2 Part I: When Somebody Hacks Somebody Else 2 Part I: When Somebody Hacks Somebody Else
Weeks 2 through 5
Week 2 (Oct. 5, 2022): Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA)
The primary federal anti-hacking law in the United States is the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA), originally enacted in 1986. This will be a two-part unit, so we'll continue studying the CFAA next week. This week we'll focus on understanding the basics about the statute and what it means. We'll also read the Supreme Court's first-ever CFAA case, 2021's Van Buren v. United States.
Week 3 (Oct. 12, 2022): CFAA cont’d.; Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA); Security Research
This week, we’ll continue our study of the CFAA. We’ll examine the effects on cybersecurity (and other) research of the CFAA (and Van Buren) and another law, the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA).
Weeks 4 & 5 (Oct. 19 & 26, 2022): Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA)
As with the CFAA, we will spend two weeks on ECPA due to its complexity. ECPA does two things: (1) it prescribes the conditions under which the government may engage in various types of electronic surveillance (such as eavesdropping on phone calls), (2) while generally forbidding everyone else from doing so. We’ll cover the latter function now and the former later in the quarter.
ECPA has three parts: the Wiretap Act (Title I), the Stored Communications Act (SCA) (Title II), and the Pen Register Act (Title III). For now, we’ll focus on certain portions of the Wiretap Act and SCA.
2.1 Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA) 2.1 Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA)
Week 2
2.1.1 Computer Fraud and Abuse Act 2.1.1 Computer Fraud and Abuse Act
18 U.S.C. § 1030
United States Code, 2018 Edition
Title 18 - CRIMES AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
PART I - CRIMES
CHAPTER 47 - FRAUD AND FALSE STATEMENTS
Sec. 1030 - Fraud and related activity in connection with computers
From the U.S. Government Publishing Office,
(a) Whoever—
(1) having knowingly accessed a computer without authorization or exceeding authorized access, and by means of such conduct having obtained information that has been determined by the United States Government pursuant to an Executive order or statute to require protection against unauthorized disclosure for reasons of national defense or foreign relations, or any restricted data, as defined in paragraph y. of section 11 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, with reason to believe that such information so obtained could be used to the injury of the United States, or to the advantage of any foreign nation willfully communicates, delivers, transmits, or causes to be communicated, delivered, or transmitted, or attempts to communicate, deliver, transmit or cause to be communicated, delivered, or transmitted the same to any person not entitled to receive it, or willfully retains the same and fails to deliver it to the officer or employee of the United States entitled to receive it;
(2) intentionally accesses a computer without authorization or exceeds authorized access, and thereby obtains—
(A) information contained in a financial record of a financial institution, or of a card issuer as defined in section 1602(n) 1 of title 15, or contained in a file of a consumer reporting agency on a consumer, as such terms are defined in the Fair Credit Reporting Act (15 U.S.C. 1681 et seq.);
(B) information from any department or agency of the United States; or
(C) information from any protected computer;
(3) intentionally, without authorization to access any nonpublic computer of a department or agency of the United States, accesses such a computer of that department or agency that is exclusively for the use of the Government of the United States or, in the case of a computer not exclusively for such use, is used by or for the Government of the United States and such conduct affects that use by or for the Government of the United States;
(4) knowingly and with intent to defraud, accesses a protected computer without authorization, or exceeds authorized access, and by means of such conduct furthers the intended fraud and obtains anything of value, unless the object of the fraud and the thing obtained consists only of the use of the computer and the value of such use is not more than $5,000 in any 1-year period;
(5)(A) knowingly causes the transmission of a program, information, code, or command, and as a result of such conduct, intentionally causes damage without authorization, to a protected computer;
(B) intentionally accesses a protected computer without authorization, and as a result of such conduct, recklessly causes damage; or
(C) intentionally accesses a protected computer without authorization, and as a result of such conduct, causes damage and loss.2
(6) knowingly and with intent to defraud traffics (as defined in section 1029) in any password or similar information through which a computer may be accessed without authorization, if—
(A) such trafficking affects interstate or foreign commerce; or
(B) such computer is used by or for the Government of the United States; 3
(7) with intent to extort from any person any money or other thing of value, transmits in interstate or foreign commerce any communication containing any—
(A) threat to cause damage to a protected computer;
(B) threat to obtain information from a protected computer without authorization or in excess of authorization or to impair the confidentiality of information obtained from a protected computer without authorization or by exceeding authorized access; or
(C) demand or request for money or other thing of value in relation to damage to a protected computer, where such damage was caused to facilitate the extortion;
shall be punished as provided in subsection (c) of this section.
(b) Whoever conspires to commit or attempts to commit an offense under subsection (a) of this section shall be punished as provided in subsection (c) of this section.
(c) The punishment for an offense under subsection (a) or (b) of this section is—
(1)(A) a fine under this title or imprisonment for not more than ten years, or both, in the case of an offense under subsection (a)(1) of this section which does not occur after a conviction for another offense under this section, or an attempt to commit an offense punishable under this subparagraph; and
(B) a fine under this title or imprisonment for not more than twenty years, or both, in the case of an offense under subsection (a)(1) of this section which occurs after a conviction for another offense under this section, or an attempt to commit an offense punishable under this subparagraph;
(2)(A) except as provided in subparagraph (B), a fine under this title or imprisonment for not more than one year, or both, in the case of an offense under subsection (a)(2), (a)(3), or (a)(6) of this section which does not occur after a conviction for another offense under this section, or an attempt to commit an offense punishable under this subparagraph;
(B) a fine under this title or imprisonment for not more than 5 years, or both, in the case of an offense under subsection (a)(2), or an attempt to commit an offense punishable under this subparagraph, if—
(i) the offense was committed for purposes of commercial advantage or private financial gain;
(ii) the offense was committed in furtherance of any criminal or tortious act in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States or of any State; or
(iii) the value of the information obtained exceeds $5,000; and
(C) a fine under this title or imprisonment for not more than ten years, or both, in the case of an offense under subsection (a)(2), (a)(3) or (a)(6) of this section which occurs after a conviction for another offense under this section, or an attempt to commit an offense punishable under this subparagraph;
(3)(A) a fine under this title or imprisonment for not more than five years, or both, in the case of an offense under subsection (a)(4) or (a)(7) of this section which does not occur after a conviction for another offense under this section, or an attempt to commit an offense punishable under this subparagraph; and
(B) a fine under this title or imprisonment for not more than ten years, or both, in the case of an offense under subsection (a)(4),4 or (a)(7) of this section which occurs after a conviction for another offense under this section, or an attempt to commit an offense punishable under this subparagraph;
(4)(A) except as provided in subparagraphs (E) and (F), a fine under this title, imprisonment for not more than 5 years, or both, in the case of—
(i) an offense under subsection (a)(5)(B), which does not occur after a conviction for another offense under this section, if the offense caused (or, in the case of an attempted offense, would, if completed, have caused)—
(I) loss to 1 or more persons during any 1-year period (and, for purposes of an investigation, prosecution, or other proceeding brought by the United States only, loss resulting from a related course of conduct affecting 1 or more other protected computers) aggregating at least $5,000 in value;
(II) the modification or impairment, or potential modification or impairment, of the medical examination, diagnosis, treatment, or care of 1 or more individuals;
(III) physical injury to any person;
(IV) a threat to public health or safety;
(V) damage affecting a computer used by or for an entity of the United States Government in furtherance of the administration of justice, national defense, or national security; or
(VI) damage affecting 10 or more protected computers during any 1-year period; or
(ii) an attempt to commit an offense punishable under this subparagraph;
(B) except as provided in subparagraphs (E) and (F), a fine under this title, imprisonment for not more than 10 years, or both, in the case of—
(i) an offense under subsection (a)(5)(A), which does not occur after a conviction for another offense under this section, if the offense caused (or, in the case of an attempted offense, would, if completed, have caused) a harm provided in subclauses (I) through (VI) of subparagraph (A)(i); or
(ii) an attempt to commit an offense punishable under this subparagraph;
(C) except as provided in subparagraphs (E) and (F), a fine under this title, imprisonment for not more than 20 years, or both, in the case of—
(i) an offense or an attempt to commit an offense under subparagraphs (A) or (B) of subsection (a)(5) that occurs after a conviction for another offense under this section; or
(ii) an attempt to commit an offense punishable under this subparagraph;
(D) a fine under this title, imprisonment for not more than 10 years, or both, in the case of—
(i) an offense or an attempt to commit an offense under subsection (a)(5)(C) that occurs after a conviction for another offense under this section; or
(ii) an attempt to commit an offense punishable under this subparagraph;
(E) if the offender attempts to cause or knowingly or recklessly causes serious bodily injury from conduct in violation of subsection (a)(5)(A), a fine under this title, imprisonment for not more than 20 years, or both;
(F) if the offender attempts to cause or knowingly or recklessly causes death from conduct in violation of subsection (a)(5)(A), a fine under this title, imprisonment for any term of years or for life, or both; or
(G) a fine under this title, imprisonment for not more than 1 year, or both, for—
(i) any other offense under subsection (a)(5); or
(ii) an attempt to commit an offense punishable under this subparagraph.
(d)(1) The United States Secret Service shall, in addition to any other agency having such authority, have the authority to investigate offenses under this section.
(2) The Federal Bureau of Investigation shall have primary authority to investigate offenses under subsection (a)(1) for any cases involving espionage, foreign counterintelligence, information protected against unauthorized disclosure for reasons of national defense or foreign relations, or Restricted Data (as that term is defined in section 11y of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2014(y)), except for offenses affecting the duties of the United States Secret Service pursuant to section 3056(a) of this title.
(3) Such authority shall be exercised in accordance with an agreement which shall be entered into by the Secretary of the Treasury and the Attorney General.
(e) As used in this section—
(1) the term "computer" means an electronic, magnetic, optical, electrochemical, or other high speed data processing device performing logical, arithmetic, or storage functions, and includes any data storage facility or communications facility directly related to or operating in conjunction with such device, but such term does not include an automated typewriter or typesetter, a portable hand held calculator, or other similar device;
(2) the term "protected computer" means a computer—
(A) exclusively for the use of a financial institution or the United States Government, or, in the case of a computer not exclusively for such use, used by or for a financial institution or the United States Government and the conduct constituting the offense affects that use by or for the financial institution or the Government; or
(B) which is used in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce or communication, including a computer located outside the United States that is used in a manner that affects interstate or foreign commerce or communication of the United States;
(3) the term "State" includes the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and any other commonwealth, possession or territory of the United States;
(4) the term "financial institution" means—
(A) an institution, with deposits insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation;
(B) the Federal Reserve or a member of the Federal Reserve including any Federal Reserve Bank;
(C) a credit union with accounts insured by the National Credit Union Administration;
(D) a member of the Federal home loan bank system and any home loan bank;
(E) any institution of the Farm Credit System under the Farm Credit Act of 1971;
(F) a broker-dealer registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission pursuant to section 15 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934;
(G) the Securities Investor Protection Corporation;
(H) a branch or agency of a foreign bank (as such terms are defined in paragraphs (1) and (3) of section 1(b) of the International Banking Act of 1978); and
(I) an organization operating under section 25 or section 25(a) 1 of the Federal Reserve Act;
(5) the term "financial record" means information derived from any record held by a financial institution pertaining to a customer's relationship with the financial institution;
(6) the term "exceeds authorized access" means to access a computer with authorization and to use such access to obtain or alter information in the computer that the accesser is not entitled so to obtain or alter;
(7) the term "department of the United States" means the legislative or judicial branch of the Government or one of the executive departments enumerated in section 101 of title 5;
(8) the term "damage" means any impairment to the integrity or availability of data, a program, a system, or information;
(9) the term "government entity" includes the Government of the United States, any State or political subdivision of the United States, any foreign country, and any state, province, municipality, or other political subdivision of a foreign country;
(10) the term "conviction" shall include a conviction under the law of any State for a crime punishable by imprisonment for more than 1 year, an element of which is unauthorized access, or exceeding authorized access, to a computer;
(11) the term "loss" means any reasonable cost to any victim, including the cost of responding to an offense, conducting a damage assessment, and restoring the data, program, system, or information to its condition prior to the offense, and any revenue lost, cost incurred, or other consequential damages incurred because of interruption of service; and
(12) the term "person" means any individual, firm, corporation, educational institution, financial institution, governmental entity, or legal or other entity.
(f) This section does not prohibit any lawfully authorized investigative, protective, or intelligence activity of a law enforcement agency of the United States, a State, or a political subdivision of a State, or of an intelligence agency of the United States.
(g) Any person who suffers damage or loss by reason of a violation of this section may maintain a civil action against the violator to obtain compensatory damages and injunctive relief or other equitable relief. A civil action for a violation of this section may be brought only if the conduct involves 1 of the factors set forth in subclauses 5 (I), (II), (III), (IV), or (V) of subsection (c)(4)(A)(i). Damages for a violation involving only conduct described in subsection (c)(4)(A)(i)(I) are limited to economic damages. No action may be brought under this subsection unless such action is begun within 2 years of the date of the act complained of or the date of the discovery of the damage. No action may be brought under this subsection for the negligent design or manufacture of computer hardware, computer software, or firmware.
(h) The Attorney General and the Secretary of the Treasury shall report to the Congress annually, during the first 3 years following the date of the enactment of this subsection, concerning investigations and prosecutions under subsection (a)(5).
(i)(1) The court, in imposing sentence on any person convicted of a violation of this section, or convicted of conspiracy to violate this section, shall order, in addition to any other sentence imposed and irrespective of any provision of State law, that such person forfeit to the United States—
(A) such person's interest in any personal property that was used or intended to be used to commit or to facilitate the commission of such violation; and
(B) any property, real or personal, constituting or derived from, any proceeds that such person obtained, directly or indirectly, as a result of such violation.
(2) The criminal forfeiture of property under this subsection, any seizure and disposition thereof, and any judicial proceeding in relation thereto, shall be governed by the provisions of section 413 of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970 (21 U.S.C. 853), except subsection (d) of that section.
(j) For purposes of subsection (i), the following shall be subject to forfeiture to the United States and no property right shall exist in them:
(1) Any personal property used or intended to be used to commit or to facilitate the commission of any violation of this section, or a conspiracy to violate this section.
(2) Any property, real or personal, which constitutes or is derived from proceeds traceable to any violation of this section, or a conspiracy to violate this section 6
Notes
References in Text
Section 11 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, referred to in subsec. (a)(1), is classified to section 2014 of Title 42, The Public Health and Welfare.
Section 1602(n) of title 15, referred to in subsec. (a)(2)(A), was redesignated section 1602(o) of title 15 by Pub. L. 111–203, title X, §1100A(1)(A), July 21, 2010, 124 Stat. 2107.
The Fair Credit Reporting Act, referred to in subsec. (a)(2)(A), is title VI of Pub. L. 90–321, as added by Pub. L. 91–508, title VI, §601, Oct. 26, 1970, 84 Stat. 1127, as amended, which is classified generally to subchapter III (§1681 et seq.) of chapter 41 of Title 15, Commerce and Trade. For complete classification of this Act to the Code, see Short Title note set out under section 1601 of Title 15 and Tables.
The Farm Credit Act of 1971, referred to in subsec. (e)(4)(E), is Pub. L. 92–181, Dec. 10, 1971, 85 Stat. 583, as amended, which is classified generally to chapter 23 (§2001 et seq.) of Title 12, Banks and Banking. For complete classification of this Act to the Code, see Short Title note set out under section 2001 of Title 12 and Tables.
Section 15 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, referred to in subsec. (e)(4)(F), is classified to section 78o of Title 15, Commerce and Trade.
Section 1(b) of the International Banking Act of 1978, referred to in subsec. (e)(4)(H), is classified to section 3101 of Title 12, Banks and Banking.
Section 25 of the Federal Reserve Act, referred to in subsec. (e)(4)(I), is classified to subchapter I (§601 et seq.) of chapter 6 of Title 12. Section 25(a) of the Federal Reserve Act, which is classified to subchapter II (§611 et seq.) of chapter 6 of Title 12, was renumbered section 25A of that act by Pub. L. 102–242, title I, §142(e)(2), Dec. 19, 1991, 105 Stat. 2281.
The date of the enactment of this subsection, referred to in subsec. (h), is the date of enactment of Pub. L. 103–322, which was approved Sept. 13, 1994.
Amendments
2008—Subsec. (a)(2)(C). Pub. L. 110–326, §203, struck out "if the conduct involved an interstate or foreign communication" after "computer".
Subsec. (a)(5). Pub. L. 110–326, §204(a)(1), redesignated cls. (i) to (iii) of subpar. (A) as subpars. (A) to (C), respectively, substituted "damage and loss." for "damage; and" in subpar. (C), and struck out former subpar. (B) which read as follows:
"(B) by conduct described in clause (i), (ii), or (iii) of subparagraph (A), caused (or, in the case of an attempted offense, would, if completed, have caused)—
"(i) loss to 1 or more persons during any 1-year period (and, for purposes of an investigation, prosecution, or other proceeding brought by the United States only, loss resulting from a related course of conduct affecting 1 or more other protected computers) aggregating at least $5,000 in value;
"(ii) the modification or impairment, or potential modification or impairment, of the medical examination, diagnosis, treatment, or care of 1 or more individuals;
"(iii) physical injury to any person;
"(iv) a threat to public health or safety; or
"(v) damage affecting a computer system used by or for a government entity in furtherance of the administration of justice, national defense, or national security;".
Subsec. (a)(7). Pub. L. 110–326, §205, amended par. (7) generally. Prior to amendment, par. (7) read as follows: "with intent to extort from any person any money or other thing of value, transmits in interstate or foreign commerce any communication containing any threat to cause damage to a protected computer;".
Subsec. (b). Pub. L. 110–326, §206, inserted "conspires to commit or" after "Whoever".
Subsec. (c)(2)(A). Pub. L. 110–326, §204(a)(2)(A), struck out "(a)(5)(A)(iii)," after "(a)(3),".
Subsec. (c)(3)(B). Pub. L. 110–326, §204(a)(2)(B), struck out "(a)(5)(A)(iii)," after "(a)(4),".
Subsec. (c)(4). Pub. L. 110–326, §204(a)(2)(C), amended par. (4) generally. Prior to amendment, par. (4) related to fines and imprisonment for intentionally or recklessly causing damage to a protected computer without authorization.
Subsec. (c)(5). Pub. L. 110–326, §204(a)(2)(D), struck out par. (5) which related to fine or imprisonment for knowingly or recklessly causing or attempting to cause serious bodily injury or death from certain conduct damaging a protected computer.
Subsec. (e)(2)(B). Pub. L. 110–326, §207, inserted "or affecting" after "which is used in".
Subsec. (g). Pub. L. 110–326, §204(a)(3)(B), in the third sentence, substituted "subsection (c)(4)(A)(i)(I)" for "subsection (a)(5)(B)(i)".
Pub. L. 110–326, §204(a)(3)(A), which directed substitution of "in subclauses (I), (II), (III), (IV), or (V) of subsection (c)(4)(A)(i)" for "in clauses (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), or (v) of subsection (a)(5)(B)" in the second sentence, was executed by making the substitution for "in clause (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), or (v) of subsection (a)(5)(B)" to reflect the probable intent of Congress.
Subsecs. (i), (j). Pub. L. 110–326, §208, added subsecs. (i) and (j).
2002—Subsec. (a)(5)(B). Pub. L. 107–273, §4005(a)(3), realigned margins.
Subsec. (c)(2)(B). Pub. L. 107–273, §4002(b)(1), realigned margins.
Subsec. (c)(2)(B)(iii). Pub. L. 107–273, §4002(b)(12)(A), inserted "and" at end.
Subsec. (c)(3)(B). Pub. L. 107–273, §4005(d)(3), inserted comma after "(a)(4)".
Subsec. (c)(4)(A), (C). Pub. L. 107–296, §2207(g)(2), formerly §225(g)(2), as renumbered by Pub. L. 115–278, §2(g)(2)(I), inserted "except as provided in paragraph (5)," before "a fine under this title".
Subsec. (c)(5). Pub. L. 107–296, §2207(g)(1), (3), (4), formerly §225(g)(1), (3), (4), as renumbered by Pub. L. 115–278, §2(g)(2)(I), added par. (5).
Subsec. (e)(4)(I). Pub. L. 107–273, §4002(b)(12)(B), substituted semicolon for period at end.
2001—Subsec. (a)(5)(A). Pub. L. 107–56, §814(a)(1)–(3), designated existing provisions as cl. (i), redesignated subpars. (B) and (C) as cls. (ii) and (iii), respectively, of subpar. (A), and inserted "and" at end of cl. (iii).
Subsec. (a)(5)(B). Pub. L. 107–56, §814(a)(4), added subpar. (B). Former subpar. (B) redesignated cl. (ii) of subpar. (A).
Subsec. (a)(5)(C). Pub. L. 107–56, §814(a)(2), redesignated subpar. (C) as cl. (iii) of subpar. (A).
Subsec. (a)(7). Pub. L. 107–56, §814(b), struck out ", firm, association, educational institution, financial institution, government entity, or other legal entity," before "any money or other thing of value".
Subsec. (c)(2)(A). Pub. L. 107–56, §814(c)(1)(A), inserted "except as provided in subparagraph (B)," before "a fine", substituted "(a)(5)(A)(iii)" for "(a)(5)(C)", and struck out "and" at end.
Subsec. (c)(2)(B). Pub. L. 107–56, §814(c)(1)(B), inserted "or an attempt to commit an offense punishable under this subparagraph," after "subsection (a)(2)," in introductory provisions.
Subsec. (c)(2)(C). Pub. L. 107–56, §814(c)(1)(C), struck out "and" at end.
Subsec. (c)(3). Pub. L. 107–56, §814(c)(2), struck out ", (a)(5)(A), (a)(5)(B)," after "subsection (a)(4)" in subpars. (A) and (B) and substituted "(a)(5)(A)(iii)" for "(a)(5)(C)" in subpar. (B).
Subsec. (c)(4). Pub. L. 107–56, §814(c)(3), added par. (4).
Subsec. (d). Pub. L. 107–56, §506(a), amended subsec. (d) generally. Prior to amendment, subsec. (d) read as follows: "The United States Secret Service shall, in addition to any other agency having such authority, have the authority to investigate offenses under subsections (a)(2)(A), (a)(2)(B), (a)(3), (a)(4), (a)(5), and (a)(6) of this section. Such authority of the United States Secret Service shall be exercised in accordance with an agreement which shall be entered into by the Secretary of the Treasury and the Attorney General."
Subsec. (e)(2)(B). Pub. L. 107–56, §814(d)(1), inserted ", including a computer located outside the United States that is used in a manner that affects interstate or foreign commerce or communication of the United States" before semicolon.
Subsec. (e)(7). Pub. L. 107–56, §814(d)(2), struck out "and" at end.
Subsec. (e)(8). Pub. L. 107–56, §814(d)(3), added par. (8) and struck out former par. (8) which read as follows: "the term 'damage' means any impairment to the integrity or availability of data, a program, a system, or information, that—
"(A) causes loss aggregating at least $5,000 in value during any 1-year period to one or more individuals;
"(B) modifies or impairs, or potentially modifies or impairs, the medical examination, diagnosis, treatment, or care of one or more individuals;
"(C) causes physical injury to any person; or
"(D) threatens public health or safety; and".
Subsec. (e)(10) to (12). Pub. L. 107–56, §814(d)(4), (5), added pars. (10) to (12).
Subsec. (g). Pub. L. 107–56, §814(e), substituted "A civil action for a violation of this section may be brought only if the conduct involves 1 of the factors set forth in clause (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), or (v) of subsection (a)(5)(B). Damages for a violation involving only conduct described in subsection (a)(5)(B)(i) are limited to economic damages." for "Damages for violations involving damage as defined in subsection (e)(8)(A) are limited to economic damages." and inserted at end "No action may be brought under this subsection for the negligent design or manufacture of computer hardware, computer software, or firmware."
1996—Subsec. (a)(1). Pub. L. 104–294, §201(1)(A), substituted "having knowingly accessed" for "knowingly accesses", "exceeding authorized access" for "exceeds authorized access", "such conduct having obtained information" for "such conduct obtains information", and "could be used to the injury of the United States" for "is to be used to the injury of the United States", struck out "the intent or" before "reason to believe", and inserted before semicolon at end "willfully communicates, delivers, transmits, or causes to be communicated, delivered, or transmitted, or attempts to communicate, deliver, transmit or cause to be communicated, delivered, or transmitted the same to any person not entitled to receive it, or willfully retains the same and fails to deliver it to the officer or employee of the United States entitled to receive it".
Subsec. (a)(2). Pub. L. 104–294, §201(1)(B), inserted dash after "thereby obtains", redesignated remainder of par. (2) as subpar. (A), and added subpars. (B) and (C).
Subsec. (a)(3). Pub. L. 104–294, §201(1)(C), inserted "nonpublic" before "computer of a department or agency", struck out "adversely" after "and such conduct", and substituted "that use by or for the Government of the United States" for "the use of the Government's operation of such computer".
Subsec. (a)(4). Pub. L. 104–294, §201(1)(D), substituted "protected computer" for "Federal interest computer" and inserted "and the value of such use is not more than $5,000 in any 1-year period" before semicolon at end.
Subsec. (a)(5). Pub. L. 104–294, §201(1)(E), inserted par. (5) and struck out former par. (5) which related to fraud in connection with computers in causing transmission of program, information, code, or command to a computer or computer system in interstate or foreign commerce which damages such system, program, information, or code, or causes a withholding or denial of use of hardware or software, or transmits viruses which causes damage in excess of $1,000 or more during any one-year period, or modifies or impairs medical examination, diagnosis, treatment or care of individuals.
Subsec. (a)(5)(B)(ii)(II)(bb). Pub. L. 104–294, §604(b)(36)(A), which directed insertion of "or" at end of subsec., could not be executed because no subsec. (a)(5)(B)(ii)(II)(bb) existed subsequent to amendment by Pub. L. 104–294, §201(1)(E). See above.
Subsec. (a)(7). Pub. L. 104–294, §201(1)(F), added par. (7).
Subsec. (c)(1). Pub. L. 104–294, §201(2)(A), substituted "under this section" for "under such subsection" in subpars. (A) and (B).
Subsec. (c)(1)(B). Pub. L. 104–294, §604(b)(36)(B), struck out "and" after semicolon at end.
Subsec. (c)(2)(A). Pub. L. 104–294, §201(2)(B)(i), inserted ", (a)(5)(C)," after "(a)(3)" and substituted "under this section" for "under such subsection".
Subsec. (c)(2)(B). Pub. L. 104–294, §201(2)(B)(iii), added subpar. (B). Former subpar. (B) redesignated (C).
Subsec. (c)(2)(C). Pub. L. 104–294, §201(2)(B)(iv), substituted "under this section" for "under such subsection" and inserted "and" at end.
Pub. L. 104–294, §201(2)(B)(ii), redesignated subpar. (B) as (C).
Subsec. (c)(3)(A). Pub. L. 104–294, §201(2)(C)(i), substituted "(a)(4), (a)(5)(A), (a)(5)(B), or (a)(7)" for "(a)(4) or (a)(5)(A)" and "under this section" for "under such subsection".
Subsec. (c)(3)(B). Pub. L. 104–294, §201(2)(C)(ii), substituted "(a)(4), (a)(5)(A), (a)(5)(B), (a)(5)(C), or (a)(7)" for "(a)(4) or (a)(5)" and "under this section" for "under such subsection".
Subsec. (c)(4). Pub. L. 104–294, §201(2)(D), struck out par. (4) which read as follows: "a fine under this title or imprisonment for not more than 1 year, or both, in the case of an offense under subsection (a)(5)(B)."
Subsec. (d). Pub. L. 104–294, §201(3), inserted "subsections (a)(2)(A), (a)(2)(B), (a)(3), (a)(4), (a)(5), and (a)(6) of" before "this section" in first sentence.
Subsec. (e)(2). Pub. L. 104–294, §201(4)(A)(i), substituted "protected" for "Federal interest" in introductory provisions.
Subsec. (e)(2)(A). Pub. L. 104–294, §201(4)(A)(ii), substituted "that use by or for the financial institution or the Government" for "the use of the financial institution's operation or the Government's operation of such computer".
Subsec. (e)(2)(B). Pub. L. 104–294, §201(4)(A)(iii), added subpar. (B) and struck out former subpar. (B) which read as follows: "which is one of two or more computers used in committing the offense, not all of which are located in the same State;".
Subsec. (e)(8), (9). Pub. L. 104–294, §201(4)(B)–(D), added pars. (8) and (9).
Subsec. (g). Pub. L. 104–294, §604(b)(36)(C), substituted "violation of this section" for "violation of the section".
Pub. L. 104–294, §201(5), struck out ", other than a violation of subsection (a)(5)(B)," before "may maintain a civil action" and substituted "involving damage as defined in subsection (e)(8)(A)" for "of any subsection other than subsection (a)(5)(A)(ii)(II)(bb) or (a)(5)(B)(ii)(II)(bb)".
Subsec. (h). Pub. L. 104–294, §604(b)(36)(D), substituted "subsection (a)(5)" for "section 1030(a)(5) of title 18, United States Code" before period at end.
1994—Subsec. (a)(3). Pub. L. 103–322, §290001(f), inserted "adversely" before "affects the use of the Government's".
Subsec. (a)(5). Pub. L. 103–322, §290001(b), amended par. (5) generally. Prior to amendment, par. (5) read as follows: "intentionally accesses a Federal interest computer without authorization, and by means of one or more instances of such conduct alters, damages, or destroys information in any such Federal interest computer, or prevents authorized use of any such computer or information, and thereby—
"(A) causes loss to one or more others of a value aggregating $1,000 or more during any one year period; or
"(B) modifies or impairs, or potentially modifies or impairs, the medical examination, medical diagnosis, medical treatment, or medical care of one or more individuals; or".
Subsec. (c)(3)(A). Pub. L. 103–322, §290001(c)(2), inserted "(A)" after "(a)(5)".
Subsec. (c)(4). Pub. L. 103–322, §290001(c)(1), (3), (4), added par. (4).
Subsec. (g). Pub. L. 103–322, §290001(d), added subsec. (g).
Subsec. (h). Pub. L. 103–322, §290001(e), added subsec. (h).
1990—Subsec. (a)(1). Pub. L. 101–647, §3533, substituted "paragraph y" for "paragraph r".
Subsec. (e)(3). Pub. L. 101–647, §1205(e), inserted "commonwealth," before "possession or territory of the United States".
Subsec. (e)(4)(G). Pub. L. 101–647, §2597(j)(2), which directed substitution of a semicolon for a period at end of subpar. (G), could not be executed because it ended with a semicolon.
Subsec. (e)(4)(H), (I). Pub. L. 101–647, §2597(j), added subpars. (H) and (I).
1989—Subsec. (e)(4)(A). Pub. L. 101–73, §962(a)(5)(A), substituted "an institution," for "a bank".
Subsec. (e)(4)(C) to (H). Pub. L. 101–73, §962(a)(5)(B), (C), redesignated subpars. (D) to (H) as (C) to (G), respectively, and struck out former subpar. (C) which read as follows: "an institution with accounts insured by the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation;".
1988—Subsec. (a)(2). Pub. L. 100–690 inserted a comma after "financial institution" and struck out the comma that followed a comma after "title 15".
1986—Subsec. (a). Pub. L. 99–474, §2(b)(2), struck out last sentence which read as follows: "It is not an offense under paragraph (2) or (3) of this subsection in the case of a person having accessed a computer with authorization and using the opportunity such access provides for purposes to which such access does not extend, if the using of such opportunity consists only of the use of the computer."
Subsec. (a)(1). Pub. L. 99–474, §2(c), substituted "or exceeds authorized access" for ", or having accessed a computer with authorization, uses the opportunity such access provides for purposes to which such authorization does not extend".
Subsec. (a)(2). Pub. L. 99–474, §2(a), (c), substituted "intentionally" for "knowingly", substituted "or exceeds authorized access" for ", or having accessed a computer with authorization, uses the opportunity such access provides for purposes to which such authorization does not extend", struck out "as such terms are defined in the Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978 (12 U.S.C. 3401 et seq.)," after "financial institution,", inserted "or of a card issuer as defined in section 1602(n) of title 15," and struck out "or" appearing at end.
Subsec. (a)(3). Pub. L. 99–474, §2(b)(1), amended par. (3) generally. Prior to amendment, par. (3) read as follows: "knowingly accesses a computer without authorization, or having accessed a computer with authorization, uses the opportunity such access provides for purposes to which such authorization does not extend, and by means of such conduct knowingly uses, modifies, destroys, or discloses information in, or prevents authorized use of, such computer, if such computer is operated for or on behalf of the Government of the United States and such conduct affects such operation;".
Subsec. (a)(4) to (6). Pub. L. 99–474, §2(d), added pars. (4) to (6).
Subsec. (b). Pub. L. 99–474, §2(e), struck out par. (1) designation and par. (2) which provided a penalty for persons conspiring to commit an offense under subsec. (a).
Subsec. (c). Pub. L. 99–474, §2(f)(9), substituted "(b)" for "(b)(1)" in introductory text.
Subsec. (c)(1)(A). Pub. L. 99–474, §2(f)(1), substituted "under this title" for "of not more than the greater of $10,000 or twice the value obtained by the offense".
Subsec. (c)(1)(B). Pub. L. 99–474, §2(f)(2), substituted "under this title" for "of not more than the greater of $100,000 or twice the value obtained by the offense".
Subsec. (c)(2)(A). Pub. L. 99–474, §2(f)(3), (4), substituted "under this title" for "of not more than the greater of $5,000 or twice the value obtained or loss created by the offense" and inserted reference to subsec. (a)(6).
Subsec. (c)(2)(B). Pub. L. 99–474, §2(f)(3), (5)–(7), substituted "under this title" for "of not more than the greater of $10,000 or twice the value obtained or loss created by the offense", "not more than" for "not than", inserted reference to subsec. (a)(6), and substituted "; and" for the period at end of subpar. (B).
Subsec. (c)(3). Pub. L. 99–474, §2(f)(8), added par. (3).
Subsec. (e). Pub. L. 99–474, §2(g), substituted a dash for the comma after "As used in this section", realigned remaining portion of subsection, inserted "(1)" before "the term", substituted a semicolon for the period at the end, and added pars. (2) to (7).
Subsec. (f). Pub. L. 99–474, §2(h), added subsec. (f).
Effective Date of 2002 Amendment
Amendment by Pub. L. 107–296 effective 60 days after Nov. 25, 2002, see section 4 of Pub. L. 107–296, set out as an Effective Date note under section 101 of Title 6, Domestic Security.
Transfer of Functions
For transfer of the functions, personnel, assets, and obligations of the United States Secret Service, including the functions of the Secretary of the Treasury relating thereto, to the Secretary of Homeland Security, and for treatment of related references, see sections 381, 551(d), 552(d), and 557 of Title 6, Domestic Security, and the Department of Homeland Security Reorganization Plan of November 25, 2002, as modified, set out as a note under section 542 of Title 6.
Reports to Congress
Pub. L. 98–473, title II, §2103, Oct. 12, 1984, 98 Stat. 2192, directed Attorney General to report to Congress annually, during first three years following Oct. 12, 1984, concerning prosecutions under this section.
2.1.2 United States v. Morris (2d Cir. 1991) 2.1.2 United States v. Morris (2d Cir. 1991)
928 F.2d 504 (1991)
UNITED STATES of America, Appellee,
v.
Robert Tappan MORRIS, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 774, Docket 90-1336.
United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
Argued December 4, 1990.
Decided March 7, 1991.
Thomas A. Guidoboni, Washington, D.C., for defendant-appellant.
Ellen R. Meltzer, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Washington, D.C. (Frederick J. Scullin, Jr., U.S. Atty., Syracuse, N.Y., Mark D. Rasch, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Washington, D.C., on the brief), for appellee.
[505] Before NEWMAN and WINTER, Circuit Judges, and DALY, District Judge.[1]
JON O. NEWMAN, Circuit Judge:
This appeal presents two narrow issues of statutory construction concerning a provision Congress recently adopted to strengthen protection against computer crimes. Section 2(d) of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986, 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(5)(A) (1988), punishes anyone who intentionally accesses without authorization a category of computers known as "[f]ederal interest computers" and damages or prevents authorized use of information in such computers, causing loss of $1,000 or more. The issues raised are (1) whether the Government must prove not only that the defendant intended to access a federal interest computer, but also that the defendant intended to prevent authorized use of the computer's information and thereby cause loss; and (2) what satisfies the statutory requirement of "access without authorization."
These questions are raised on an appeal by Robert Tappan Morris from the May 16, 1990, judgment of the District Court for the Northern District of New York (Howard G. Munson, Judge) convicting him, after a jury trial, of violating 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(5)(A). Morris released into INTERNET, a national computer network, a computer program known as a "worm"[2] that spread and multiplied, eventually causing computers at various educational institutions and military sites to "crash" or cease functioning.
We conclude that section 1030(a)(5)(A) does not require the Government to demonstrate that the defendant intentionally prevented authorized use and thereby caused loss. We also find that there was sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude that Morris acted "without authorization" within the meaning of section 1030(a)(5)(A). We therefore affirm.
FACTS
In the fall of 1988, Morris was a first-year graduate student in Cornell University's computer science Ph.D. program. Through undergraduate work at Harvard and in various jobs he had acquired significant computer experience and expertise. When Morris entered Cornell, he was given an account on the computer at the Computer Science Division. This account gave him explicit authorization to use computers at Cornell. Morris engaged in various discussions with fellow graduate students about the security of computer networks and his ability to penetrate it.
In October 1988, Morris began work on a computer program, later known as the INTERNET "worm" or "virus." The goal of this program was to demonstrate the inadequacies of current security measures on computer networks by exploiting the security defects that Morris had discovered. The tactic he selected was release of a worm into network computers. Morris designed the program to spread across a national network of computers after being inserted at one computer location connected to the network. Morris released the worm into INTERNET, which is a group of national networks that connect university, governmental, and military computers around the country. The network permits communication and transfer of information between computers on the network.
Morris sought to program the INTERNET worm to spread widely without drawing attention to itself. The worm was supposed to occupy little computer operation time, and thus not interfere with normal use of the computers. Morris programmed the worm to make it difficult to detect and read, so that other programmers would not be able to "kill" the worm easily.
[506] Morris also wanted to ensure that the worm did not copy itself onto a computer that already had a copy. Multiple copies of the worm on a computer would make the worm easier to detect and would bog down the system and ultimately cause the computer to crash. Therefore, Morris designed the worm to "ask" each computer whether it already had a copy of the worm. If it responded "no," then the worm would copy onto the computer; if it responded "yes," the worm would not duplicate. However, Morris was concerned that other programmers could kill the worm by programming their own computers to falsely respond "yes" to the question. To circumvent this protection, Morris programmed the worm to duplicate itself every seventh time it received a "yes" response. As it turned out, Morris underestimated the number of times a computer would be asked the question, and his one-out-of-seven ratio resulted in far more copying than he had anticipated. The worm was also designed so that it would be killed when a computer was shut down, an event that typically occurs once every week or two. This would have prevented the worm from accumulating on one computer, had Morris correctly estimated the likely rate of reinfection.
Morris identified four ways in which the worm could break into computers on the network:
(1) through a "hole" or "bug" (an error) in SEND MAIL, a computer program that transfers and receives electronic mail on a computer;
(2) through a bug in the "finger demon" program, a program that permits a person to obtain limited information about the users of another computer;
(3) through the "trusted hosts" feature, which permits a user with certain privileges on one computer to have equivalent privileges on another computer without using a password; and
(4) through a program of password guessing, whereby various combinations of letters are tried out in rapid sequence in the hope that one will be an authorized user's password, which is entered to permit whatever level of activity that user is authorized to perform.
On November 2, 1988, Morris released the worm from a computer at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. MIT was selected to disguise the fact that the worm came from Morris at Cornell. Morris soon discovered that the worm was replicating and reinfecting machines at a much faster rate than he had anticipated. Ultimately, many machines at locations around the country either crashed or became "catatonic." When Morris realized what was happening, he contacted a friend at Harvard to discuss a solution. Eventually, they sent an anonymous message from Harvard over the network, instructing programmers how to kill the worm and prevent reinfection. However, because the network route was clogged, this message did not get through until it was too late. Computers were affected at numerous installations, including leading universities, military sites, and medical research facilities. The estimated cost of dealing with the worm at each installation ranged from $200 to more than $53,000.
Morris was found guilty, following a jury trial, of violating 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(5)(A). He was sentenced to three years of probation, 400 hours of community service, a fine of $10,050, and the costs of his supervision.
DISCUSSION
I. The intent requirement in section 1030(a)(5)(A)
Section 1030(a)(5)(A), covers anyone who
(5) intentionally accesses a Federal interest computer without authorization, and by means of one or more instances of such conduct alters, damages, or destroys information in any such Federal interest computer, or prevents authorized use of any such computer or information, and thereby
(A) causes loss to one or more others of a value aggregating $1,000 or more during any one year period; ... [emphasis added].
The District Court concluded that the intent requirement applied only to the accessing and not to the resulting damage. [507] Judge Munson found recourse to legislative history unnecessary because he considered the statute clear and unambiguous. However, the Court observed that the legislative history supported its reading of section 1030(a)(5)(A).
Morris argues that the Government had to prove not only that he intended the unauthorized access of a federal interest computer, but also that he intended to prevent others from using it, and thus cause a loss. The adverb "intentionally," he contends, modifies both verb phrases of the section. The Government urges that since punctuation sets the "accesses" phrase off from the subsequent "damages" phrase, the provision unambiguously shows that "intentionally" modifies only "accesses." Absent textual ambiguity, the Government asserts that recourse to legislative history is not appropriate. See Burlington N.R. Co. v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 481 U.S. 454, 461, 107 S.Ct. 1855, 1859, 95 L.Ed.2d 404 (1987); Consumer Product Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108, 100 S.Ct. 2051, 2056, 64 L.Ed.2d 766 (1980); United States v. Holroyd, 732 F.2d 1122, 1125 (2d Cir.1984).
