to two other aspects of the temporary scheduling statute that allegedly render it unconstitutional. They argue first that it concentrates too much power in the Attorney General. Petitioners concede that Congress may legitimately authorize someone in the Executive Branch to schedule drugs temporarily, but argue that it must be someone other than the Attorney General because he wields the power to prosecute crimes. They insist that allowing the Attorney General both to schedule a particular drug and to prosecute those who manufacture that drug violates the principle of separation of powers. Petitioners do not object to the permanent scheduling statute, however, because it gives “veto power” to the Secretary of HHS. Brief for Petitioners 20.

This argument has no basis in our separation-of-powers jurisprudence. The principle of separation of powers focuses on the distribution of powers among the three coequal *168Branches, see Mistretta, 488 U. S., at 382; it does not speak to the manner in which authority is parceled out within a single Branch. The Constitution vests all executive power in the President, U. S. Const., Art. II, § 1, and it is the President to whom both the Secretary and the Attorney General report. Petitioners’ argument that temporary scheduling authority should have been vested in one executive officer rather than another does not implicate separation-of-powers concerns; it merely challenges the wisdom of a legitimate policy judgment made by Congress.

Petitioners next argue that the temporary scheduling statute is unconstitutional because it bars judicial review. They explain that the purpose of requiring an “intelligible principle” is to permit a court to “‘ascertain whether the will of Congress has been obeyed.’” Skinner v. Mid-America Pipeline Co., 490 U. S. 212, 218 (1989), quoting Yakus, supra, at 426. By providing that a temporary scheduling order “is not subject to judicial review,” § 201(h)(6), the Act purportedly violates the nondelegation doctrine.

We reject petitioners’ argument. Although § 201(h)(6), 21 U. S. C. § 811(h)(6), states that a temporary scheduling order “is not subject to judicial review,” another section of the Act plainly authorizes judicial review of a permanent scheduling order. See § 507, 21 U. S. C. § 877. Thus, the effect of § 201(h)(6) is merely to postpone legal challenges to a scheduling order for up to 18 months, until the administrative process has run its course. This is consistent with Congress’ express desire to permit the Government to respond quickly to the appearance in the market of dangerous new drugs. Even before a permanent scheduling order is entered, judicial review is possible under certain circumstances. The United States contends, and we agree, that § 201(h)(6) does not preclude an individual facing criminal charges from bringing a challenge to a temporary scheduling order as a defense to prosecution. See Brief for United States 34-36. This is sufficient to permit a court to “ ‘ascertain whether the will of *169Congress has been obeyed.’” Skinner, supra, at 218, quoting Yakus, 321 U. S., at 426. Under these circumstances, the nondelegation doctrine does not require, in addition, an opportunity for preenforcement review of administrative determinations.

Ill

Having concluded that Congress did not unconstitutionally delegate legislative power to the Attorney General, we consider petitioners’ claim that the Attorney General improperly delegated his temporary scheduling power to the DEA. Petitioners insist that delegation within the Executive Branch is permitted only to the extent authorized by Congress, and that Congress did not authorize the delegation of temporary scheduling power from the Attorney General to the DEA.

We disagree. Section 501(a) of the Act states plainly that “[t]he Attorney General may delegate any of his functions under [the Controlled Substances Act] to any officer or employee of the Department of Justice.” 21 U. S. C. § 871(a). We have interpreted § 501(a) to permit the delegation of any function vested in the Attorney General under the Act unless a specific limitation on that delegation authority appears elsewhere in the statute. See United States v. Giordano, 416 U. S. 505, 512-514 (1974). No such limitation appears with regard to the Attorney General’s power to schedule drugs temporarily under § 201(h).

The judgment of the Court of Appeals is

Affirmed.

Justice Marshall,

with whom Justice Blackmun joins, concurring.

I join the Court’s opinion but write separately to emphasize two points underlying my vote. The first is my conclusion that the opportunity of a defendant to challenge the substance of a temporary scheduling order in the course of a criminal prosecution is essential to the result in this case. Section 811(h)(6) of Title 21 U. S. C. expressly prohibits di*170rect review of a temporary scheduling order in the Court of Appeals but says nothing about judicial review of such an order in other settings. Under established rules of construction, we must presume from Congress’ silence on the matter that it did not intend to foreclose review in the enforcement context. See Estep v. United States, 327 U. S. 114, 120-122 (1946). See generally McNary v. Haitian Refugee Center, Inc., 498 U. S. 479, 496 (1991); Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U. S. 136, 140-141 (1967). An additional consideration reinforces this principle here. As the Court notes, judicial review perfects a delegated-lawmaking scheme by assuring that the exercise of such power remains within statutory bounds. See, e. g., Skinner v. Mid-America Pipeline Co., 490 U. S. 212, 218-219 (1989). Because of the severe impact of criminal laws on individual liberty, I believe that an opportunity to challenge a delegated lawmaker’s compliance with congressional directives is a constitutional necessity when administrative standards are enforced by criminal law. Cf. United States v. Mendoza-Lopez, 481 U. S. 828, 837-839 (1987); Hart, The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 Harv. L. Rev. 1362, 1379-1383 (1953). We must therefore read the Controlled Substances Act as preserving judicial review of a temporary scheduling order in the course of a criminal prosecution in order to save the Act’s delegation of lawmaking power from unconstitutionality. Cf. Webster v. Doe, 486 U. S. 592, 603-604 (1988).

The second point that I wish to emphasize is my understanding of the breadth of the Court’s constitutional holding. I agree that the separation of powers doctrine relates only to the allocation of power betiveen the Branches, not the allocation of power within a single Branch. But this conclusion by no means suggests that the Constitution as a whole is indifferent to how permissibly delegated powers are distributed within the Executive Branch. In particular, the Due Process Clause limits the extent to which prosecutorial and *171other functions may be combined in a single actor. See, e. g., Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U. S. 471, 485-487 (1972). Petitioners raise no due process challenge in this case, and I do not understand anything in today’s decision as detracting from the teachings of our due process jurisprudence generally.