With some statutes, punctuation has been relied upon to indicate that a phrase set off by commas is independent of the language that followed. See United States v. Ron Pair Enterprises, Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 241, 109 S.Ct. 1026, 1030, 103 L.Ed.2d 290 (1989) (interpreting the Bankruptcy Code). However, we have been advised that punctuation is not necessarily decisive in construing statutes, see Costanzo v. Tillinghast, 287 U.S. 341, 344, 53 S.Ct. 152, 153, 77 L.Ed. 350 (1932), and with many statutes, a mental state adverb adjacent to initial words has been applied to phrases or clauses appearing later in the statute without regard to the punctuation or structure of the statute. See Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 426-29, 105 S.Ct. 2084, 2088-90, 85 L.Ed.2d 434 (1985) (interpreting food stamps provision); United States v. Nofziger, 878 F.2d 442, 446-50 (D.C.Cir.) (interpreting government "revolving door" statute), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 110 S.Ct. 564, 107 L.Ed.2d 559 (1989); United States v. Johnson & Towers, Inc., 741 F.2d 662, 667-69 (3d Cir.1984) (interpreting the conservation act), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1208, 105 S.Ct. 1171, 84 L.Ed.2d 321 (1985). In the present case, we do not believe the comma after "authorization" renders the text so clear as to preclude review of the legislative history.
The first federal statute dealing with computer crimes was passed in 1984, Pub.L. No. 98-473 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (Supp. II 1984)). The specific provision under which Morris was convicted was added in 1986, Pub.L. No. 99-474, along with some other changes. The 1986 amendments made several changes relevant to our analysis.
First, the 1986 amendments changed the scienter requirement in section 1030(a)(2) from "knowingly" to "intentionally." See Pub.L. No. 99-474, section 2(a)(1). The subsection now covers anyone who
(2) intentionally accesses a computer without authorization or exceeds authorized access, and thereby obtains information contained in a financial record of a financial institution, or of a card issuer as defined in section 1602(n) of title 15, or contained in a file of a consumer reporting agency on a consumer, as such terms are defined in the Fair Credit Reporting Act (15 U.S.C. 1681 et seq.).
According to the Senate Judiciary Committee, Congress changed the mental state requirement in section 1030(a)(2) for two reasons. Congress sought only to proscribe intentional acts of unauthorized access, not "mistaken, inadvertent, or careless" acts of unauthorized access. S.Rep. No. 99-432, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 2479, 2483 [hereinafter Senate Report].
Also, Congress expressed concern that the "knowingly" standard "might be inappropriate for cases involving computer technology." Id. The concern was that a scienter requirement of "knowingly" might encompass the acts of an individual "who inadvertently `stumble[d] into' someone else's computer file or computer data," especially where such individual was authorized [508] to use a particular computer. Id. at 6, 1986 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News at 2483. The Senate Report concluded that "[t]he substitution of an `intentional' standard is designed to focus Federal criminal prosecutions on those whose conduct evinces a clear intent to enter, without proper authorization, computer files or data belonging to another." Id., U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News at 2484. Congress retained the "knowingly" standard in other subsections of section 1030. See 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(1), (a)(4).
This use of a mens rea standard to make sure that inadvertent accessing was not covered is also emphasized in the Senate Report's discussion of section 1030(a)(3) and section 1030(a)(5), under which Morris was convicted. Both subsections were designed to target "outsiders," individuals without authorization to access any federal interest computer. Senate Report at 10, U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News at 2488. The rationale for the mens rea requirement suggests that it modifies only the "accesses" phrase, which was the focus of Congress's concern in strengthening the scienter requirement.
The other relevant change in the 1986 amendments was the introduction of subsection (a)(5) to replace its earlier version, subsection (a)(3) of the 1984 act, 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(3) (Supp. II 1984). The predecessor subsection covered anyone who
knowingly accesses a computer without authorization, or having accessed a computer with authorization, uses the opportunity such access provides for purposes to which such authorization does not extend, and by means of such conduct knowingly uses, modifies, destroys, or discloses information in, or prevents authorized use of, such computer, if such computer is operated for or on behalf of the Government of United States and such conduct affects such operation.
The 1986 version changed the mental state requirement from "knowingly" to "intentionally," and did not repeat it after the "accesses" phrase, as had the 1984 version. By contrast, other subsections of section 1030 have retained "dual intent" language, placing the scienter requirement at the beginning of both the "accesses" phrase and the "damages" phrase. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(1).
Morris notes the careful attention that Congress gave to selecting the scienter requirement for current subsections (a)(2) and (a)(5). Then, relying primarily on comments in the Senate and House reports, Morris argues that the "intentionally" requirement of section 1030(a)(5)(A) describes both the conduct of accessing and damaging. As he notes, the Senate Report said that "[t]he new subsection 1030(a)(5) to be created by the bill is designed to penalize those who intentionally alter, damage, or destroy certain computerized data belonging to another." Senate Report at 10, U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News at 2488. The House Judiciary Committee stated that "the bill proposes a new section (18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(5)) which can be characterized as a `malicious damage' felony violation involving a Federal interest computer. We have included an `intentional' standard for this felony and coverage is extended only to outside trespassers with a $1,000 threshold damage level." H.R.Rep. No. 99-612, 99th Cong.2d Sess. at 7 (1986). A member of the Judiciary Committee also referred to the section 1030(a)(5) offense as a "malicious damage" felony during the floor debate. 132 Cong.Rec. H3275, 3276 (daily ed. June 3, 1986) (remarks of Rep. Hughes).
The Government's argument that the scienter requirement in section 1030(a)(5)(A) applies only to the "accesses" phrase is premised primarily upon the difference between subsection (a)(5)(A) and its predecessor in the 1984 statute. The decision to state the scienter requirement only once in subsection (a)(5)(A), along with the decision to change it from "knowingly" to "intentionally," are claimed to evince a clear intent upon the part of Congress to apply the scienter requirement only to the "accesses" phrase, though making that requirement more difficult to satisfy. This reading would carry out the Congressional objective of protecting the individual who "inadvertently `stumble[s] into' someone else's computer file." Senate Report at 6, U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News at 2483.
[509] The Government also suggests that the fact that other subsections of section 1030 continue to repeat the scienter requirement before both phrases of a subsection is evidence that Congress selectively decided within the various subsections of section 1030 where the scienter requirement was and was not intended to apply. Morris responds with a plausible explanation as to why certain other provisions of section 1030 retain dual intent language. Those subsections use two different mens rea standards; therefore it is necessary to refer to the scienter requirement twice in the subsection. For example, section 1030(a)(1) covers anyone who
(1) knowingly accesses a computer without authorization or exceeds authorized access, and by means of such conduct obtains information that has been determined by the United States Government pursuant to an Executive order or statute to require protection against unauthorized disclosure for reasons of national defense or foreign relations, or any restricted data ... with the intent or reason to believe that such information so obtained is to be used to the injury of the United States, or to the advantage of any foreign nation.
Since Congress sought in subsection (a)(1) to have the "knowingly" standard govern the "accesses" phrase and the "with intent" standard govern the "results" phrase, it was necessary to state the scienter requirement at the beginning of both phrases. By contrast, Morris argues, where Congress stated the scienter requirement only once, at the beginning of the "accesses" phrase, it was intended to cover both the "accesses" phrase and the phrase that followed it.
There is a problem, however, with applying Morris's explanation to section 1030(a)(5)(A). As noted earlier, the predecessor of subsection (a)(5)(A) explicitly placed the same mental state requirement before both the "accesses" phrase and the "damages" phrase. In relevant part, that predecessor in the 1984 statute covered anyone who "knowingly accesses a computer without authorization, ... and by means of such conduct knowingly uses, modifies, destroys, or discloses information in, or prevents authorized use of, such computer...." 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(3) (Supp. II 1984) (emphasis added). This earlier provision demonstrates that Congress has on occasion chosen to repeat the same scienter standard in the "accesses" phrase and the subsequent phrase of a subsection of the Computer Fraud Statute. More pertinently, it shows that the 1986 amendments adding subsection (a)(5)(A) placed the scienter requirement adjacent only to the "accesses" phrase in contrast to a predecessor provision that had placed the same standard before both that phrase and the subsequent phrase.
Despite some isolated language in the legislative history that arguably suggests a scienter component for the "damages" phrase of section 1030(a)(5)(A), the wording, structure, and purpose of the subsection, examined in comparison with its departure from the format of its predecessor provision persuade us that the "intentionally" standard applies only to the "accesses" phrase of section 1030(a)(5)(A), and not to its "damages" phrase.
II. The unauthorized access requirement in section 1030(a)(5)(A)
Section 1030(a)(5)(A) penalizes the conduct of an individual who "intentionally accesses a Federal interest computer without authorization." Morris contends that his conduct constituted, at most, "exceeding authorized access" rather than the "unauthorized access" that the subsection punishes. Morris argues that there was insufficient evidence to convict him of "unauthorized access," and that even if the evidence sufficed, he was entitled to have the jury instructed on his "theory of defense."
We assess the sufficiency of the evidence under the traditional standard. Morris was authorized to use computers at Cornell, Harvard, and Berkeley, all of which were on INTERNET. As a result, Morris was authorized to communicate with other computers on the network to send electronic mail (SEND MAIL), and to find out certain information about the users of other computers [510] (finger demon). The question is whether Morris's transmission of his worm constituted exceeding authorized access or accessing without authorization.
The Senate Report stated that section 1030(a)(5)(A), like the new section 1030(a)(3), would "be aimed at `outsiders,' i.e., those lacking authorization to access any Federal interest computer." Senate Report at 10, U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News at 2488. But the Report also stated, in concluding its discussion on the scope of section 1030(a)(3), that it applies "where the offender is completely outside the Government, ... or where the offender's act of trespass is interdepartmental in nature." Id. at 8, U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News at 2486 (emphasis added).
Morris relies on the first quoted portion to argue that his actions can be characterized only as exceeding authorized access, since he had authorized access to a federal interest computer. However, the second quoted portion reveals that Congress was not drawing a bright line between those who have some access to any federal interest computer and those who have none. Congress contemplated that individuals with access to some federal interest computers would be subject to liability under the computer fraud provisions for gaining unauthorized access to other federal interest computers. See, e.g., id. (stating that a Labor Department employee who uses Labor's computers to access without authorization an FBI computer can be criminally prosecuted).
The evidence permitted the jury to conclude that Morris's use of the SEND MAIL and finger demon features constituted access without authorization. While a case might arise where the use of SEND MAIL or finger demon falls within a nebulous area in which the line between accessing without authorization and exceeding authorized access may not be clear, Morris's conduct here falls well within the area of unauthorized access. Morris did not use either of those features in any way related to their intended function. He did not send or read mail nor discover information about other users; instead he found holes in both programs that permitted him a special and unauthorized access route into other computers.
Moreover, the jury verdict need not be upheld solely on Morris's use of SEND MAIL and finger demon. As the District Court noted, in denying Morris' motion for acquittal,
Although the evidence may have shown that defendant's initial insertion of the worm simply exceeded his authorized access, the evidence also demonstrated that the worm was designed to spread to other computers at which he had no account and no authority, express or implied, to unleash the worm program. Moreover, there was also evidence that the worm was designed to gain access to computers at which he had no account by guessing their passwords. Accordingly, the evidence did support the jury's conclusion that defendant accessed without authority as opposed to merely exceeding the scope of his authority.
In light of the reasonable conclusions that the jury could draw from Morris's use of SEND MAIL and finger demon, and from his use of the trusted hosts feature and password guessing, his challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence fails.
Morris endeavors to bolster his sufficiency argument by contending that his conduct was not punishable under subsection (a)(5) but was punishable under subsection (a)(3). That concession belies the validity of his claim that he only exceeded authorization rather than made unauthorized access. Neither subsection (a)(3) nor (a)(5) punishes conduct that exceeds authorization. Both punish a person who "accesses" "without authorization" certain computers. Subsection (a)(3) covers the computers of a department or agency of the United States; subsection (a)(5) more broadly covers any federal interest computers, defined to include, among other computers, those used exclusively by the United States, 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(2)(A), and adds the element of causing damage or loss of use of a value of $1,000 or more. If Morris violated subsection (a)(3), as he concedes, then his conduct in inserting the worm into the INTERNET [511] must have constituted "unauthorized access" under subsection (a)(5) to the computers of the federal departments the worm reached, for example, those of NASA and military bases.
To extricate himself from the consequence of conceding that he made "unauthorized access" within the meaning of subsection (a)(3), Morris subtly shifts his argument and contends that he is not within the reach of subsection (a)(5) at all. He argues that subsection (a)(5) covers only those who, unlike himself, lack access to any federal interest computer. It is true that a primary concern of Congress in drafting subsection (a)(5) was to reach those unauthorized to access any federal interest computer. The Senate Report stated, "[T]his subsection [(a)(5)] will be aimed at `outsiders,' i.e., those lacking authorization to access any Federal interest computer." Senate Report at 10, U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News at 2488. But the fact that the subsection is "aimed" at such "outsiders" does not mean that its coverage is limited to them. Congress understandably thought that the group most likely to damage federal interest computers would be those who lack authorization to use any of them. But it surely did not mean to insulate from liability the person authorized to use computers at the State Department who causes damage to computers at the Defense Department. Congress created the misdemeanor offense of subsection (a)(3) to punish intentional trespasses into computers for which one lacks authorized access; it added the felony offense of subsection (a)(5) to punish such a trespasser who also causes damage or loss in excess of $1,000, not only to computers of the United States but to any computer within the definition of federal interest computers. With both provisions, Congress was punishing those, like Morris, who, with access to some computers that enable them to communicate on a network linking other computers, gain access to other computers to which they lack authorization and either trespass, in violation of subsection (a)(3), or cause damage or loss of $1,000 or more, in violation of subsection (a)(5).
Morris also contends that the District Court should have instructed the jury on his theory that he was only exceeding authorized access. The District Court decided that it was unnecessary to provide the jury with a definition of "authorization." We agree. Since the word is of common usage, without any technical or ambiguous meaning, the Court was not obliged to instruct the jury on its meaning. See, e.g., United States v. Chenault, 844 F.2d 1124, 1131 (5th Cir.1988) ("A trial court need not define specific statutory terms unless they are outside the common understanding of a juror or are so technical or specific as to require a definition.").
An instruction on "exceeding authorized access" would have risked misleading the jury into thinking that Morris could not be convicted if some of his conduct could be viewed as falling within this description. Yet, even if that phrase might have applied to some of his conduct, he could nonetheless be found liable for doing what the statute prohibited, gaining access where he was unauthorized and causing loss.
Additionally, the District Court properly refused to charge the jury with Morris's proposed jury instruction on access without authorization. That instruction stated, "To establish the element of lack of authorization, the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Morris was an `outsider,' that is, that he was not authorized to access any Federal interest computer in any manner." As the analysis of the legislative history reveals, Congress did not intend an individual's authorized access to one federal interest computer to protect him from prosecution, no matter what other federal interest computers he accesses.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the District Court is affirmed.
[1] The Honorable T.F. Gilroy Daly of the District Court for the District of Connecticut, sitting by designation.
[2] In the colorful argot of computers, a "worm" is a program that travels from one computer to another but does not attach itself to the operating system of the computer it "infects." It differs from a "virus," which is also a migrating program, but one that attaches itself to the operating system of any computer it enters and can infect any other computer that uses files from the infected computer.
2.1.3 Van Buren v. United States (2021) 2.1.3 Van Buren v. United States (2021)
141 S.Ct. 1648
Supreme Court of the United States.
Nathan VAN BUREN, Petitioner
v.
UNITED STATES
Argued November 30, 2020
Decided June 3, 2021
BARRETT, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BREYER, SOTOMAYOR, KAGAN, GORSUCH, and KAVANAUGH, JJ., joined. THOMAS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which ROBERTS, C. J., and ALITO, J., joined.
Opinion
Justice BARRETT delivered the opinion of the Court.
Nathan Van Buren, a former police sergeant, ran a license-plate search in a law enforcement computer database in exchange for money. Van Buren's conduct plainly flouted his department's policy, which authorized him to obtain database information only for law enforcement purposes. We must decide whether Van Buren also violated the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986 (CFAA), which makes it illegal “to access a computer with authorization and to use such access to obtain or alter information in the computer that the accesser is not entitled so to obtain or alter.”
He did not. This provision covers those who obtain information from particular areas in the computer—such as files, folders, or databases—to which their computer access does not extend. It does not cover those who, like Van Buren, have improper motives for obtaining information that is otherwise available to them.
I.
A.
Technological advances at the dawn of the 1980s brought computers to schools, offices, and homes across the Nation. But as the public and private sectors harnessed the power of computing for improvement and innovation, so-called hackers hatched ways to coopt computers for illegal ends. After a series of highly publicized hackings captured the public's attention, it became clear that traditional theft and trespass statutes were ill suited to address cybercrimes that did not deprive computer owners of property in the traditional sense. See Kerr, Cybercrime's Scope: Interpreting “Access” and “Authorization” in Computer Misuse Statutes, 78 N. Y. U. L. Rev. 1596, 1605–1613 (2003).
Congress, following the lead of several States, responded by enacting the first federal computer-crime statute as part of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984. § 2102(a), 98 Stat. 2190–2192. A few years later, Congress passed the CFAA, which included the provisions at issue in this case. The Act subjects to criminal liability anyone who “intentionally accesses a computer without authorization or exceeds authorized access,” and thereby obtains computer information. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2). It defines the term “exceeds authorized access” to mean “to access a computer with authorization and to use such access to obtain or alter information in the computer that the accesser is not entitled so to obtain or alter.” § 1030(e)(6).
Initially, subsection (a)(2)’s prohibition barred accessing only certain financial information. It has since expanded to cover any information from any computer “used in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce or communication.” § 1030(e)(2)(B). As a result, the prohibition now applies—at a minimum—to all information from all computers that connect to the Internet. §§ 1030(a)(2)(C), (e)(2)(B).
Those who violate § 1030(a)(2) face penalties ranging from fines and misdemeanor sentences to imprisonment for up to 10 years. § 1030(c)(2). They also risk civil liability under the CFAA's private cause of action, which allows persons suffering “damage” or “loss” from CFAA violations to sue for money damages and equitable relief. § 1030(g).
B.
This case stems from Van Buren's time as a police sergeant in Georgia. In the course of his duties, Van Buren crossed paths with a man named Andrew Albo. The deputy chief of Van Buren's department considered Albo to be “very volatile” and warned officers in the department to deal with him carefully. Notwithstanding that warning, Van Buren developed a friendly relationship with Albo. Or so Van Buren thought when he went to Albo to ask for a personal loan. Unbeknownst to Van Buren, Albo secretly recorded that request and took it to the local sheriff ’s office, where he complained that Van Buren had sought to “shake him down” for cash.
The taped conversation made its way to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), which devised an operation to see how far Van Buren would go for money. The steps were straightforward: Albo would ask Van Buren to search the state law enforcement computer database for a license plate purportedly belonging to a woman whom Albo had met at a local strip club. Albo, no stranger to legal troubles, would tell Van Buren that he wanted to ensure that the woman was not in fact an undercover officer. In return for the search, Albo would pay Van Buren around $5,000.
Things went according to plan. Van Buren used his patrol-car computer to access the law enforcement database with his valid credentials. He searched the database for the license plate that Albo had provided. After obtaining the FBI-created license-plate entry, Van Buren told Albo that he had information to share.
The Federal Government then charged Van Buren with a felony violation of the CFAA on the ground that running the license plate for Albo violated the “exceeds authorized access” clause of 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2).[FN1] The trial evidence showed that Van Buren had been trained not to use the law enforcement database for “an improper purpose,” defined as “any personal use.” App. 17. Van Buren therefore knew that the search breached department policy. And according to the Government, that violation of department policy also violated the CFAA. Consistent with that position, the Government told the jury that Van Buren's access of the database “for a non[-]law[-]enforcement purpose” violated the CFAA “concept” against “using” a computer network in a way contrary to “what your job or policy prohibits.” Id., at 39. The jury convicted Van Buren, and the District Court sentenced him to 18 months in prison.
Van Buren appealed to the Eleventh Circuit, arguing that the “exceeds authorized access” clause applies only to those who obtain information to which their computer access does not extend, not to those who misuse access that they otherwise have. While several Circuits see the clause Van Buren's way, the Eleventh Circuit is among those that have taken a broader view.[FN2] Consistent with its Circuit precedent, the panel held that Van Buren had violated the CFAA by accessing the law enforcement database for an “inappropriate reason.” 940 F.3d 1192, 1208 (2019). We granted certiorari to resolve the split in authority regarding the scope of liability under the CFAA's “exceeds authorized access” clause. 590 U. S. ––––, 140 S.Ct. 2667, 206 L.Ed.2d 822 (2020).
II.
A.
1.
Both Van Buren and the Government raise a host of policy arguments to support their respective interpretations. But we start where we always do: with the text of the statute. Here, the most relevant text is the phrase “exceeds authorized access,” which means “to access a computer with authorization and to use such access to obtain ... information in the computer that the accesser is not entitled so to obtain.” § 1030(e)(6).
The parties agree that Van Buren “access[ed] a computer with authorization” when he used his patrol-car computer and valid credentials to log into the law enforcement database. They also agree that Van Buren “obtain[ed] ... information in the computer” when he acquired the license-plate record for Albo. The dispute is whether Van Buren was “entitled so to obtain” the record.
“Entitle” means “to give ... a title, right, or claim to something.” Random House Dictionary of the English Language 649 (2d ed. 1987). See also Black's Law Dictionary 477 (5th ed. 1979) (“to give a right or legal title to”). The parties agree that Van Buren had been given the right to acquire license-plate information—that is, he was “entitled to obtain” it—from the law enforcement computer database. But was Van Buren “entitled so to obtain” the license-plate information, as the statute requires?
Van Buren says yes. He notes that “so,” as used in this statute, serves as a term of reference that recalls “the same manner as has been stated” or “the way or manner described.” Black's Law Dictionary, at 1246; 15 Oxford English Dictionary 887 (2d ed. 1989). The disputed phrase “entitled so to obtain” thus asks whether one has the right, in “the same manner as has been stated,” to obtain the relevant information. And the only manner of obtaining information already stated in the definitional provision is “via a computer [one] is otherwise authorized to access.” Reply Brief 3. Putting that together, Van Buren contends that the disputed phrase—“is not entitled so to obtain”—plainly refers to information one is not allowed to obtain by using a computer that he is authorized to access. On this reading, if a person has access to information stored in a computer—e.g., in “Folder Y,” from which the person could permissibly pull information—then he does not violate the CFAA by obtaining such information, regardless of whether he pulled the information for a prohibited purpose. But if the information is instead located in prohibited “Folder X,” to which the person lacks access, he violates the CFAA by obtaining such information.
The Government agrees that the statute uses “so” in the word's term-of-reference sense, but it argues that “so” sweeps more broadly. It reads the phrase “is not entitled so to obtain” to refer to information one was not allowed to obtain in the particular manner or circumstances in which he obtained it. The manner or circumstances in which one has a right to obtain information, the Government says, are defined by any “specifically and explicitly” communicated limits on one's right to access information. Brief for United States 19. As the Government sees it, an employee might lawfully pull information from Folder Y in the morning for a permissible purpose—say, to prepare for a business meeting—but unlawfully pull the same information from Folder Y in the afternoon for a prohibited purpose—say, to help draft a resume to submit to a competitor employer.
The Government's interpretation has surface appeal but proves to be a sleight of hand. While highlighting that “so” refers to a “manner or circumstance,” the Government simultaneously ignores the definition's further instruction that such manner or circumstance already will “ ‘ha[ve] been stated,’ ” “ ‘asserted,’ ” or “ ‘described.’ ” Id., at 18 (quoting Black's Law Dictionary, at 1246; 15 Oxford English Dictionary, at 887). Under the Government's approach, the relevant circumstance—the one rendering a person's conduct illegal—is not identified earlier in the statute. Instead, “so” captures any circumstance-based limit appearing anywhere—in the United States Code, a state statute, a private agreement, or anywhere else. And while the Government tries to cabin its interpretation by suggesting that any such limit must be “specifically and explicitly” stated, “express,” and “inherent in the authorization itself,” the Government does not identify any textual basis for these guardrails. Brief for United States 19; Tr. of Oral Arg. 41.
Van Buren's account of “so”—namely, that “so” references the previously stated “manner or circumstance” in the text of § 1030(e)(6) itself—is more plausible than the Government's. “So” is not a free-floating term that provides a hook for any limitation stated anywhere. It refers to a stated, identifiable proposition from the “preceding” text; indeed, “so” typically “[r]epresent[s]” a “word or phrase already employed,” thereby avoiding the need for repetition. 15 Oxford English Dictionary, at 887; see Webster's Third New International Dictionary 2160 (1986) (so “often used as a substitute ... to express the idea of a preceding phrase”). Myriad federal statutes illustrate this ordinary usage.[FN3] We agree with Van Buren: The phrase “is not entitled so to obtain” is best read to refer to information that a person is not entitled to obtain by using a computer that he is authorized to access.[FN4]
2.
The Government's primary counterargument is that Van Buren's reading renders the word “so” superfluous. Recall the definition: “to access a computer with authorization and to use such access to obtain ... information in the computer that the accesser is not entitled so to obtain.” § 1030(e)(6) (emphasis added). According to the Government, “so” adds nothing to the sentence if it refers solely to the earlier stated manner of obtaining the information through use of a computer one has accessed with authorization. What matters on Van Buren's reading, as the Government sees it, is simply that the person obtain information that he is not entitled to obtain—and that point could be made even if “so” were deleted. By contrast, the Government insists, “so” makes a valuable contribution if it incorporates all of the circumstances that might qualify a person's right to obtain information. Because only its interpretation gives “so” work to do, the Government contends, the rule against superfluity means that its interpretation wins. See Republic of Sudan v. Harrison, 587 U. S. ––––, ––––, 139 S.Ct. 1048, 1058, 203 L.Ed.2d 433 (2019).
But the canon does not help the Government because Van Buren's reading does not render “so” superfluous. As Van Buren points out, without “so,” the statute would allow individuals to use their right to obtain information in nondigital form as a defense to CFAA liability. Consider, for example, a person who downloads restricted personnel files he is not entitled to obtain by using his computer. Such a person could argue that he was “entitled to obtain” the information if he had the right to access personnel files through another method (e.g., by requesting hard copies of the files from human resources). With “so,” the CFAA forecloses that theory of defense. The statute is concerned with what a person does on a computer; it does not excuse hacking into an electronic personnel file if the hacker could have walked down the hall to pick up a physical copy.
This clarification is significant because it underscores that one kind of entitlement to information counts: the right to access the information by using a computer. That can expand liability, as the above example shows. But it narrows liability too. Without the word “so,” the statute could be read to incorporate all kinds of limitations on one's entitlement to information. The dissent's take on the statute illustrates why.
3.
While the dissent accepts Van Buren's definition of “so,” it would arrive at the Government's result by way of the word “entitled.” One is “entitled” to do something, the dissent contends, only when “ ‘proper grounds’ ” are in place. Post, at 1663 – 1664 (opinion of THOMAS, J.) (quoting Black's Law Dictionary, at 477). Deciding whether a person was “entitled” to obtain information, the dissent continues, therefore demands a “circumstance dependent” analysis of whether access was proper. Post, at 1663 – 1664. This reading, like the Government's, would extend the statute's reach to any circumstance-based limit appearing anywhere.
The dissent's approach to the word “entitled” fares fine in the abstract but poorly in context. The statute does not refer to “information ... that the accesser is not entitled to obtain.” It refers to “information ... that the accesser is not entitled so to obtain.” 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(6) (emphasis added). The word “entitled,” then, does not stand alone, inviting the reader to consider the full scope of the accesser's entitlement to information. The modifying phrase “so to obtain” directs the reader to consider a specific limitation on the accesser's entitlement: his entitlement to obtain the information “in the manner previously stated.” Supra, at 1650. And as already explained, the manner previously stated is using a computer one is authorized to access. Thus, while giving lipservice to Van Buren's reading of “so,” the dissent, like the Government, declines to give “so” any limiting function.[FN5]
The dissent cannot have it both ways. The consequence of accepting Van Buren's reading of “so” is the narrowed scope of “entitled.” In fact, the dissent's examples implicitly concede as much: They all omit the word “so,” thereby giving “entitled” its full sweep. See post, at 1663 – 1664. An approach that must rewrite the statute to work is even less persuasive than the Government's.
4.
The Government falls back on what it describes as the “common parlance” meaning of the phrase “exceeds authorized access.” Brief for United States 20–21. According to the Government, any ordinary speaker of the English language would think that Van Buren “exceed[ed] his authorized access” to the law enforcement database when he obtained license-plate information for personal purposes. Id., at 21. The dissent, for its part, asserts that this point “settles” the case. Post, at 1667.
If the phrase “exceeds authorized access” were all we had to go on, the Government and the dissent might have a point. But both breeze by the CFAA's explicit definition of the phrase “exceeds authorized access.” When “a statute includes an explicit definition” of a term, “we must follow that definition, even if it varies from a term's ordinary meaning.” Tanzin v. Tanvir, 592 U. S. ––––, ––––, 141 S.Ct. 486, 490, 208 L.Ed.2d 295 (2020) (internal quotation marks omitted). So the relevant question is not whether Van Buren exceeded his authorized access but whether he exceeded his authorized access as the CFAA defines that phrase. And as we have already explained, the statutory definition favors Van Buren's reading.
That reading, moreover, is perfectly consistent with the way that an “appropriately informed” speaker of the language would understand the meaning of “exceeds authorized access.” Nelson, What Is Textualism? 91 Va. L. Rev. 347, 354 (2005). When interpreting statutes, courts take note of terms that carry “technical meaning[s].” A. Scalia & B. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 73 (2012). “Access” is one such term, long carrying a “well established” meaning in the “computational sense”—a meaning that matters when interpreting a statute about computers. American Heritage Dictionary 10 (3d ed. 1992). In the computing context, “access” references the act of entering a computer “system itself ” or a particular “part of a computer system,” such as files, folders, or databases.[FN6] It is thus consistent with that meaning to equate “exceed[ing] authorized access” with the act of entering a part of the system to which a computer user lacks access privileges.[FN7] The Government and the dissent's broader interpretation is neither the only possible nor even necessarily the most natural one.
B.
While the statute's language “spells trouble” for the Government's position, a “wider look at the statute's structure gives us even more reason for pause.” Romag Fasteners, Inc. v. Fossil Group, Inc., 590 U. S. ––––, –––– – ––––, 140 S.Ct. 1492, 1495, 206 L.Ed.2d 672 (2020).
The interplay between the “without authorization” and “exceeds authorized access” clauses of subsection (a)(2) is particularly probative. Those clauses specify two distinct ways of obtaining information unlawfully. First, an individual violates the provision when he “accesses a computer without authorization.” § 1030(a)(2). Second, an individual violates the provision when he “exceeds authorized access” by accessing a computer “with authorization” and then obtaining information he is “not entitled so to obtain.” §§ 1030(a)(2), (e)(6). Van Buren's reading places the provision's parts “into an harmonious whole.” Roberts v. Sea-Land Services, Inc., 566 U.S. 93, 100, 132 S.Ct. 1350, 182 L.Ed.2d 341 (2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Government's does not.
Start with Van Buren's view. The “without authorization” clause, Van Buren contends, protects computers themselves by targeting so-called outside hackers—those who “acces[s] a computer without any permission at all.” LVRC Holdings LLC v. Brekka, 581 F.3d 1127, 1133 (CA9 2009); see also Pulte Homes, Inc. v. Laborers’ Int'l Union of North Am., 648 F.3d 295, 304 (CA6 2011). Van Buren reads the “exceeds authorized access” clause to provide complementary protection for certain information within computers. It does so, Van Buren asserts, by targeting so-called inside hackers—those who access a computer with permission, but then “ ‘exceed’ the parameters of authorized access by entering an area of the computer to which [that] authorization does not extend.” United States v. Valle, 807 F.3d 508, 524 (CA2 2015).
Van Buren's account of subsection (a)(2) makes sense of the statutory structure because it treats the “without authorization” and “exceeds authorized access” clauses consistently. Under Van Buren's reading, liability under both clauses stems from a gates-up-or-down inquiry—one either can or cannot access a computer system, and one either can or cannot access certain areas within the system.[FN8] And reading both clauses to adopt a gates-up-or-down approach aligns with the computer-context understanding of access as entry. See supra, at 1657 – 1658.[FN9]
By contrast, the Government's reading of the “exceeds authorized access” clause creates “inconsistenc[ies] with the design and structure” of subsection (a)(2). University of Tex. Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 353, 133 S.Ct. 2517, 186 L.Ed.2d 503 (2013). As discussed, the Government reads the “exceeds authorized access” clause to incorporate purpose-based limits contained in contracts and workplace policies. Yet the Government does not read such limits into the threshold question whether someone uses a computer “without authorization”—even though similar purpose restrictions, like a rule against personal use, often govern one's right to access a computer in the first place. See, e.g., Royal Truck & Trailer Sales & Serv., Inc. v. Kraft, 974 F.3d 756, 757 (CA6 2020). Thus, the Government proposes to read the first phrase “without authorization” as a gates-up-or-down inquiry and the second phrase “exceeds authorized access” as one that depends on the circumstances. The Government does not explain why the statute would prohibit accessing computer information, but not the computer itself, for an improper purpose.[FN10]
The Government's position has another structural problem. Recall that violating § 1030(a)(2), the provision under which Van Buren was charged, also gives rise to civil liability. See § 1030(g). Provisions defining “damage” and “loss” specify what a plaintiff in a civil suit can recover. “ ‘[D]amage,’ ” the statute provides, means “any impairment to the integrity or availability of data, a program, a system, or information.” § 1030(e)(8). The term “loss” likewise relates to costs caused by harm to computer data, programs, systems, or information services. § 1030(e)(11). The statutory definitions of “damage” and “loss” thus focus on technological harms—such as the corruption of files—of the type unauthorized users cause to computer systems and data. Limiting “damage” and “loss” in this way makes sense in a scheme “aimed at preventing the typical consequences of hacking.” Royal Truck, 974 F.3d at 760. The term's definitions are ill fitted, however, to remediating “misuse” of sensitive information that employees may permissibly access using their computers. Ibid. Van Buren's situation is illustrative: His run of the license plate did not impair the “integrity or availability” of data, nor did it otherwise harm the database system itself.
C.
Pivoting from text and structure, the Government claims that precedent and statutory history support its interpretation. These arguments are easily dispatched.
As for precedent, the Government asserts that this Court's decision in Musacchio v. United States, 577 U.S. 237, 136 S.Ct. 709, 193 L.Ed.2d 639 (2016), bolsters its reading. There, in addressing a question about the standard of review for instructional error, the Court described § 1030(a)(2) as prohibiting “(1) obtaining access without authorization; and (2) obtaining access with authorization but then using that access improperly.” Id., at 240, 136 S.Ct. 709. This paraphrase of the statute does not do much for the Government. As an initial matter, Musacchio did not address—much less resolve in the Government's favor—the “point now at issue,” and we thus “are not bound to follow” any dicta in the case. Central Va. Community College v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356, 363, 126 S.Ct. 990, 163 L.Ed.2d 945 (2006). But in any event, Van Buren's interpretation, no less than the Government's, involves “using [one's] access improperly.” It is plainly “improper” for one to use the opportunity his computer access provides to obtain prohibited information from within the computer.
As for statutory history, the Government claims that the original 1984 Act supports its interpretation of the current version. In a precursor to the “exceeds authorized access” clause, the 1984 Act covered any person who, “having accessed a computer with authorization, uses the opportunity such access provides for purposes to which such authorization does not extend,” and thus expressly alluded to the purpose of an insider's computer access. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2) (1982 ed. Supp. III). According to the Government, this confirms that the amended CFAA—which makes no mention of purpose in defining “exceeds authorized access”—likewise covers insiders like Van Buren who use their computer access for an unauthorized purpose.[FN11] The Government's argument gets things precisely backward. “When Congress amends legislation, courts must presume it intends the change to have real and substantial effect.” Ross v. Blake, 578 U. S. 632, 641–642, 136 S.Ct. 1850, 195 L.Ed.2d 117 (2016) (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). Congress’ choice to remove the statute's reference to purpose thus cuts against reading the statute “to capture that very concept.” Brief for United States 22. The statutory history thus hurts rather than helps the Government's position.
III.
To top it all off, the Government's interpretation of the statute would attach criminal penalties to a breathtaking amount of commonplace computer activity. Van Buren frames the far-reaching consequences of the Government's reading as triggering the rule of lenity or constitutional avoidance. That is not how we see it: Because the text, context, and structure support Van Buren's reading, neither of these canons is in play. Still, the fallout underscores the implausibility of the Government's interpretation. It is “extra icing on a cake already frosted.” Yates v. United States, 574 U.S. 528, 557, 135 S.Ct. 1074, 191 L.Ed.2d 64 (2015) (KAGAN, J., dissenting).
If the “exceeds authorized access” clause criminalizes every violation of a computer-use policy, then millions of otherwise law-abiding citizens are criminals. Take the workplace. Employers commonly state that computers and electronic devices can be used only for business purposes. So on the Government's reading of the statute, an employee who sends a personal e-mail or reads the news using her work computer has violated the CFAA. Or consider the Internet. Many websites, services, and databases—which provide “information” from “protected computer[s],” § 1030(a)(2)(C)—authorize a user's access only upon his agreement to follow specified terms of service. If the “exceeds authorized access” clause encompasses violations of circumstance-based access restrictions on employers’ computers, it is difficult to see why it would not also encompass violations of such restrictions on website providers’ computers. And indeed, numerous amici explain why the Government's reading of subsection (a)(2) would do just that—criminalize everything from embellishing an online-dating profile to using a pseudonym on Facebook. See Brief for Orin Kerr as Amicus Curiae 10–11; Brief for Technology Companies as Amici Curiae 6, n. 3, 11; see also Brief for Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press et al. as Amici Curiae 10–13 (journalism activity); Brief for Kyratso Karahalios et al. as Amici Curiae 11–17 (online civil-rights testing and research).
In response to these points, the Government posits that other terms in the statute—specifically “authorization” and “use”—“may well” serve to cabin its prosecutorial power. Brief for United States 35; see Tr. of Oral Arg. 38, 40, 58 (“instrumental” use; “individualized” and “fairly specific” authorization). Yet the Government stops far short of endorsing such limitations. Cf. Brief for United States 37 (concept of “authorization” “may not logically apply”); id., at 38 (“ ‘use’ ” might be read in a more “limited” fashion, even though it “often has a broader definition”); see also, e.g., post, at 1668 – 1669 (mens rea requirement “might” preclude liability in some cases). Nor does it cite any prior instance in which it has read the statute to contain such limitations—to the contrary, Van Buren cites instances where it hasn't. See Reply Brief 14–15, 17 (collecting cases); cf. Sandvig v. Barr, 451 F.Supp.3d 73, 81–82 (D.D.C. 2020) (discussing Department of Justice testimony indicating that the Government could “ ‘bring a CFAA prosecution based’ ” on terms-of-service violations causing “ ‘de minimis harm’ ”). If anything, the Government's current CFAA charging policy shows why Van Buren's concerns are far from “hypothetical,” post, at 1668 – 1669: The policy instructs that federal prosecution “may not be warranted”—not that it would be prohibited—“if the defendant exceed[s] authorized access solely by violating an access restriction contained in a contractual agreement or term of service with an Internet service provider or website.”[FN12] And while the Government insists that the intent requirement serves as yet another safety valve, that requirement would do nothing for those who intentionally use their computers in a way their “job or policy prohibits”—for example, by checking sports scores or paying bills at work. App. 39.
One final observation: The Government's approach would inject arbitrariness into the assessment of criminal liability. The Government concedes, as it must, that the “exceeds authorized access” clause prohibits only unlawful information “access,” not downstream information “ ‘misus[e].’ ” Brief in Opposition 17 (statute does not cover “ ‘subsequen[t] misus[e of] information’ ”). But the line between the two can be thin on the Government's reading. Because purpose-based limits on access are often designed with an eye toward information misuse, they can be expressed as either access or use restrictions. For example, one police department might prohibit using a confidential database for a non-law-enforcement purpose (an access restriction), while another might prohibit using information from the database for a non-law-enforcement purpose (a use restriction). Conduct like Van Buren's can be characterized either way, and an employer might not see much difference between the two. On the Government's reading, however, the conduct would violate the CFAA only if the employer phrased the policy as an access restriction. An interpretation that stakes so much on a fine distinction controlled by the drafting practices of private parties is hard to sell as the most plausible.
IV
In sum, an individual “exceeds authorized access” when he accesses a computer with authorization but then obtains information located in particular areas of the computer—such as files, folders, or databases—that are off limits to him. The parties agree that Van Buren accessed the law enforcement database system with authorization. The only question is whether Van Buren could use the system to retrieve license-plate information. Both sides agree that he could. Van Buren accordingly did not “excee[d] authorized access” to the database, as the CFAA defines that phrase, even though he obtained information from the database for an improper purpose. We therefore reverse the contrary judgment of the Eleventh Circuit and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Footnotes
[FN1] Van Buren also was charged with and convicted of honest-services wire fraud. In a separate holding not at issue here, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit vacated Van Buren's honest-services fraud conviction as contrary to this Court's decision in McDonnell v. United States, 579 U. S. 550, 136 S.Ct. 2355, 195 L.Ed.2d 639 (2016).
[FN2] Compare Royal Truck & Trailer Sales & Serv., Inc. v. Kraft, 974 F.3d 756 (CA6 2020); United States v. Valle, 807 F.3d 508 (CA2 2015); WEC Carolina Energy Solutions LLC v. Miller, 687 F.3d 199 (CA4 2012); United States v. Nosal, 676 F.3d 854 (CA9 2012) (en banc), with United States v. Rodriguez, 628 F.3d 1258 (CA11 2010); United States v. John, 597 F.3d 263 (CA5 2010); International Airport Centers, L.L.C. v. Citrin, 440 F.3d 418 (CA7 2006); EF Cultural Travel BV v. Explorica, Inc., 274 F.3d 577 (CA1 2001).
[FN3] See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. § 171(8) (authorizing Secretary of Agriculture “[t]o sell guayule or rubber processed from guayule and to use funds so obtained in replanting and maintaining an area”); 18 U.S.C. § 648 (any person responsible for “safe-keeping of the public moneys” who “loans, uses, or converts to his own use ... any portion of the public moneys ... is guilty of embezzlement of the money so loaned, used, converted, deposited, or exchanged”); § 1163 (“[W]hoever embezzles, steals, [or] knowingly converts to his use” money or property “belonging to any Indian tribal organization,” or “[w]hoever, knowing any such moneys ... or other property to have been so embezzled, stolen, [or] converted ... retains the same with intent to convert it to his use,” is subject to punishment); § 1708 (“[W]hoever steals, takes, or abstracts, or by fraud or deception obtains, or attempts so to obtain,” parcels of mail is subject to punishment).
[FN4] The dissent criticizes this interpretation as inconsistent with “basic principles of property law,” and in particular the “familiar rule that an entitlement to use another person's property is circumstance specific.” Post, at 1664 (opinion of THOMAS, J.). But common-law principles “should be imported into statutory text only when Congress employs a common-law term”—not when Congress has outlined an offense “analogous to a common-law crime without using common-law terms.” Carter v. United States, 530 U.S. 255, 265, 120 S.Ct. 2159, 147 L.Ed.2d 203 (2000) (emphasis deleted). Relying on the common law is particularly ill advised here because it was the failure of pre-existing law to capture computer crime that helped spur Congress to enact the CFAA. See supra, at 1652.
[FN5] For the same reason, the dissent is incorrect when it contends that our interpretation reads the additional words “under any possible circumstance” into the statute. Post, at 1663 – 1664 (emphasis deleted). Our reading instead interprets the phrase “so to obtain” to incorporate the single “circumstance” of permissible information access identified by the statute: obtaining the information by using one's computer.
[FN6] 1 Oxford English Dictionary 72 (2d ed. 1989) (“[t]o gain access to ... data, etc., held in a computer or computer-based system, or the system itself ”); Random House Dictionary of the English Language 11 (2d ed. 1987) (“Computers. to locate (data) for transfer from one part of a computer system to another ...”); see also C. Sippl & R. Sippl, Computer Dictionary and Handbook 2 (3d ed. 1980) (“[c]oncerns the process of obtaining data from or placing data in storage”); Barnhart Dictionary of New English 2 (3d ed. 1990) (“to retrieve (data) from a computer storage unit or device ...”); Microsoft Computer Dictionary 12 (4th ed. 1999) (“[t]o gain entry to memory in order to read or write data”); A Dictionary of Computing 5 (6th ed. 2008) (“[t]o gain entry to data, a computer system, etc.”).
[FN7] The dissent makes the odd charge that our interpretation violates the “ ‘presumption against’ ” reading a provision “contrary to the ordinary meaning of the term it defines.” Post, at 1667. But when a statute, like this one, is “addressing a ... technical subject, a specialized meaning is to be expected.” Scalia, Reading Law, at 73. Consistent with that principle, our interpretation tracks the specialized meaning of “access” in the computer context. This reading is far from “ ‘repugnant to’ ” the meaning of the phrase “exceeds authorized access,” post, at 1667—unlike, say, a definitional provision directing that “ ‘the word dog is deemed to include all horses.’ ” Scalia, supra, at 232, n. 29.
[FN8] For present purposes, we need not address whether this inquiry turns only on technological (or “code-based”) limitations on access, or instead also looks to limits contained in contracts or policies. Cf. Brief for Orin Kerr as Amicus Curiae 7 (urging adoption of code-based approach).
[FN9] Van Buren's gates-up-or-down reading also aligns with the CFAA's prohibition on password trafficking. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 33. Enacted alongside the “exceeds authorized access” definition in 1986, the password-trafficking provision bars the sale of “any password or similar information through which a computer may be accessed without authorization.” § 1030(a)(6). The provision thus contemplates a “specific type of authorization—that is, authentication,” which turns on whether a user's credentials allow him to proceed past a computer's access gate, rather than on other, scope-based restrictions. Bellia, A Code-Based Approach to Unauthorized Access Under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 84 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1442, 1470 (2016); cf. A Dictionary of Computing, at 30 (defining “authorization” as a “process by which users, having completed an ... authentication stage, gain or are denied access to particular resources based on their entitlement”).
[FN10] Unlike the Government, the dissent would read both clauses of subsection (a)(2) to require a circumstance-specific analysis. Doing so, the dissent contends, would reflect that “[p]roperty law generally protects against both unlawful entry and unlawful use.” Post, at 1666. This interpretation suffers from structural problems of its own. Consider the standard rule prohibiting the use of one's work computer for personal purposes. Under the dissent's approach, an employee's computer access would be without authorization if he logged on to the computer with the purpose of obtaining a file for personal reasons. In that event, obtaining the file would not violate the “exceeds authorized access” clause, which applies only when one accesses a computer “with authorization.” § 1030(e)(6) (emphasis added). The dissent's reading would therefore leave the “exceeds authorized access” clause with no work to do much of the time—an outcome that Van Buren's interpretation (and, for that matter, the Government's) avoids.
[FN11] While the Government insists that Congress made this change “ ‘merely to clarify the language’ ” of § 1030(a)(2), Brief for United States 28, the dissent has a different take. In the dissent's telling, the 1986 amendment in fact “expand[ed]” the provision to reach “time and manner” restrictions on computer access—not just purpose-based ones. Post, at 1667 – 1668. The dissent's distinct explanation for why Congress removed § 1030(a)(2)’s reference to “purpose” requires accepting that the “exceeds authorized access” definition supports a circumstance-specific approach. We reject the dissent's premise for the textual and structural reasons already discussed.
[FN12] Memorandum from U. S. Atty. Gen. to U. S. Attys. & Assistant Attys. Gen. for the Crim. & Nat. Security Divs., Intake and Charging Policy for Computer Crime Matters 5 (Sept. 11, 2014), https://www.justice.gov/criminal-ccips/file/904941/download (emphasis added). Although the Government asserts that it has “[h]istorically” prosecuted only “core conduct” like Van Buren's and not the commonplace violations that Van Buren fears, Brief for United States 40, the contrary examples Van Buren and his amici cite give reason to balk at that assurance. See Brief for Petitioner 32–33; Brief for Orin Kerr as Amicus Curiae 18–23; Brief for Technology Companies as Amici Curiae 11.
2.1.4. Grimes interview on YouTube (February 2022)
Watch the portion of this video from 2:19 to 3:13, of a Vanity Fair interview with the musician Grimes. (You can watch the rest too if you like, but we'll only discuss that one portion.) Here's press coverage of the interview in Vice; be ready to discuss why, as the Vice article notes, "DDOSing someone is a federal crime, as would be destroying their property in the form of erasing backups."
2.1.5. [OPTIONAL] SCOTUSblog's post about the Van Buren ruling
Note that SCOTUSblog is a blog about the Supreme Court; it is not published by the Supreme Court.
2.1.6. [OPTIONAL] Prof. Orin Kerr's response to the Van Buren ruling
Professor Kerr is a top cyberlaw scholar whose academic publications are frequently cited in opinions of the federal courts of appeals and the Supreme Court - including the Van Buren decision.
2.2 Van Buren's Ramifications for Security Research 2.2 Van Buren's Ramifications for Security Research
Week 3
2.2.1. Electronic Frontier Foundation's blog post about Van Buren
Electronic Frontier Foundation (June 3, 2021)
The Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) is a San Francisco-based nonprofit that has been defending Americans' digital rights for over 30 years.
2.2.2 Excerpt from Department of Justice CFAA Charging Policy (May 2022) 2.2.2 Excerpt from Department of Justice CFAA Charging Policy (May 2022)
The attorney for the government should decline prosecution if available evidence shows the defendant’s conduct consisted of, and the defendant intended, good-faith security research. For purposes of this policy, the attorney for the government should apply the definition of “good-faith security research” recommended by the Register of Copyrights in Section 1201 Rulemaking: Eighth Triennial Proceeding to Determine Exemptions to the Prohibition on Circumvention, at 258 (Oct. 2021). That is: “good faith security research” means accessing a computer solely for purposes of good-faith testing, investigation, and/or correction of a security flaw or vulnerability, where such activity is carried out in a manner designed to avoid any harm to individuals or the public, and where the information derived from the activity is used primarily to promote the security or safety of the class of devices, machines, or online services to which the accessed computer belongs, or those who use such devices, machines, or online services. Security research not conducted in good faith—for example, for the purpose of discovering security holes in devices, machines, or services in order to extort the owners of such devices, machines, or services—might be called “research,” but is not in good faith. CCIPS can consult with prosecutors about specific applications of this factor.
2.2.3. Radio interview with Prof. Pfefferkorn about the DOJ's new CFAA policy
Marketplace Tech (May 25, 2022)
This is a short (under 7 minutes long) radio segment interviewing Prof. Pfefferkorn about the new DOJ's new policy regarding "good-faith security research" under the CFAA.
2.3 Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) 2.3 Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA)
Week 3
2.3.1 DMCA Section 1201 - Circumvention of copyright protection systems 2.3.1 DMCA Section 1201 - Circumvention of copyright protection systems
17 U.S.C. § 1201
United States Code, 2018 Edition
Title 17 - COPYRIGHTS
CHAPTER 12 - COPYRIGHT PROTECTION AND MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS
Sec. 1201 - Circumvention of copyright protection systems
From the U.S. Government Publishing Office,
(a)
(B) The prohibition contained in subparagraph (A) shall not apply to persons who are users of a copyrighted work which is in a particular class of works, if such persons are, or are likely to be in the succeeding 3-year period, adversely affected by virtue of such prohibition in their ability to make noninfringing uses of that particular class of works under this title, as determined under subparagraph (C).
(C) During the 2-year period described in subparagraph (A), and during each succeeding 3-year period, the Librarian of Congress, upon the recommendation of the Register of Copyrights, who shall consult with the Assistant Secretary for Communications and Information of the Department of Commerce and report and comment on his or her views in making such recommendation, shall make the determination in a rulemaking proceeding for purposes of subparagraph (B) of whether persons who are users of a copyrighted work are, or are likely to be in the succeeding 3-year period, adversely affected by the prohibition under subparagraph (A) in their ability to make noninfringing uses under this title of a particular class of copyrighted works. In conducting such rulemaking, the Librarian shall examine—
(i) the availability for use of copyrighted works;
(ii) the availability for use of works for nonprofit archival, preservation, and educational purposes;
(iii) the impact that the prohibition on the circumvention of technological measures applied to copyrighted works has on criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching, scholarship, or research;
(iv) the effect of circumvention of technological measures on the market for or value of copyrighted works; and
(v) such other factors as the Librarian considers appropriate.
(D) The Librarian shall publish any class of copyrighted works for which the Librarian has determined, pursuant to the rulemaking conducted under subparagraph (C), that noninfringing uses by persons who are users of a copyrighted work are, or are likely to be, adversely affected, and the prohibition contained in subparagraph (A) shall not apply to such users with respect to such class of works for the ensuing 3-year period.
(E) Neither the exception under subparagraph (B) from the applicability of the prohibition contained in subparagraph (A), nor any determination made in a rulemaking conducted under subparagraph (C), may be used as a defense in any action to enforce any provision of this title other than this paragraph.
(2) No person shall manufacture, import, offer to the public, provide, or otherwise traffic in any technology, product, service, device, component, or part thereof, that—
(A) is primarily designed or produced for the purpose of circumventing a technological measure that effectively controls access to a work protected under this title;
(B) has only limited commercially significant purpose or use other than to circumvent a technological measure that effectively controls access to a work protected under this title; or
(C) is marketed by that person or another acting in concert with that person with that person's knowledge for use in circumventing a technological measure that effectively controls access to a work protected under this title.
(3) As used in this subsection—
(A) to "circumvent a technological measure" means to descramble a scrambled work, to decrypt an encrypted work, or otherwise to avoid, bypass, remove, deactivate, or impair a technological measure, without the authority of the copyright owner; and
(B) a technological measure "effectively controls access to a work" if the measure, in the ordinary course of its operation, requires the application of information, or a process or a treatment, with the authority of the copyright owner, to gain access to the work.
(b)
(A) is primarily designed or produced for the purpose of circumventing protection afforded by a technological measure that effectively protects a right of a copyright owner under this title in a work or a portion thereof;
(B) has only limited commercially significant purpose or use other than to circumvent protection afforded by a technological measure that effectively protects a right of a copyright owner under this title in a work or a portion thereof; or
(C) is marketed by that person or another acting in concert with that person with that person's knowledge for use in circumventing protection afforded by a technological measure that effectively protects a right of a copyright owner under this title in a work or a portion thereof.
(2) As used in this subsection—
(A) to "circumvent protection afforded by a technological measure" means avoiding, bypassing, removing, deactivating, or otherwise impairing a technological measure; and
(B) a technological measure "effectively protects a right of a copyright owner under this title" if the measure, in the ordinary course of its operation, prevents, restricts, or otherwise limits the exercise of a right of a copyright owner under this title.
(c)
(2) Nothing in this section shall enlarge or diminish vicarious or contributory liability for copyright infringement in connection with any technology, product, service, device, component, or part thereof.
(3) Nothing in this section shall require that the design of, or design and selection of parts and components for, a consumer electronics, telecommunications, or computing product provide for a response to any particular technological measure, so long as such part or component, or the product in which such part or component is integrated, does not otherwise fall within the prohibitions of subsection (a)(2) or (b)(1).
(4) Nothing in this section shall enlarge or diminish any rights of free speech or the press for activities using consumer electronics, telecommunications, or computing products.
(d)
(A) may not be retained longer than necessary to make such good faith determination; and
(B) may not be used for any other purpose.
(2) The exemption made available under paragraph (1) shall only apply with respect to a work when an identical copy of that work is not reasonably available in another form.
(3) A nonprofit library, archives, or educational institution that willfully for the purpose of commercial advantage or financial gain violates paragraph (1)—
(A) shall, for the first offense, be subject to the civil remedies under section 1203; and
(B) shall, for repeated or subsequent offenses, in addition to the civil remedies under section 1203, forfeit the exemption provided under paragraph (1).
(4) This subsection may not be used as a defense to a claim under subsection (a)(2) or (b), nor may this subsection permit a nonprofit library, archives, or educational institution to manufacture, import, offer to the public, provide, or otherwise traffic in any technology, product, service, component, or part thereof, which circumvents a technological measure.
(5) In order for a library or archives to qualify for the exemption under this subsection, the collections of that library or archives shall be—
(A) open to the public; or
(B) available not only to researchers affiliated with the library or archives or with the institution of which it is a part, but also to other persons doing research in a specialized field.
(e)
(f)
(2) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsections (a)(2) and (b), a person may develop and employ technological means to circumvent a technological measure, or to circumvent protection afforded by a technological measure, in order to enable the identification and analysis under paragraph (1), or for the purpose of enabling interoperability of an independently created computer program with other programs, if such means are necessary to achieve such interoperability, to the extent that doing so does not constitute infringement under this title.
(3) The information acquired through the acts permitted under paragraph (1), and the means permitted under paragraph (2), may be made available to others if the person referred to in paragraph (1) or (2), as the case may be, provides such information or means solely for the purpose of enabling interoperability of an independently created computer program with other programs, and to the extent that doing so does not constitute infringement under this title or violate applicable law other than this section.
(4) For purposes of this subsection, the term "interoperability" means the ability of computer programs to exchange information, and of such programs mutually to use the information which has been exchanged.
(g)
(1)
(A) the term "encryption research" means activities necessary to identify and analyze flaws and vulnerabilities of encryption technologies applied to copyrighted works, if these activities are conducted to advance the state of knowledge in the field of encryption technology or to assist in the development of encryption products; and
(B) the term "encryption technology" means the scrambling and descrambling of information using mathematical formulas or algorithms.
(2)
(A) the person lawfully obtained the encrypted copy, phonorecord, performance, or display of the published work;
(B) such act is necessary to conduct such encryption research;
(C) the person made a good faith effort to obtain authorization before the circumvention; and
(D) such act does not constitute infringement under this title or a violation of applicable law other than this section, including section 1030 of title 18 and those provisions of title 18 amended by the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986.
(3)
(A) whether the information derived from the encryption research was disseminated, and if so, whether it was disseminated in a manner reasonably calculated to advance the state of knowledge or development of encryption technology, versus whether it was disseminated in a manner that facilitates infringement under this title or a violation of applicable law other than this section, including a violation of privacy or breach of security;
(B) whether the person is engaged in a legitimate course of study, is employed, or is appropriately trained or experienced, in the field of encryption technology; and
(C) whether the person provides the copyright owner of the work to which the technological measure is applied with notice of the findings and documentation of the research, and the time when such notice is provided.
(4)
(A) develop and employ technological means to circumvent a technological measure for the sole purpose of that person performing the acts of good faith encryption research described in paragraph (2); and
(B) provide the technological means to another person with whom he or she is working collaboratively for the purpose of conducting the acts of good faith encryption research described in paragraph (2) or for the purpose of having that other person verify his or her acts of good faith encryption research described in paragraph (2).
(5)
(A) encryption research and the development of encryption technology;
(B) the adequacy and effectiveness of technological measures designed to protect copyrighted works; and
(C) protection of copyright owners against the unauthorized access to their encrypted copyrighted works.
The report shall include legislative recommendations, if any.
(h)
(1) does not itself violate the provisions of this title; and
(2) has the sole purpose to prevent the access of minors to material on the Internet.
(i)
(1)
(A) the technological measure, or the work it protects, contains the capability of collecting or disseminating personally identifying information reflecting the online activities of a natural person who seeks to gain access to the work protected;
(B) in the normal course of its operation, the technological measure, or the work it protects, collects or disseminates personally identifying information about the person who seeks to gain access to the work protected, without providing conspicuous notice of such collection or dissemination to such person, and without providing such person with the capability to prevent or restrict such collection or dissemination;
(C) the act of circumvention has the sole effect of identifying and disabling the capability described in subparagraph (A), and has no other effect on the ability of any person to gain access to any work; and
(D) the act of circumvention is carried out solely for the purpose of preventing the collection or dissemination of personally identifying information about a natural person who seeks to gain access to the work protected, and is not in violation of any other law.
(2)
(j)
(1)
(2)
(3)
(A) whether the information derived from the security testing was used solely to promote the security of the owner or operator of such computer, computer system or computer network, or shared directly with the developer of such computer, computer system, or computer network; and
(B) whether the information derived from the security testing was used or maintained in a manner that does not facilitate infringement under this title or a violation of applicable law other than this section, including a violation of privacy or breach of security.
(4)
(k)
(1)
(A) Effective 18 months after the date of the enactment of this chapter, no person shall manufacture, import, offer to the public, provide or otherwise traffic in any—
(i) VHS format analog video cassette recorder unless such recorder conforms to the automatic gain control copy control technology;
(ii) 8mm format analog video cassette camcorder unless such camcorder conforms to the automatic gain control technology;
(iii) Beta format analog video cassette recorder, unless such recorder conforms to the automatic gain control copy control technology, except that this requirement shall not apply until there are 1,000 Beta format analog video cassette recorders sold in the United States in any one calendar year after the date of the enactment of this chapter;
(iv) 8mm format analog video cassette recorder that is not an analog video cassette camcorder, unless such recorder conforms to the automatic gain control copy control technology, except that this requirement shall not apply until there are 20,000 such recorders sold in the United States in any one calendar year after the date of the enactment of this chapter; or
(v) analog video cassette recorder that records using an NTSC format video input and that is not otherwise covered under clauses (i) through (iv), unless such device conforms to the automatic gain control copy control technology.
(B) Effective on the date of the enactment of this chapter, no person shall manufacture, import, offer to the public, provide or otherwise traffic in—
(i) any VHS format analog video cassette recorder or any 8mm format analog video cassette recorder if the design of the model of such recorder has been modified after such date of enactment so that a model of recorder that previously conformed to the automatic gain control copy control technology no longer conforms to such technology; or
(ii) any VHS format analog video cassette recorder, or any 8mm format analog video cassette recorder that is not an 8mm analog video cassette camcorder, if the design of the model of such recorder has been modified after such date of enactment so that a model of recorder that previously conformed to the four-line colorstripe copy control technology no longer conforms to such technology.
Manufacturers that have not previously manufactured or sold a VHS format analog video cassette recorder, or an 8mm format analog cassette recorder, shall be required to conform to the four-line colorstripe copy control technology in the initial model of any such recorder manufactured after the date of the enactment of this chapter, and thereafter to continue conforming to the four-line colorstripe copy control technology. For purposes of this subparagraph, an analog video cassette recorder "conforms to" the four-line colorstripe copy control technology if it records a signal that, when played back by the playback function of that recorder in the normal viewing mode, exhibits, on a reference display device, a display containing distracting visible lines through portions of the viewable picture.
(2)
(A) of a single transmission, or specified group of transmissions, of live events or of audiovisual works for which a member of the public has exercised choice in selecting the transmissions, including the content of the transmissions or the time of receipt of such transmissions, or both, and as to which such member is charged a separate fee for each such transmission or specified group of transmissions;
(B) from a copy of a transmission of a live event or an audiovisual work if such transmission is provided by a channel or service where payment is made by a member of the public for such channel or service in the form of a subscription fee that entitles the member of the public to receive all of the programming contained in such channel or service;
(C) from a physical medium containing one or more prerecorded audiovisual works; or
(D) from a copy of a transmission described in subparagraph (A) or from a copy made from a physical medium described in subparagraph (C).
In the event that a transmission meets both the conditions set forth in subparagraph (A) and those set forth in subparagraph (B), the transmission shall be treated as a transmission described in subparagraph (A).
(3)
(A) require any analog video cassette camcorder to conform to the automatic gain control copy control technology with respect to any video signal received through a camera lens;
(B) apply to the manufacture, importation, offer for sale, provision of, or other trafficking in, any professional analog video cassette recorder; or
(C) apply to the offer for sale or provision of, or other trafficking in, any previously owned analog video cassette recorder, if such recorder was legally manufactured and sold when new and not subsequently modified in violation of paragraph (1)(B).
(4)
(A) An "analog video cassette recorder" means a device that records, or a device that includes a function that records, on electromagnetic tape in an analog format the electronic impulses produced by the video and audio portions of a television program, motion picture, or other form of audiovisual work.
(B) An "analog video cassette camcorder" means an analog video cassette recorder that contains a recording function that operates through a camera lens and through a video input that may be connected with a television or other video playback device.
(C) An analog video cassette recorder "conforms" to the automatic gain control copy control technology if it—
(i) detects one or more of the elements of such technology and does not record the motion picture or transmission protected by such technology; or
(ii) records a signal that, when played back, exhibits a meaningfully distorted or degraded display.
(D) The term "professional analog video cassette recorder" means an analog video cassette recorder that is designed, manufactured, marketed, and intended for use by a person who regularly employs such a device for a lawful business or industrial use, including making, performing, displaying, distributing, or transmitting copies of motion pictures on a commercial scale.
(E) The terms "VHS format", "8mm format", "Beta format", "automatic gain control copy control technology", "colorstripe copy control technology", "four-line version of the colorstripe copy control technology", and "NTSC" have the meanings that are commonly understood in the consumer electronics and motion picture industries as of the date of the enactment of this chapter.
(5)
Notes
References in Text
The date of the enactment of this chapter, referred to in subsecs. (a)(1)(A), (g)(5), and (k)(1), (4)(E), is the date of enactment of Pub. L. 105–304, which was approved Oct. 28, 1998.
The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986, referred to in subsecs. (g)(2)(D) and (j)(2), is Pub. L. 99–474, Oct. 16, 1986, 100 Stat. 1213, which amended section 1030 of Title 18, Crimes and Criminal Procedure, and enacted provisions set out as a note under section 1001 of Title 18. For complete classification of this Act to the Code, see Short Title of 1986 Amendment note set out under section 1001 of Title 18 and Tables.
Amendments
1999—Subsec. (a)(1)(C). Pub. L. 106–113 struck out "on the record" after "determination in a rulemaking proceeding" in first sentence.
Unlocking Consumer Choice and Wireless Competition
Pub. L. 113–144, Aug. 1, 2014, 128 Stat. 1751, provided that:
"SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
"This Act may be cited as the 'Unlocking Consumer Choice and Wireless Competition Act'.
"SEC. 2. REPEAL OF EXISTING RULE AND ADDITIONAL RULEMAKING BY LIBRARIAN OF CONGRESS.
"(a)
"(b)
"(c)
"(1)(A) as authorized by paragraph (3) of section 201.40(b) of title 37, Code of Federal Regulations, as made effective by subsection (a); and
"(B) as may be extended to other wireless devices pursuant to a determination in the rulemaking conducted under subsection (b); or
"(2) as authorized by an exemption adopted by the Librarian of Congress pursuant to a determination made on or after the date of enactment of this Act under section 1201(a)(1)(C) of title 17, United States Code,
may be initiated by the owner of any such handset or other device, by another person at the direction of the owner, or by a provider of a commercial mobile radio service or a commercial mobile data service at the direction of such owner or other person, solely in order to enable such owner or a family member of such owner to connect to a wireless telecommunications network, when such connection is authorized by the operator of such network.
"(d)
"(1)
"(2)
"(e)
"(1)
"(2)
"(3)
2.3.2 Copyright Office - Final Rule, Eighth Triennial Section 1201 Rulemaking (Oct. 2021) 2.3.2 Copyright Office - Final Rule, Eighth Triennial Section 1201 Rulemaking (Oct. 2021)
AGENCY:
U.S. Copyright Office, Library of Congress.
ACTION:
Final rule.
SUMMARY:
In this final rule, the Librarian of Congress adopts exemptions to the provision of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”) that prohibits circumvention of technological measures that control access to copyrighted works. As required under the statute, the Register of Copyrights, following a public proceeding, submitted a recommendation concerning proposed exemptions to the Librarian of Congress (“Register's Recommendation”). After careful consideration, the Librarian adopts final regulations based upon the Register's Recommendation.
DATES:
Effective October 28, 2021.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Kevin R. Amer, Acting General Counsel and Associate Register of Copyrights, by email at kamer@copyright.gov, or Mark Gray, Attorney-Advisor, by email at mgray@copyright.gov. Each can be contacted by telephone by calling (202) 707-8350.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
The Librarian of Congress, pursuant to section 1201(a)(1) of title 17, United States Code, has determined in this eighth triennial rulemaking proceeding that the prohibition against circumvention of technological measures that effectively control access to copyrighted works shall not apply for the next three years to persons who engage in certain noninfringing uses of certain classes of such works. This determination is based upon the Register's Recommendation.
The below discussion summarizes the rulemaking proceeding and the Register's recommendations, announces the Librarian's determination, and publishes the regulatory text specifying the exempted classes of works. A more complete discussion of the rulemaking process, the evidentiary record, and the Register's analysis with respect to each proposed exemption can be found in the Register's Recommendation, which is posted at www.copyright.gov/1201/2021/.
I. Background
A. Statutory Requirements
Congress enacted the DMCA in 1998 to implement certain provisions of the WIPO Copyright and WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaties. Among other things, title I of the DMCA, which added a new chapter 12 to title 17 of the U.S. Code, prohibits circumvention of technological measures employed by or on behalf of copyright owners to protect access to their works. In enacting this aspect of the law, Congress observed that technological protection measures (“TPMs”) can “support new ways of disseminating copyrighted materials to users, and . . . safeguard the availability of legitimate uses of those materials by individuals.” [1]
Section 1201(a)(1) provides in pertinent part that “[n]o person shall circumvent a technological measure that effectively controls access to a work protected under [title 17].” Under the statute, to “circumvent a technological measure” means “to descramble a scrambled work, to decrypt an encrypted work, or otherwise to avoid, bypass, remove, deactivate, or impair a technological measure, without the authority of the copyright owner.” [2] A technological measure that “effectively controls access to a work” is one that “in the ordinary course of its operation, requires the application of information, or a process or a treatment, with the authority of the copyright owner, to gain access to the work.” [3]
Section 1201(a)(1) also includes what Congress characterized as a “fail-safe” mechanism,[4] which requires the Librarian of Congress, following a rulemaking proceeding, to exempt any class from the prohibition for a three-year period if she has determined that noninfringing uses by persons who are users of copyrighted works in that class are, or are likely to be, adversely affected by the prohibition against circumvention during that period.[5] The Librarian's determination to grant an exemption is based upon the recommendation of the Register of Copyrights, who conducts the rulemaking proceeding.[6] The Register consults with the Assistant Secretary for Communications and Information of the Department of Commerce, who oversees the National Telecommunications and Information Administration (“NTIA”), in the course of formulating her recommendations.[7]
Exemptions adopted by rule under section 1201(a)(1) apply only to the conduct of circumventing a technological measure that controls access to a copyrighted work. Other parts of section 1201 address the manufacture and provision of—or “trafficking” in—products and services designed for purposes of circumvention. Section 1201(a)(2) bars trafficking in products and services that are used to circumvent technological measures that control access to copyrighted works (for example, a password needed to open a media file),[8] while section 1201(b) bars trafficking in products and services used to circumvent technological measures that protect the exclusive rights of the copyright owner (for example, technology that prevents the work from being reproduced).[9] The Librarian has no authority to adopt exemptions for the anti-trafficking prohibitions contained in section 1201(a)(2) or (b).[10]
The statute contains certain permanent exemptions to permit specified uses. These include section 1201(d), which exempts certain activities of nonprofit libraries, archives, and educational institutions; section 1201(e), which exempts “lawfully authorized investigative, protective, information security, or intelligence activity” of a state or the federal government; section 1201(f), which exempts certain “reverse engineering” activities to facilitate interoperability; section 1201(g), which exempts certain types of research into encryption technologies; section 1201(h), which exempts certain activities to prevent the “access of minors to material on the internet”; section 1201(i), which exempts certain activities “solely for the purpose of preventing the collection or dissemination of personally identifying information”; and section 1201(j), which exempts certain acts of “security testing” of computers and computer systems.
B. Rulemaking Standards
In adopting the DMCA, Congress imposed legal and evidentiary requirements for the section 1201 rulemaking proceeding, as discussed in greater detail in the Register's Recommendation [11] and the Copyright Office's 2017 policy study on section 1201.[12] The Register will recommend granting an exemption only “when the preponderance of the evidence in the record shows that the conditions for granting an exemption have been met.” [13] The evidence must show “that it is more likely than not that users of a copyrighted work will, in the succeeding three‐year period, be adversely affected by the prohibition on circumvention in their ability to make noninfringing uses of a particular class of copyrighted works.” [14]
The Librarian must assess whether the implementation of access controls impairs the ability of individuals to make noninfringing uses of copyrighted works within the meaning of section 1201(a)(1). To aid in this process, the Register develops a comprehensive administrative record using information submitted by interested members of the public, and makes recommendations to the Librarian concerning whether exemptions are warranted based on that record.
To establish the need for an exemption, proponents must show, at a minimum, (1) that uses affected by the prohibition on circumvention are or are likely to be noninfringing; and (2) that as a result of a technological measure controlling access to a copyrighted work, the prohibition is causing, or in the next three years is likely to cause, an adverse impact on those uses. In addition, the Librarian must examine the statutory factors listed in section 1201(a)(1): (1) The availability for use of copyrighted works; (2) the availability for use of works for nonprofit archival, preservation, and educational purposes; (3) the impact that the prohibition on the circumvention of technological measures applied to copyrighted works has on criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching, scholarship, or research; (4) the effect of circumvention of technological measures on the market for or value of copyrighted works; and (5) such other factors as the Librarian considers appropriate.
Finally, section 1201(a)(1) specifies that any exemption adopted as part of this rulemaking must be defined based on “a particular class of works.” [15] Among other things, the determination of the appropriate scope of a “class of works” recommended for exemption may take into account the adverse effects an exemption may have on the market for or value of copyrighted works. Accordingly, “it can be appropriate to refine a class by reference to the use or user in order to remedy the adverse effect of the prohibition and to limit the adverse consequences of an exemption.” [16]
II. History of the Eighth Triennial Proceeding
The Office initiated the eighth triennial rulemaking proceeding through a Notice of Inquiry (“NOI”) on June 22, 2020.[17] The NOI requested petitions for renewal of exemptions adopted in the 2018 rulemaking, petitions in opposition to renewal, and any petitions for new exemptions, including proposals to expand a current exemption. The Office received twenty-six petitions for new exemptions, including thirteen comments seeking to expand certain current exemptions.
As in the prior rulemaking, the Office employed a streamlined process for renewing existing exemptions in this proceeding, detailing the renewal process in its public notices.[18] Streamlined renewal is based upon a determination that, due to a lack of legal, marketplace, or technological changes, the factors that led the Register to recommend adoption of the exemption in the prior rulemaking are expected to continue into the forthcoming triennial period.[19] That is, the same material facts and circumstances underlying the previously-adopted regulatory exemption may be relied on to renew the exemption. Because the statute requires that exemptions be adopted upon a new determination concerning the next three-year period, the fact that the Librarian previously adopted an exemption creates no presumption that readoption is appropriate.
The Register's Recommendation provides a detailed description of the process the Office used to create a record for each renewal petition.[20] In brief, the Office first solicited renewal petitions as well as comments from participants opposing the readoption of the exemption. The Office received thirty-two renewal petitions and fifteen comments in response to those petitions. Seven comments supported renewal of a current exemption, and eight comments raised discrete concerns with specific petitions, but did not oppose readoption of the relevant exemption.[21]
On October 15, 2020, the Office issued its notice of proposed rulemaking (“NPRM”) identifying the existing exemptions for which the Register intended to recommend renewal, and outlined the proposed classes for new exemptions, for which three rounds of public comments were initiated.[22] Those proposals were organized into seventeen classes of works. Six of the seventeen proposed exemptions sought expansions of existing exemptions, seven proposed entirely new exemptions, and four contained a combination of both expansions and new exemptions. The Office then held seven days of public hearings in which it heard testimony from numerous participants. After the hearings, the Office issued written questions to hearing participants regarding certain proposed classes.[23] Finally, the Office held several ex parte meetings with participants concerning ten proposed classes.[24]
As required by section 1201(a)(1), the Register consulted with NTIA during this rulemaking. NTIA provided input at various stages and participated in the virtual public hearings. NTIA formally communicated its views on each of the proposed exemptions to the Register on October 1, 2021. The Office addresses NTIA's substantive views on the proposed classes below. NTIA's recommendations can be viewed at https://cdn.loc.gov/copyright/1201/2021/2021_NTIA_DMCA_Letter.pdf.
III. Summary of Register's Recommendation
A. Renewal Recommendations
As set forth in the NPRM, the Register received petitions to renew each of the exemptions adopted pursuant to the seventh triennial rulemaking. Eight comments in response to renewal petitions raised discrete concerns with specific petitions, but none opposed the verbatim readoption of an existing regulatory exemption or disputed the reliability of the previously analyzed administrative record.[25] The Register recommends renewal of these exemptions based on the information provided in the renewal petitions and the lack of meaningful opposition, finding that the conditions that led to adoption of the exemptions are likely to continue during the next triennial period. The existing exemptions, and the bases for the recommendation to readopt each exemption in accordance with the streamlined renewal process, are discussed in detail in the Recommendation and summarized briefly below. Where noted, these exemptions serve as a baseline in considering requests for expansion.
1. Audiovisual Works—Educational and Derivative Uses
Multiple individuals and organizations petitioned to renew the exemption covering the use of short portions of motion pictures for various educational and derivative uses.[26] The Office did not receive meaningful opposition to readoption of these exemptions. Petitions to renew the various subparts of the exemption are discussed below. The existing exemption and its various subparts collectively serve as the baseline in assessing whether to recommend any expansions in Class 1.
a. Audiovisual Works—Criticism and Comment, Teaching, or Scholarship—Universities and K-12 Educational Institutions.[27]
Multiple individuals and organizations petitioned to renew the exemption for motion pictures for educational purposes by college and university or K-12 faculty and students. The Office did not receive substantive opposition to readoption of this exemption. The petitions demonstrated that educators and students continue to rely on excerpts from digital media for class presentations and coursework. For example, a collective of individuals and organizations provided several examples of professors using DVD clips in the classroom. A group of individual educators and educational organizations [28] broadly suggested that the “entire field” of video essays or multimedia criticism “could not have existed in the United States without fair use and the 1201 educational exemption.” [29] Petitioners demonstrated personal knowledge and experience with regard to this exemption based on their representation of thousands of digital and literacy educators and/or members supporting educators and students, combined with past participation in the section 1201 triennial rulemaking. The Register finds that petitioners demonstrated a continuing need and justification for the exemption.
b. Audiovisual Works—Criticism and Comment—Massive Open Online Courses (“MOOCs”).[30]
A collective of individuals and organizations and Brigham Young University (“BYU”) petitioned to renew the exemption for educational uses of motion pictures in MOOCs. The Office did not receive meaningful opposition to readoption of this exemption. The petitions demonstrated the continuing need and justification for the exemption, stating that instructors continue to rely on the exemption to develop, provide, and improve MOOCs, as well as to increase the number of (and therefore access to) MOOCs in the field of film and media studies.
c. Audiovisual Works—Criticism and Comment—Digital and Media Literacy Programs [31]
Library Copyright Alliance (“LCA”) and Renee Hobbs petitioned to renew the exemption for motion pictures for educational uses in nonprofit digital and media literacy programs offered by libraries, museums, and other organizations. No oppositions were filed against readoption of this exemption. The petition stated that librarians across the country have relied on the current exemption and will continue to do so for their digital and media literacy programs, thereby demonstrating the continuing need and justification for the exemption.
d. Audiovisual Works—Criticism and Comment—Multimedia E-books [32]
Multiple petitioners jointly sought to renew the exemption for the use of motion picture excerpts in nonfiction multimedia e-books. The Office did not receive meaningful opposition to readoption of this exemption. The petition demonstrated the continuing need and justification for the exemption. In addition, the petitioners demonstrated personal knowledge through Bobette Buster's continued work on an e-book series based on her lecture series, “Deconstructing Master Filmmakers: The Uses of Cinematic Enchantment,” which “relies on the availability of high-resolution video not available without circumvention of TPMs.” [33]
e. Audiovisual Works—Criticism and Comment—Filmmaking [34]
Multiple organizations petitioned to renew the exemption for motion pictures for uses in documentary films or other films where the use is a parody or based on the work's biographical or historically significant nature. The Office did not receive meaningful opposition to readoption of this exemption. Petitioners stated that they personally know many filmmakers who have found it necessary to rely on this exemption and will continue to do so. The petitions summarized the continuing need and justification for the exemption.
f. Audiovisual Works—Criticism and Comment—Noncommercial Videos [35]
Two organizations petitioned to renew the exemption for motion pictures for uses in noncommercial videos. The Office did not receive meaningful opposition to readoption of this exemption. Petitioners stated that they had personal knowledge that video creators have relied on this exemption and anticipate needing to continue to use the exemption in the future. The Organization for Transformative Works (“OTW”) included an account from an academic who stated that footage ripped from DVDs and Blu-ray is preferred for “vidders” (noncommercial remix artists) because “it is high quality enough to bear up under the transformations that vidders make to it.” [36] The petitions therefore demonstrated the continuing need and justification for the exemption.
2. Audiovisual Works—Accessibility [37]
Multiple organizations petitioned to renew the exemption for motion pictures for the provision of captioning and/or audio description by disability services offices or similar units at educational institutions for students with disabilities. No oppositions were filed in connection with readoption of this exemption. The petitions demonstrated the continuing need and justification for the exemption, and the petitioners demonstrated personal knowledge and experience as to the exemption. For example, BYU asserted that its disability services offices “sometimes need to create accessible versions of motion pictures” to accommodate its students with disabilities.[38] The petitions stated that there is a need for the exemption going forward; indeed, one group of petitioners stated that “the need is likely to increase significantly in light of the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic as many educational institutions shift to online learning and the use of digital multimedia by faculty increases.” [39] This existing exemption serves as the baseline in assessing whether to recommend any expansions in Class 3.
3. Literary Works Distributed Electronically—Accessibility [40]
Multiple organizations petitioned to renew the exemption for literary works distributed electronically ( i.e., e-books), for use with assistive technologies for persons who are blind, visually impaired, or have print disabilities. No oppositions were filed against readoption of this exemption. The petitions demonstrated the continuing need and justification for the exemption, stating that individuals who are blind, visually impaired, or print disabled have difficulty obtaining accessible e-book content because TPMs interfere with the use of assistive technologies. Petitioners noted that their members frequently cite accessibility of e-books as a top priority. Finally, petitioners demonstrated personal knowledge and experience with regard to the assistive technology exemption because they are all organizations that advocate for the blind, visually impaired, and print disabled. This existing exemption serves as the baseline in assessing whether to recommend any expansions in Class 8.
4. Literary Works—Medical Device Data [41]
Hugo Campos petitioned to renew the exemption covering access to patient data on networked medical devices. No oppositions were filed against readoption of this exemption, and Consumer Reports submitted a comment in support of the renewal petition. Mr. Campos's petition demonstrated the continuing need and justification for the exemption, stating that patients continue to need access to data output from their medical devices to manage their health. Mr. Campos demonstrated personal knowledge and experience with regard to this exemption, as he is a patient needing access to the data output from his medical device and a member of a coalition whose members research the effectiveness of networked medical devices. This existing exemption serves as the baseline in assessing whether to recommend any expansions in Class 9.
5. Computer Programs—Unlocking [42]
Multiple organizations petitioned to renew the exemption for computer programs that operate cellphones, tablets, mobile hotspots, or wearable devices ( e.g., smartwatches) to allow connection of a new or used device to an alternative wireless network (“unlocking”).[43] No oppositions were filed against readoption of this exemption, and Consumer Reports submitted a comment in support of the renewal petition. The petitions demonstrated the continuing need and justification for the exemption, stating that consumers of the enumerated products continue to need to be able to unlock the devices so they can switch network providers. For example, the Institute of Scrap Recycling Industries, Inc. (“ISRI”) stated that its members continue to purchase or acquire donated cell phones, tablets, and other wireless devices and try to reuse them, but that wireless carriers lock devices to prevent them from being used on other carriers.[44] In addition, petitioners demonstrated personal knowledge and experience with regard to this exemption. This existing exemption serves as the baseline in assessing whether to recommend any expansions in Class 10.
6. Computer Programs—Jailbreaking [45]
Multiple organizations petitioned to renew the exemptions for computer programs that operate smartphones, tablets and other portable all-purpose mobile computing devices, smart TVs, or voice assistant devices to allow the device to interoperate with or to remove software applications (“jailbreaking”). No oppositions were filed against readoption of this exemption, and Consumer Reports submitted a comment in support of the renewal petition. The petitions demonstrated the continuing need and justification for the exemption, and that petitioners have personal knowledge and experience with regard to this exemption. For example, regarding smart TVs specifically, the Software Freedom Conservancy (“SFC”) asserted that it has “reviewed the policies and product offerings of major Smart TV manufacturers (Sony, LG, Samsung, etc.) and they are substantially the same as those examined during the earlier rulemaking process.” [46] The petitions stated that, absent an exemption, TPMs applied to the enumerated products would have an adverse effect on noninfringing uses, such as being able to install third-party applications on a smartphone or download third-party software on a smart TV to enable interoperability. This existing exemption serves as the baseline in assessing whether to recommend any expansions in Class 11.
7. Computer Programs—Repair of Motorized Land Vehicles [47]
Multiple organizations petitioned to renew the exemption for computer programs that control motorized land vehicles, including farm equipment, for purposes of diagnosis, repair, or modification of a vehicle function. The Office did not receive meaningful opposition to readoption of this exemption, and Consumer Reports submitted a comment in support of the renewal petition. The petitions demonstrated the continuing need and justification for the exemption. For example, the Motor & Equipment Manufacturers Association (“MEMA”) stated that over the past three years, its membership “has seen firsthand that the exemption is helping protect consumer choice and a competitive market, while mitigating risks to intellectual property and vehicle safety.” [48] Similarly, the Auto Care Association (“ACA”) stated that “[u]nless this exemption is renewed, the software measures manufacturers deploy for the purpose of controlling access to vehicle software will prevent Auto Care members from lawfully assisting consumers in the maintenance, repair, and upgrade of their vehicles.” [49] The petitioners demonstrated personal knowledge and experience with regard to this exemption; each either represents or gathered information from individuals or businesses that perform vehicle service and repair. This existing exemption, as well as the existing exemption pertaining to repair of smartphones, home appliances, and home systems, serve as the baseline in assessing whether to recommend any expansions in Class 12.
8. Computer Programs—Repair of Smartphones, Home Appliances, and Home Systems [50]
Multiple organizations petitioned to renew the exemption for computer programs that control smartphones, home appliances, or home systems, for diagnosis, maintenance, or repair of the device or system. The Office did not receive meaningful opposition to readoption of this exemption, and Consumer Reports submitted a comment in support of the renewal petition. The petitions demonstrated the continuing need and justification for the exemption. For example, the Electronic Frontier Foundation (“EFF”), the Repair Association, and iFixit asserted that “[m]anufacturers of these devices continue to implement [TPMs] that inhibit lawful repairs, maintenance, and diagnostics, and they show no sign of changing course.” [51] This existing exemption, as well as the existing exemption pertaining to repair of motorized land vehicles, serve as the baseline in assessing whether to recommend any expansions in Class 12.
9. Computer Programs—Security Research [52]
Multiple organizations and security researchers petitioned to renew the exemption permitting circumvention for purposes of good-faith security research. No oppositions were filed against readoption of this exemption, and Consumer Reports submitted a comment in support of the renewal petition. The petitioners demonstrated the continuing need and justification for the exemption, as well as personal knowledge and experience with regard to this exemption. For example, J. Alex Halderman, the Center for Democracy and Technology (“CDT”), and the U.S. Technology Policy Committee of the Association for Computing Machinery (“ACM”) highlighted the need to find and detect vulnerabilities in voting machines and other election systems in response to increasing aggressiveness on the part of threat actors, including other nation states.[53] MEMA stated that its membership “experienced firsthand that the exemption is helping encourage innovation in the automotive industry while mitigating risks to intellectual property and vehicle safety,” and opined that the current exemption strikes an “appropriate balance.” [54] This existing exemption serves as the baseline in assessing whether to recommend any expansions in Class 13.
10. Computer Programs—Software Preservation [55]
The Software Preservation Network (“SPN”) and LCA petitioned to renew the exemption for computer programs, other than video games, for the preservation of computer programs and computer program-dependent materials by libraries, archives, and museums. No oppositions were filed against readoption of this exemption. The petition stated that libraries, archives, and museums continue to need the exemption to preserve and curate software and materials dependent on software. For example, the petition explained that researchers at the University of Virginia designed a project in order to access a collection of drawings and plans from a local Charlottesville architecture firm, and that without the exemption, the outdated Computer Aided Design software used to create many of the designs “may have remained inaccessible to researchers, rendering the designs themselves inaccessible, too.” [56] In addition, petitioners demonstrated personal knowledge and experience with regard to this exemption through past participation in the section 1201 triennial rulemaking relating to access controls on software, and/or representing major library associations with members who have relied on this exemption. This existing exemption, as well as the exemption pertaining to video game preservation, serve as the baseline in assessing whether to recommend any expansions in Class 14.
11. Computer Programs—Video Game Preservation [57]
SPN and LCA petitioned to renew the exemption for preservation of video games for which outside server support has been discontinued. No oppositions were filed against readoption of this exemption, and Consumer Reports submitted a comment in support of the renewal petition. The petition stated that libraries, archives, and museums continue to need the exemption to preserve and curate video games in playable form. For example, the petition highlighted Georgia Tech University Library's Computing Lab, retroTECH, which has made a significant collection of recovered video game consoles accessible for research and teaching uses pursuant to the exemption.[58] Petitioners demonstrated personal knowledge and experience with regard to this exemption through past participation in the section 1201 triennial rulemaking, and/or through their representation of members who have relied on this exemption. This existing exemption, as well as the above exemption pertaining to software preservation, serve as the baseline in assessing whether to recommend any expansions in Class 14.
12. Computer Programs—3D Printers [59]
Michael Weinberg petitioned to renew the exemption for computer programs that operate 3D printers to allow use of alternative feedstock. No oppositions were filed against readoption of this exemption. The petition demonstrated the continuing need and justification for the exemption, and petitioner demonstrated personal knowledge and experience regarding the exemption. Specifically, Mr. Weinberg declared that he is a member of the 3D printing community and previously participated in the section 1201 triennial rulemaking. In addition, the petition stated that manufacturers of 3D printers continue to limit the types of materials that may be used with the devices. This existing exemption serves as the baseline in assessing whether to recommend any expansions in Class 15.
B. New or Expanded Designations of Classes
Based upon the record in this proceeding regarding proposed expansions to existing exemptions or newly proposed exemptions, the Register recommends that the Librarian determine that the following classes of works be exempt from the prohibition against circumvention of technological measures set forth in section 1201(a)(1):
1. Proposed Class 1: Audiovisual Works—Criticism and Comment [60]
Proposed Class 1 sought to expand the existing exemption that permits circumvention of access controls protecting excerpts of motion pictures on DVDs, Blu-ray discs, and digitally transmitted video for the purposes of criticism and comment, including for educational purposes by certain users. Three different petitions were filed in this class. OTW's proposed exemption sought to eliminate multiple limitations, including the requirement that a user consider whether screen capture technology is a viable alternative before circumvention. BYU's proposed exemption would permit circumvention by college or university employees or students or by K-12 educators or students acting under the direct supervision of an educator, and would significantly alter the language of the current exemption regarding the purpose of the circumvention. A group of individual educators and educational organizations (“Joint Educators”) proposed an exemption that would permit circumvention by “educators and preparers of online learning materials” to be used on online learning platforms. All three proposals sought to remove the reference to screen capture from the existing exemption. OTW and Joint Educators' proposals sought to use short portions of motion pictures; the BYU proposal sought use of full-length works. The proposals addressed several uses of motion pictures that proponents contended are noninfringing and that they argued are adversely affected by TPMs. NTIA supported the proposed exemption, but proposed some amendments to the text.
Opponents argued that the proposed changes were unwarranted or unnecessary. The Motion Picture Association, the Alliance for Recorded Music, and the Entertainment Software Association (collectively, “Joint Creators”) and the DVD Copy Control Association (“DVD CCA”) and the Advanced Access Content System Licensing Administrator, LLC (“AACS LA”) argued that screen capture technology has improved and remains an adequate alternative in some circumstances. Joint Creators also argued that the Joint Educators' proposal to expand the exemption to “educators and preparers of online learning materials” could permit circumvention by businesses and threaten the market for licensed clips. DVD CCA and AACS LA contended that expanding the exemption to cover employees of a qualifying MOOC was unnecessary for online educators to prepare materials.
For the reasons detailed in the Register's Recommendation, the Register recommended expanding the exemption to permit employees of colleges and universities to circumvent at the direction of a faculty member for the purpose of teaching a course, and also to cover similar uses by both faculty and employees acting at the direction of faculty members of accredited nonprofit educational institutions for the purposes of offering MOOCs. The Register further recommended retaining the screen capture provision in the exemption to anticipate the possibility that screen capture technology could be found to involve circumvention. The Register concluded that the exemption should not be expanded or amended to cover copying for the purpose of performing full-length motion pictures for educational purposes; to replace the phrase “short portions” with “reasonable and limited portions”; to enable circumvention by for-profit and/or unaccredited educational companies and organizations; or to cover the broadly defined “educators and preparers of online learning materials” of “online learning platforms.”
2. Proposed Class 3: Audiovisual Works—Accessibility [61]
Class 3 proponents sought to expand several provisions of the current exemption for adding captions or audio description to motion pictures for the benefit of students with disabilities. Proponents requested expanding the exemption to include faculty and staff with disabilities at educational institutions as beneficiaries, explicitly permitting reuse of previously remediated materials, allowing for proactive remediation in advance of a specific request for accessible material, and clarifying the market-check requirement to encompass only works on the market that are of “sufficient quality.” Joint Creators and DVD CCA & AACS LA filed oppositions. NTIA supported the proposed exemption.
For the reasons discussed in the Register's Recommendation, the Register concluded that expanding the exemption to faculty and staff with disabilities, allowing reuse of previously remediated material, and permitting proactive remediation are likely fair uses because they are directed towards adding captions or audio descriptions in compliance with disability law, the same purpose found fair in the Register's 2018 Recommendation. Additionally, the Register concluded that proponents had provided sufficient evidence that they would be adversely affected if the exemption were not expanded.
3. Proposed Class 5: Audiovisual Works—Preservation and Replacement [62]
Class 5 proponents sought to permit circumvention of TPMs on motion pictures (including television shows and videos) stored on DVDs or Blu-ray discs that are no longer reasonably available in the marketplace to enable libraries, archives, and museums to make preservation and replacement copies of those works. The proposed exemption would permit qualifying institutions to make copies of discs that are damaged or deteriorating, as well as discs that have not yet begun to deteriorate; to make physical or digital copies of the motion pictures; and to make any digital copies available outside the premises of the institution. NTIA supported the proposed exemption.
Joint Creators and DVD CCA and AACS LA opposed the exemption, arguing that it would enable institutions to space-shift [63] their film collections and launch online streaming services. Opponents contended that, should an exemption be granted, it should apply only to damaged or deteriorating discs; it should prohibit off-premises access to the copied works; and the market check should include a requirement that institutions determine if the motion picture is available for streaming through a licensed source.
For the reasons detailed in the Register's Recommendation, the Register concluded that it was likely to be a fair use for qualifying institutions to copy motion pictures from discs that are damaged or deteriorating if the motion pictures on those discs are not reasonably available in the marketplace for purchase or streaming. The Register concluded that proponents had not demonstrated that providing off-premises access to the replacement copies of motion pictures is likely to be noninfringing. The Register concluded that proponents had provided substantial evidence that granting the exemption would benefit preservation, education, and scholarship by making available motion pictures that might otherwise be lost to history and that the exemption is unlikely to adversely affect the market for or value of the motion pictures.
4. Proposed Classes 7(a): Motion Pictures and 7(b): Literary Works—Text and Data Mining [64]
Authors Alliance, the American Association of University Professors, and LCA jointly filed a petition proposing Classes 7(a) and 7(b), seeking to permit circumvention of TPMs on motion pictures and literary works stored on DVDs or Blu-ray discs or made available for digital download to enable researchers to perform text and data mining (“TDM”) techniques for the purpose of scholarly research and teaching. Proponents argued that copying literary works and motion pictures to create large collections on which to perform TDM research is a fair use, and that requirements to use security measures to protect the corpora from public access or further distribution should afford qualifying institutions flexibility to tailor the measures to the size and content of the corpus. NTIA supported the proposed exemptions.
Joint Creators and DVD CCA and AACS LA opposed the proposed exemption for class 7(a), and the American Association for Publishers (“AAP”) and the Software and Information Industry Association opposed the proposed exemption for class 7(b). They argued that TDM research would interfere with the licensing market for collections of literary works and motion pictures and that researchers' ability to view the entirety of the works in a corpus would create a risk of substitutional use. They also argued that any exemption must require specific, robust security measures.
As discussed in greater detail in the Register's Recommendation, the Register found that the prohibition on circumvention adversely affects researchers' ability to conduct TDM research projects, which are likely to be noninfringing with the addition of several limitations. Most importantly, the Register recommended requiring the institution of higher education storing or hosting a corpus of copyrighted works to implement either security measures that have been agreed upon by copyright owners and institutions of higher education, or, in the absence of such measures, those measures that the institution uses to keep its own highly confidential information secure. The Register also recommended adding a limitation that the person undertaking the circumvention view or listen to the contents of the copyrighted works in the corpus solely for the purpose of verification of the research findings, not for the works' expressive purposes. The Register concluded that existing alternatives to circumvention do not meet researchers' needs.
5. Proposed Class 8: Literary Works—Accessibility [65]
Class 8 proponents sought to modify the current exemption for e-book accessibility to align with recent changes to the Copyright Act as a result of the Marrakesh Treaty Implementation Act. Proponents requested expanding the class of beneficiaries to “eligible persons” as defined in section 121 of the Copyright Act, expanding the exemption to cover previously published musical works, and replacing references to a “mainstream copy” in the remuneration requirement with the term “inaccessible copy.” Proponents also sought guidance on whether import and export activity under section 121A was implicated by the prohibition on circumvention. Joint Creators stated that they did not oppose the exemption to the extent it is consistent with sections 121 and 121A. AAP filed a reply comment in support of this class, and NTIA supported the proposed exemption.
For the reasons discussed in the Register's Recommendation, the Register concluded that without the proposed modifications, print-disabled individuals would be adversely affected in their ability to engage in the proposed noninfringing uses. The Register also determined that replacement of the reference to a “mainstream copy” with an “inaccessible copy” is a non-substantive change. Finally, the Register declined to recommend language regarding import and export of accessible works because the record did not indicate that such activity implicates the prohibition on circumvention. Proponents and Joint Creators filed a joint post-hearing submission proposing regulatory language that excludes sound recordings of performances of musical works from the exemption, which the Register recommended including.
6. Proposed Class 9: Literary Works—Medical Device Data [66]
Class 9 proponents sought to expand several provisions of the current exemption that permits the circumvention of TPMs on medical devices to access their data outputs. Proponents filed a petition seeking to eliminate the current limitation of the exemption to “wholly or partially implanted” devices; permit authorized third parties to perform the circumvention on behalf of a patient; extend the exemption to non-passive monitoring; and remove the condition that circumvention not violate other applicable laws. ACT | The App Association opposed the proposed exemption. NTIA supported adopting the proposed exemption, with some modification.
For the reasons detailed in the Register's Recommendation, the Register concluded that accessing medical data outputs likely qualifies as a fair use and that expanding the exemption to include non-implanted medical devices and non-passive monitoring would not alter the fair use analysis. Additionally, the Register concluded that proponents set forth sufficient evidence that the “wholly or partially implanted” language and the passive monitoring limitation are causing, or are likely to cause, adverse effects on these noninfringing uses. The Register also recommended expanding the exemption to permit circumvention “by or on behalf of a patient.” After consultation with the U.S. Food and Drug Administration, the Register recommended removing the language requiring compliance with other laws, and replacing it with a statement that eligibility for the exemption does not preclude liability from other applicable laws.
7. Proposed Class 10: Computer Programs—Unlocking [67]
ISRI petitioned to expand the existing exemption for unlocking to either (1) add a new device category for laptop computers or (2) remove enumerated device categories from the current exemption and permit unlocking of all wireless devices. It argued that the proposed uses are noninfringing based on the Register's previous findings that unlocking of certain types of devices is a fair use, contending that the legal analysis does not differ depending on the type of device that is unlocked. The only opposition comment was filed by MEMA, which opposed expanding the exemption to permit unlocking cellular-enabled vehicles. NTIA supported expanding the exemption to permit unlocking all lawfully-acquired devices.
For the reasons discussed in the Register's Recommendation, the Register concluded that proponents established that unlocking is likely to be a fair use regardless of the type of device involved. Proponents offered unrebutted evidence that many different types of wireless devices share the same wireless modem. Because the Register concluded that unlocking those modems is likely a fair use, she determined that users of these devices experience the same adverse effects from the prohibition on circumvention.
8. Proposed Class 11: Computer Programs—Jailbreaking [68]
Two petitions were filed for new or expanded exemptions relating to the circumvention of computer programs for jailbreaking purposes. EFF filed a petition seeking to clarify and expand the current exemption pertaining to jailbreaking smart TVs to include video streaming devices. SFC filed a petition for a new exemption to allow jailbreaking of routers and other networking devices to enable the installation of alternative firmware. ACT | The App Association, DVD CCA and AACS LA, and Joint Creators opposed this proposed class. NTIA supported adopting both proposed exemptions.
In supporting comments, EFF clarified that its proposed exemption would cover devices whose primary purpose is to run applications that stream video from the internet for display on a screen, and would not extend to DVD or Blu-ray players or video game consoles. The Register concluded that jailbreaking video streaming devices likely constitutes a fair use. Additionally, the Register concluded that the prohibition on circumvention is likely to adversely affect proponents' ability to engage in such activities. She recommended that the regulatory language contain certain limitations to address opponents' concerns over potential market harm.
With respect to SFC's petition, the Register concluded that jailbreaking routers and other networking devices is likely to qualify as a fair use. Additionally, the Register concluded that the prohibition on circumvention is likely to prevent users from installing free and open source software (“FOSS”) on routers and other networking devices and that there are no viable alternatives to circumvention to accomplish that purpose.
9. Proposed Class 12: Computer Programs—Repair [69]
Several organizations submitted petitions for new or expanded exemptions relating to the diagnosis, maintenance, repair, and modification of software-enabled devices. EFF and, jointly, iFixit and the Repair Association filed petitions seeking to merge and expand the two existing exemptions to cover all devices and vehicles and permit “modification” of all devices. Opponents objected that the proposed expansion to cover all devices was overbroad and that proponents failed to develop a record demonstrating sufficient commonalities among the various types of software-enabled devices. In addition, they argued that specific types of devices for which circumvention of TPMs raises piracy and safety concerns should be excluded from the proposed class. Opponents also contended that the term “modification” is so broad that it could implicate infringing activities, including violating copyright owners' exclusive right to prepare derivative works.
Separately, Public Knowledge and iFixit jointly petitioned for an exemption to repair optical drives in video game consoles and to replace damaged hardware in such devices. They asserted that authorized repair services are inadequate, particularly for certain legacy consoles that manufacturers no longer support. Opponents argued that the proposed exemption would create a risk of market harm for these devices and that adequate alternatives to circumvention exist.
NTIA recommended expanding the current exemptions by merging them into a single exemption that would permit circumvention for the diagnosis, maintenance, and repair of all software-enabled devices, machines, and systems. In addition, NTIA recommended allowing “lawful modification that is necessary for a repair or maintenance” and software modifications relating to device functionality.
For the reasons discussed in the Register's Recommendation, the Register recommended expanding the existing exemption for diagnosis, maintenance, and repair of certain categories of devices to cover any software-enabled device that is primarily designed for use by consumers. For video game consoles, the Register concluded that an exemption is warranted solely for the repair of optical drives.
The proposals to merge the two existing repair exemptions would also effectively broaden the existing vehicle exemption by: (1) No longer limiting the class to “motorized land vehicles”; and (2) removing other limitations in the exemption, including that users comply with other laws. Opponents did not object to including marine vessels in the vehicle exemption, but opposed removing language requiring compliance with other laws. For the reasons discussed in the Register's Recommendation, the Register recommended that the exemption for land vehicles be expanded to cover marine vessels and to remove the condition requiring compliance with other laws.
Finally, Summit Imaging, Inc. and Transtate Equipment Co., Inc. petitioned to exempt circumvention of TPMs on software-enabled medical devices and systems for purposes of diagnosis, maintenance, and repair. Petitioners also sought access to related data files stored on medical devices and systems, including manuals and servicing materials. Opponents argued that this exemption is unnecessary because adequate authorized repair services are available. They also contended that the proposed uses are commercial in nature, would harm the market for medical devices and systems, may undermine patient safety and create cybersecurity risks, and would interfere with manufacturers' regulatory compliance obligations. For the reasons discussed in the Register's Recommendation, the Register recommended a new exemption allowing circumvention of TPMs restricting access to firmware and related data files on medical devices and systems for the purposes of diagnosis, maintenance, and repair.
10. Proposed Class 13: Computer Programs—Security Research [70]
Two petitions sought to expand the current exemption that permits circumvention of TPMs on computer programs for good-faith security research. Together, the petitions sought to eliminate several limitations within the exemption and to explicitly extend the exemption to privacy research. Proponents generally argued that the limitations have chilled valuable security research, primarily by creating uncertainty about whether conducting or reporting security research could result in liability under section 1201. Six parties opposed class 13 at least in part; they argued that the existing exemption has sufficiently enabled good-faith security research and that the record did not justify removing the limitations. NTIA supported the elimination of several limitations, but did not recommend modifying the existing exemption to address privacy-related research activities explicitly.
For the reasons discussed in the Register's Recommendation, the Register concluded that because the exemption is broadly defined and is not limited to specific issues or subjects relating to security flaws or vulnerabilities, expanding it to expressly cover privacy research is unnecessary. Regarding the specific limitations, the Register recommended removing the condition that circumvention not violate “other laws” and instead clarifying that the exemption does not provide a safe harbor from liability under other laws. The Department of Justice submitted comments supporting this change. The Register declined to recommend removal of limitations pertaining to access to and use of computer programs, finding a lack of specific evidence establishing adverse effects resulting from those provisions. The Register also did not recommend removal of the requirement that devices be lawfully acquired.
11. Proposed Class 14(a): Computer Programs and 14(b) Video Games—Preservation [71]
Proposed Classes 14(a) and 14(b) seek to amend the existing exemptions permitting libraries, archives, and museums to circumvent TPMs on computer programs and video games, respectively, for the purpose of preservation activities. Specifically, proponents seek to remove the requirement that the preserved computer program or video game must not be distributed or made available outside of the physical premises of the institution. Proposed Class 14(b) would also incorporate the current eligibility requirements for the software preservation exemption into the video game preservation exemption.
Proponents argued that enabling remote access to the works is likely to be a fair use, based in part on a general federal policy favoring remote access to preservation materials, as reflected in various provisions of the Copyright Act. They also argued that the proposed uses would not affect the potential market for or value of the copyrighted works because only works that are no longer reasonably available in the commercial marketplace would be subject to the exemption. NTIA supported the removal of the premises limitation in both exemptions.
Joint Creators and the Entertainment Software Association opposed removing the premises limitation, with most arguments directed to the video game class. They expressed concern that, because the proposed exemption did not limit beneficiaries of the exemption to authenticated educators or researchers, if preserved video games were made available outside the premises of an institution, they would become accessible to the general public, thereby adversely affecting the existing market for older video games.
For the reasons discussed in the Register's Recommendation, the Register concluded that off-premises access to software as described in the proposal is likely to be noninfringing, with the limitation that the work be accessible to only one user at a time and for a limited time. With respect to video games, the Register concluded that proponents failed to carry their burden to show that the uses are likely noninfringing, and noted the greater risk of market harm in this context given the market for legacy video games. The Register therefore recommends that the Librarian amend the exemption for Class 14(a) to address the eligibility requirements for libraries, archives, and museums, but not to remove the premises limitation. The Register recommends removing the premises limitation in the exemption for Class 14(a).
12. Proposed Class 15: Computer Programs—3D Printing [72]
Class 15 seeks to expand two provisions of the current exemption that permits the circumvention of access controls on computer programs in 3D printers to enable the use of non-manufacturer approved feedstock. Michael Weinberg filed a petition to replace the term “feedstock” with the term “material,” stating that the latter is more commonly used within the industry and that the two terms are interchangeable. Additionally, Mr. Weinberg sought to eliminate the phrase “microchip-reliant” from the exemption, arguing that 3D printers may use technology other than microchips to verify 3D printing materials. Mr. Weinberg provided evidence that manufacturers are increasingly moving beyond microchip-based verification techniques, such as using optical scanners. No parties opposed proposed class 15. NTIA supported the proposed exemption.
For the reasons discussed in greater detail in the Register's Recommendation, the Register concluded that changing the word “feedstock” to “material” is not a substantive change, and found that the removal of the term “microchip-reliant” does not alter the fair use analysis because the expansion is directed at the same uses the Office previously concluded were fair.
13. Proposed Class 16: Computer Programs—Copyright License Investigation [73]
SFC petitioned for a new exemption that would permit investigating whether a particular computer program includes FOSS, and if so, whether the use of the program complies with applicable license terms. SFC, supported by the Free Software Foundation, subsequently agreed to add limitations to require that the circumvention be undertaken on a lawfully acquired device or machine; that it be solely for the purpose of investigating potential copyright infringement; that it be performed by, or at the direction of, a party that has standing to bring a breach of license claim; and that it otherwise comply with applicable law. NTIA supported the proposed exemption as modified.
Opponents—DVD CCA and AACS LA; the Equipment Dealers Association, and its regional affiliates, and Associated Equipment Distributors; Joint Creators; and Marcia Wilbur—argued that FOSS licensors could obtain the information they seek by other means. They objected to application of the proposed exemption to a broad category of devices, and requested exclusion of DVD and Blu-ray players, video game consoles, set-top boxes, and vehicles. They argued that any exemption should be limited to investigating potential violations of FOSS licenses, rather than infringement of any proprietary software, and that the investigation must be based on a good-faith, reasonable belief that the device may violate FOSS license terms. Finally, opponents expressed concerns about devices being left exposed to piracy or unauthorized access after circumvention.
For the reasons discussed in the Register's Recommendation, the Register recommended adopting an exemption with several limitations. First, the purpose of the investigation must be limited to investigating whether a computer program potentially infringes FOSS, and the user must have a good-faith, reasonable belief in the need for the investigation. Second, circumvention must be undertaken by, or at the direction of, a party that would have standing to bring either a breach of license claim or a copyright infringement claim. Third, the copy of a computer program made pursuant to the exemption, or the device or machine on which it operates, cannot be used in a manner that facilitates copyright infringement. Finally, video game consoles should be excluded from the types of devices on which TPMs may be circumvented.
14. Proposed Class 17: All Works—Accessibility Uses [74]
Petitioners, a coalition of accessibility groups, requested a new exemption to create accessible versions of any copyrighted works that are inaccessible to individuals with disabilities. They argued that the Librarian has the authority to define a class of works that share the attribute of being inaccessible to individuals with disabilities and that creating accessible versions of inaccessible works is unquestionably a fair use. Proponents argued that a broad exemption is warranted to prevent individuals with disabilities from being forced to make piecemeal requests every three years when new accessibility issues arise. NTIA supported the proposed exemption.
Joint Creators, DVD CCA and AACS LA, and AAP filed comments opposing the proposed exemption, focusing primarily on the ground that the statute does not give the Librarian the authority to adopt a class consisting of “all works” sharing a particular attribute. Joint Creators also raised concerns about the lack of limitations on the use of copies, such as prohibiting further distribution to individuals without disabilities.
As discussed in greater detail in the Register's Recommendation, although the Register supports the policy goals that underpin the proposed exemption, the statute requires proponents to provide evidence of actual or likely adverse effects resulting from the prohibition on circumvention with respect to “particular class[es]” of works. Here, the Register determined that proponents submitted insufficient evidence of such adverse effects as to most types of works. Proponents did, however, provide evidence to support an exemption to enable individuals with disabilities to use alternate input devices to play video games.
C. Classes Considered but Not Recommended
Based upon the record in this proceeding, the Register recommended that the Librarian determine that the following classes of works shall not be exempt during the next three-year period from the prohibition against circumvention of technological measures set forth in section 1201(a)(1):
1. Proposed Class 2: Audiovisual Works—Texting [75]
Proposed Class 2 would allow circumvention of technological measures protecting motion pictures and other audiovisual works to create short audiovisual clips for expressive purposes in text messages. Petitioner did not provide legal arguments or evidence in support of its petition and did not participate in the public hearings. Petitioner failed to explain how the proposed uses were noninfringing and why an exemption is necessary. NTIA recommended denying the proposed exemption. As discussed more fully in the Register's Recommendation, due to the de minimis showing provided by proponents, the Register does not recommend the adoption of an exemption for proposed Class 2.
2. Proposed Class 4: Audiovisual Works—Livestream Recording [76]
Proposed Class 4 would allow circumvention of HTTP Live Streaming technology for the purpose of recording audiovisual works originating as livestreams. Petitioner did not provide legal arguments or evidence to support its petition and did not participate in the public hearings. Petitioner first described the exemption as encompassing sports and other competitive events, but elsewhere stated that the class includes “any and all works” where audiovisual recordings may be made, including individual school performances. NTIA recommended denying the proposed exemption. As discussed more fully in the Register's Recommendation, the Register does not recommend the adoption of an exemption for proposed Class 4.
3. Proposed Class 6: Audiovisual Works—Space-Shifting [77]
Proposed Class 6 would allow circumvention of TPMs protecting motion pictures and other audiovisual works to engage in space-shifting. Petitioner failed to provide legal arguments or evidence to demonstrate that space-shifting is a noninfringing use. Additionally, petitioner did not participate in the public hearings to support its petition or clarify whether the proposed exemption would extend to commercial services. Opponents argued that petitioner did not provide the evidence necessary to support an exemption, citing several substantive and procedural deficiencies. NTIA recommended denying the proposed exemption. As discussed more fully in the Register's Recommendation, the Register does not recommend the adoption of an exemption for proposed Class 6.
D. Conclusion
Having considered the evidence in the record, the contentions of the commenting parties, and the statutory objectives, the Register of Copyrights has recommended that the Librarian of Congress publish certain classes of works, as designated above, so that the prohibition against circumvention of technological measures that effectively control access to copyrighted works shall not apply for the next three years to persons who engage in noninfringing uses of those particular classes of works.
Dated: October 20, 2021.
Shira Perlmutter,
Register of Copyrights and Director of the U.S. Copyright Office.
Determination of the Librarian of Congress
Having duly considered and accepted the recommendation of the Register of Copyrights, the Librarian of Congress, pursuant to 17 U.S.C. 1201(a)(1)(C) and (D), hereby publishes as a new rule the classes of copyrighted works that shall for a three-year period be subject to the exemption provided in 17 U.S.C. 1201(a)(1)(B) from the prohibition against circumvention of technological measures that effectively control access to copyrighted works set forth in 17 U.S.C. 1201(a)(1)(A).
List of Subjects in 37 CFR Part 201
- Copyright
- Exemptions to prohibition against circumvention
Final Regulations
For the reasons set forth in the preamble, 37 CFR part 201 is amended as follows:
PART 201—GENERAL PROVISIONS
1. The authority citation for part 201 continues to read as follows:
2. Section 201.40 is amended by revising paragraph (b) to read as follows:
(b) Classes of copyrighted works. Pursuant to the authority set forth in 17 U.S.C. 1201(a)(1)(C) and (D), and upon the recommendation of the Register of Copyrights, the Librarian has determined that the prohibition against circumvention of technological measures that effectively control access to copyrighted works set forth in 17 U.S.C. 1201(a)(1)(A) shall not apply to persons who engage in noninfringing uses of the following classes of copyrighted works:
(1) Motion pictures (including television shows and videos), as defined in 17 U.S.C. 101, where the motion picture is lawfully made and acquired on a DVD protected by the Content Scramble System, on a Blu-ray disc protected by the Advanced Access Content System, or via a digital transmission protected by a technological measure, and the person engaging in circumvention under paragraphs (b)(1)(i) and (b)(1)(ii)(A) and (B) of this section reasonably believes that non-circumventing alternatives are unable to produce the required level of high-quality content, or the circumvention is undertaken using screen-capture technology that appears to be offered to the public as enabling the reproduction of motion pictures after content has been lawfully acquired and decrypted, where circumvention is undertaken solely in order to make use of short portions of the motion pictures in the following instances:
(i) For the purpose of criticism or comment:
(A) For use in documentary filmmaking, or other films where the motion picture clip is used in parody or for its biographical or historically significant nature;
(B) For use in noncommercial videos (including videos produced for a paid commission if the commissioning entity's use is noncommercial); or
(C) For use in nonfiction multimedia e-books.
(ii) For educational purposes:
(A) By college and university faculty and students or kindergarten through twelfth-grade (K-12) educators and students (where the K-12 student is circumventing under the direct supervision of an educator), or employees acting at the direction of faculty of such educational institutions for the purpose of teaching a course, including of accredited general educational development (GED) programs, for the purpose of criticism, comment, teaching, or scholarship;
(B) By faculty of accredited nonprofit educational institutions and employees acting at the direction of faculty members of those institutions, for purposes of offering massive open online courses (MOOCs) to officially enrolled students through online platforms (which platforms themselves may be operated for profit), in film studies or other courses requiring close analysis of film and media excerpts, for the purpose of criticism or comment, where the MOOC provider through the online platform limits transmissions to the extent technologically feasible to such officially enrolled students, institutes copyright policies and provides copyright informational materials to faculty, students, and relevant staff members, and applies technological measures that reasonably prevent unauthorized further dissemination of a work in accessible form to others or retention of the work for longer than the course session by recipients of a transmission through the platform, as contemplated by 17 U.S.C. 110(2); or
(C) By educators and participants in nonprofit digital and media literacy programs offered by libraries, museums, and other nonprofit entities with an educational mission, in the course of face-to-face instructional activities, for the purpose of criticism or comment, except that such users may only circumvent using screen-capture technology that appears to be offered to the public as enabling the reproduction of motion pictures after content has been lawfully acquired and decrypted.
(2)(i) Motion pictures (including television shows and videos), as defined in 17 U.S.C. 101, where the motion picture is lawfully acquired on a DVD protected by the Content Scramble System, on a Blu-ray disc protected by the Advanced Access Content System, or via a digital transmission protected by a technological measure, where:
(A) Circumvention is undertaken by a disability services office or other unit of a kindergarten through twelfth-grade educational institution, college, or university engaged in and/or responsible for the provision of accessibility services for the purpose of adding captions and/or audio description to a motion picture to create an accessible version for students, faculty, or staff with disabilities;
(B) The educational institution unit in paragraph (b)(2)(i)(A) of this section has a reasonable belief that the motion picture will be used for a specific future activity of the institution and, after a reasonable effort, has determined that an accessible version of sufficient quality cannot be obtained at a fair market price or in a timely manner, including where a copyright holder has not provided an accessible version of a motion picture that was included with a textbook; and
(C) The accessible versions are provided to students or educators and stored by the educational institution in a manner intended to reasonably prevent unauthorized further dissemination of a work.
(ii) For purposes of paragraph (b)(2) of this section,
(A) “Audio description” means an oral narration that provides an accurate rendering of the motion picture;
(B) “Accessible version of sufficient quality” means a version that in the reasonable judgment of the educational institution unit has captions and/or audio description that are sufficient to meet the accessibility needs of students, faculty, or staff with disabilities and are substantially free of errors that would materially interfere with those needs; and
(C) Accessible materials created pursuant to this exemption and stored pursuant to paragraph (b)(2)(i)(C) of this section may be reused by the educational institution unit to meet the accessibility needs of students, faculty, or staff with disabilities pursuant to paragraphs (b)(2)(i)(A) and (B) of this section.
(3)(i) Motion pictures (including television shows and videos), as defined in 17 U.S.C. 101, where the motion picture is lawfully acquired on a DVD protected by the Content Scramble System, or on a Blu-ray disc protected by the Advanced Access Content System, solely for the purpose of lawful preservation or the creation of a replacement copy of the motion picture, by an eligible library, archives, or museum, where:
(A) Such activity is carried out without any purpose of direct or indirect commercial advantage;
(B) The DVD or Blu-ray disc is damaged or deteriorating;
(C) The eligible institution, after a reasonable effort, has determined that an unused and undamaged replacement copy cannot be obtained at a fair price and that no streaming service, download service, or on-demand cable and satellite service makes the motion picture available to libraries, archives, and museums at a fair price; and
(D) The preservation or replacement copies are not distributed or made available outside of the physical premises of the eligible library, archives, or museum.
(ii) For purposes of paragraph (b)(3)(i) of this section, a library, archives, or museum is considered “eligible” if—
(A) The collections of the library, archives, or museum are open to the public and/or are routinely made available to researchers who are not affiliated with the library, archives, or museum;
(B) The library, archives, or museum has a public service mission;
(C) The library, archives, or museum's trained staff or volunteers provide professional services normally associated with libraries, archives, or museums;
(D) The collections of the library, archives, or museum are composed of lawfully acquired and/or licensed materials; and
(E) The library, archives, or museum implements reasonable digital security measures as appropriate for the activities permitted by paragraph (b)(3)(i) of this section.
(4)(i) Motion pictures, as defined in 17 U.S.C. 101, where the motion picture is on a DVD protected by the Content Scramble System, on a Blu-ray disc protected by the Advanced Access Content System, or made available for digital download where:
(A) The circumvention is undertaken by a researcher affiliated with a nonprofit institution of higher education, or by a student or information technology staff member of the institution at the direction of such researcher, solely to deploy text and data mining techniques on a corpus of motion pictures for the purpose of scholarly research and teaching;
(B) The copy of each motion picture is lawfully acquired and owned by the institution, or licensed to the institution without a time limitation on access;
(C) The person undertaking the circumvention views or listens to the contents of the motion pictures in the corpus solely for the purpose of verification of the research findings; and
(D) The institution uses effective security measures to prevent further dissemination or downloading of motion pictures in the corpus, and to limit access to only the persons identified in paragraph (b)(4)(i)(A) of this section or to researchers affiliated with other institutions of higher education solely for purposes of collaboration or replication of the research.
(ii) For purposes of paragraph (b)(4)(i) of this section:
(A) An institution of higher education is defined as one that:
( 1 ) Admits regular students who have a certificate of graduation from a secondary school or the equivalent of such a certificate;
( 2 ) Is legally authorized to provide a postsecondary education program;
( 3 ) Awards a bachelor's degree or provides not less than a two-year program acceptable towards such a degree;
( 4 ) Is a public or other nonprofit institution; and
( 5 ) Is accredited by a nationally recognized accrediting agency or association.
(B) The term “effective security measures” means security measures that have been agreed to by interested copyright owners of motion pictures and institutions of higher education; or, in the absence of such measures, those measures that the institution uses to keep its own highly confidential information secure. If the institution uses the security measures it uses to protect its own highly confidential information, it must, upon a reasonable request from a copyright owner whose work is contained in the corpus, provide information to that copyright owner regarding the nature of such measures.
(5)(i) Literary works, excluding computer programs and compilations that were compiled specifically for text and data mining purposes, distributed electronically where:
(A) The circumvention is undertaken by a researcher affiliated with a nonprofit institution of higher education, or by a student or information technology staff member of the institution at the direction of such researcher, solely to deploy text and data mining techniques on a corpus of literary works for the purpose of scholarly research and teaching;
(B) The copy of each literary work is lawfully acquired and owned by the institution, or licensed to the institution without a time limitation on access;
(C) The person undertaking the circumvention views the contents of the literary works in the corpus solely for the purpose of verification of the research findings; and
(D) The institution uses effective security measures to prevent further dissemination or downloading of literary works in the corpus, and to limit access to only the persons identified in paragraph (b)(5)(i)(A) of this section or to researchers or to researchers affiliated with other institutions of higher education solely for purposes of collaboration or replication of the research.
(ii) For purposes of paragraph (b)(5)(i) of this section:
(A) An institution of higher education is defined as one that:
(1) Admits regular students who have a certificate of graduation from a secondary school or the equivalent of such a certificate;
(2) Is legally authorized to provide a postsecondary education program;
(3) Awards a bachelor's degree or provides not less than a two-year program acceptable towards such a degree;
(4) Is a public or other nonprofit institution; and
(5) Is accredited by a nationally recognized accrediting agency or association.
(B) The term “effective security measures” means security measures that have been agreed to by interested copyright owners of literary works and institutions of higher education; or, in the absence of such measures, those measures that the institution uses to keep its own highly confidential information secure. If the institution uses the security measures it uses to protect its own highly confidential information, it must, upon a reasonable request from a copyright owner whose work is contained in the corpus, provide information to that copyright owner regarding the nature of such measures.
(6)(i) Literary works or previously published musical works that have been fixed in the form of text or notation, distributed electronically, that are protected by technological measures that either prevent the enabling of read-aloud functionality or interfere with screen readers or other applications or assistive technologies:
(A) When a copy or phonorecord of such a work is lawfully obtained by an eligible person, as such a person is defined in 17 U.S.C. 121; provided, however, that the rights owner is remunerated, as appropriate, for the market price of an inaccessible copy of the work as made available to the general public through customary channels; or
(B) When such a work is lawfully obtained and used by an authorized entity pursuant to 17 U.S.C. 121.
(ii) For the purposes of paragraph (b)(6)(i) of this section, a “phonorecord of such a work” does not include a sound recording of a performance of a musical work unless and only to the extent the recording is included as part of an audiobook or e-book.
(7) Literary works consisting of compilations of data generated by medical devices or by their personal corresponding monitoring systems, where such circumvention is undertaken by or on behalf of a patient for the sole purpose of lawfully accessing data generated by a patient's own medical device or monitoring system. Eligibility for this exemption is not a safe harbor from, or defense to, liability under other applicable laws, including without limitation the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986, or regulations of the Food and Drug Administration.
(8) Computer programs that enable wireless devices to connect to a wireless telecommunications network, when circumvention is undertaken solely in order to connect to a wireless telecommunications network and such connection is authorized by the operator of such network.
(9) Computer programs that enable smartphones and portable all-purpose mobile computing devices to execute lawfully obtained software applications, where circumvention is accomplished for the sole purpose of enabling interoperability of such applications with computer programs on the smartphone or device, or to permit removal of software from the smartphone or device. For purposes of this paragraph (b)(9), a “portable all-purpose mobile computing device” is a device that is primarily designed to run a wide variety of programs rather than for consumption of a particular type of media content, is equipped with an operating system primarily designed for mobile use, and is intended to be carried or worn by an individual.
(10) Computer programs that enable smart televisions to execute lawfully obtained software applications, where circumvention is accomplished for the sole purpose of enabling interoperability of such applications with computer programs on the smart television, and is not accomplished for the purpose of gaining unauthorized access to other copyrighted works. For purposes of this paragraph (b)(10), “smart televisions” includes both internet-enabled televisions, as well as devices that are physically separate from a television and whose primary purpose is to run software applications that stream authorized video from the internet for display on a screen.
(11) Computer programs that enable voice assistant devices to execute lawfully obtained software applications, where circumvention is accomplished for the sole purpose of enabling interoperability of such applications with computer programs on the device, or to permit removal of software from the device, and is not accomplished for the purpose of gaining unauthorized access to other copyrighted works. For purposes of this paragraph (b)(11), a “voice assistant device” is a device that is primarily designed to run a wide variety of programs rather than for consumption of a particular type of media content, is designed to take user input primarily by voice, and is designed to be installed in a home or office.
(12) Computer programs that enable routers and dedicated network devices to execute lawfully obtained software applications, where circumvention is accomplished for the sole purpose of enabling interoperability of such applications with computer programs on the router or dedicated network device, and is not accomplished for the purpose of gaining unauthorized access to other copyrighted works. For the purposes of this paragraph (b)(12), “dedicated network device” includes switches, hubs, bridges, gateways, modems, repeaters, and access points, and excludes devices that are not lawfully owned.
(13) Computer programs that are contained in and control the functioning of a lawfully acquired motorized land vehicle or marine vessel such as a personal automobile or boat, commercial vehicle or vessel, or mechanized agricultural vehicle or vessel, except for programs accessed through a separate subscription service, when circumvention is a necessary step to allow the diagnosis, repair, or lawful modification of a vehicle or vessel function, where such circumvention is not accomplished for the purpose of gaining unauthorized access to other copyrighted works. Eligibility for this exemption is not a safe harbor from, or defense to, liability under other applicable laws, including without limitation regulations promulgated by the Department of Transportation or the Environmental Protection Agency.
(14) Computer programs that are contained in and control the functioning of a lawfully acquired device that is primarily designed for use by consumers, when circumvention is a necessary step to allow the diagnosis, maintenance, or repair of such a device, and is not accomplished for the purpose of gaining access to other copyrighted works. For purposes of this paragraph (b)(14):
(i) The “maintenance” of a device is the servicing of the device in order to make it work in accordance with its original specifications and any changes to those specifications authorized for that device; and
(ii) The “repair” of a device is the restoring of the device to the state of working in accordance with its original specifications and any changes to those specifications authorized for that device. For video game consoles, “repair” is limited to repair or replacement of a console's optical drive and requires restoring any technological protection measures that were circumvented or disabled.
(15) Computer programs that are contained in and control the functioning of a lawfully acquired medical device or system, and related data files, when circumvention is a necessary step to allow the diagnosis, maintenance, or repair of such a device or system. For purposes of this paragraph (b)(15):
(i) The “maintenance” of a device or system is the servicing of the device or system in order to make it work in accordance with its original specifications and any changes to those specifications authorized for that device or system; and
(ii) The “repair” of a device or system is the restoring of the device or system to the state of working in accordance with its original specifications and any changes to those specifications authorized for that device or system.
(16)(i) Computer programs, where the circumvention is undertaken on a lawfully acquired device or machine on which the computer program operates, or is undertaken on a computer, computer system, or computer network on which the computer program operates with the authorization of the owner or operator of such computer, computer system, or computer network, solely for the purpose of good-faith security research.
(ii) For purposes of paragraph (b)(16)(i) of this section, “good-faith security research” means accessing a computer program solely for purposes of good-faith testing, investigation, and/or correction of a security flaw or vulnerability, where such activity is carried out in an environment designed to avoid any harm to individuals or the public, and where the information derived from the activity is used primarily to promote the security or safety of the class of devices or machines on which the computer program operates, or those who use such devices or machines, and is not used or maintained in a manner that facilitates copyright infringement.
(iii) Good-faith security research that qualifies for the exemption under paragraph (b)(16)(i) of this section may nevertheless incur liability under other applicable laws, including without limitation the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986, as amended and codified in title 18, United States Code, and eligibility for that exemption is not a safe harbor from, or defense to, liability under other applicable laws.
(17)(i) Video games in the form of computer programs embodied in physical or downloaded formats that have been lawfully acquired as complete games, when the copyright owner or its authorized representative has ceased to provide access to an external computer server necessary to facilitate an authentication process to enable gameplay, solely for the purpose of:
(A) Permitting access to the video game to allow copying and modification of the computer program to restore access to the game for personal, local gameplay on a personal computer or video game console; or
(B) Permitting access to the video game to allow copying and modification of the computer program to restore access to the game on a personal computer or video game console when necessary to allow preservation of the game in a playable form by an eligible library, archives, or museum, where such activities are carried out without any purpose of direct or indirect commercial advantage and the video game is not distributed or made available outside of the physical premises of the eligible library, archives, or museum.
(ii) Video games in the form of computer programs embodied in physical or downloaded formats that have been lawfully acquired as complete games, that do not require access to an external computer server for gameplay, and that are no longer reasonably available in the commercial marketplace, solely for the purpose of preservation of the game in a playable form by an eligible library, archives, or museum, where such activities are carried out without any purpose of direct or indirect commercial advantage and the video game is not distributed or made available outside of the physical premises of the eligible library, archives, or museum.
(iii) Computer programs used to operate video game consoles solely to the extent necessary for an eligible library, archives, or museum to engage in the preservation activities described in paragraph (b)(17)(i)(B) or (b)(17)(ii) of this section.
(iv) For purposes of this paragraph (b)(17), the following definitions shall apply:
(A) For purposes of paragraphs (b)(17)(i)(A) and (b)(17)(ii) of this section, “complete games” means video games that can be played by users without accessing or reproducing copyrightable content stored or previously stored on an external computer server.
(B) For purposes of paragraph (b)(17)(i)(B) of this section, “complete games” means video games that meet the definition in paragraph (b)(17)(iv)(A) of this section, or that consist of both a copy of a game intended for a personal computer or video game console and a copy of the game's code that was stored or previously stored on an external computer server.
(C) “Ceased to provide access” means that the copyright owner or its authorized representative has either issued an affirmative statement indicating that external server support for the video game has ended and such support is in fact no longer available or, alternatively, server support has been discontinued for a period of at least six months; provided, however, that server support has not since been restored.
(D) “Local gameplay” means gameplay conducted on a personal computer or video game console, or locally connected personal computers or consoles, and not through an online service or facility.
(E) A library, archives, or museum is considered “eligible” if—
( 1 ) The collections of the library, archives, or museum are open to the public and/or are routinely made available to researchers who are not affiliated with the library, archives, or museum;
( 2 ) The library, archives, or museum has a public service mission;
( 3 ) The library, archives, or museum's trained staff or volunteers provide professional services normally associated with libraries, archives, or museums;
( 4 ) The collections of the library, archives, or museum are composed of lawfully acquired and/or licensed materials; and
( 5 ) The library, archives, or museum implements reasonable digital security measures as appropriate for the activities permitted by this paragraph (b)(17).
(18)(i) Computer programs, except video games, that have been lawfully acquired and that are no longer reasonably available in the commercial marketplace, solely for the purpose of lawful preservation of a computer program, or of digital materials dependent upon a computer program as a condition of access, by an eligible library, archives, or museum, where such activities are carried out without any purpose of direct or indirect commercial advantage. Any electronic distribution, display, or performance made outside of the physical premises of an eligible library, archives, or museum of works preserved under this paragraph may be made to only one user at a time, for a limited time, and only where the library, archives, or museum has no notice that the copy would be used for any purpose other than private study, scholarship, or research.
(ii) For purposes of the exemption in paragraph (b)(18)(i) of this section, a library, archives, or museum is considered “eligible” if—
(A) The collections of the library, archives, or museum are open to the public and/or are routinely made available to researchers who are not affiliated with the library, archives, or museum;
(B) The library, archives, or museum has a public service mission;
(C) The library, archives, or museum's trained staff or volunteers provide professional services normally associated with libraries, archives, or museums;
(D) The collections of the library, archives, or museum are composed of lawfully acquired and/or licensed materials; and
(E) The library, archives, or museum implements reasonable digital security measures as appropriate for the activities permitted by this paragraph (b)(18).
(19) Computer programs that operate 3D printers that employ technological measures to limit the use of material, when circumvention is accomplished solely for the purpose of using alternative material and not for the purpose of accessing design software, design files, or proprietary data.
(20) Computer programs, solely for the purpose of investigating a potential infringement of free and open source computer programs where:
(i) The circumvention is undertaken on a lawfully acquired device or machine other than a video game console, on which the computer program operates;
(ii) The circumvention is performed by, or at the direction of, a party that has a good-faith, reasonable belief in the need for the investigation and has standing to bring a breach of license or copyright infringement claim;
(iii) Such circumvention does not constitute a violation of applicable law; and
(iv) The copy of the computer program, or the device or machine on which it operates, is not used or maintained in a manner that facilitates copyright infringement.
(21) Video games in the form of computer programs, embodied in lawfully acquired physical or downloaded formats, and operated on a general-purpose computer, where circumvention is undertaken solely for the purpose of allowing an individual with a physical disability to use software or hardware input methods other than a standard keyboard or mouse.
Dated: October 21, 2021.
Carla D. Hayden,
Librarian of Congress.
Footnotes
1. Staff of H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong., Section-by-Section Analysis of H.R. 2281 as Passed by the United States House of Representatives on August 4, 1998, at 6 (Comm. Print 1998).
Back to Citation4. See H.R. Rep. No. 105-551, pt. 2, at 36 (1998).
Back to Citation5. See 17 U.S.C. 1201(a)(1).
Back to Citation7. Id.
Back to Citation10. See 17 U.S.C. 1201(a)(1)(E) (“Neither the exception under subparagraph (B) from the applicability of the prohibition contained in subparagraph (A), nor any determination made in a rulemaking conducted under subparagraph (C), may be used as a defense in any action to enforce any provision of this title other than this paragraph.”).
Back to Citation11. Register of Copyrights, Section 1201 Rulemaking: Eighth Triennial Proceeding to Determine Exemptions to the Prohibition on Circumvention, Recommendation of the Register of Copyrights (Oct. 2021), https://cdn.loc.gov/copyright/1201/2021/2021_Section_1201_Registers_Recommendation.pdf (Register's Recommendation”).
Back to Citation12. Register's Recommendation at section II.C; U.S. Copyright Office, Section 1201 of Title 17 111-12 (2017), https://www.copyright.gov/policy/1201/section-1201-full-report.pdf (“Section 1201 Report”).
Back to Citation13. Section 1201 Report at 111-12; accord Register of Copyrights, Section 1201 Rulemaking: Seventh Triennial Proceeding to Determine Exemptions to the Prohibition on Circumvention, Recommendation of the Register of Copyrights 12-13 (Oct. 2018). References to the Register's recommendations in prior rulemakings are cited by the year of publication followed by “Recommendation” ( e.g., “2018 Recommendation”). Prior Recommendations are available on the Copyright Office website at https://www.copyright.gov/1201/.
Back to Citation14. Section 1201 Report at 112.
Back to Citation16. 2006 Recommendation at 19.
Back to Citation17. Exemptions to Permit Circumvention of Access Controls on Copyrighted Works, 85 FR 37399 (June 22, 2020).
Back to Citation18. Exemptions to Permit Circumvention of Access Controls on Copyrighted Works, 85 FR 37399, 37400-02 (June 22, 2020); Exemptions to Permit Circumvention of Access Controls on Copyrighted Works, 85 FR 65293, 65294-95 (Oct. 15, 2020).
Back to Citation19. Exemptions to Permit Circumvention of Access Controls on Copyrighted Works, 85 FR 37399, 37401-02 (June 22, 2020); Exemptions to Permit Circumvention of Access Controls on Copyrighted Works, 85 FR 65293, 65295 (Oct. 15, 2020).
Back to Citation20. Register's Recommendation at III.D & IV.
Back to Citation21. The submissions received in response to the NOI are available at https://www.copyright.gov/1201/2021/. References to these submissions are by party and class name (abbreviated where appropriate) followed by “Renewal Pet.,” “Renewal Comment,” or party name and class number followed by “Pet.,” “Initial,” “Opp'n,” or “Reply” for comments submitted in the first, second, or third round, as applicable.
Back to Citation22. Exemptions to Permit Circumvention of Access Controls on Copyrighted Works, 85 FR 65293, 65293 (Oct. 15, 2020).
Back to Citation23. Participants' post-hearing letter responses are available at https://www.copyright.gov/1201/2021/post-hearing/.
Back to Citation24. All ex parte letters in the eighth triennial rulemaking can be found at https://www.copyright.gov/1201/2021/ex-parte-communications.html.
Back to Citation25. Exemptions to Permit Circumvention of Access Controls on Copyrighted Works, 85 FR 65293, 65295 (Oct. 15, 2020); see also Exemptions to Permit Circumvention of Access Controls on Copyrighted Works, 85 FR 37399, 37402 (June 22, 2020) (describing “meaningful opposition” standard).
Back to Citation26. See 37 CFR 201.40(b)(1). In the 2018 rulemaking, this recommended regulatory language was the result of consideration of one proposed class of works that grouped together five petitions. See 2018 Recommendation at 31-34.
Back to Citation27. The Register's analysis and conclusions for this subpart, including citations to the record and relevant legal authority, can be found in the Register's Recommendation at IV.A.1.
Back to Citation28. The individuals and organizations include Peter Decherney, Katherine Sender, John L. Jackson, Int'l Commc'n Ass'n, Soc'y for Cinema and Media Studies, Console-ing Passions, Library Copyright All., and Am. Ass'n of Univ. Professors.
Back to Citation29. Joint Educators AV Educ. Renewal Pet. at 3.
Back to Citation30. The Register's analysis and conclusions for this subpart, including citations to the record and relevant legal authority, can be found in the Register's Recommendation at IV.A.2.
Back to Citation31. The Register's analysis and conclusions for this subpart, including citations to the record and relevant legal authority, can be found in the Register's Recommendation at IV.A.3.
Back to Citation32. The Register's analysis and conclusions for this subpart, including citations to the record and relevant legal authority, can be found in the Register's Recommendation at IV.A.4.
Back to Citation33. Bobette Buster, Authors All. & Am. Ass'n of Univ. Professors Nonfiction Multimedia E-Books Renewal Pet. at 3.
Back to Citation34. The Register's analysis and conclusions for this subpart, including citations to the record and relevant legal authority, can be found in the Register's Recommendation at IV.A.5.
Back to Citation35. The Register's analysis and conclusions for this subpart, including citations to the record and relevant legal authority, can be found in the Register's Recommendation at IV.A.6.
Back to Citation36. OTW Noncommercial Videos Renewal Pet. at 3.
Back to Citation37. The Register's analysis and conclusions for this class, including citations to the record and relevant legal authority, can be found in the Register's Recommendation at IV.B.
Back to Citation38. BYU Captioning Renewal Pet. at 3.
Back to Citation39. Accessibility Petitioners Captioning Renewal Pet. at 3.
Back to Citation40. The Register's analysis and conclusions for this class, including citations to the record and relevant legal authority, can be found in the Register's Recommendation at IV.C.
Back to Citation41. The Register's analysis and conclusions for this class, including citations to the record and relevant legal authority, can be found in the Register's Recommendation at IV.D.
Back to Citation42. The Register's analysis and conclusions for this class, including citations to the record and relevant legal authority, can be found in the Register's Recommendation at IV.E.
Back to Citation43. Competitive Carriers Ass'n Unlocking Renewal Pet.; Inst. of Scrap Recycling Indus., Inc. Unlocking Renewal Pet.
Back to Citation44. ISRI Unlocking Renewal Pet. at 3.
Back to Citation45. The Register's analysis and conclusions for this class, including citations to the record and relevant legal authority, can be found in the Register's Recommendation at IV.F.
Back to Citation46. SFC Jailbreaking Renewal Pet. at 3.
Back to Citation47. The Register's analysis and conclusions for this class, including citations to the record and relevant legal authority, can be found in the Register's Recommendation at IV.G.
Back to Citation48. MEMA Vehicle Repair Renewal Pet. at 3.
Back to Citation49. ACA Vehicle Repair Renewal Pet. at 3.
Back to Citation50. The Register's analysis and conclusions for this class, including citations to the record and relevant legal authority, can be found in the Register's Recommendation at IV.H.
Back to Citation51. EFF Device Repair Renewal Pet. at 3; EFF, Repair Ass'n & iFixit Device Repair Renewal Pet. at 3.
Back to Citation52. The Register's analysis and conclusions for this class, including citations to the record and relevant legal authority, can be found in the Register's Recommendation at IV.I.
Back to Citation53. J. Alex Halderman, CDT & ACM Security Research Renewal Pet. at 4.
Back to Citation54. MEMA Security Research Renewal Pet. at 3.
Back to Citation55. The Register's analysis and conclusions for this class, including citations to the record and relevant legal authority, can be found in the Register's Recommendation at IV.J.
Back to Citation56. SPN & LCA Software Preservation Renewal Pet. at 3.
Back to Citation57. The Register's analysis and conclusions for this class, including citations to the record and relevant legal authority, can be found in the Register's Recommendation at IV.K.
Back to Citation58. SPN & LCA Abandoned Video Game Renewal Pet. at 3.
Back to Citation59. The Register's analysis and conclusions for this class, including citations to the record and relevant legal authority, can be found in the Register's Recommendation at IV.L.
Back to Citation60. The Register's analysis and conclusions for these classes, including citations to the record and relevant legal authority, can be found in the Register's Recommendation at V.A.
Back to Citation61. The Register's analysis and conclusions for this class, including citations to the record and relevant legal authority, can be found in the Register's Recommendation at V.C.
Back to Citation62. The Register's analysis and conclusions for this class, including citations to the record and relevant legal authority, can be found in the Register's Recommendation at V.E.
Back to Citation63. Space-shifting occurs when a work is transferred from one storage medium to another, such as from a DVD to a computer hard drive. See 2015 Recommendation at 107.
Back to Citation64. The Register's analysis and conclusions for this class, including citations to the record and relevant legal authority, can be found in the Register's Recommendation at V.G.
Back to Citation65. The Register's analysis and conclusions for these classes, including citations to the record and relevant legal authority, can be found in the Register's Recommendation at V.H.
Back to Citation66. The Register's analysis and conclusions for these classes, including citations to the record and relevant legal authority, can be found in the Register's Recommendation at V.I.
Back to Citation67. The Register's analysis and conclusions for this class, including citations to the record and relevant legal authority, can be found in the Register's Recommendation at V.J.
Back to Citation68. The Register's analysis and conclusions for this class, including citations to the record and relevant legal authority, can be found in the Register's Recommendation at V.K.
Back to Citation69. The Register's analysis and conclusions for this class, including citations to the record and relevant legal authority, can be found in the Register's Recommendation at V.L.
Back to Citation70. The Register's analysis and conclusions for this class, including citations to the record and relevant legal authority, can be found in the Register's Recommendation at V.M.
Back to Citation71. The Register's analysis and conclusions for this class, including citations to the record and relevant legal authority, can be found in the Register's Recommendation at V.N.
Back to Citation72. The Register's analysis and conclusions for this class, including citations to the record and relevant legal authority, can be found in the Register's Recommendation at V.O.
Back to Citation73. The Register's analysis and conclusions for this class, including citations to the record and relevant legal authority, can be found in the Register's Recommendation at V.P.
Back to Citation74. The Register's analysis and conclusions for this class, including citations to the record and relevant legal authority, can be found in the Register's Recommendation at V.Q .
Back to Citation75. The Register's analysis and conclusions for these classes, including citations to the record and relevant legal authority, can be found in the Register's Recommendation at V.B.
Back to Citation76. The Register's analysis and conclusions for these classes, including citations to the record and relevant legal authority, can be found in the Register's Recommendation at V.D.
Back to Citation77. The Register's analysis and conclusions for this class, including citations to the record and relevant legal authority, can be found in the Register's Recommendation at V.F.
Back to Citation[FR Doc. 2021-23311 Filed 10-27-21; 8:45 am]
2.3.3 37 CFR § 201.40(b)(16) - Exemptions to prohibition against circumvention 2.3.3 37 CFR § 201.40(b)(16) - Exemptions to prohibition against circumvention
(b) Classes of copyrighted works. Pursuant to the authority set forth in 17 U.S.C. 1201(a)(1)(C) and (D), and upon the recommendation of the Register of Copyrights, the Librarian [of Congress] has determined that the prohibition against circumvention of technological measures that effectively control access to copyrighted works set forth in 17 U.S.C. 1201(a)(1)(A) shall not apply to persons who engage in noninfringing uses of the following classes of copyrighted works:
[...]
(i) Computer programs, where the circumvention is undertaken on a lawfully acquired device or machine on which the computer program operates, or is undertaken on a computer, computer system, or computer network on which the computer program operates with the authorization of the owner or operator of such computer, computer system, or computer network, solely for the purpose of good-faith security research.
(ii) For purposes of paragraph (b)(16)(i) of this section, “good-faith security research” means accessing a computer program solely for purposes of good-faith testing, investigation, and/or correction of a security flaw or vulnerability, where such activity is carried out in an environment designed to avoid any harm to individuals or the public, and where the information derived from the activity is used primarily to promote the security or safety of the class of devices or machines on which the computer program operates, or those who use such devices or machines, and is not used or maintained in a manner that facilitates copyright infringement.
(iii) Good-faith security research that qualifies for the exemption under paragraph (b)(16)(i) of this section may nevertheless incur liability under other applicable laws, including without limitation the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986, as amended and codified in title 18, United States Code, and eligibility for that exemption is not a safe harbor from, or defense to, liability under other applicable laws.
2.4 Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA) 2.4 Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA)
Weeks 4 & 5
2.4.1 Wiretap Act and Wi-Fi "Sniffing" 2.4.1 Wiretap Act and Wi-Fi "Sniffing"
Week 4
2.4.1.1 Wiretap Act, Section 2510: Definitions 2.4.1.1 Wiretap Act, Section 2510: Definitions
18 U.S.C. § 2510
United States Code, 2018 Edition
Title 18 - CRIMES AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
PART I - CRIMES
CHAPTER 119 - WIRE AND ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS INTERCEPTION AND INTERCEPTION OF ORAL COMMUNICATIONS
Sec. 2510 - Definitions
From the U.S. Government Publishing Office,
As used in this chapter—
(1) "wire communication" means any aural transfer made in whole or in part through the use of facilities for the transmission of communications by the aid of wire, cable, or other like connection between the point of origin and the point of reception (including the use of such connection in a switching station) furnished or operated by any person engaged in providing or operating such facilities for the transmission of interstate or foreign communications or communications affecting interstate or foreign commerce;
(2) "oral communication" means any oral communication uttered by a person exhibiting an expectation that such communication is not subject to interception under circumstances justifying such expectation, but such term does not include any electronic communication;
(3) "State" means any State of the United States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and any territory or possession of the United States;
(4) "intercept" means the aural or other acquisition of the contents of any wire, electronic, or oral communication through the use of any electronic, mechanical, or other device.1
(5) "electronic, mechanical, or other device" means any device or apparatus which can be used to intercept a wire, oral, or electronic communication other than—
(a) any telephone or telegraph instrument, equipment or facility, or any component thereof, (i) furnished to the subscriber or user by a provider of wire or electronic communication service in the ordinary course of its business and being used by the subscriber or user in the ordinary course of its business or furnished by such subscriber or user for connection to the facilities of such service and used in the ordinary course of its business; or (ii) being used by a provider of wire or electronic communication service in the ordinary course of its business, or by an investigative or law enforcement officer in the ordinary course of his duties;
(b) a hearing aid or similar device being used to correct subnormal hearing to not better than normal;
(6) "person" means any employee, or agent of the United States or any State or political subdivision thereof, and any individual, partnership, association, joint stock company, trust, or corporation;
(7) "Investigative or law enforcement officer" means any officer of the United States or of a State or political subdivision thereof, who is empowered by law to conduct investigations of or to make arrests for offenses enumerated in this chapter, and any attorney authorized by law to prosecute or participate in the prosecution of such offenses;
(8) "contents", when used with respect to any wire, oral, or electronic communication, includes any information concerning the substance, purport, or meaning of that communication;
(9) "Judge of competent jurisdiction" means—
(a) a judge of a United States district court or a United States court of appeals; and
(b) a judge of any court of general criminal jurisdiction of a State who is authorized by a statute of that State to enter orders authorizing interceptions of wire, oral, or electronic communications;
(10) "communication common carrier" has the meaning given that term in section 3 of the Communications Act of 1934;
(11) "aggrieved person" means a person who was a party to any intercepted wire, oral, or electronic communication or a person against whom the interception was directed;
(12) "electronic communication" means any transfer of signs, signals, writing, images, sounds, data, or intelligence of any nature transmitted in whole or in part by a wire, radio, electromagnetic, photoelectronic or photooptical system that affects interstate or foreign commerce, but does not include—
(A) any wire or oral communication;
(B) any communication made through a tone-only paging device;
(C) any communication from a tracking device (as defined in section 3117 of this title); or
(D) electronic funds transfer information stored by a financial institution in a communications system used for the electronic storage and transfer of funds;
(13) "user" means any person or entity who—
(A) uses an electronic communication service; and
(B) is duly authorized by the provider of such service to engage in such use;
(14) "electronic communications system" means any wire, radio, electromagnetic, photooptical or photoelectronic facilities for the transmission of wire or electronic communications, and any computer facilities or related electronic equipment for the electronic storage of such communications;
(15) "electronic communication service" means any service which provides to users thereof the ability to send or receive wire or electronic communications;
(16) "readily accessible to the general public" means, with respect to a radio communication, that such communication is not—
(A) scrambled or encrypted;
(B) transmitted using modulation techniques whose essential parameters have been withheld from the public with the intention of preserving the privacy of such communication;
(C) carried on a subcarrier or other signal subsidiary to a radio transmission;
(D) transmitted over a communication system provided by a common carrier, unless the communication is a tone only paging system communication; or
(E) transmitted on frequencies allocated under part 25, subpart D, E, or F of part 74, or part 94 of the Rules of the Federal Communications Commission, unless, in the case of a communication transmitted on a frequency allocated under part 74 that is not exclusively allocated to broadcast auxiliary services, the communication is a two-way voice communication by radio;
(17) "electronic storage" means—
(A) any temporary, intermediate storage of a wire or electronic communication incidental to the electronic transmission thereof; and
(B) any storage of such communication by an electronic communication service for purposes of backup protection of such communication;
(18) "aural transfer" means a transfer containing the human voice at any point between and including the point of origin and the point of reception;
(19) "foreign intelligence information", for purposes of section 2517(6) of this title, means—
(A) information, whether or not concerning a United States person, that relates to the ability of the United States to protect against—
(i) actual or potential attack or other grave hostile acts of a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power;
(ii) sabotage or international terrorism by a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power; or
(iii) clandestine intelligence activities by an intelligence service or network of a foreign power or by an agent of a foreign power; or
(B) information, whether or not concerning a United States person, with respect to a foreign power or foreign territory that relates to—
(i) the national defense or the security of the United States; or
(ii) the conduct of the foreign affairs of the United States;
(20) "protected computer" has the meaning set forth in section 1030; and
(21) "computer trespasser"—
(A) means a person who accesses a protected computer without authorization and thus has no reasonable expectation of privacy in any communication transmitted to, through, or from the protected computer; and
(B) does not include a person known by the owner or operator of the protected computer to have an existing contractual relationship with the owner or operator of the protected computer for access to all or part of the protected computer.
Notes
References in Text
Section 3 of the Communications Act of 1934, referred to in par. (10), is classified to section 153 of Title 47, Telecommunications.
Amendments
2002—Par. (10). Pub. L. 107–273 substituted "has the meaning given that term in section 3 of the Communications Act of 1934;" for "shall have the same meaning which is given the term 'common carrier' by section 153(h) of title 47 of the United States Code;".
2001—Par. (1). Pub. L. 107–56, §209(1)(A), struck out "and such term includes any electronic storage of such communication" before semicolon at end.
Par. (14). Pub. L. 107–56, §209(1)(B), inserted "wire or" after "transmission of".
Par. (19). Pub. L. 107–108 inserted ", for purposes of section 2517(6) of this title," before "means" in introductory provisions.
Pub. L. 107–56, §203(b)(2), added par. (19).
Pars. (20), (21). Pub. L. 107–56, §217(1), added pars. (20) and (21).
1996—Par. (12)(D). Pub. L. 104–132, §731(1), added subpar. (D).
Par. (16)(F). Pub. L. 104–132, §731(2), struck out subpar. (F) which read as follows: "an electronic communication;".
1994—Par. (1). Pub. L. 103–414, §202(a)(1), struck out before semicolon at end ", but such term does not include the radio portion of a cordless telephone communication that is transmitted between the cordless telephone handset and the base unit".
Par. (12). Pub. L. 103–414, §202(a)(2), redesignated subpars. (B) to (D) as (A) to (C), respectively, and struck out former subpar. (A) which read as follows: "the radio portion of a cordless telephone communication that is transmitted between the cordless telephone handset and the base unit;".
Par. (16)(F). Pub. L. 103–414, §203, added subpar. (F).
1986—Par. (1). Pub. L. 99–508, §101(a)(1), substituted "any aural transfer" for "any communication", inserted "(including the use of such connection in a switching station)" after "reception", struck out "as a common carrier" after "person engaged", and inserted "or communications affecting interstate or foreign commerce and such term includes any electronic storage of such communication, but such term does not include the radio portion of a cordless telephone communication that is transmitted between the cordless telephone handset and the base unit" before the semicolon at end.
Par. (2). Pub. L. 99–508, §101(a)(2), inserted ", but such term does not include any electronic communication" before the semicolon at end.
Par. (4). Pub. L. 99–508, §101(a)(3), inserted "or other" after "aural" and ", electronic," after "wire".
Par. (5). Pub. L. 99–508, §101(a)(4), (c)(1)(A), (4), substituted "wire, oral, or electronic" for "wire or oral" in introductory provisions, substituted "provider of wire or electronic communication service" for "communications common carrier" in subpars. (a)(i) and (ii), and inserted "or furnished by such subscriber or user for connection to the facilities of such service and used in the ordinary course of its business" before the semicolon in subpar. (a)(i).
Par. (8). Pub. L. 99–508, §101(a)(5), (c)(1)(A), substituted "wire, oral, or electronic" for "wire or oral" and struck out "identity of the parties to such communication or the existence," after "concerning the".
Pars. (9)(b), (11). Pub. L. 99–508, §101(c)(1)(A), substituted "wire, oral, or electronic" for "wire or oral".
Pars. (12) to (18). Pub. L. 99–508, §101(a)(6), added pars. (12) to (18).
Termination Date of 2001 Amendment
Pub. L. 107–56, title II, §224, Oct. 26, 2001, 115 Stat. 295, as amended by Pub. L. 109–160, §1, Dec. 30, 2005, 119 Stat. 2957; Pub. L. 109–170, §1, Feb. 3, 2006, 120 Stat. 3, which provided that title II of Pub. L. 107–56 and the amendments made by that title would cease to have effect on Mar. 10, 2006, with certain exceptions, was repealed by Pub. L. 109–177, title I, §102(a), Mar. 9, 2006, 120 Stat. 194.
Effective Date of 1986 Amendment
Pub. L. 99–508, title I, §111, Oct. 21, 1986, 100 Stat. 1859, provided that:
"(a)
"(b)
"(1) the day before the date of the taking effect of State law conforming the applicable State statute with chapter 119 of title 18, United States Code, as so amended; or
"(2) the date two years after the date of the enactment of this Act [Oct. 21, 1986].
"(c)
Short Title of 1997 Amendment
Pub. L. 105–112, §1, Nov. 21, 1997, 111 Stat. 2273, provided that: "This Act [amending section 2512 of this title] may be cited as the 'Law Enforcement Technology Advertisement Clarification Act of 1997'."
Short Title of 1986 Amendment
Pub. L. 99–508, §1, Oct. 21, 1986, 100 Stat. 1848, provided that: "This Act [enacting sections 1367, 2521, 2701 to 2710, 3117, and 3121 to 3126 of this title, amending sections 2232, 2511 to 2513, and 2516 to 2520 of this title, and enacting provisions set out as notes under this section and sections 2701 and 3121 of this title] may be cited as the 'Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986'."
Intelligence Activities
Pub. L. 99–508, title I, §107, Oct. 21, 1986, 100 Stat. 1858, provided that:
"(a)
"(b)
"(1) intercept encrypted or other official communications of United States executive branch entities or United States Government contractors for communications security purposes;
"(2) intercept radio communications transmitted between or among foreign powers or agents of a foreign power as defined by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 [50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.]; or
"(3) access an electronic communication system used exclusively by a foreign power or agent of a foreign power as defined by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978."
Congressional Findings
Pub. L. 90–351, title III, §801, June 19, 1968, 82 Stat. 211, provided that: "On the basis of its own investigations and of published studies, the Congress makes the following findings:
"(a) Wire communications are normally conducted through the use of facilities which form part of an interstate network. The same facilities are used for interstate and intrastate communications. There has been extensive wiretapping carried on without legal sanctions, and without the consent of any of the parties to the conversation. Electronic, mechanical, and other intercepting devices are being used to overhear oral conversations made in private, without the consent of any of the parties to such communications. The contents of these communications and evidence derived therefrom are being used by public and private parties as evidence in court and administrative proceedings, and by persons whose activities affect interstate commerce. The possession, manufacture, distribution, advertising, and use of these devices are facilitated by interstate commerce.
"(b) In order to protect effectively the privacy of wire and oral communications, to protect the integrity of court and administrative proceedings, and to prevent the obstruction of interstate commerce, it is necessary for Congress to define on a uniform basis the circumstances and conditions under which the interception of wire and oral communications may be authorized, to prohibit any unauthorized interception of such communications, and the use of the contents thereof in evidence in courts and administrative proceedings.
"(c) Organized criminals make extensive use of wire and oral communications in their criminal activities. The interception of such communications to obtain evidence of the commission of crimes or to prevent their commission is an indispensable aid to law enforcement and the administration of justice.
"(d) To safeguard the privacy of innocent persons, the interception of wire or oral communications where none of the parties to the communication has consented to the interception should be allowed only when authorized by a court of competent jurisdiction and should remain under the control and supervision of the authorizing court. Interception of wire and oral communications should further be limited to certain major types of offenses and specific categories of crime with assurances that the interception is justified and that the information obtained thereby will not be misused."
National Commission for the Review of Federal and State Laws Relating to Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance
Pub. L. 90–351, title III, §804, June 19, 1968, 82 Stat. 223, as amended by Pub. L. 91–452, title XII, §1212, Oct. 15, 1970, 84 Stat. 961; Pub. L. 91–644, title VI, §20, Jan. 2, 1971, 84 Stat. 1892; Pub. L. 93–609, §§1–4, Jan. 2, 1975, 88 Stat. 1972, 1973; Pub. L. 94–176, Dec. 23, 1975, 89 Stat. 1031, established a National Commission for the Review of Federal and State Laws Relating to Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance, provided for its membership, Chairman, powers and functions, compensation and allowances, required the Commission to study and review the operation of the provisions of this chapter to determine their effectiveness and to submit interim reports and a final report to the President and to the Congress of its findings and recommendations on or before Apr. 30, 1976, and also provided for its termination sixty days after submission of the final report.
2.4.1.2 Wiretap Act, Section 2511: Interception and disclosure of wire, oral, or electronic communications prohibited 2.4.1.2 Wiretap Act, Section 2511: Interception and disclosure of wire, oral, or electronic communications prohibited
18 U.S.C. § 2511
United States Code, 2018 Edition
Title 18 - CRIMES AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
PART I - CRIMES
CHAPTER 119 - WIRE AND ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS INTERCEPTION AND INTERCEPTION OF ORAL COMMUNICATIONS
Sec. 2511 - Interception and disclosure of wire, oral, or electronic communications prohibited
From the U.S. Government Publishing Office,
(1) Except as otherwise specifically provided in this chapter any person who—
(a) intentionally intercepts, endeavors to intercept, or procures any other person to intercept or endeavor to intercept, any wire, oral, or electronic communication;
(b) intentionally uses, endeavors to use, or procures any other person to use or endeavor to use any electronic, mechanical, or other device to intercept any oral communication when—
(i) such device is affixed to, or otherwise transmits a signal through, a wire, cable, or other like connection used in wire communication; or
(ii) such device transmits communications by radio, or interferes with the transmission of such communication; or
(iii) such person knows, or has reason to know, that such device or any component thereof has been sent through the mail or transported in interstate or foreign commerce; or
(iv) such use or endeavor to use (A) takes place on the premises of any business or other commercial establishment the operations of which affect interstate or foreign commerce; or (B) obtains or is for the purpose of obtaining information relating to the operations of any business or other commercial establishment the operations of which affect interstate or foreign commerce; or
(v) such person acts in the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, or any territory or possession of the United States;
(c) intentionally discloses, or endeavors to disclose, to any other person the contents of any wire, oral, or electronic communication, knowing or having reason to know that the information was obtained through the interception of a wire, oral, or electronic communication in violation of this subsection;
(d) intentionally uses, or endeavors to use, the contents of any wire, oral, or electronic communication, knowing or having reason to know that the information was obtained through the interception of a wire, oral, or electronic communication in violation of this subsection; or
(e)(i) intentionally discloses, or endeavors to disclose, to any other person the contents of any wire, oral, or electronic communication, intercepted by means authorized by sections 2511(2)(a)(ii), 2511(2)(b)–(c), 2511(2)(e), 2516, and 2518 of this chapter, (ii) knowing or having reason to know that the information was obtained through the interception of such a communication in connection with a criminal investigation, (iii) having obtained or received the information in connection with a criminal investigation, and (iv) with intent to improperly obstruct, impede, or interfere with a duly authorized criminal investigation,
shall be punished as provided in subsection (4) or shall be subject to suit as provided in subsection (5).
(2)(a)(i) It shall not be unlawful under this chapter for an operator of a switchboard, or an officer, employee, or agent of a provider of wire or electronic communication service, whose facilities are used in the transmission of a wire or electronic communication, to intercept, disclose, or use that communication in the normal course of his employment while engaged in any activity which is a necessary incident to the rendition of his service or to the protection of the rights or property of the provider of that service, except that a provider of wire communication service to the public shall not utilize service observing or random monitoring except for mechanical or service quality control checks.
(ii) Notwithstanding any other law, providers of wire or electronic communication service, their officers, employees, and agents, landlords, custodians, or other persons, are authorized to provide information, facilities, or technical assistance to persons authorized by law to intercept wire, oral, or electronic communications or to conduct electronic surveillance, as defined in section 101 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, if such provider, its officers, employees, or agents, landlord, custodian, or other specified person, has been provided with—
(A) a court order directing such assistance or a court order pursuant to section 704 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 signed by the authorizing judge, or
(B) a certification in writing by a person specified in section 2518(7) of this title or the Attorney General of the United States that no warrant or court order is required by law, that all statutory requirements have been met, and that the specified assistance is required,
setting forth the period of time during which the provision of the information, facilities, or technical assistance is authorized and specifying the information, facilities, or technical assistance required. No provider of wire or electronic communication service, officer, employee, or agent thereof, or landlord, custodian, or other specified person shall disclose the existence of any interception or surveillance or the device used to accomplish the interception or surveillance with respect to which the person has been furnished a court order or certification under this chapter, except as may otherwise be required by legal process and then only after prior notification to the Attorney General or to the principal prosecuting attorney of a State or any political subdivision of a State, as may be appropriate. Any such disclosure, shall render such person liable for the civil damages provided for in section 2520. No cause of action shall lie in any court against any provider of wire or electronic communication service, its officers, employees, or agents, landlord, custodian, or other specified person for providing information, facilities, or assistance in accordance with the terms of a court order, statutory authorization, or certification under this chapter.
(iii) If a certification under subparagraph (ii)(B) for assistance to obtain foreign intelligence information is based on statutory authority, the certification shall identify the specific statutory provision and shall certify that the statutory requirements have been met.
(b) It shall not be unlawful under this chapter for an officer, employee, or agent of the Federal Communications Commission, in the normal course of his employment and in discharge of the monitoring responsibilities exercised by the Commission in the enforcement of chapter 5 of title 47 of the United States Code, to intercept a wire or electronic communication, or oral communication transmitted by radio, or to disclose or use the information thereby obtained.
(c) It shall not be unlawful under this chapter for a person acting under color of law to intercept a wire, oral, or electronic communication, where such person is a party to the communication or one of the parties to the communication has given prior consent to such interception.
(d) It shall not be unlawful under this chapter for a person not acting under color of law to intercept a wire, oral, or electronic communication where such person is a party to the communication or where one of the parties to the communication has given prior consent to such interception unless such communication is intercepted for the purpose of committing any criminal or tortious act in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States or of any State.
(e) Notwithstanding any other provision of this title or section 705 or 706 of the Communications Act of 1934, it shall not be unlawful for an officer, employee, or agent of the United States in the normal course of his official duty to conduct electronic surveillance, as defined in section 101 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as authorized by that Act.
(f) Nothing contained in this chapter or chapter 121 or 206 of this title, or section 705 of the Communications Act of 1934, shall be deemed to affect the acquisition by the United States Government of foreign intelligence information from international or foreign communications, or foreign intelligence activities conducted in accordance with otherwise applicable Federal law involving a foreign electronic communications system, utilizing a means other than electronic surveillance as defined in section 101 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, and procedures in this chapter or chapter 121 and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 shall be the exclusive means by which electronic surveillance, as defined in section 101 of such Act, and the interception of domestic wire, oral, and electronic communications may be conducted.
(g) It shall not be unlawful under this chapter or chapter 121 of this title for any person—
(i) to intercept or access an electronic communication made through an electronic communication system that is configured so that such electronic communication is readily accessible to the general public;
(ii) to intercept any radio communication which is transmitted—
(I) by any station for the use of the general public, or that relates to ships, aircraft, vehicles, or persons in distress;
(II) by any governmental, law enforcement, civil defense, private land mobile, or public safety communications system, including police and fire, readily accessible to the general public;
(III) by a station operating on an authorized frequency within the bands allocated to the amateur, citizens band, or general mobile radio services; or
(IV) by any marine or aeronautical communications system;
(iii) to engage in any conduct which—
(I) is prohibited by section 633 of the Communications Act of 1934; or
(II) is excepted from the application of section 705(a) of the Communications Act of 1934 by section 705(b) of that Act;
(iv) to intercept any wire or electronic communication the transmission of which is causing harmful interference to any lawfully operating station or consumer electronic equipment, to the extent necessary to identify the source of such interference; or
(v) for other users of the same frequency to intercept any radio communication made through a system that utilizes frequencies monitored by individuals engaged in the provision or the use of such system, if such communication is not scrambled or encrypted.
(h) It shall not be unlawful under this chapter—
(i) to use a pen register or a trap and trace device (as those terms are defined for the purposes of chapter 206 (relating to pen registers and trap and trace devices) of this title); or
(ii) for a provider of electronic communication service to record the fact that a wire or electronic communication was initiated or completed in order to protect such provider, another provider furnishing service toward the completion of the wire or electronic communication, or a user of that service, from fraudulent, unlawful or abusive use of such service.
(i) It shall not be unlawful under this chapter for a person acting under color of law to intercept the wire or electronic communications of a computer trespasser transmitted to, through, or from the protected computer, if—
(I) the owner or operator of the protected computer authorizes the interception of the computer trespasser's communications on the protected computer;
(II) the person acting under color of law is lawfully engaged in an investigation;
(III) the person acting under color of law has reasonable grounds to believe that the contents of the computer trespasser's communications will be relevant to the investigation; and
(IV) such interception does not acquire communications other than those transmitted to or from the computer trespasser.
(j) It shall not be unlawful under this chapter for a provider of electronic communication service to the public or remote computing service to intercept or disclose the contents of a wire or electronic communication in response to an order from a foreign government that is subject to an executive agreement that the Attorney General has determined and certified to Congress satisfies section 2523.
(3)(a) Except as provided in paragraph (b) of this subsection, a person or entity providing an electronic communication service to the public shall not intentionally divulge the contents of any communication (other than one to such person or entity, or an agent thereof) while in transmission on that service to any person or entity other than an addressee or intended recipient of such communication or an agent of such addressee or intended recipient.
(b) A person or entity providing electronic communication service to the public may divulge the contents of any such communication—
(i) as otherwise authorized in section 2511(2)(a) or 2517 of this title;
(ii) with the lawful consent of the originator or any addressee or intended recipient of such communication;
(iii) to a person employed or authorized, or whose facilities are used, to forward such communication to its destination; or
(iv) which were inadvertently obtained by the service provider and which appear to pertain to the commission of a crime, if such divulgence is made to a law enforcement agency.
(4)(a) Except as provided in paragraph (b) of this subsection or in subsection (5), whoever violates subsection (1) of this section shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
(b) Conduct otherwise an offense under this subsection that consists of or relates to the interception of a satellite transmission that is not encrypted or scrambled and that is transmitted—
(i) to a broadcasting station for purposes of retransmission to the general public; or
(ii) as an audio subcarrier intended for redistribution to facilities open to the public, but not including data transmissions or telephone calls,
is not an offense under this subsection unless the conduct is for the purposes of direct or indirect commercial advantage or private financial gain.
(5)(a)(i) If the communication is—
(A) a private satellite video communication that is not scrambled or encrypted and the conduct in violation of this chapter is the private viewing of that communication and is not for a tortious or illegal purpose or for purposes of direct or indirect commercial advantage or private commercial gain; or
(B) a radio communication that is transmitted on frequencies allocated under subpart D of part 74 of the rules of the Federal Communications Commission that is not scrambled or encrypted and the conduct in violation of this chapter is not for a tortious or illegal purpose or for purposes of direct or indirect commercial advantage or private commercial gain,
then the person who engages in such conduct shall be subject to suit by the Federal Government in a court of competent jurisdiction.
(ii) In an action under this subsection—
(A) if the violation of this chapter is a first offense for the person under paragraph (a) of subsection (4) and such person has not been found liable in a civil action under section 2520 of this title, the Federal Government shall be entitled to appropriate injunctive relief; and
(B) if the violation of this chapter is a second or subsequent offense under paragraph (a) of subsection (4) or such person has been found liable in any prior civil action under section 2520, the person shall be subject to a mandatory $500 civil fine.
(b) The court may use any means within its authority to enforce an injunction issued under paragraph (ii)(A), and shall impose a civil fine of not less than $500 for each violation of such an injunction.
Notes
Amendment of Paragraph (2)(a)(ii)(A)
Pub. L. 110–261, title IV, §403(b)(2), July 10, 2008, 122 Stat. 2474, as amended by Pub. L. 112–238, §2(a)(2), Dec. 30, 2012, 126 Stat. 1631; Pub. L. 115–118, title II, §201(a)(2), Jan. 19, 2018, 132 Stat. 19, provided that, except as provided in section 404 of Pub. L. 110–261, set out as a note under section 1801 of Title 50, War and National Defense, effective Dec. 31, 2023, paragraph (2)(a)(ii)(A) of this section is amended by striking "or a court order pursuant to section 704 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978".
References in Text
The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, referred to in par. (2)(e), (f), is Pub. L. 95–511, Oct. 25, 1978, 92 Stat. 1783, which is classified principally to chapter 36 (§1801 et seq.) of Title 50, War and National Defense. Sections 101 and 704 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, referred to in par. (2)(a)(ii), (e), and (f), are classified to sections 1801 and 1881c of Title 50, respectively. For complete classification of this Act to the Code, see Short Title note set out under section 1801 of Title 50 and Tables.
Sections 633, 705, and 706 of the Communications Act of 1934, referred to in par. (2)(e), (f), (g)(iii), are classified to sections 553, 605, and 606 of Title 47, Telecommunications, respectively.
Constitutionality
For information regarding constitutionality of certain provisions of this section, as amended by section 101(c)(1)(A) of Pub. L. 99–508, see Congressional Research Service, The Constitution of the United States of America: Analysis and Interpretation, Appendix 1, Acts of Congress Held Unconstitutional in Whole or in Part by the Supreme Court of the United States.
Amendments
2018—Par. (2)(j). Pub. L. 115–141 added subpar. (j).
2008—Par. (2)(a)(ii)(A). Pub. L. 110–261, §101(c)(1), inserted "or a court order pursuant to section 704 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978" after "assistance".
Par. (2)(a)(iii). Pub. L. 110–261, §102(c)(1), added cl. (iii).
2002—Par. (2)(a)(ii). Pub. L. 107–296, §2207(h)(2), formerly §225(h)(2), as renumbered by Pub. L. 115–278, §2(g)(2)(I), inserted ", statutory authorization," after "terms of a court order" in concluding provisions.
Par. (4)(b), (c). Pub. L. 107–296, §2207(j)(1), formerly §225(j)(1), as renumbered by Pub. L. 115–278, §2(g)(2)(I), redesignated subpar. (c) as (b) and struck out former subpar. (b) which read as follows: "If the offense is a first offense under paragraph (a) of this subsection and is not for a tortious or illegal purpose or for purposes of direct or indirect commercial advantage or private commercial gain, and the wire or electronic communication with respect to which the offense under paragraph (a) is a radio communication that is not scrambled, encrypted, or transmitted using modulation techniques the essential parameters of which have been withheld from the public with the intention of preserving the privacy of such communication, then—
"(i) if the communication is not the radio portion of a cellular telephone communication, a cordless telephone communication that is transmitted between the cordless telephone handset and the base unit, a public land mobile radio service communication or a paging service communication, and the conduct is not that described in subsection (5), the offender shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than one year, or both; and
"(ii) if the communication is the radio portion of a cellular telephone communication, a cordless telephone communication that is transmitted between the cordless telephone handset and the base unit, a public land mobile radio service communication or a paging service communication, the offender shall be fined under this title."
2001—Par. (2)(f). Pub. L. 107–56, §204, substituted "this chapter or chapter 121 or 206 of this title, or section 705 of the Communications Act of 1934" for "this chapter or chapter 121, or section 705 of the Communications Act of 1934" and "wire, oral, and electronic communications" for "wire and oral communications".
Par. (2)(i). Pub. L. 107–56, §217(2), added subpar. (i).
1996—Par. (1)(e)(i). Pub. L. 104–294 substituted "sections 2511(2)(a)(ii), 2511(2)(b)–(c), 2511(2)(e), 2516, and 2518 of this chapter" for "sections 2511(2)(A)(ii), 2511(b)–(c), 2511(e), 2516, and 2518 of this subchapter".
1994—Par. (1)(e). Pub. L. 103–322, §320901, added par. (1)(e).
Par. (2)(a)(i). Pub. L. 103–414, §205, inserted "or electronic" after "transmission of a wire".
Par. (4)(b). Pub. L. 103–414, §204, in introductory provisions substituted ", encrypted, or transmitted using modulation techniques the essential parameters of which have been withheld from the public with the intention of preserving the privacy of such communication, then" for "or encrypted, then".
Par. (4)(b)(i). Pub. L. 103–414, §202(b)(1), inserted "a cordless telephone communication that is transmitted between the cordless telephone handset and the base unit," after "cellular telephone communication,".
Par. (4)(b)(ii). Pub. L. 103–414, §202(b)(2), inserted "a cordless telephone communication that is transmitted between the cordless telephone handset and the base unit," after "cellular telephone communication,".
Pub. L. 103–322, §330016(1)(G), substituted "fined under this title" for "fined not more than $500".
1986—Pub. L. 99–508, §101(c)(1)(A), substituted "wire, oral, or electronic" for "wire or oral" in section catchline.
Par. (1). Pub. L. 99–508, §101(c)(1)(A), (d)(1), (f)[(1)], substituted "intentionally" for "willfully" in subpars. (a) to (d) and "wire, oral, or electronic' for "wire or oral" wherever appearing in subpars. (a), (c), and (d), and in concluding provisions substituted "shall be punished as provided in subsection (4) or shall be subject to suit as provided in subsection (5)" for "shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both".
Par. (2)(a)(i). Pub. L. 99–508, §101(c)(5), substituted "a provider of wire or electronic communication service" for "any communication common carrier" and "of the provider of that service, except that a provider of wire communication service to the public" for "of the carrier of such communication: Provided, That said communication common carriers".
Par. (2)(a)(ii). Pub. L. 99–508, §101(b)(1), (c)(1)(A), (6), substituted "providers of wire or electronic communication service" for "communication common carriers", "wire, oral, or electronic" for "wire or oral", "if such provider" for "if the common carrier", "provider of wire or electronic communication service" for "communication common carrier" wherever appearing, "such disclosure" for "violation of this subparagraph by a communication common carrier or an officer, employee, or agent thereof", "render such person liable" for "render the carrier liable", and "a court order or certification under this chapter" for "an order or certification under this subparagraph" in two places.
Par. (2)(b). Pub. L. 99–508, §101(c)(1)(B), inserted "or electronic" after "wire".
Par. (2)(c). Pub. L. 99–508, §101(c)(1)(A), substituted "wire, oral, or electronic" for "wire or oral".
Par. (2)(d). Pub. L. 99–508, §101(b)(2), (c)(1)(A), substituted "wire, oral, or electronic" for "wire or oral" and struck out "or for the purpose of committing any other injurious act" after "of any State".
Par. (2)(f). Pub. L. 99–508, §101(b)(3), inserted "or chapter 121" in two places and substituted "foreign communications, or foreign intelligence activities conducted in accordance with otherwise applicable Federal law involving a foreign electronic communications system, utilizing a means" for "foreign communications by a means".
Par. (2)(g), (h). Pub. L. 99–508, §101(b)(4), added subpars. (g) and (h).
Par. (3). Pub. L. 99–508, §102, added par. (3).
Pars. (4), (5). Pub. L. 99–508, §101(d)(2), added pars. (4) and (5).
1984—Par. (2)(e). Pub. L. 98–549, §6(b)(2)(A), substituted "section 705 or 706" for "section 605 or 606".
Par. (2)(f). Pub. L. 98–549, §6(b)(2)(B), substituted "section 705" for "section 605".
1978—Par. (2)(a)(ii). Pub. L. 95–511, §201(a), substituted provisions authorizing communication common carriers etc., to provide information to designated persons, prohibiting disclosure of intercepted information, and rendering violators civilly liable for provision exempting communication common carriers from criminality for giving information to designated officers.
Par. (2)(e), (f). Pub. L. 95–511, §201(b), added par. (2)(e) and (f).
Par. (3). Pub. L. 95–511, §201(c), struck out par. (3) which provided that nothing in this chapter or section 605 of title 47 limited the President's constitutional power to gather necessary intelligence to protect the national security and stated the conditions necessary for the reception into evidence and disclosure of communications intercepted by the President.
1970—Par. (2)(a). Pub. L. 91–358 designated existing provisions as cl. (i) and added cl. (ii).
Effective Date of 2008 Amendment
Amendments by sections 101(c)(1) and 102(c)(1) of Pub. L. 110–261 effective July 10, 2008, except as otherwise provided in section 404 of Pub. L. 110–261, set out as a Transition Procedures note under section 1801 of Title 50, War and National Defense, see section 402 of Pub. L. 110–261, set out as a note under section 1801 of Title 50.
Pub. L. 110–261, title IV, §403(b)(2), July 10, 2008, 122 Stat. 2474, as amended by Pub. L. 112–238, §2(a)(2), Dec. 30, 2012, 126 Stat. 1631; Pub. L. 115–118, title II, §201(a)(2), Jan. 19, 2018, 132 Stat. 19, provided that, except as provided in section 404 of Pub. L. 110–261, set out as a Transition Procedures note under section 1801 of Title 50, War and National Defense, the amendments made by section 403(b)(2) are effective Dec. 31, 2023.
Effective Date of 2002 Amendment
Amendment by Pub. L. 107–296 effective 60 days after Nov. 25, 2002, see section 4 of Pub. L. 107–296, set out as an Effective Date note under section 101 of Title 6, Domestic Security.
Effective Date of 1996 Amendment
Amendment by Pub. L. 104–294 effective Sept. 13, 1994, see section 604(d) of Pub. L. 104–294, set out as a note under section 13 of this title.
Effective Date of 1986 Amendment
Amendment by Pub. L. 99–508 effective 90 days after Oct. 21, 1986, and, in case of conduct pursuant to court order or extension, applicable only with respect to court orders and extensions made after such date, with special rule for State authorizations of interceptions, see section 111 of Pub. L. 99–508, set out as a note under section 2510 of this title.
Effective Date of 1984 Amendment
Amendment by Pub. L. 98–549 effective 60 days after Oct. 30, 1984, see section 9(a) of Pub. L. 98–549, set out as an Effective Date note under section 521 of Title 47, Telecommunications.
Effective Date of 1978 Amendment
Amendment by Pub. L. 95–511 effective Oct. 25, 1978, except as specifically provided, see section 401 of Pub. L. 95–511, formerly set out as an Effective Date note under section 1801 of Title 50, War and National Defense.
Effective Date of 1970 Amendment
Amendment by Pub. L. 91–358 effective on first day of seventh calendar month which begins after July 29, 1970, see section 901(a) of Pub. L. 91–358.
2.4.1.3 Wiretap Act, Section 2520: Recovery of civil damages authorized 2.4.1.3 Wiretap Act, Section 2520: Recovery of civil damages authorized
18 U.S.C. § 2520
United States Code, 2018 Edition
Title 18 - CRIMES AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
PART I - CRIMES
CHAPTER 119 - WIRE AND ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS INTERCEPTION AND INTERCEPTION OF ORAL COMMUNICATIONS
Sec. 2520 - Recovery of civil damages authorized
From the U.S. Government Publishing Office,
(a)
(b)
(1) such preliminary and other equitable or declaratory relief as may be appropriate;
(2) damages under subsection (c) and punitive damages in appropriate cases; and
(3) a reasonable attorney's fee and other litigation costs reasonably incurred.
(c)
(A) If the person who engaged in that conduct has not previously been enjoined under section 2511(5) and has not been found liable in a prior civil action under this section, the court shall assess the greater of the sum of actual damages suffered by the plaintiff, or statutory damages of not less than $50 and not more than $500.
(B) If, on one prior occasion, the person who engaged in that conduct has been enjoined under section 2511(5) or has been found liable in a civil action under this section, the court shall assess the greater of the sum of actual damages suffered by the plaintiff, or statutory damages of not less than $100 and not more than $1000.
(2) In any other action under this section, the court may assess as damages whichever is the greater of—
(A) the sum of the actual damages suffered by the plaintiff and any profits made by the violator as a result of the violation; or
(B) statutory damages of whichever is the greater of $100 a day for each day of violation or $10,000.
(d)
(1) a court warrant or order, a grand jury subpoena, a legislative authorization, or a statutory authorization;
(2) a request of an investigative or law enforcement officer under section 2518(7) of this title; or
(3) a good faith determination that section 2511(3), 2511(2)(i), or 2511(2)(j) of this title permitted the conduct complained of;
is a complete defense against any civil or criminal action brought under this chapter or any other law.
(e)
(f)
(g)
Notes
Amendments
2018—Subsec. (d)(3). Pub. L. 115–141 amended par. (3) generally. Prior to amendment, par. (3) read as follows: "a good faith determination that section 2511(3) or 2511(2)(i) of this title permitted the conduct complained of;".
2002—Subsec. (d)(3). Pub. L. 107–296 inserted "or 2511(2)(i)" after "2511(3)".
2001—Subsec. (a). Pub. L. 107–56, §223(a)(1), inserted ", other than the United States," after "person or entity".
Subsecs. (f), (g). Pub. L. 107–56, §223(a)(2), (3), added subsecs. (f) and (g).
1986—Pub. L. 99–508 amended section generally. Prior to amendment, section read as follows: "Any person whose wire or oral communication is intercepted, disclosed, or used in violation of this chapter shall (1) have a civil cause of action against any person who intercepts, discloses, or uses, or procures any other person to intercept, disclose, or use such communications, and (2) be entitled to recover from any such person—
"(a) actual damages but not less than liquidated damages computed at the rate of $100 a day for each day of violation or $1,000, whichever is higher;
"(b) punitive damages; and
"(c) a reasonable attorney's fee and other litigation costs reasonably incurred.
A good faith reliance on a court order or legislative authorization shall constitute a complete defense to any civil or criminal action brought under this chapter or under any other law."
1970—Pub. L. 91–358 substituted provisions that a good faith reliance on a court order or legislative authorization constitute a complete defense to any civil or criminal action brought under this chapter or under any other law, for provisions that a good faith reliance on a court order or on the provisions of section 2518(7) of this chapter constitute a complete defense to any civil or criminal action brought under this chapter.
Effective Date of 2002 Amendment
Amendment by Pub. L. 107–296 effective 60 days after Nov. 25, 2002, see section 4 of Pub. L. 107–296, set out as an Effective Date note under section 101 of Title 6, Domestic Security.
Effective Date of 1986 Amendment
Amendment by Pub. L. 99–508 effective 90 days after Oct. 21, 1986, and, in case of conduct pursuant to court order or extension, applicable only with respect to court orders and extensions made after such date, with special rule for State authorizations of interceptions, see section 111 of Pub. L. 99–508, set out as a note under section 2510 of this title.
Effective Date of 1970 Amendment
Amendment by Pub. L. 91–358 effective on first day of seventh calendar month which begins after July 29, 1970, see section 901(a) of Pub. L. 91–358.
Rule of Construction
Pub. L. 115–141, div. V, §106, Mar. 23, 2018, 132 Stat. 1224, provided that: "Nothing in this division [see section 101 of Pub. L. 115–141, set out as a Short Title of 2018 Amendment note under section 1 of this title], or the amendments made by this division, shall be construed to preclude any foreign authority from obtaining assistance in a criminal investigation or prosecution pursuant to section 3512 of title 18, United States Code, section 1782 of title 28, United States Code, or as otherwise provided by law."
2.4.1.4 In re Innovatio IP Ventures, LLC Patent Litigation (N.D. Ill. 2012) 2.4.1.4 In re Innovatio IP Ventures, LLC Patent Litigation (N.D. Ill. 2012)
In re INNOVATIO IP VENTURES, LLC PATENT LITIGATION.
This Order Applies to all Cases Pretrial Order No. 6.
MDL No. 2303.
Case No. 11 C 9308.
United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division.
Aug. 22, 2012.
Brian Erik Haan, Gabriel I. Opatken, Matthew G. McAndrews, Raymond Pardo Niro, Jr., Niro, Scavone, Haller & Niro, Gregory Clements Schodde, Peter J. McAndrews, Jean Dudek Kuelper, Ronald H. Spuhler, Shawn Leonard Peterson, McAndrews, Held & Malloy, P.C., Chicago, IL, Robert L. Wolter, Beusse Wolter Sanks Mora & Maire, PA, Orlando, FL, for Innovatio IP Ventures, LLC.
John David Silk, Kenneth P. Taube, Robin Korman Powers, Rothschild, Barry & Myers LLP, Kevin John O’Shea, Green-berg Traurig LLP, Deanna L. Keysor, Jason F. Hoffman, Kaye Scholer LLP, Richard Albert Cowen, Stahl Cowen Crowley *889LLC, John Conroy Martin, Law Offices of John C. Martin, Avani C. Macaluso, McDermott, Will & Emery LLP, Elizabeth A.F. Morris, Sharon Renae Albrecht, Steven L. Baron, Steven P. Mandell, Mandell Menkes LLC, Thomas J. Wimbiscus, McAndrews, Held & Malloy, P.C., Keith V. Rockey, Matthew L. DePreter, Rockey & Lyons, Daniel Long Farris, Robert David Donoghne, Steven Eric Jedlinski, Holland and Knight, LLP, Anthony J. Tunney, Helper Broom, LLC, Avidan Joel Stern, Lynch & Stern LLP, Carolyn M. Passen, Christine Elizabeth Bestor, Katten Muchin Rosenman LLP, Christopher R. Parker, Gilberto Eduardo Espinoza, Michael Best & Friedrich LLP, Eric Charles Cohen, Katten Muchin Rosenman LLP, Jason Michael Wejnert, Kirkland & Ellis LLP, Michael J. Word, Richard M. Assmus, Steven Yovits, Mayer Brown LLP, Steven John Martin, HeplerBroom, LLC, Chicago, IL, William C. Brittan, Campbell Killin Brit-tan & Ray, LLC, Denver, CO, F. Joseph Jaskowiak, Richard M. Davis, Hoeppner Wagner & Evans LLP, Merrillville, IN, Adam A. Alper, Kirkland & Ellis LLP, San Francisco, CA, Brian Paul Gearing, Steven C. Cherny, Kirkland & Ellis LLP, New York, NY, Michael W. De Vries, Kirkland & Ellis LLP, Los Angeles, CA, Alfred S. Lee, Johnson, Westra, Broecker, Whitaker & Newitt, P.C., Schaumburg, IL, Kenneth Laurence Dorsney, Morris James LLP, Jack B. Blumenfeld, Rodger Dallery Smith, II, Morris, Nichols, Arsht & Tunnell LLP, Wilmington, DE, James George Goggin, Verrill Dana, LLP, Portland, ME, Adam K. Yowell, Michael D. Rounds, Watson Rounds, Bret F. Meich, Richard G. Campbell, Jr., Armstrong Teasdale, LLP, Reno, NV, Anthony Richard Zeuli, Christopher Davis, Merchant & Gould P.C., Minneapolis, MN, David S. Elkins, Squire Sanders LLP, Palo Alto, CA, Eric J. Schwalb, Eckert Seamans Cherin & Mellott, LLC, Washington, DC, Jay L. Kanzler, Jr., Witzel & Kanzler LLC, St. Louis, MO, Sandy Garfinkel, Eckert Seamans Cherin & Mellott, LLC, Pittsburgh, PA, Shane Allen Brunner, Merchant & Gould PC, Madison, WI, Vaibhav P. Kadaba, Kilpatrick Stockton, LLP, Atlanta, GA, for Defendants.
Travelodge Hotel O’Hare/Chicago, Mel-rose Park, IL, pro se.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER ADDRESSING PROTOCOL FOR INNOVATIO’S WI-FI “SNIFFING”
Plaintiff Innovatio IP Ventures, LLC (“Innovatio”) has sued various hotels, coffee shops, restaurants, supermarkets, and other commercial users of wireless internet technology located throughout the United States (collectively, the “Wireless Network Users”). (See Dkt. No. 198 (“Second Am. Compl.”).) Innovatio alleges that, by making wireless internet available to their customers or using it to manage internal processes, the Wireless Network Users infringe various claims of seventeen patents owned by Innovatio. (Id. ¶¶48-81.) In addition, several manufactures of the products that the Wireless Network Users use to provide wireless internet (collectively, the “Manufacturers”) have brought declaratory judgment actions against Innovatio seeking a declaration that their products, and the networks or systems of which they are a part, do not infringe Innovatio’s patents. See Compl. (Dkt. No. 1), Cisco Sys., Inc. v. Innovatio IP Ventures, No. 11-cv-9309 (N.D. Ill. May 13, 2011). All claims and parties were consolidated before this court by the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation. (Dkt. No. 1.) Pending before the court is Innovatio’s motion titled “Rule 16(c)(2) Motion for Entry of Protocol for Collection of Electronic Evidence and Preliminary Ruling on Admissibility of Evidence Collected Therefrom.” (Dkt. No. 329.) For *890the reasons explained below, that motion is granted.
BACKGROUND
The standard for the operation of wireless networks that access the internet is established by the Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers (“IEEE”), and is known as IEEE 802.11, or “Wi-Fi.” As discovery has proceeded in this case, Innovatio has been using commercially-available Wi-Fi network analyzers to collect information about the Wireless Network Users’ allegedly infringing Wi-Fi networks. (Dkt. No. 329, at 2.) That process, which is known in the industry as “sniffing,” requires Innovatio’s technicians to enter the Wireless Network Users’ premises during business hours with a laptop computer and a Riverbed AirPcap Nx packet capture adapter (or a similar device). (Id.) The packet capture adapter can intercept data packets that are traveling wirelessly between the Wi-Fi router provided by the Wireless Network Users and any devices that may be communicating with it, such as a customer’s laptop, smartphone, or tablet computer. Innovatio then uses Wireshark network packet analyzer software to analyze the data packets, revealing information about the configuration of the network and the devices in the network. The data packets also include any substantive information that customers using the Wi-Fi network may have been transmitting during the interception of the data packets, including e-mails, pictures, videos, passwords, financial information, private documents, and anything else a customer could transmit to the internet. Innovatio contends that the information it collects will assist in proving its infringement claims.
Before continuing to incur the expense of additional sniffing, Innovatio sought permission to obtain a preliminary ruling on the admissibility of the information that it gains in the sniffing process. (Dkt. No. 290.) The court granted permission to Innovatio to seek an admissibility ruling (Dkt. No. 323), but expressed some concern that Innovatio’s sniffing may implicate the privacy interests of the customers using the Wi-Fi networks under the federal Wiretap Act. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522. Accordingly, the court ordered Innovatio’s motion to describe its proposed sniffing protocol in detail and to address the applicability of the Wiretap Act. Innovatio has submitted a proposed protocol under seal (Dkt. No. 329, Ex. A), and now requests that the court approve that protocol and issue a preliminary ruling on the admissibility of any evidence Innovatio may gather through the use of that protocol.
ANALYSIS
I. The Federal Wiretap Act
The Federal Wiretap Act provides that, with certain exceptions, “any person who ... intentionally intercepts ... any wire, oral, or electronic communication” shall be subject to criminal and civil liability. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(l)(a); see also 18 U.S.C. § 2520(a). An “electronic communication” includes “any transfer of signals, -writing, images, sounds, data or intelligence of any nature transmitted in whole or in part by a wire, radio, electromagnetic, photoelectronic or photooptical system that affects interstate or foreign commerce.” Neither party disputes that the allegedly infringing Wi-Fi networks transmit information using radio waves (which are a type of electromagnetic radiation), and thus transmit “electronic communications.”
Nonetheless, Innovatio contends that the Wiretap Act does not apply because it has altered the source code of the Wireshark software so that it no longer intercepts the contents of any third-party communication.1 The Wiretap Act pro*891vides that “ ‘intercept’ means the aural or other acquisition of the contents of any wire, electronic, or oral communication through the use of any electronic, mechanical, or other device.” 18 U.S.C. § 2510(4). The “contents” of a communication are “any information concerning the substance, purport, or meaning of that communication.” 18 U.S.C. § 2510(8). According to Innovatio, its modified Wireshark software “overwrites the data payload (i.e. the ‘substance’ of the [Wi-Fi] communication) before the results are provided to the user,” while still collecting the header information that it needs to analyze the configuration of the wireless network (such as the source of the data packet, the destination of the packet, the packet length, and the checksum2). (Dkt. No. 329, at 4.) Innovatio thus contends that it is not acquiring the contents of any communication, and that its sniffing does not violate the Wiretap Act.
In response, the defendants3 argue that the process of “overwriting” the data payload implies that Innovatio initially captures the data payload before deleting it. According to the defendants’ expert, James Edward Hung, the mere act of initially recording the data payload is sufficient to complete the acquisition of the data, regardless of whether the intercepted data is later overwritten before it is used. (Dkt. No. 349, Ex. 5 (“Hung Decl. ¶ 12”).) The defendants thus contend that Innovatio’s proposed protocol intercepts the contents of the communication. In support of that argument, the defendants note that § 2511(l)(d) of the Wiretap Act contains a separate provision prohibiting the use of intercepted communications and that, to avoid redundancy with that section, § 2511(l)(a)’s prohibition on interception must not require the use of the communication as an element of the offense. See Noel v. Hall, 568 F.3d 743, 749 (9th Cir.2009) (“No new interception occurs when a person listens to or copies the communication that has already been captured or redirected. Any subsequent use of the recorded conversation is governed not by the prohibition on interception, but by the prohibition in § 2511(c) and (d) on the ‘use’ and ‘disclosure]’ of intercepted wire communications.”).
Innovatio replies, however, that the defendants have misunderstood the relevant technology. According to Innovatio’s expert, Ray Nettleton, all Wi-Fi devices necessarily store an entire received data packet, including the packet’s substantive communications, while the device processes the packet. (Dkt. No. 384, Ex. U (“Nettleton Decl.”) ¶ 40.) During processing, if the Wi-Fi device determines that the data packet is not addressed to it or has been corrupted during transmission, the packet is deleted. (Id. ¶¶ 42-46.) Pri- or to that point, the entire data packet is retained only in the Wi-Fi device’s random access memory, and is not stored in a permanent medium. (Id. ¶ 47.) The entire process is momentary, so deleted packets are retained in memory for no more than milliseconds. (Id. ¶ 48.) Innovatio proposes to automatically overwrite all substantive communications in the data packets that it intercepts, making its protocol “intercept” substantive communica*892tions only to the extent that a normal Wi-Fi device would intercept all communications on a Wi-Fi network to which it is connected. (Id. ¶ 54.) If its proposal runs afoul of the Wiretap Act, Innovatio argues, then all Wi-Fi devices necessarily violate the Act whenever they are connected to a Wi-Fi network that also includes devices belonging to a another party, an absurd result.
In essence, Innovatio asks the court to conclude that a communication is not “intercepted” until it has been recorded in a permanent medium. The court is hesitant to adopt that conclusion, first because that requirement is nowhere found in the Wiretap Act. Moreover, an individual’s online activity can be chilled merely by the knowledge that a third party has the power to acquire, however briefly, the contents of his communications. See Amati v. City of Woodstock, 829 F.Supp. 998, 1008 (N.D.Ill.1993) (holding that the privacy interests of an individual whose conversations come under the power of another are implicated “even if the individual was assured no one would listen to his conversations, because the individual’s privacy interests are no longer autonomous”); see also United States v. Rodriguez, 968 F.2d 130, 136 (2d Cir.1992) (acquisition occurs “when the contents of a wire communication are captured or redirected in any way ” (emphasis added)).
The court need not, however, construe the term “intercept” in this case, nor must it resolve the dispute between the parties’ experts. The reason is that, even assuming that Innovatio’s proposed protocol intercepts Wi-Fi communications, Innovatio’s proposed protocol falls into the exception to the Wiretap Act allowing a person “to intercept or access an electronic communication made through an electronic communication system that is configured so that such electronic communication is readily accessible to the general public.” 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(g)(i).4 Most of the Wireless Network Users’ Wi-Fi networks are open and available to the general public, allowing any customer who so desires to access the internet through them. The question is not, however, whether the networks are “readily accessible to the general public,” but instead whether the network is configured in such a way so that the electronic communications sent over the network are readily accessible.
The only reported decision addressing that question is In re Google Inc. Street View Electronic Communications Litigation, 794 F.Supp.2d 1067, 1070 (N.D.Cal. 2011). In that case before Chief Judge Ware, the plaintiffs sued Google under the Wiretap Act for the intentional interception of data from their unencrypted home Wi-Fi networks during the collection of *893data for the Google Street View feature of Google Maps. In denying Google’s motion to dismiss, the court noted that the plaintiffs had alleged that the data packets transmitted over the Wi-Fi networks “were not readable by the general public without the use of sophisticated packet sniffer technology.” Id. at 1082. After accepting that allegation as true, the court held that the data packets were not readily accessible to the general public:
[CJommunications sent via Wi-Fi technology, as pleaded by Plaintiffs, are not designed or intended to be public. Rather, as alleged, Wi-Fi technology shares a common design with cellular phone technology, in that they both use radio waves to transmit communications, however they are both designed to send communications privately, as in solely to select recipients, and both types of technology are architected in order to make intentional monitoring by third parties difficult.5
The court’s conclusion thus depended on the proposition that data packets sent through unencrypted Wi-Fi networks are only readable with “sophisticated packet sniffer technology,” a proposition that the court accepted as true under the standards applicable to a motion to dismiss.
Here, by contrast, the court is not required to accept any such allegation. Moreover, upon examination, the proposition that Wi-Fi communications are accessible only with sophisticated technology breaks down. As mentioned above, Innovatio is intercepting Wi-Fi communications with a Riverbed AirPcap Nx packet capture adapter, which is available to the public for purchase for $698.00. See Riverbed Technology Product Catalog, http:// www.cacetech.com/products/catalog' (last visited Aug. 21, 2012). A more basic packet capture adapter is available for only $198.00. Id. The software necessary to analyze the data that the packet capture adapters collect is available for download for free. See Wireshark Frequently Asked Questions, http://www.wireshark.org/faq. html#secl (last visited Aug. 21, 2012) (‘Wireshark® is a network protocol analyzer .... It is freely available as open source.... ”). With a packet capture adapter and the software, along with a basic laptop computer, any member of the general public within range of an unencrypted Wi-Fi network can begin intercepting communications sent on that network. Many Wi-Fi networks provided by commercial establishments (such as coffee shops and restaurants) are unencrypted, and open to such interference from anyone with the right equipment. In light of the ease of “sniffing” Wi-Fi networks, the court concludes that the communications sent on an unencrypted Wi-Fi network are readily accessible to the general public.
To be sure, the majority of the public is likely unaware that communications on an unencrypted Wi-Fi network are so easily intercepted by a third party. See Predrag Klasnja et al., “When I Am on Wi-Fi, I am Fearless: ” Privacy Concerns & Prac *894 tices in Everyday Wi-Fi Use, in CHI '09 Proc. 27th Int’l Conf. (2009), available at http://appanalysis.org/jjung/jaeyeon-pub/ FormativeUserStudy4CHI.pdf (reporting the results of a study involving eleven participants and concluding that “users from the general public ... were largely unaware of ... the visibility of unencrypted communications,” which “led them to a false sense of security that reduced how much they thought about privacy and security while using Wi-Fi”); see also Press Release, Wi-Fi Alliance, Wi-Fi Security Barometer Reveals Large Gap Between What Users Know and What They Do (Oct. 5, 2011) (reporting that only 18% of users take steps to protect their communications when accessing a commercial Wi-Fi hotspot). The public still has a strong expectation of privacy in its communications on an unencrypted Wi-Fi network, even if reality does not match that expectation.
The public’s lack of awareness of the ease with which unencrypted Wi-Fi communications can be intercepted by a third party is, however, irrelevant to a determination of whether those communications are “readily accessible to the general public.” 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(g)(i). The language of the exception does not, after all, refer to “communications that the general public knows are readily accessible to the general public.” Therefore, the public’s expectation of privacy in a particular communication is irrelevant to the application of the Wiretap Act as currently written. Because data packets sent over unencrypted Wi-Fi networks are readily accessible using the basic equipment described above, the Wiretap Act does not apply here. Accordingly, to the extent that Innovation proposed sniffing protocol accesses only communications sent over unencrypted Wi-Fi networks available to the general public, it is permissible under § 2511(2)(g)(i)’s exception to the Wiretap Act.6
Any tension between that conclusion and the public’s expectation of privacy is the product of the law’s constant struggle to keep up with changing technology. Five or ten years ago, sniffing technology might have been more difficult to obtain, and the court’s conclusion might have been different. But it is not the court’s job to update the law to provide protection for consumers against ever changing technology. Only Congress, after balancing any competing policy interests, can play that role. Indeed, one United States Senator has already called for changes to the Wiretap Act in light of the threat that unencrypted communications may be easily intercepted. See Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr., On Google Spy-Fi, Senator Durbin Calls for Update to Wiretap Law, FCC Chair Agrees Law Should Protect Unencrypted Communications (May 11, 2012), http://epic.org/2012/ 05/on-google-spy-fi-senator-durbi.html. Unless and until Congress chooses to amend the Wiretap Act, the interception of communications sent over unencrypted Wi-Fi networks is permissible.
II. The Pen Registers and Trap and Trace Devices Act
The defendants also briefly contend that Innovatio’s proposed protocol violates *895the Pen Registers and Trap and Trace Devices Act. 18 U.S.C. §§ 8121-3127. That statute makes it a crime to “install or use a pen register or a trap and trace device.” 18 U.S.C. § 3121(a). A pen register is “a device or process which records or decodes dialing, routing, addressing, or signaling information transmitted by an instrument or facility from which a wire or electronic communication is transmitted, provided, however, that such information shall not include the contents of any communication.” 18 U.S.C. § 3127(3). A trap and trace device is “a device or process which captures the incoming electronic or other impulses which identify the originating number or other dialing, routing, addressing, and signaling information reasonably likely to identify the source of a wire or electronic communication, provided, however, that such information shall not include the contents of any communication.” 18 U.S.C. § 3127(4).
The defendants’ argument is a single paragraph, and it cites no cases applying the Pen Registers and Trap and Trace Devices Act to Wi-Fi packet capture adapters. Because all Wi-Fi devices on a network necessarily receive addressing information to determine if a data packet is addressed to them, doing so would put any user of a Wi-Fi network on which a third party was also operating in violation of the Act. Moreover, there is some doubt that the Pen Registers and Trap and Trace Devices Act applies to any device that is also capable of collecting the contents of a communication. In Matter of Application of U.S. For an Order Authorizing the Installation & Use of a Pen Register & a Trap & Trace Device on E-Mail Account, 416 F.Supp.2d 13, 18 (D.D.C.2006) (“ ‘[P]en registers’ and ‘trap and trace devices’ are statutorily defined as processes or devices that are prohibited from collecting ‘the contents of any communication.’ 18 U.S.C. § 3127(3)-(4). Consequently, the argument could be made that any process or device that collects the content of an electronic communication is not, in fact, a pen register or trap and trace device but, instead, is an electronic intercepting device as defined in [the Wiretap Act].”). Operating as it is without adequate briefing on the subject, the court declines to apply the Pen Registers and Trap and Trace Devices Act to Wi-Fi packet capture adapters.
III. The Admissibility of the Information Innovatio Collects
In light of the court’s conclusion that Innovatio’s proposed sniffing protocol does not violate the Wiretap Act or the Pen Registers and Trap and Trace Devices Act, the evidence Innovatio collects through the use of that protocol will not be inadmissible because of a violation of those Acts. Accordingly, if Innovatio lays a proper foundation under the Federal Rules of Evidence at trial for the information it collects through the sniffing protocol, that evidence will be admissible.
CONCLUSION
Innovatio’s “Rule 16(c)(2) Motion for Entry of Protocol for Collection of Electronic Evidence and Preliminary Ruling on Admissibility of Evidence Collected Therefrom” (Dkt. No. 329) is granted. Innovatio may collect information from the defendants’ public-facing Wi-Fi networks according to its proposed protocol. (Dkt. No. 329, Ex. A.)
2.4.1.5. Recent Case: Joffe v. Google, Inc. - 127 Harv. L. Rev. 1855 (Apr. 18, 2014)
This is a Harvard Law Review "recent case" note about Joffe v. Google Inc., 746 F.3d 920 (9th Cir. 2013), aka the "Google Street View" case. Here's the link to the case note on the Harvard Law Review website, where you can find other examples of "recent case" articles that summarize and comment on noteworthy recent court cases.
You can read the Ninth Circuit's decision itself here [PDF], but it's a grueling read.
Bear in mind when reading this case note that it is not the court's opinion itself. You must take care to distinguish the descriptive portions of this reading from the prescriptive portions.
In the descriptive part, the author is describing what the Wiretap Act actually says and what the Ninth Circuit actually said and did in its ruling.
The prescriptive part talks about what the author believes the law should be and what courts should do. All the discussion about the "express prohibition test" that the author believes courts should use? That's prescriptive.
Understanding that this reading assignment is an outside observer's commentary, not the court's opinion, has proved confusing to non-law students in the past. And the commentary itself is pretty dense, if you're not used to reading legal academic writing. Trust me, however, when I say that it is still much easier than actually reading the opinion itself.
2.4.1.6. [OPTIONAL] Should the Wall of Sheep Be Illegal? - YouTube
This video is from a panel discussion at the 2012 Defcon computer security conference. If you're a radio hobbyist, licensed ham, etc., you might enjoy it!
If you're wondering "What's the Wall of Sheep?", see this explainer.
2.4.1.7 [OPTIONAL] United States v. Hutchins 2.4.1.7 [OPTIONAL] United States v. Hutchins
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff,
v.
Marcus HUTCHINS, Defendant.
Case No. 17-CR-124-2-JPS
United States District Court, E.D. Wisconsin.
Signed February 11, 2019
*783Benjamin W. Proctor, Michael J. Chmelar, Benjamin P. Taibleson, United States Department of Justice (ED-WI) Office of the US Attorney, Milwaukee, WI, for Plaintiff.
Brian E. Klein, Baker Marquart LLP, Los Angeles, CA, Marcia C. Hofmann, Zeitgeist Law PC, San Francisco, CA, Daniel W. Stiller, D. Stiller LLC, Milwaukee, WI, for Defendant.
ORDER
Defendant Marcus Hutchins is a hacker who received considerable attention for disabling a North Korean malware called WannaCry. He has a reputation as a "white hat" hacker, which implies a hacker who works for the benefit of the public. Hutchins has nevertheless been indicted for various crimes related to his activity with two forms of malware, "Kronos" and "UPAS Kit."
On March 30, 2018, Hutchins filed a motion to suppress the statement that he made to Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI") agents immediately following his arrest, as well as any evidence the government may have obtained as a result. (Docket # 55). On July 13, 2018, Hutchins also filed three motions to dismiss various counts in the superseding indictment. (Docket # 92, # 95, and # 96).1 Magistrate Judge Nancy Joseph issued a report and recommendation in which she recommended denying all motions. (Docket # 109). Hutchins timely objected, and each party has fully briefed the issues. The Court will address each of the motions below. In accord with Magistrate Joseph's analyses, all motions will be denied. The Court will overrule Hutchins's objections and adopt Magistrate Joseph's recommendation in large measure.
2. LEGAL STANDARD
When reviewing a magistrate's recommendation, this Court is obliged to analyze de novo "those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made." 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). The Court can "accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate." Id. The Court's review encompasses both the magistrate's legal analysis and factual findings. Id. ; see also Fed. R. Crim. P. 59(b).
3. RELEVANT FACTS
Hutchins, a citizen of the United Kingdom, is a coder and hacker of considerable repute. He is most well-known for finding the kill-switch to a North Korean malware called WannaCry in May 2017. According to the superseding indictment, several years ago, Hutchins developed two types of malware, UPAS Kit and Kronos (a "banking trojan").
The superseding indictment alleges that Hutchins developed UPAS Kit and, in 2012, sold it to Individual A, who then sold it to an individual in the Eastern District of Wisconsin. At some point before July 2014, Hutchins allegedly developed Kronos and provided it to Individual A, intending for Individual A to advertise, promote, and sell it. Hutchins used a YouTube video to demonstrate how Kronos worked, and referred prospective customers to Individual A. In December 2014, Hutchins hacked and analyzed a malware that competed with Kronos, and published a blog post describing the competing malware's vulnerability. In February 2015, Hutchins allegedly updated the Kronos malware, and distributed it to Individual B, who was *785located in California and was known to be involved in cyber-based criminal activities.
On July 11, 2017, a grand jury indicted Hutchins on various counts related to his activity with the malware. He was charged with conspiracy, fraud, and unlawfully intercepting communications. (Docket # 1). On June 5, 2018, the government filed a superseding indictment with additional charges. (Docket # 86). In Count One, the superseding indictment charges Hutchins with conspiring to violate the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act ("CFAA"), 18 U.S.C. § 1030, and the Electronic Communications Privacy Act ("Wiretap Act"), 18 U.S.C. § 2510 et seq. , in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371. Counts Two and Three charge Hutchins with disseminating, aiding, and abetting an attempt to advertise the malware, in violation of the Wiretap Act. Counts Four and Five charge Hutchins with aiding and abetting the distribution of the malware, in violation of the Wiretap Act. Count Six charges Hutchins with using, or getting others to use, the malware to intercept communications in violation of the Wiretap Act. Count Seven charges Hutchins with causing, aiding, and abetting the transmission of malware in violation of the CFAA. Count Eight charges Hutchins with aiding and abetting the intentional access and damage to protected computers for the purpose of private financial gain, in violation of the CFAA. Count Nine charges Hutchins with lying to the FBI about whether he knew that his computer code was part of Kronos, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(2). Finally, Count Ten charges Hutchins with conspiring to commit fraud in connection with his malware activities, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1343, 1349.
In the summer of 2017, Hutchins spent a week in Las Vegas to attend "Defcon," which is a conference for hackers. On August 2, 2017, Hutchins was about to embark on his journey back to the U.K. Hutchins was waiting in a lounge at the Las Vegas airport when a federal agent and two Customs and Border Patrol ("CBP") officials approached him. Unbeknownst to him, FBI Special Agents Lee Chartier ("Chartier") and Jamie Butcher ("Butcher") had been monitoring Hutchins's whereabouts all morning, and had followed him to the airport, through security, and to his lounge. Although the FBI had originally planned to arrest Hutchins as he boarded the flight, they opted to arrest him earlier in order to ensure that he did not consume any alcoholic beverages that might affect his ability to answer questions in an interrogation. Indeed, Hutchins had spent much of the week partying, which included ingesting various intoxicating substances. He had had very little sleep the night before. There are no allegations, however, that Hutchins was intoxicated whilst at the airport-only exhausted and, it can be assumed, terribly hungover.
Thus, at approximately 1:17 p.m., Hutchins was approached in the airport lounge by two CBP officers and a plainclothes FBI agent, Chartier. These officials escorted Hutchins to a stairwell, whereupon he was handcuffed. Chartier informed Hutchins that he was under arrest pursuant to a federal warrant. The officials then led Hutchins to an interview room, where Butcher was waiting. The agents observed Hutchins to be alert, engaged, and not visibly intoxicated or disoriented. Hutchins verbally confirmed that he was able to answer questions and was not drunk. Hutchins received his Miranda rights orally. He was also given an advisement of rights form. He listened to his rights and signed the advisement form in the presence of both agents. There is a dispute as to what time he signed it, but the Court does not find this to be material for reasons that will be explained below.
*786Hutchins then proceeded to respond to the questions asked by the agents, and gave consent for them to search his phones, laptops, backpacks, and USB drives. He did not request a lawyer or invoke his right to remain silent, although he did ask "what this is all about." The agents told him they would explain eventually, but continued questioning him. In total, Hutchins was questioned for approximately 105 minutes. He was offered food, an opportunity to use the restroom, and-eventually-allowed to contact his mother. He was not shown a copy of the arrest warrant until over an hour into the interrogation.2
Hutchins showed every indication of being voluntarily cooperative with the agents, but was also clearly confused about the nature of the interrogation. The interrogation began with broad questions about his career and his online activities, but about ten minutes in, the questions focused on Hutchins's involvement with malware. Hutchins acknowledged that when he was younger, he had written some code that ultimately ended up in malware, but denied that he developed malware. About eleven minutes into the interrogation, after looking at a string of code, Hutchins asked if they were looking for the developer of Kronos. Hutchins stated that he did not develop Kronos, and he had "gotten out" of writing code for malware before he was eighteen. Thirteen minutes in, he said that he had feared that law enforcement authorities would come after him, instead of the actual developer, because pieces of his code appeared in Kronos. Thus, Hutchins was aware that the criminal investigation was, at least in part, about Kronos, and that he was implicated in the investigation, although he expressed confusion about why he was being detained throughout the interrogation. Almost eighty minutes into the recorded interrogation, the agents finally provided him with the warrant, and told him that it had "nothing to do with WannaCry." The interrogation continued for about twenty minutes after that. Throughout the remainder of the interrogation, Hutchins tried to be helpful but noted that he had been "out" of so-called "black hat" hacking for so long that he did not have any helpful connections.
Hutchins was taken to a jail, where he proceeded to make two phone calls, which were recorded. Prior to making the phone calls, Hutchins was informed that the phone calls were subject to monitoring and recording. In the calls, Hutchins also made incriminating statements.
4. ANALYSIS
4.1 Motion to Suppress
Hutchins seeks to suppress his post-arrest statements and any evidence that may have been obtained as a result of his statements. He argues that he did not waive his Miranda rights, (Docket # 55 at 6-9), and submits that the government has not met its burden in rebutting the presumption against waiver, (Docket # 111 at 13). Hutchins calls into question whether (1) he received notice of his rights at all; and (2) whether he was able to voluntarily waive his rights due to his intoxication, his *787limited understanding of the American criminal procedural system, and the deceptive nature of the interrogation.
It is axiomatic that law enforcement officers must inform suspects of their Miranda rights before a custodial interrogation. United States v. Thurman , 889 F.3d 356, 364 (7th Cir. 2018). "If the suspect invokes his rights, the officers must cease their questioning." Id. However, before officers must cease their questioning, the burden is on the suspect to assert his Miranda rights in a "clear and unambiguous" fashion. Id. (quoting United States v. Lee , 413 F.3d 622, 625 (7th Cir. 2005) ). Hutchins did not make any statements regarding his intent to invoke his Miranda rights; therefore, his rights were not invoked in a clear and unambiguous fashion. The interrogation properly proceeded.
However, "[e]ven if a suspect does not invoke his Miranda rights, his self-incriminating statements cannot be used against him in court unless the Government shows by a preponderance of the evidence that he voluntarily waived these rights." Thurman , 889 F.3d at 364 (citing Berghuis v. Thompkins , 560 U.S. 370, 382-84, 130 S.Ct. 2250, 176 L.Ed.2d 1098 (2010) ; United States v. Brown , 664 F.3d 1115, 1118 (7th Cir. 2011) ). Indeed, the Court must "indulge in every reasonable presumption against waiver." Brewer v. Williams , 430 U.S. 387, 404, 97 S.Ct. 1232, 51 L.Ed.2d 424 (1977). In order to rebut the presumption, the government must show that Hutchins's decision to give up his rights was "the product of a free and deliberate choice...made with a full awareness of both the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it." Berghuis , 560 U.S. at 382-83, 130 S.Ct. 2250 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
Voluntariness, or free and deliberate choice, is assessed in view of the totality of the circumstances. Brown , 664 F.3d at 1118. The Court will consider, among other things, a defendant's age, level of education, and prior experience with law enforcement, as well as the conditions of the interrogation itself and the attitude of the interrogating officials. Thurman , 889 F.3d at 364-65 ; Brown , 664 F.3d at 1118 ; United States v. Shabaz , 579 F.3d 815, 820 (7th Cir. 2009). "The law can presume that an individual who, with a full understanding of his or her rights, acts in a manner inconsistent with their exercise has made a deliberate choice to relinquish the protection those rights afford." Berghuis , 560 U.S. at 385, 130 S.Ct. 2250 ; Thurman , 889 F.3d at 364-65 (finding waiver despite refusal to sign a waiver form because the defendant understood his rights, the interrogation was "low key and informal," and defendant engaged in the interrogation); United States v. Smith , 218 F.3d 777, 781 (7th Cir. 2000) (finding waiver despite refusal to sign waiver form where a suspect "immediately began talking to the agents...[and] never requested an attorney and never asked that the questioning be stopped.").
4.1.1 Adequate Receipt of Miranda Rights
Hutchins argues that there is insufficient evidence that he received notice of his Miranda rights. This argument is a non-starter, in part because Hutchins acknowledges that he was read his rights. (Docket # 55 at 5-6) ("[T]here seems to be little doubt that the agents-in some unspecified fashion, at an uncertain time-advised Mr. Hutchins of his rights under Miranda ."). Hutchins makes much about the fact that there is no proof that he received his rights at the beginning of the interrogation, but he does not suggest when else they may have been given. Additionally, both agents have testified, under oath and in non-contradictory terms, that the rights were given at the beginning of *788the interrogation. Moreover, in the recorded portion of the interrogation, Butcher provided Hutchins with a consent form to search his computers and said, "because we're the government, there's a form for that, too," implying that Hutchins had previously received other consent forms. The Court sees no reasonable basis to conclude that Hutchins did not receive notice of his rights before the interrogation.
Additionally, it does not actually matter when Hutchins signed the advisement of rights form, so long as he was apprised of his Miranda rights prior to questioning. "[T]he rigidity of Miranda does not extend to the precise formulation of the warnings given a criminal defendant...[and] no talismanic incantation is required to satisfy its strictures." Duckworth v. Eagan , 492 U.S. 195, 202-03, 109 S.Ct. 2875, 106 L.Ed.2d 166 (1989) (quoting California v. Prysock , 453 U.S. 355, 359, 101 S.Ct. 2806, 69 L.Ed.2d 696 (1981) ) (internal quotation marks omitted). Courts merely look to whether the law enforcement officers "fully conveyed" the rights. Prysock , 453 U.S. at 361, 101 S.Ct. 2806 ; In re Terrorist Bombings of U.S. Embassies in E. Africa , 552 F.3d 177, 209 (2d Cir. 2008) (oral warnings sufficient to satisfy Miranda regardless of any alleged deficiencies in the advisement of rights form). In light of Hutchins's admission that he received his Miranda rights, and in light of the agents' corroborating testimony that this occurred before the interrogation, as well as the lack of any indication of when else he may have received them, the Court finds that Hutchins was sufficiently apprised of his rights before the interrogation.
4.1.2 Voluntariness of Waiver
The waiver of Hutchins's Miranda rights must have been "voluntary in the sense that it was the product of a free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or deception." Moran v. Burbine , 475 U.S. 412, 421, 106 S.Ct. 1135, 89 L.Ed.2d 410 (1986). Hutchins must also have waived his rights with "a full awareness of both the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it." Id. Hutchins argues he did not voluntarily waive his Miranda rights because he was intoxicated, unsure about American criminal procedure, and deceived by the questioning agents as to the nature of his arrest. These factors will be assessed in turn.
4.1.2.1 Intoxication
In assessing the validity of a Miranda waiver, courts may consider intoxication, lack of sleep, or other physical discomfort as they affect a defendant's susceptibility to coercion. See United States v. Brooks , 125 F.3d 484, 491 (7th Cir. 1997) (finding voluntary waiver despite the fact that defendant was high on crack, sleep deprived, and in pain). However, "intoxication...by itself-without some showing of coercion by the government-will not negate voluntariness." United States v. Chrismon , 965 F.2d 1465, 1469 (7th Cir. 1992) ; Andersen v. Thieret , 903 F.2d 526, 530-31 (7th Cir. 1990) (noting that impairment is unlikely where approximately 19 hours had elapsed between the defendant's last drink and his confession). Additionally, "mental state alone cannot make [a defendant's] confession involuntary...[I]t is relevant only to the extent it made him more susceptible to mentally coercive police tactics." Id. at 530 n.1 (citing Colorado v. Connelly , 479 U.S. 157, 163-67, 107 S.Ct. 515, 93 L.Ed.2d 473 (1986) ).
It is unlikely that Hutchins's alleged impairment significantly factored into his ability to give a voluntary waiver or made him more susceptible to deceptive interrogation tactics. The agents monitored *789Hutchins from the beginning of the day to ensure that he was sober when he was arrested. They ensured that he was in custody before he had the opportunity to drink at the airport. They walked him to two separate locations (first, the stairwell; second, the interview room) and engaged him in conversation, which gave them opportunity to evaluate whether Hutchins appeared to be somehow impaired by an intoxicant. Hutchins appeared to be alert, engaged, coordinated, and coherent. There is no evidence in the record to the contrary. There is also no evidence, nor does Hutchins claim, that he was under the influence of drugs that day-only that he was exhausted. But a terrible hangover alone does not, as a matter of law, render someone unable to exercise or waive their Miranda rights. This factor does not weigh in Hutchins's favor.
4.1.2.2 Intelligent Waiver
Hutchins next argues that he did not appreciate the nature of his Miranda rights, or the consequences of waiving them, because he was confused by the purpose of the interrogation, and believed, based on U.K. criminal procedure, that it would be helpful for him to speak in his defense. (Docket # 111 at 13).3
The Court takes judicial notice of the warning given to suspects upon arrest in the U.K., which advises: "You do not have to say anything. But it may harm your defence if you do not mention when questioned something which you later rely on in Court. Anything you do say may be given in evidence." Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 Code G 3.5, Revised Code of Practice for the Statutory Power of Arrest by Police Officers (revised July 2012), https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/117583/pace-code-g-2012.pdf. For comparison, an arrest warning in the United States reads to the effect of, "you have the right to remain silent, anything you say can and will be used against you in a court of law." See e.g., Miranda v. Arizona , 384 U.S. 436, 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).
On its face, the U.K. warning appears to serve the same function as the U.S. warning, but there are important differences that theoretically would have affected whether Hutchins appreciated the consequence of giving up his right to remain silent. In the U.K., a defendant is told, "You do not have to say anything." There is neither right, nor waiver-the consequence stems, in fact, from not saying anything ("it may harm your defence if you do not mention when questioned..."). By contrast, in the U.S., a defendant is told "you have a right to remain silent," and the consequences of failing to remain silent are clear: "anything you say can and will be used against you ." The warnings-and their consequences-are substantively different, although their cadences are similar. It is conceivable that anyone-even a well-educated person-would find comfort in the broad similarities between the two, and believe that, wording aside, the substance is the same.
The Seventh Circuit has held that Miranda waivers are valid so long as the defendant has a general understanding of the nature of the right, and the consequences of waiver. See *790Collins v. Gaetz , 612 F.3d 574, 588 (7th Cir. 2010). In Gaetz , which evaluated a person of limited mental capacity's ability to waive his rights, the Court of Appeals referred to a "relatively low bar in proving an intelligent waiver," whereby a defendant need only comprehend the most basic concepts underlying Miranda . Id. Other circuits to consider this issue in the context of foreign citizens have invalidated a waiver only where the defendant's grasp on the interrogating language was so attenuated that he could not intelligently waive his rights. See United States v. Amano , 229 F.3d 801, 805 (9th Cir. 2000) (finding that a defendant's lack of contact with the U.S. criminal justice system and the Japanese consulate "did not render his waiver involuntary" in light of evidence that he understood English, was read his rights twice, and claimed to understand them); c.f. United States v. Garibay , 143 F.3d 534, 538-39 (9th Cir. 1998) (finding no valid waiver where the defendant was not fluent in English and had a low verbal IQ); United States v. Zaitar , 858 F.Supp.2d 103, 115-16 (D.D.C. 2012) (finding no valid waiver of counsel during an interview in Romania conducted in Portuguese by American officials, where the defendant, a native Lebanese speaker, responded affirmatively to all questions except the question regarding waiver of counsel, to which he replied, nonsensically, "I understand Portuguese.").
Hutchins is a well-educated English-speaker from a common law country. Although there is no language barrier, he claims that he did not understand the consequences of waiving his Miranda rights in light of the subtle, but substantive, differences between U.S. and U.K. arrest procedure. The Court is inclined to agree that these differences, though small, are elemental enough that they may have affected Hutchins's understanding of the basic concepts underlying Miranda (i.e., whether it would be helpful for him to speak). However, in light of Hutchins's mental acuity, the Court cannot find that his waiver was unintelligent. This factor does not weigh heavily in his favor.
4.1.2.3 Deception
In order to establish that his statement was the product of deception, Hutchins bears the burden of showing by "clear and convincing evidence that that the agents affirmatively mislead him as to the true nature of their investigation." United States. v. Serlin , 707 F.2d 953, 956 (7th Cir. 1983). "Defendant must also prove that the misinformation was material in his decision to speak with the agents." Id. "Simple failure to inform defendant that he was the subject of the investigation, or that the investigation was criminal in nature, does not amount to affirmative deceit unless defendant inquired about the nature of the investigation and the agents' failure to respond was intended to mislead." Id. The fact that an agent makes misrepresentations to a defendant, while relevant, is "insufficient...to make [an] otherwise voluntary confession inadmissible." Frazier v. Cupp , 394 U.S. 731, 739, 89 S.Ct. 1420, 22 L.Ed.2d 684 (1969) ; but see United States v. Giddins , 858 F.3d 870, 885 (4th Cir. 2017) (finding that a defendant's will was "overborne or his capacity for self-determination critically impaired" where he voluntarily went to the police station under the pretense of retrieving an impounded car, was repeatedly told that he was not under arrest or investigation, but was interrogated anyway).
In Serlin , a defendant was questioned by the IRS regarding a criminal investigation, but did not realize that he was the target of the investigation. 707 F.2d at 957. The agents initially told him they were investigating his business partners, but several minutes into the interview, warned the defendant not to make incriminating statements. Id. The defendant continued to speak. Id. The Seventh Circuit determined *791that the defendant's statements "were not the product of affirmative deceit," in large part because the statements that the agents made were true-the agents were, in fact, investigating the defendant's business partners as well. Id. Moreover, the agents warned the defendant not to incriminate himself, and then specifically asked about his own failure to file taxes. Id. On those facts, the Seventh Circuit determined that "even the most unsuspecting taxpayer [would be alerted that he] was, at least partly, the focus of the search." Id.
In this case, Hutchins received his Miranda rights and understood that he was under arrest for alleged criminal activity, and the investigation related, at least in some way, to Kronos. However, Hutchins's recent triumph with WannaCry had vaulted him into the public eye as a "white hat" hacker. Thus, Hutchins could have been reasonably confused about the FBI's interest in him. In assessing whether he voluntarily waived his rights, some consideration must be given to the fact that white hat hacking is a complex and relatively novel field that can toe an already blurry line vis-à-vis online criminal activity. The agents did not tell Hutchins why he was under arrest, and did nothing to explain the nature of the charges against him until the end of his interrogation. Hutchins, who had no cause for concern regarding his role in WannaCry, and who had distanced himself from nefarious internet activity, cooperated. The interrogation ended twenty minutes after he was presented with the warrant, though he continued to consent to searches and answer questions after he understood the charges against him.
This case differs from Serlin in one salient way: Hutchins had already been indicted on a host of specific charges. Thus, the aim of the agents' questioning was not to cobble together enough information to establish probable cause for arrest, as it was in Serlin . Rather, the purpose of the interrogation was to continue collecting enough evidence to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The stakes were dramatically higher, and Hutchins's privilege against self-incrimination all the more precious. The government argues that this fact cuts against Hutchins-that is, he understood that the "nature" of the investigation was criminal, and should have known not to make incriminating statements. However, this ignores the context of Hutchins's work as a hacker. Hutchins had recently dealt with matters of international concern, and reasonably believed that it was in his best interest to answer their questions. At one point in the interrogation, he made a comment that showed that he did not realize he had even been indicted. There is no reason why the government could not have told him exactly why he was arrested, as he requested, and as was required of them by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 4(c), unless they were concerned that he would not be cooperative with them. There is certainly an element of deception to this set of events that the Court does not endorse.
On the other hand, the scope of the agents' questions should have put Hutchins on notice of the nature of the investigation. The agents did not try to "hide the ball," so to speak, about their interest in Kronos, and asked him about it early and often in the interrogation. And although the agents acted very familiarly with Hutchins, which may have put him at false ease, Chartier did remind him that he was in trouble. The Court is concerned by the abject failure of the agents to abide by the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 4(c), but their obvious interest in Kronos-including providing Hutchins with a string of code related to Kronos-leads the Court to conclude that there is not clear and convincing evidence that they acted with intent to deceive. Moreover, the fact that *792Hutchins continued to answer questions and consented to the search after he knew the substance of the indictment indicates that the deception was not material to his statements-that is, it seems that he would have attempted to be helpful even if he had seen the warrant.4
4.1.2.4 Totality of the Circumstances
Under the totality of the circumstances-considering Hutchins's exhausted state, his unfamiliarity with the American criminal procedure system, his high level of intelligence, and the lack of material deception, there is an insufficient basis for the Court to find that Hutchins's statements were involuntary. It is wholly improper that he was not provided with a warrant immediately upon arrest. But in light of the record of the post-arrest interrogation, the government has met its burden in proving that the waiver was voluntary. Thurman , 889 F.3d at 364.
4.2 Motion to Dismiss
Hutchins advances several motions to dismiss, all of which must be denied for the reasons given below. A motion to dismiss is proper where an indictment fails to state an offense. Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(b)(3)(B)(v). The indictment must contain a "plain, concise, and definite written statement of the essential facts constituting the offense charged." Fed. R. Crim. P. 7(c)(1). An indictment meets this rule's criteria if it "(1) states all the elements of the crime charged; (2) adequately informs the defendant of the nature of the charges so that he may prepare a defense; and (3) allows the defendant to plead the judgment as a bar to any future prosecutions." United States v. White , 610 F.3d 956, 958 (7th Cir. 2010). A charge that traces the language of the statute will typically suffice if it contains enough facts to provide the defendant with an understanding of the conduct at issue. United States v. Vaughn , 722 F.3d 918, 925 (7th Cir. 2013). "[T]he presence or absence of any particular fact is not dispositive." Id. (quoting White , 610 F.3d at 958-59 ). "A motion to dismiss is not intended to be a 'summary trial of the evidence.' " United States v. Yasak , 884 F.2d 996, 1001 (7th Cir. 1989) (quoting United States v. Winer , 323 F.Supp. 604, 605 (E.D. Pa. 1971) ). The Court will not assess "the strength or weakness of the government's case" at this stage-rather, it will consider whether the government is theoretically able to prove its case. White , 610 F.3d at 958 ; United States v. Castor , 558 F.2d 379, 384-85 (7th Cir. 1977).
As Magistrate Joseph noted, the superseding indictment is facially sufficient *793because each charge in it lists the date of the alleged wrongful conduct, the elements of the crime charged, and the nature of the offense charged-including the software at issue-such that Hutchins would be protected from double jeopardy. See (Docket # 109 at 20). The Court also agrees with Magistrate Joseph's analysis of United States v. Risk , 843 F.2d 1059 (7th Cir. 1988), wherein the Seventh Circuit dismissed an indictment where the government provided a set of undisputed facts that did not constitute a violation of any statute. In Risk , the issue was not that the government failed to allege enough facts-it was that the facts the government itself alleged could not, as a matter of law, result in a violation of a statute. Id. at 1061. By contrast, here, the government has alleged that Hutchins engaged in behavior that violated various statutes, and the government has not provided a set of undisputed facts to the contrary.
Accordingly, the Court agrees with Magistrate Joseph's determination that the superseding indictment is sufficient. In the interest of thoroughness, Hutchins's specific arguments will be addressed below.
4.2.1 Counts One and Seven Allege "Damage" Under 18 U.S.C. § 1030
Counts One and Seven are brought under the CFAA and allege that Hutchins conspired and attempted to cause damage to protected computers. Specifically, Count One alleges that between "July 2012 and September 2015, in the state and Eastern District of Wisconsin," Hutchins "knowingly conspired and agreed with Individual A ... to:
(a) knowingly cause and aid and abet the transmission of a program, information, code, and command, and as a result of such conduct, intentionally cause damage without authorization , to 10 or more protected computers during a 1-year period, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Sections 1030(a)(5)(A), (c)(4)(B)(i) and (c)(4)(A)(i)(VI) and 2." (Docket # 86 at 3) (emphasis added).
Relatedly, Count Seven alleges that:
"On or about June 11, 2015, in the state and Eastern District of Wisconsin and elsewhere, MARCUS HUTCHINS, aka 'Malwaretech,' aka 'irp@jabber.se,' knowingly caused and aided and abetted the transmission of a program, information, code and command and as a result of such conduct, attempted to cause damage without authorization , to 10 or more protected computers during a 1-year period. In violation of Title 18, United States Code, Sections 1030(a)(5)(A), (c)(4)(B)(i) and (ii), (c)(4)(A)(i)(VI), 1030(b), and 2." (Docket # 86 at 12) (emphasis added).
Each count is facially sufficient because it traces the language of the statute, cites to the statute, and provides a date (and a location) for the alleged conduct. Vaughn , 722 F.3d at 925. Count One contains additional allegations, including that Hutchins developed UPAS Kit and provided it to Individual A, who sold it to an individual in the Eastern District of Wisconsin. (Docket # 86 at 4). The count goes on to allege that Hutchins developed Kronos intending for Individual A to advertise, promote, and sell it; used a YouTube video to demonstrate how Kronos worked; updated the Kronos malware; and evaluated competing malwares. Id. at 4-5. Finally, it alleges that Hutchins referred prospective customers to Individual A. Id. at 6.
Hutchins argues that the facts as alleged are insufficient to state an offense. He submits that Counts One and Seven "fail[ ] to allege any facts that would show that Mr. Hutchins had any intent to cause 'damage' to a protected computer" because the superseding indictment does not allege *794that the malware at issue "damage[s]" computers. (Docket # 95 at 1 and # 111 at 28). The CFAA defines damage as "any impairment to the integrity or availability of data, a program, a system, or information." 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(8). The superseding indictment states that UPAS Kit is a "malware" that allows for "unauthorized exfiltration," and Kronos is a "malware" that "recorded and exfiltrated" various data. (Docket # 86 at 2). Hutchins suggests that "exfiltrate" means "making a copy of the data and taking it away," (Docket # 95 at 5), which is not "damage" under the CFAA.
The Seventh Circuit has held that "damage encompasses clearly destructive behavior such as using a virus or worm or deleting data...[b]ut it may also include less obviously invasive conduct, such as flooding an email account." Fidlar Tech. v. LPS Real Estate Data Solutions, Inc. , 810 F.3d 1075, 1084-85 (7th Cir. 2016) (quotations omitted) (finding that a claim involving a web-harvester was "trespassory in nature" but "mere access" did not amount to damage under the CFAA). The word "exfiltrate" has several definitions, one of which is: "to steal (sensitive data) from a computer (as with a flash drive)." Exfiltrate, Merriam-Webster Dictionary Online , https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/exfiltrate (accessed Jan. 19, 2019). When a person "steals (sensitive data)," as a matter of logic, they "impair[ ]...the integrity...of [the] data [or]...system." 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(8). This is more than merely accessing data. C.f. Landmark Credit Union v. Doberstein , 746 F.Supp.2d 990, 993-94 (E.D. Wis. 2010) (finding no damage where former employee accessed and disclosed client list by emailing it to herself). The superseding indictment also describes the software at issue as "malware" or "malicious computer code intended to damage a computer." (Docket # 86 at 2). These terms are sufficient to allege intent to cause damage. The burden will be on the government to prove this at trial.
4.2.2 Counts One Through Six Refer to a "Device" Under 18 U.S.C. § 2510(5)
Counts One through Six are brought under the Wiretap Act, which criminalizes activity involving "any device or apparatus which can be used to intercept a wire, oral, or electronic communication." 18 U.S.C. § 2510(5). Hutchins argues that software such as Kronos and UPAS Kit should not be considered "devices" for the purposes of the Wiretap Act because software is not an "electronic, mechanical, or other device" under Section 2510(5). Hutchins relies on United States v. Szymuszkiewicz , in which the Court of Appeals assumed that "devices" referred to computers and servers that carried out a program, rather than the program itself. 622 F.3d 701, 707 (7th Cir. 2010) (discussing a Microsoft Outlook "rule" for email forwarding). In Szymuszkiewicz , the Court of Appeals considered whether "the 'device' used to intercept a communication must differ from the device the intended audience uses to receive the message," and determined that it did not. Id. The opinion did not consider whether a program or a piece of software could be considered a "device." Hutchins also relies on Potter v. Havlicek for the proposition that a software "alone cannot be used to intercept communications. It must be installed in a device, such as a computer, to be able to do so." 2008 WL 2556723, at *8, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 122211, at *23-24 (S.D. Ohio June 23, 2008). The Havlicek court did not cite any cases directly in support of its conclusion, and this Court finds its definitional logic faulty: computers, alone, also cannot be used to intercept communications. They require some software or program installed in order to have this capability.
*795The majority of courts to consider this issue have entertained the notion that software may be considered a device for the purposes of the Wiretap Act. See Luis v. Zang , 833 F.3d 619, 630 (6th Cir. 2016) (accepting that a software could be a "device" for the purpose of the Wiretap Act); In re Carrier IQ, Inc. , 78 F.Supp.3d 1051, 1087 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (concluding that a software was an "electronic, mechanical or other device"); Klumb v. Goan , 884 F.Supp.2d 644, 661-62 (E.D. Ten. 2012) (analyzing spyware software as a device under Wiretap Act); Rene v. G.F. Fishers, Inc. , 817 F.Supp.2d 1090, 1094 (S.D. Ind. 2011) (holding that keystrokes are not electronic communications for the purpose of the Wiretap Act, but accepting the notion that software could be a device); Shefts v. Petrakis , 2012 WL 4049484, at *8-9 (C.D. Ill. 2012) (analyzing software as a device under the Wiretap Act); see also United States v. Barrington , 648 F.3d 1178, 1203 (11th Cir. 2011) (accepting that a keylogger software could be considered a scanning receiver, or a device, under 18 U.S.C. § 1029(e)(8) ).
The Court is in accord with the majority of courts to consider this issue. The Court also agrees with the government's position that Section 2510(5)'s reference to "mechanism," which is commonly defined as a "process, technique, or system for achieving a result" seems to encompass software. Mechanism, Merriam-Webster Dictionary , https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/mechanism (accessed Jan. 22, 2019); see also United States v. Mitra , 405 F.3d 492, 495 (7th Cir. 2005) (acknowledging that general technology statute should be read broadly in order to accommodate new developments).
4.2.3 Counts One, Four Through Eight, and Ten Allege Intent and Causation
Hutchins argues that the superseding indictment does not allege the necessary intent and causation elements in Counts One, Four through Eight, and Ten. The aforementioned counts each contain an intent element in connection with allegedly distributing malware for illegal purposes. Hutchins argues that the superseding indictment fails to specifically allege that he "intended any specific result to occur" as a result of his activities, and therefore, the superseding indictment does not state offenses. (Docket # 95 at 12).
These are arguments that go to the merits of the case, i.e., whether Hutchins had the requisite intent to commit the crimes charged. As discussed above, the superseding indictment is facially valid, and Hutchins does not contend that these specific counts lack all elements of the crimes charged, fail to inform him of the nature of the offenses, or are so insufficiently pled that he would be prevented from asserting any judgment as a bar to future prosecutions of the same offense. Vaughn , 722 F.3d at 925. The superseding indictment does not need to establish intent-it merely needs to allege it, which it does by listing the elements of the crimes charged. As the magistrate noted, Hutchins "tries to impose a standard for civil pleading on a criminal indictment." (Docket # 109 at 26). Therefore, this motion to dismiss will be denied.
4.2.4 Counts Two and Three are not Multiplicitous
Hutchins contends that Counts Two and Three are multiplicitous and submits that Count Three should be dismissed. (Docket # 95 at 9-11). Count Two charges Hutchins with a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2512(1)(c)(i), Count Three charges Hutchins with a violation of 18 U.S.C § 2512(1)(c)(ii). "If one element is required to prove the offense in one count which is not required to prove the offense in the second count, there is no multiplicity."
*796United States v. Conley , 291 F.3d 464, 470 (7th Cir. 2002) (citing United States v. Briscoe , 896 F.2d 1476, 1522 (7th Cir. 1990) (quoting United States v. Marquardt , 786 F.2d 771, 778 (7th Cir. 1986) ) (internal citations and quotations omitted) ). Put another way, the Court must determine whether each count requires proof of a fact that the other does not.
The relevant portions of the statute make it unlawful for a person to intentionally:
"(c) place[ ] in any newspaper, magazine, handbill, or other publication or disseminate[ ] by electronic means any advertisement of-
(i) any electronic, mechanical, or other device knowing or having reason to know that the design of such device renders it primarily useful for the purpose of the surreptitious interception of wire, oral, or electronic communications; or
(ii) any other electronic, mechanical, or other device, where such advertisement promotes the use of such device for the purpose of the surreptitious interception of wire, oral, or electronic communications." 18 U.S.C. § 2512(1)(c)(i),(ii).
In other words, Count Two, Section 2512(1)(c)(i), requires that Hutchins (1) made an advertisement with (2) knowledge or reason to know that the device's primary design was for surreptitiously infiltrating communication. There is no element requiring that Hutchins promoted the device as one that could be used for the surreptitious interception of communication, only that he knew its primary design was that.
By contrast, Count Three, Section 2512(1)(c)(ii), requires that Hutchins (1) made an advertisement with (2) the claim or promotion that a device could be used for the surreptitious interception of communication. Count Three does not require that Hutchins knew or had reason to know that its primary design was surreptitious interception of communication, as Count Two requires, only that he promoted it for that purpose.
Each count contains an element required to prove the offense that is not required in the other count, and the counts require proof of different facts. There is no multiplicity.
4.2.5 Count Seven does not Contain a Grand Jury Defect
As discussed above, Count Seven alleges violations of the CFAA, which criminalizes actions intended to damage protected computers. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(5)(A) applies to one who "intentionally causes damage without authorization." Count Seven charges Hutchins with "attempt[ing] to cause damage without authorization." (Docket # 86 at 12). To prove an attempt to violate Section 1030(a)(5)(A), the government must prove that (1) Hutchins knowingly took a substantial step toward committing a violation of Section 1030(a)(5)(A) and (2) that he did so with the intent to violate § 1030(a)(5)(A). Seventh Circuit Pattern Jury Instruction 4.09 (2012) (emphasis added). It is fairly well settled that allegations of "attempt" necessarily encompasses the intent element. United States v. Resendiz-Ponce , 549 U.S. 102, 107, 127 S.Ct. 782, 166 L.Ed.2d 591 (2007) (holding that "the word 'attempt' as used in common parlance connote[s] action rather than mere intent, but more importantly, as used in the law for centuries, it encompasses both the overt act and intent elements.") (emphasis added). The indictment must "set forth all the elements necessary to constitute the offense intended to be punished" and allow defendant to "pin[ ] down the specific conduct at issue." United States v. Smith , 230 F.3d 300, 305 (7th Cir. 2000) (internal citations omitted). However, the absence of any particular fact is not necessarily dispositive, *797and indictments are reviewed "on a practical basis and in their entirety, rather than in a hypertechnical manner." Id. (quotations and citations omitted); see also (Docket # 109 at 29).
Hutchins argues that he cannot be charged with attempt to aid and abet an attempt to violate the CFAA because Count Seven is pled "without reference to the intentional causing of damage," as stated in the statute. (Docket # 92 at 5). The superseding indictment alleges that Hutchins attempted to cause damage, which encompasses the intent element. Whether the government can actually prove this at trial is a question for another time.
4.2.6 Extraterritorial Challenges
Hutchins argues that Counts Two and Three, which arise under the Wiretap Act, are an improper exercise of extraterritoriality because they do not charge domestic conduct. (Docket # 96 at 6). He further argues that Congress did not intend for the Wiretap Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1343, or 18 U.S.C. § 1001 to have extraterritorial application, "so the government must allege domestic violations of those statutes to state viable claims."Id. at 8.
The Court generally agrees with the magistrate's finding that the superseding indictment alleges domestic violations of all statutes, and therefore there is no extraterritoriality issue at hand. For example, the superseding indictment alleges that the criminal conduct in question occurred in the Eastern District of Wisconsin. (Docket # 86). Specifically, it alleges that Hutchins developed UPAS Kit and provided it to Individual A, who subsequently sold it to someone in the Eastern District of Wisconsin. Id. at 4. The superseding indictment further alleges that Hutchins developed Kronos and provided it to Individuals A and B, the former of whom advertised, marketed, and sold Kronos in the Eastern District of Wisconsin. Id. at 4-6. It also alleges that Hutchens used a YouTube video to promote the sale of Kronos, and referred interested purchasers of Kronos to Individual A. Id. at 4, 6. As Magistrate Joseph and this Court have repeatedly stated, "whether the government will be able to prove that is a question for another day." (Docket # 109 at 31). However, as stated, the charges sufficiently allege activity in the United States, specifically in the Eastern District of Wisconsin. There is no extraterritorial activity at issue.
However, because there is confusion about the proper standard to apply in the extraterritorial analysis, the Court takes this opportunity to clarify the issue in case it should arise in the future. There is a presumption against applying statutes extraterritorially because "Congress generally legislates with domestic concerns in mind." Small v. United States , 544 U.S. 385, 388, 125 S.Ct. 1752, 161 L.Ed.2d 651 (2005) (quotations and citations omitted). This broad presumption applies in all cases, "preserving a stable background against which Congress can legislate with predictable effects." Morrison v. Nat'l Australia Bank Ltd. , 561 U.S. 247, 261, 130 S.Ct. 2869, 177 L.Ed.2d 535 (2010). "[G]eneral reference to foreign commerce in the definition of 'interstate commerce' does not defeat the presumption against extraterritoriality." Id. at 263, 130 S.Ct. 2869. Although Congress does not need to explicitly state a rule of extraterritoriality and "context can be consulted," there must be an "affirmative indication" of Congress's extraterritorial intent. Id. at 265, 130 S.Ct. 2869.
Thus, the first step in any inquiry-civil or criminal-is "whether the presumption against extraterritoriality has been rebutted-that is, whether the statute gives a clear, affirmative indication that it applies extraterritorially."
*798RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Cmty. , --- U.S. ----, 136 S.Ct. 2090, 2101, 195 L.Ed.2d 476 (2016) (discussing RICO statute's extraterritorial hold). If there is no clear, affirmative indication of extraterritorial application, courts are instructed to consider
whether the case involves a domestic application of the statute...by looking to the statute's focus. If the conduct relevant to the statute's focus occurred in the United States, then the case involves a permissible domestic application even if other conduct occurred abroad; but if the conduct relevant to the focus occurred in a foreign country, then the case involves an impermissible extraterritorial application regardless of any other conduct that occurred in U.S. territory. Id. (quotation marks omitted).
In other words, if there is no clear Congressional intent for extraterritoriality, the Court must determine (1) the statute's focus and (2) whether the conduct relevant to the focus occurred in the United States. Id.
The government and the magistrate rely on United States v. Bowman , 260 U.S. 94, 98-99, 43 S.Ct. 39, 67 L.Ed. 149 (1922) and United States v. Leija-Sanchez , 602 F.3d 797, 799 (7th Cir. 2010) (" Leija-Sanchez I ") to stand for the broad proposition that the presumption against extraterritoriality does not apply to criminal cases. In light of Morrison and RJR Nabisco , this is not the correct standard. However, neither case has been overruled-and, indeed, there is no conflict with their holdings.
In Bowman, the Supreme Court held that a criminal fraud statute applied to certain extraterritorial conduct at sea and in foreign ports after finding that Congress must have intended it to apply to at-sea vessels and foreign ports. 260 U.S. at 102, 43 S.Ct. 39. Although the statute did not explicitly say that it applied extraterritorially, the Supreme Court determined that Congress's intent for extraterritorial application could be inferred from the function of the statute and from other sections in the statute's chapter, which was titled, "Offenses against the Operation of Government." Id. at 98-99, 43 S.Ct. 39 ; see also ; RJR Nabisco , 136 S.Ct. at 2102 ("an express statement of extraterritoriality is not essential."). Thus, the Bowman opinion shows the Supreme Court's determination that there was a "clear, affirmative indication" that the statute applied extraterritorially. See Morrison , 561 U.S. at 265, 130 S.Ct. 2869 ; RJR Nabisco , 136 S.Ct. at 2101.
In 2016, the Seventh Circuit upheld its decision in Leija-Sanchez I , which found that a criminal RICO statute applied extraterritorially to individuals who murdered a Mexican man in Mexico. United States v. Leija-Sanchez , 820 F.3d 899, 900 (7th Cir. 2016) ( Leija-Sanchez II ). Ten days after the Seventh Circuit denied rehearing in Leija-Sanchez II , the Supreme Court issued RJR Nabisco, which noted that "[t]he unique structure makes RICO the rare statute that clearly evidences extraterritorial effect despite lacking an express statement of extraterritoriality." RJR Nabisco , 136 S.Ct. at 2103. In the Leija-Sanchez cases, the murder was arranged and paid for in the United States in order to protect a criminal organization based in the United States, whose focus was defrauding the United States government. See Leija-Sanchez II, 820 F.3d at 901. The Court will not take it upon itself to re-write the Seventh Circuit's analysis in light of RJR Nabisco , but merely observes that it is possible to reconcile Leija-Sanchez I & II with the rule in RJR Nabisco .
Therefore, the proper rule to apply is that of RJR Nabisco : if Congress has not evinced an affirmative intent to apply the statute extraterritorially, the Court must assess the focus of the statute, and determine whether the conduct relevant to the *799focus occurred in the United States. Under RJR Nabisco , some conduct could occur outside of the United States as long as the conduct relevant to the focus of the statute occurred inside the United States. However, as stated above, the conduct that the superseding indictment alleges took place in the United States. Therefore, the Court need not evaluate Sections 2512, 1343, or 1001 for extraterritorial application.
4.2.7 Counts One Through Eight and Ten do not Violate Due Process
Hutchins argues that there is an insufficient nexus between his conduct and the United States, which violates his Due Process rights. Generally, a defendant must have adequate contacts with the United States in order to support United States jurisdiction. See In re Hijazi , 589 F.3d 401, 412 (7th Cir. 2009) ; Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law §§ 402, 403 (1987) ; see also United States v. Yousef , 750 F.3d 254, 262 (2d Cir. 2014) ("The due process requirement that a territorial nexus underlie the extraterritorial application of a criminal statute... protects criminal defendants from prosecutions that are arbitrary or fundamentally unfair.") (citations and quotations omitted).
As the magistrate noted, the government's superseding indictment states the approximate date and location for each charge, and briefly describes the allegedly unlawful conduct that occurred in the United States. To the extent that the government prosecutes Hutchins's activities within the United States-specifically, the Eastern District of Wisconsin-the Court finds that there is adequate nexus as alleged in the superseding indictment. For example, if, as it is alleged, Hutchins promoted his malware to individuals in the Eastern District of Wisconsin, then he could reasonably foresee being haled before this Court for trial on that issue. See United States v. Perlaza , 439 F.3d 1149, 1168 (9th Cir. 2006) ("The nexus requirement is a judicial gloss applied to ensure that a defendant is not improperly haled before a court for trial.") (citations and quotations omitted). Whether Hutchins actually did any of the alleged conduct is a question for the jury.
4.2.8 The Superseding Indictment Properly Alleges Count Nine
Count Nine charges Hutchins with lying to the FBI in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(2). (Docket # 86 at 14). The crux of Hutchins's argument here is that Count Nine should be dismissed if Counts One through Eight and Ten are dismissed, because the FBI "had no power to exercise authority against Mr. Hutchins." (Docket # 105 at 17) (citations and quotations omitted). Because none of the charges above are dismissed, the Court finds that the FBI was properly within its jurisdiction to investigate these claims. Therefore, the charge that Hutchins lied to the FBI must also go forward.
5. Conclusion
The Court lacks a sufficient basis to grant the motion to suppress or the motions to dismiss. Indeed, many of Hutchins's contentions are not properly resolved at the motion to dismiss stage. Therefore, the Court adopts the magistrate's recommendation to deny all motions.
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that Marcus Hutchins's motion to suppress (Docket # 55) be and the same is hereby DENIED ;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Marcus Hutchins's motion to dismiss (Docket # 56) be and the same is hereby DENIED as moot ;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Marcus Hutchins's motions to dismiss (Docket # 92, # 95, and # 96) be and the same are hereby DENIED ;
*800IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Marcus Hutchins's objections to Magistrate Judge Nancy Joseph's Report and Recommendation (Docket # 111) be and the same are hereby OVERRULED in accordance with the terms of this Order; and
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Magistrate Judge Nancy Joseph's Report and Recommendation (Docket # 109) be and the same is hereby ADOPTED in accordance with the terms of this Order.
2.4.2 Wiretap Act, SCA, and GET Requests 2.4.2 Wiretap Act, SCA, and GET Requests
Week 5
2.4.2.1 Stored Communications Act, Section 2701: Unlawful access to stored communications 2.4.2.1 Stored Communications Act, Section 2701: Unlawful access to stored communications
18 U.S.C. § 2701
United States Code, 2018 Edition
Title 18 - CRIMES AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
PART I - CRIMES
CHAPTER 121 - STORED WIRE AND ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS AND TRANSACTIONAL RECORDS ACCESS
Sec. 2701 - Unlawful access to stored communications
From the U.S. Government Publishing Office,
(a)
(1) intentionally accesses without authorization a facility through which an electronic communication service is provided; or
(2) intentionally exceeds an authorization to access that facility;
and thereby obtains, alters, or prevents authorized access to a wire or electronic communication while it is in electronic storage in such system shall be punished as provided in subsection (b) of this section.
(b)
(1) if the offense is committed for purposes of commercial advantage, malicious destruction or damage, or private commercial gain, or in furtherance of any criminal or tortious act in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States or any State—
(A) a fine under this title or imprisonment for not more than 5 years, or both, in the case of a first offense under this subparagraph; and
(B) a fine under this title or imprisonment for not more than 10 years, or both, for any subsequent offense under this subparagraph; and
(2) in any other case—
(A) a fine under this title or imprisonment for not more than 1 year or both, in the case of a first offense under this paragraph; and
(B) a fine under this title or imprisonment for not more than 5 years, or both, in the case of an offense under this subparagraph that occurs after a conviction of another offense under this section.
(c)
(1) by the person or entity providing a wire or electronic communications service;
(2) by a user of that service with respect to a communication of or intended for that user; or
(3) in section 2703, 2704 or 2518 of this title.
Notes
Amendments
2002—Subsec. (b)(1). Pub. L. 107–296, §2207(j)(2)(A), formerly §225(j)(2)(A), as renumbered by Pub. L. 115–278, §2(g)(2)(I), in introductory provisions, inserted ", or in furtherance of any criminal or tortious act in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States or any State" after "commercial gain".
Subsec. (b)(1)(A). Pub. L. 107–296, §2207(j)(2)(B), formerly §225(j)(2)(B), as renumbered by Pub. L. 115–278, §2(g)(2)(I), substituted "5 years" for "one year".
Subsec. (b)(1)(B). Pub. L. 107–296, §2207(j)(2)(C), formerly §225(j)(2)(C), as renumbered by Pub. L. 115–278, §2(g)(2)(I), substituted "10 years" for "two years".
Subsec. (b)(2). Pub. L. 107–296, §2207(j)(2)(D), formerly §225(j)(2)(D), as renumbered by Pub. L. 115–278, §2(g)(2)(I), added par. (2) and struck out former par. (2) which read as follows: "a fine under this title or imprisonment for not more than six months, or both, in any other case."
1996—Subsec. (b)(1)(A), (2). Pub. L. 104–294 substituted "fine under this title" for "fine of under this title".
1994—Subsec. (b)(1)(A). Pub. L. 103–322, §330016(1)(U), substituted "under this title" for "not more than $250,000".
Subsec. (b)(2). Pub. L. 103–322, §330016(1)(K), substituted "under this title" for "not more than $5,000".
Effective Date of 2002 Amendment
Amendment by Pub. L. 107–296 effective 60 days after Nov. 25, 2002, see section 4 of Pub. L. 107–296, set out as an Effective Date note under section 101 of Title 6, Domestic Security.
Effective Date
Pub. L. 99–508, title II, §202, Oct. 21, 1986, 100 Stat. 1868, provided that: "This title and the amendments made by this title [enacting this chapter] shall take effect ninety days after the date of the enactment of this Act [Oct. 21, 1986] and shall, in the case of conduct pursuant to a court order or extension, apply only with respect to court orders or extensions made after this title takes effect."
Short Title of 1988 Amendment
Pub. L. 100–618, §1, Nov. 5, 1988, 102 Stat. 3195, provided that: "This Act [enacting section 2710 of this title and renumbering former section 2710 as 2711 of this title] may be cited as the 'Video Privacy Protection Act of 1988'."
2.4.2.2 Stored Communications Act, Section 2707: Civil action 2.4.2.2 Stored Communications Act, Section 2707: Civil action
18 U.S.C. § 2707
United States Code, 2018 Edition
Title 18 - CRIMES AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
PART I - CRIMES
CHAPTER 121 - STORED WIRE AND ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS AND TRANSACTIONAL RECORDS ACCESS
Sec. 2707 - Civil action
From the U.S. Government Publishing Office,
(a)
(b)
(1) such preliminary and other equitable or declaratory relief as may be appropriate;
(2) damages under subsection (c); and
(3) a reasonable attorney's fee and other litigation costs reasonably incurred.
(c)
(d)
(e)
(1) a court warrant or order, a grand jury subpoena, a legislative authorization, or a statutory authorization (including a request of a governmental entity under section 2703(f) of this title);
(2) a request of an investigative or law enforcement officer under section 2518(7) of this title; or
(3) a good faith determination that section 2511(3), section 2702(b)(9), or section 2702(c)(7) of this title permitted the conduct complained of;
is a complete defense to any civil or criminal action brought under this chapter or any other law.
(f)
(g)
Notes
Amendments
2018—Subsec. (e)(3). Pub. L. 115–141 amended par. (3) generally. Prior to amendment, par. (3) read as follows: "a good faith determination that section 2511(3) of this title permitted the conduct complained of;".
2002—Subsec. (e)(1). Pub. L. 107–273 made technical correction to directory language of Pub. L. 107–56, §815. See 2001 Amendment note below.
2001—Subsec. (a). Pub. L. 107–56, §223(b)(1), inserted ", other than the United States," after "person or entity".
Subsec. (d). Pub. L. 107–56, §223(b)(2), added subsec. (d) and struck out heading and text of former subsec. (d). Text read as follows: "If a court determines that any agency or department of the United States has violated this chapter and the court finds that the circumstances surrounding the violation raise the question whether or not an officer or employee of the agency or department acted willfully or intentionally with respect to the violation, the agency or department concerned shall promptly initiate a proceeding to determine whether or not disciplinary action is warranted against the officer or employee."
Subsec. (e)(1). Pub. L. 107–56, §815, as amended by Pub. L. 107–273, inserted "(including a request of a governmental entity under section 2703(f) of this title)" after "or a statutory authorization".
Subsec. (g). Pub. L. 107–56, §223(b)(3), added subsec. (g).
1996—Subsec. (a). Pub. L. 104–293, §601(c)(1), substituted "other person" for "customer".
Subsec. (c). Pub. L. 104–293, §601(c)(2), inserted at end "If the violation is willful or intentional, the court may assess punitive damages. In the case of a successful action to enforce liability under this section, the court may assess the costs of the action, together with reasonable attorney fees determined by the court."
Subsecs. (d) to (f). Pub. L. 104–293, §601(c)(3), (4), added subsec. (d) and redesignated former subsecs. (d) and (e) as (e) and (f), respectively.
Effective Date of 2002 Amendment
Pub. L. 107–273, div. B, title IV, §4005(f)(2), Nov. 2, 2002, 116 Stat. 1813, provided that the amendment made by section 4005(f)(2) is effective Oct. 26, 2001.
Effective Date
Section effective 90 days after Oct. 21, 1986, and, in the case of conduct pursuant to a court order or extension, applicable only with respect to court orders or extensions made after such effective date, see section 202 of Pub. L. 99–508, set out as a note under section 2701 of this title.
2.4.2.3 Stored Communications Act, Section 2711: Definitions 2.4.2.3 Stored Communications Act, Section 2711: Definitions
18 U.S.C. § 2711
United States Code, 2018 Edition
Title 18 - CRIMES AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
PART I - CRIMES
CHAPTER 121 - STORED WIRE AND ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS AND TRANSACTIONAL RECORDS ACCESS
Sec. 2711 - Definitions for chapter
From the U.S. Government Publishing Office,
As used in this chapter—
(1) the terms defined in section 2510 of this title have, respectively, the definitions given such terms in that section;
(2) the term "remote computing service" means the provision to the public of computer storage or processing services by means of an electronic communications system;
(3) the term "court of competent jurisdiction" includes—
(A) any district court of the United States (including a magistrate judge of such a court) or any United States court of appeals that—
(i) has jurisdiction over the offense being investigated;
(ii) is in or for a district in which the provider of a wire or electronic communication service is located or in which the wire or electronic communications, records, or other information are stored; or
(iii) is acting on a request for foreign assistance pursuant to section 3512 of this title;
(B) a court of general criminal jurisdiction of a State authorized by the law of that State to issue search warrants; or
(C) a court-martial or other proceeding under chapter 47 of title 10 (the Uniform Code of Military Justice) to which a military judge has been detailed; and
(4) the term "governmental entity" means a department or agency of the United States or any State or political subdivision thereof.
Notes
Amendments
2016—Par. (3)(C). Pub. L. 114–328 added subpar. (C).
2009—Par. (3). Pub. L. 111–79 substituted "includes—" and subpars. (A) and (B) for "has the meaning assigned by section 3127, and includes any Federal court within that definition, without geographic limitation; and".
2006—Par. (4). Pub. L. 109–177 added par. (4).
2001—Par. (3). Pub. L. 107–56 added par. (3).
1988—Pub. L. 100–618 renumbered section 2710 of this title as this section.
Effective Date of 2016 Amendment
Amendment by Pub. L. 114–328 effective on the date designated by the President [Jan. 1, 2019, with certain conditions and exceptions, see Ex. Ord. No. 13825, set out as a note under section 801 of Title 10, Armed Forces], not later than the first day of the first calendar month beginning two years after Dec. 23, 2016, with implementing regulations prescribed by the President not later than one year after Dec. 23, 2016, and with provisions relating to applicability to various situations, see section 5542 of Pub. L. 114–328, set out as a note under section 801 of Title 10, Armed Forces.
Effective Date
Section effective 90 days after Oct. 21, 1986, and, in the case of conduct pursuant to a court order or extension, applicable only with respect to court orders or extensions made after such effective date, see section 202 of Pub. L. 99–508, set out as a note under section 2701 of this title.
2.4.2.4 In re Google Inc. Cookie Placement Consumer Privacy Litigation (3d Cir. 2015) 2.4.2.4 In re Google Inc. Cookie Placement Consumer Privacy Litigation (3d Cir. 2015)
Need help understanding this case? Read this analysis from Columbia.
In re GOOGLE INC. COOKIE PLACEMENT CONSUMER PRIVACY LITIGATION. William Gourley; Jose M. Bermudez; Nicholas Todd Heinrich; Lynne Krause, Appellants.
No. 13-4300.
United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.
Argued Dec. 11, 2014.
Opinion Filed: Nov. 10, 2015.
Amended Nov. 12, 2015.
*129Jason O. Barnes, Esq. [Argued], Barnes & Associates, Edward D. Robertson, Jr., *130Esq., Bartimus Frickleton Robertson & Gorny, Jefferson City, MO, James P. Frickleton, Esq., Bartimus Frickleton Robertson & Gorny, Leawood, KS, Brian R. Strange, Esq., Strange & Carpenter, Los Angeles, CA, for Plaintiff-Appellants.
Colleen Bal, Esq., Michael H. Rubin, Esq. [Argued], Wilson, Sonsini, Goodrich & Rosati, San Francisco, CA, Michael H. Rubin, Esq., Wilson, Sonsini, Goodrich & Rosati, San Francisco, CA, Anthony J. Weibell, Esq., Wilson, Sonsini, Goodrich & Rosati, Palo Alto, CA, for Defendant-Ap-pellee Google Inc.
Edward P. Boyle, Esq., David N. Cinot-ti, Esq., Venable, New York, N.Y., Travis S. Hunter, Esq., Rudolf Koch, Esq., Richards, Layton & Finger, Wilmington, DE, for Defendant-Appellee Vibrant Media Inc.
Lisa M. Coyle, Esq., Ropes & Gray, New York, N.Y., Douglas-H. Meal, Esq., Ropes & Gray, Boston, MA, for Defendant-Appellees Media Innovation Group LLC and WPP PLC.
Before: FUENTES, FISHER, and KRAUSE, Circuit Judges.
OPINION OF THE COURT
This class action arises from allegations that the defendants, who run internet advertising businesses, placed tracking cookies on the plaintiffs’ web browsers in contravention of their browsers’ cookie blockers and defendant Google’s own public statements. At issue in this appeal is the District Court’s dismissal of each of the nine claims brought by the plaintiffs. As follows, we will affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand to the District Court for additional proceedings.
I. Background
A. Internet Advertising and Cookie-Based Tracking
In most users’ experience, webpages appear on browsers as integrated collages of text and images. As a technical matter, this content is delivered and aggregated from multiple independent servers. This includes advertising content, which is typically drawn from “third-party” servers owned by the advertisers themselves. The defendants in this case are internet advertising companies, and this suit concerns their practices in serving advertisements to the browsers of webpage visitors.
The delivery of advertising content from third party servers to webpage visitors’ browsers is a highly technical process involving a series of communications between the visitor’s browser, the server of the visited website, and the server of the advertising company. In its specifics:
The host website leaves part of its web-page blank where the third-party advertisements will appear. Upon receiving a “GET” request from a user seeking to display a particular webpage, the server for that webpage will subsequently respond to the browser, instructing the browser to send a “GET” request to the third-party company charged with serving the advertisements for that particular webpage.... The third-party server responds to the GET request by sending the advertisement to the user’s browser, which then displays it on the user’s device. The entire process occurs within milliseconds and the third-party content appears to arrive simultaneously with the first-party content so that the user does not discern any separate GET requests from the third-parties.1
*131As the defendants deliver their advertisements directly to users from their own servers, the defendants have the capacity to vary how they populate their rented webpage space. This capacity permits targeting by which the defendants may serve different advertisements to different visitors. The general principle is that the more that an advertisement is tailored to its audience — sneakers for runners, legal pads for lawyers — the greater the advertisement’s expected value. Here, the value of customization, combined with the capacity for individuated advertisement service, impels internet advertisers to surmise whatever they can about each particular person requesting webpage content.
As pled in the complaint:
To inject the most targeted ads possible, and therefore charge higher rates to buyers of the ad space, these third-party companies ... compile the [ijnternet histories of users. The third-party advertising companies use “third-party cookies” to accomplish this goal. In the process of injecting the advertisements into the first-party websites, the third-party advertising companies also place third-party cookies on user’s computing devices. Since the advertising companies place advertisements on multiple sites, these cookies allow these companies to keep track of and monitor an individual user’s web activity over every website on which these companies inject ads.2
These third-party cookies are used by advertising companies to help create detailed profiles on individuals ... by recording every communication request by ■ that browser to sites that are participating in the ad network, including all search terms the user has entered. The information is sent to the companies and associated with unique cookies — that is how the tracking takes place. The cookie lets the tracker associate the web activity with a unique person using a unique browser on a device. Once the third-party cookie is placed in the browser, the next time the user goes to a website with the same [defendant's advertisements, a copy of that request can be associated with the unique third-party cookie previously placed. Thus the tracker can track the behavior of the user.... 3
B. Cookie Blocking, Circumvention, Deceit, and Discovery
Individually tailored webpage advertisements are now ubiquitous. But, where cookie-based tracking is concerned, leading web browsers have designed built-in features to prevent the installation of cookies by third-party servers. The complaint calls them '“cookie blockers.” The cookie blockers of two browsers are at issue in this case. One is Microsoft’s Internet Explorer, which featured an “opt-in” cookie blocker that a user could elect to activate. The other is Apple’s Safari browser, which featured an “opt-out” cookie blocker that was activated by default. The complaint notes that the main Apple website page dedicated to Safari advertised its opt-out cookie blocker as a unique feature, stating that, “to better protect[] your privacy!,] Safari accepts cookies only from the websites you visit.”4 Likewise, the Safari browser labeled its default cookie setting as “Block cookies: From third parties and advertisers.”5
*132According to the complaint, the Safari and Internet Explorer cookie blockers were well-known to industry participants, including as to their existence, functionality, and purpose. More is alleged about Google in particular. Google’s Privacy Policy explained that “most browsers are initially set up to accept cookies, but you can reset your browser to refuse all cookies or to indicate when a cookie is being sent.”6 Google provided further assurances about the Safari cookie blocker specifically. Google offered a proprietary cookie blocker, a so-called “opt-out cookie” that, when downloaded, would prevent the installation of tracking cookies. On the public webpage Google maintained to describe its opt-out cookie, Google assured visitors that “Safari is set by default to block all third party cookies. If you have not changed those settings, this option essentially accomplishes the same thing as setting the opt-out cookie.”7
In February 2012, Stanford graduate student Jonathan Mayer published an online report revealing that Google and the other defendants had discovered, and were surreptitiously exploiting, loopholes in both the Safari cookie blocker and the Internet Explorer cookie blocker.8 Safari’s cookie blocker turns out to have had a few exceptions, one of which was that it permitted third-party cookies if the browser submitted a certain form to the third-party. Because advertisement delivery does not, in the ordinary course, involve such forms, the exception ought not have provided a pathway to installing advertiser tracking cookies. But according to Mayer’s report, Google used code to command users’ web browsers to automatically submit a hidden form to Google when users visited websites embedded with Google advertisements. This covert form triggered the exception to the cookie blocker, and, used widely, enabled the broad placement of cookies on Safari browsers notwithstanding that the blocker — as Google publicly acknowledged — was designed to prevent just that. Thé other defendants, meanwhile, accomplished similar circumventions. As a result, the defendants could — and did — place third-party cookies on browsers with activated blockers.
Mayer’s findings were concurrently published in the Wall Street Journal9 and drew the attention of the Federal Trade Commission and a consortium of state attorneys general. The Department of Justice filed suit under the Federal Trade Commission’s authorizing statute in the Northern District of California, and the action resolved by way of a stipulated order providing for a $22.5 million civil penalty.10 Google further agreed to certain forward-looking conditions related to internet privacy, but admitted no past acts or *133wrongdoing.11 Google similarly reached a $17 million settlement with 38 state attorneys general, including the California Attorney General.12
C. The Instant Suit
Following Mayer’s report, a series of lawsuits were filed in federal district courts around the country. Those lawsuits were consolidated by the Multi-District Litigation panel and assigned to Judge Sue Robinson of the District of Delaware. This appeal is from the District Court’s dismissal of that consolidated case.
The consolidated case was presented to the District Court as a putative class action, and four named plaintiffs — our appellants here — filed a consolidated class action complaint. The putative class consists of:
all persons in the United States of America who used the Apple Safari or Microsoft Internet Explorer web browsers and who visited a website from which doublechck.net (Google’s advertising serving service), PointRoll, Vibrant Media, Media Innovation Group, or WPP cookies were deployed as part of a scheme to circumvent the users’ browsers’ settings to block such cookies and which were ■ thereby used to enable tracking of the class membersf] [ijnter-net communications without consent.13
The complaint asserts three federal law claims against all defendants. Count I claims violation of the federal Wiretap Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2510 et seq. Count II claims violation of the Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2701. And Count III claims violation of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1030.
The complaint also asserts six California state law claims against Google only. Count IV claims violation of the privacy right conferred by the California Constitution. Count V claims intrusion upon seclusion under California tort law. Count VI claims violation of the Unfair Competition Law, Cal. Bus. & Prof.Code § 17200. Count VII claims violation of the California Comprehensive Computer Data Access and Fraud Act, CaLPenal Code § 502. Count VIII claims violation of the California Invasion of Privacy Act, CahPenal Code § 630 et seq. And Count IX claims violation of the California Consumers Legal Remedies Act, Cal. Civ.Code § 1750 et seq.
The defendants moved to dismiss the entire complaint for lack of Article III *134standing and for failure to state any claim. Without definitively resolving the standing challenge, the District Court agreed with the defendants that the allegations in the complaint did not give rise to any action, and on that basis dismissed the complaint under Rule 12(b)(6).14 On appeal, the plaintiffs challenge the dismissal of each of their nine claims, and the defendants renew their contention that the plaintiffs lack Article III standing.
II. Injury in Fact
Before we reach the merits, we address the defendants’ argument that the plaintiffs lack standing. “[T]he question of standing is whether the litigant is entitled to have the court decide the merits of the dispute or of particular issues.”15 A core requirement of standing is that the plaintiff have suffered an injury in fact. The defendants contend that the plaintiffs fail to demonstrate injury in fact because they make insufficient allegations of pecuniary harm.
For purposes of injury in fact, the defendants’ emphasis on economic loss is misplaced. In assessing injury in fact, we look for an “invasion ... which is (a) concrete and particularized; and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.” 16 Though the “injury must affect the plaintiff in a personal and individual way,”17 this standard does not demand that a plaintiff suffer any particular type of harm to have standing. Consequently, and contrary to the contentions of the defendants, a plaintiff need not show actual monetary loss for purposes of injury in fact. Rather, “the actual or threatened injury required by Art. Ill may exist solely by virtue of statutes creating legal rights, the invasion of which creates standing.” 18 Sure enough, the Supreme Court itself has permitted a plaintiff to bring suit for violations of federal privacy law absent any indication of pecuniary harm.19
The plaintiffs here base their claims on highly specific allegations that the defendants, in the course of serving advertisements to their personal web browsers, implanted tracking cookies on their personal computers. Irrespective of whether these allegations state a claim, the *135events that the complaint describes are concrete, particularized, and actual as to the plaintiffs. To the extent that the defendants believe that the alleged conduct implicates interests that are not legally protected, this is an issue of the merits rather than of standing.
The plaintiffs show injury in fact, and we have jurisdiction to address the merits of their claims.20
III. Federal Claims Against All Defendants
We first address the three federal law claims brought against all defendants. For the following reasons, we will affirm the dismissal of the plaintiffs’ Wiretap Act claim as well as the dismissal of plaintiffs’ claims under the Stored Communications Act and Computer Fraud and Abuse Act.
A. The Federal Wiretap Act
The federal Wiretap Act is codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2510 et seq. A plaintiff pleads a prima facie case under the Act by showing that the defendant “(1) intentionally (2) intercepted, endeavored to intercept or procured another person to intercept or endeavor to intercept (3) the contents of (4) an electronic communication, (5) using a device.”21 Of several statutory exceptions, one is the exception of § 2511(2)(d). Section 2511(2)(d) provides that, ordinarily, no cause of action will lie against a private person “where such person is a party to the communication or where one ■ of the parties to the communication has given prior consent to such-interception.”22
1. Acquisition of “Content”
The District Court dismissed the plaintiffs’ Wiretap Act claim on the basis that the defendants’ alleged conduct did not involve the acquisition of communications “content.” While the plaintiffs allege that the defendants acquired and tracked the URLs they visited, the Act defines “contents” as “any information concerning the substance, purport, or meaning of th[e] communication [at issue].”23 The District Court held that, “[a]s described by their name, ‘Universal Resource Locators,’.... a URL is a location identifier and does not ‘concern [ ] the substance, purport, or meaning’ of an electronic communication.’ ”24
In Smith v. Maryland, the Supreme Court made clear the important difference between extrinsic information used to route a communication and the communicated content itself.25 In Smith, the Su*136preme Court found no Fourth Amendment violation from the government’s warrant-less use of a pen register.26 Distinguishing its holding in Katz v. United States27 that warrantless wiretapping violated the Fourth Amendment, the Supreme Court explained that “a pen register differs significantly from the listening device employed in Katz, for pen registers do hot acquire the contents of communications.”28 Rather, the Court explained, pen registers “disclose only the telephone numbers that have been dialed' — a means of establishing communication. Neither the purport of any communication between the caller and the recipient of the call, their identities, nor whether the call was even completed is disclosed by pen registers.”29
Smith’s differentiation between the “means of establishing communication” and the “purport of a[ ] communication”30 looms large in federal surveillance law. Whereas the Wiretap Act governs the interception of communications “content[ ],”31 the separate federal Pen Register Act governs the acquisition of non-content “dialing, routing, addressing, [or] signaling information.”32 As the House of Representatives noted in its Report regarding the enactment of the PATRIOT Act, “the statutorily prescribed line between a communication’s contents and non-content information[ ] [is] a line identical to the constitutional distinction drawn by the U.S. Supreme Court in Smith v. Maryland.”33
Since Smith, location identifiers have classically been associated with non-content “means of establishing communication.” 34 Nevertheless, the District Court’s categorical assessment that location identifiers never “concern[ ] the substance, purport, or meaning” of a communication misses the mark.35 Often, a location identifier serves no routing function, but instead comprises part of a communication’s substance.36 As a leading treatise on criminal procedure explains:
[T]he line between content and non-content information is inherently relative. If A sends a letter to B, asking him to deliver a package to C at a particular address, the contents of that letter are contents from A to B but mere non-content addressing information with re*137spect to the delivery of the package to C. In the case of email, for example, a list of e-mail addresses sent as an attachment to an e-mail communication from one person to another are contents rather than addressing information. In short, whether an e-mail address is content or non-content information depends entirely on the circumstances.37
In essence, addresses, phone numbers, and URLs may be dialing, routing, addressing, or signaling information, but only when they are performing such a function. If an address, phone number, or URL is instead part of the substantive information conveyed to the recipient, then by definition it is “content.”
The different ways that an address can be used means, as Professor Orin Ken-puts it, that “the line between contents and metadata is not abstract but contextual with respect to each communication.”38 Thus, there'is no general answer to the question of whether locational information is content. Rather, a “content” inquiry is a case-specific one turning on the role the location identifier played in the “intercepted” communication.
Here, the complaint does not make clear whether the tracked URLs were acquired by the defendants from communications in which those URLs played a routing function. This is not, however, fatal to the plaintiffs’ claim.
In a declassified opinion analyzing whether there was statutory authority for a National Security Agency surveillance program, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court observed that the government possessed trap and trace authority over “dialing, routing, addressing, and signaling information .■.. provided, however, that such information shall not include the contents of any information.”39 The Surveillance Court read this to mean that, for purposes of federal surveillance law, information may well serve both a routing function and a content function. Noting the breadth of the statutory descriptions of routing information and “content,” the Surveillance Court concluded that routing information and “content” are not mutually exclusive categories, but rather ones that Congress expressly contemplated to be occasionally coextensive.40 Proceeding to identify exemplary areas where routing information and “content” overlap, the Surveillance Court pointed, “in particular,” to URL queries that involve reproduction of a search phrase entered by a user into a search engine.41 Quoting the District of Massachusetts, the Surveillance Court explained that, “if a user runs a search using an [i]nternet search engine, the ‘search phrase would appear in the URL after the first forward slash’ as part of the addressing information, but would also reveal contents, ie., the “ ‘substance’ ” and “meaning” of the communication ... that the user is conducting a search for information on a particular topic.’ ”42 For an example from another context, the court pointed to post-cut-through digits in the phone context “as dialing information, some of which also constitutes contents.”43
*138The decision of the Surveillance Court is instructive in several ways relevant to our analysis here. The first of these is that, to the extent that the statutory definitions and conceptual categories of content and routing information overlap, Congress expressly contemplated the possibility of such an overlap. For the reasons stated by the Surveillance Court, we are persuaded that, under the surveillance laws, “dialing, routing, addressing, and signaling information” may also be “content.”
Second, the Surveillance Court takes the position that queried URLs can be content as well as routing information, for instance in the case of URLs that reproduce search engine inquiries. Though some district courts have held that a URL is never content, the Surveillance Court decision is part of a growing chorus that some, if not most, queried URLs do contain content. In In re Zynga Privacy Litigation, the Ninth Circuit took the position that queried URLs are content if, but only if, they reproduce words from a search engine query.44 In United States v. Forrester, meanwhile, a different panel of the Ninth Circuit noted that warrantless capture of URLs generally “might be more constitutionally problematic” than warrantless capture of IP addresses.45 The Forrester court explained that “[a] URL, unlike an IP address, identifies the particular document within a website that a person views and thus reveals much more information about the person’s [ijnternet activity.”46 Akin to Forrester is the stance taken by the House Judiciary Committee in its PATRIOT Act report, which stated that a pen register order “could not be used to collect information other than ‘dialing, routing, addressing, and signaling’ information, such as the portion of a URL (Uniform Resource Locator) specifying Web seárch terms or the name of a requested file or article.” 47 Though none of these authorities offer detailed reasoning on why they draw the “content” line where they do, what they have in common is that they assess whether a URL involves “contents” based on how much information would be revealed by disclosure of the URL.
Third, the Surveillance Court’s example of post-cut-through digits in the telephone context — i.e.. numbers dialed from a telephone after a call is already setup or “cut-through” — hints at a different reason why queried URLs might be considered content. A number of courts apart from the Surveillance Court — most prominently the. D.C. Circuit — have found such digits to comprise communications content beyond *139the permissible scope of a pen register.48 URL queries bear functional analogues to this process, in that different portions of a queried URL may serve to convey different messages to different audiences. For instance, the domain name portion of the URL — everything before the “.com” — instructs a centralized web server to direct the user to a particular website, but post-domain name portions of the URL are designed to communicate to the visited website which webpage content to send the user.49
As stated above, we agree with the Surveillance Court that routing information and content are not mutually exclusive categories. And between the information revealed by highly detailed URLs and their functional parallels to post-cut-through digits, we are persuaded that — at a minimum — some queried URLs qualify as content.50 Indeed, the defendants’ counsel acknowledged as much at argument.51 Because the complaint pleads a broad scheme in which the defendants generally acquired and tracked the plaintiffs’ internet usage, we are satisfied that this scheme, if it operated as alleged, involved the collection of at least some “content” within the meaning of the Wiretap Act.52
*1402. Section 2511(2)(d)
According to the defendants, even if we find that the plaintiffs adequately plead the acquisition of “content,” we may affirm nevertheless under § 2511(2)(d). Section 2511(2)(d) sets forth that “[i]t shall not be unlawful ... for a person not acting under color of law to intercept a wire, oral, or electronic communication where such person is a party to the communication ... unless such communication is intercepted for the purpose of committing any criminal or tortious act in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States or of any State.” The defendants contend that they were the intended recipients of — and thus “parties” to — any electronic transmissions that they acquired and tracked, and that, as they committed no secondary criminal or tortious act, their conduct cannot have been unlawful under the statute.
a. How the Information at Issue Was Acquired
Before we can assess whether the defendants were “parties” to the electronic transmissions at issue, we must first identify what, exactly, are the transmissions at issue.
In the portion of the complaint devoted to the plaintiffs’ Wiretap Act claim, the complaint states that “the [defendants’ third-party web tracking permitted them to record information that [c]lass [m]embers exchanged with first-party websites ... which [the defendants intercepted while not a party to those communications (hence third-party tracking)[J”53 It continues to plead that “the defendants’ third-party tracking intercepted the class members’ communications while they were in transit from the class members’ computing devices to the web servers of the first-party websites the class members used their browsers to visit.”54
The highly specific allegations contained in the body of the complaint, however, give no credence to the complaint’s later allegations that the defendants acquired their internet history information from transmissions between the plaintiffs’ browsers and first-party websites. With respect to the mechanics of the defendants’ acquisition of web browsing information, the interior of the complaint says that, “[u]pon receiving a [ ]GET[ ] request from a user seeking to display a particular webpage, the server for that webpage will subsequently respond to the browser, instructing the browser to send a []GET[] request to the third-party company charged with serving the advertisements for that particular webpage.”55 As to Google specifically, the complaint likewise pleads that “the server hosting the publisher’s web-page ... instructs the user’s web browser to send a GET request to Google to display the relevant advertising information for the space on the page for which Google has agreed to sell display advertisements.” 56
If users’ browsers directly communicate with the defendants about the webpages they are visiting — as the complaint pleads with particularity — then there is no need for the defendants to acquire that information from transmissions to which they are *141not a party. After all, the defendants would have the information at issue anyway. Underscoring that there are direct transmissions between the plaintiffs and the defendants, the complaint notes that the defendants place cookies on web browsers “in the process of injecting the advertisements,”57 which are “serve[d] ... directly from the third-party company’s servers, rather than going through the individual website’s server.”58
The complaint’s descriptions of how tracking is accomplished, meanwhile, further supports that thé information was captured from the plaintiffs’ GET requests to the defendants. According to the complaint:
The information is sent to the companies and associated with unique cookies— that is how the tracking takes place. The cookie lets the tracker associate the web activity with a unique person using a unique browser on a device. Once the third-party cookie is placed in the browser, the next time the user goes to a webpage with the same [defendant's advertisements, a copy of that request can be associated with the unique third-party cookie previously placed. Thus the tracker can track the behavior of the user[.]”59
If the information at issue is sent to the defendants in the ordinary course, then this description of the cookies makes sense. This is because in such a scenario the defendants need only associate information to track it, which can be successfully accomplished by affixing an identifier to that information. This is precisely how the complaint describes the defendants’ cookies’ function. With respect to Google, the complaint pleads installation of Goo-gle’s “id” cookie, “which is a unique and consistent identifier given to each user by Google for its use in tracking persons across the entire spectrum of websites on which Google places ... cookies.”60 Goo-gle allegedly uses this cookie to “identif[y] users,” such that “the .placement of the third-party cookies, placed by circumventing Plaintiffs’ and Class Members’ privacy settings, allows this identification to take place.”61 Likewise, as to two of the other defendants, the complaint says that “[t]he spokesman [for Vibrant] admitted Vibrant used the trick ‘for unique user identification,’ ”62 and that “Media’s ‘id’ cookie is just that — an ‘ID’ or ‘identification’ cookie.” 63
Just as the operative allegations in the complaint tend to support the inference that the cookies enabled the defendants to identify, and thus associate, information that the plaintiffs sent directly to them in the ordinary course, the operative allegations tend to negate any inference to the contrary. This is because, if the information at issue was not sent to the defendants in the ordinary course, mere identification cookies would not be sufficient for the defendants’ scheme. To accomplish their tracking in that instance, the defendants would have needed not an associative device, but one capable of capturing communications sent by the plaintiffs and intended for -first-party websites, and then transmitting them to the defendants.64 *142There is no pleading of any such device, nor is that function the ordinary function of a tracking cookie. As stated" above, in discussing the function of the defendants’ cookies, the complaint describes them as having an associative function only.65
In view of our common sense reading of the operative allegations of the complaint, we note the factual position that the defendants advanced at argument: “The cookie doesn’t acquire anything ... The cookie doesn’t look for anything. It just sits on the browser and gets sent along with information that would otherwise be sent.”66 The information at issue would be sent anyway because “the user’s web browser send[s] a GET request to Google to display the relevant advertising information for the space on the page for which Google has agreed to sell display advertisements.” 67 We note also that, at argument, the plaintiffs’ counsel was directly asked on six separate occasions to clarify what transmissions they believed were improperly acquired and/or how the defendants’ cookies functioned.68 The plaintiffs’ counsel did not provide a direct response on any of these occasions.
At the Rule 12(b)(6) stage “we accept the pleader’s description of what happened to him or her along with any conclusions that can reasonably be drawn therefrom.”69 This standard permits the dismissal of a complaint “when [the] defendant’s plausible alternative explanation is so convincing that plaintiffs explanation is im plausible.”70 Here, the operative allegations of the complaint support only the conclusion that the defendants acquired the plaintiffs’ internet history information by way of GET requests that the plaintiffs sent directly to the defendants, and that the defendants deployed identifier cookies to make the information received from GET requests associable and thus tracka-ble. And though the portion of the complaint pertaining to the Wiretap Act contains statements to the contrary, we need not give legal effect to “conclusory allegations” that are contradicted by the pleader’s actual description of what happened.71
In short, our understanding of the plaintiffs’ allegations is that the defendants acquired the plaintiffs’ internet history information when, in the course of requesting webpage advertising content at the direction of the visited website, the plaintiffs’ browsers sent that information directly to the defendants’ servers.
b. Application of § 2511(2) (d)
Because the defendants were the intended recipients of the transmissions at issue — i.e. GET requests that the plaintiffs’ browsers sent directly to the defendants’ servers — we agree that § 2511(2)(d) means the defendants have done nothing unlawful *143under the Wiretap Act. Tautologically, a communication will always consist of at least two parties: the speaker and/or sender, and at least one intended recipient. As the intended recipient of a communication is necessarily one of its parties, and the defendants were the intended recipients of the GET requests they acquired here, the defendants were parties to the transmissions at issue in this case. And under § 2511(2)(d), it is not unlawful for a private person “to intercept a wire, oral, or electronic communication where such person is a party to the communication.”72
In their reply brief, the plaintiffs raise three objections in response to the argument that their Wiretap Act claim must fail because the defendants were the intended recipients of the relevant communications. None are persuasive.
First, the plaintiffs argue that we should not consider the defendants’ argument because the issue was not addressed by the District Court and because the defendants failed to raise the issue in the form of a cross-appeal. This is inapposite, for even if the defendants had never raised the issue at all, whether the plaintiffs have stated a claim is a matter of law to be determined from the face of their complaint. As always, we may affirm a district court’s judgment on grounds other than those considered by the district court itself.73
Second, the plaintiffs argue that the party exception should not apply for equitable reasons, in that the transmitted GET requests included cookie information that the communications included only because of the defendants’ surreptitious circumvention of the cookie blockers. The point here is that, though the plaintiffs sent the GET requests to the defendants voluntarily, they were induced to do so by deceit. Though we are no doubt troubled by the various deceits alleged in the complaint, we do not agree that a deceit upon the sender affects the presumptive non-liability of parties under § 2511(2)(d). “In the context of the statute, a party to the conversation is one who takes part in the conversation.”74 There is no statutory language indicating this excludes intended recipients who procured their entrance to a conversation through a fraud in the inducement, such as, here, by deceiving the plaintiffs’ browsers into thinking the cookie-setting entity was a first-party website.
It is not unimaginable that the Wiretap Act would give legal effect to the fraudulent participation of a party to a conversation.75 It is, after all, a wiretapping statute.76 Indeed, it appears the absence of an equitable exception to § 2511(2)(d) is no accident. In United States v. Pasha, the Seventh Circuit held that a police officer who impersonated the intended recipient of a phone call did not violate the Wiretap *144Act.77 And, as the Sixth Circuit has explained: We agree with the Sixth Circuit and the Fifth Circuit that, “[b]y citing Pasha, Congress strongly intimated that one who impersonates the intended receiver of a communication may still be a party to that communication for the purposes of the federal wiretap statute and that such conduct is not proscribed by the statute.”79 Likewise, we conclude it was by design that there is no statutory language by which the defendants’ various alleged deceits would vitiate their claims to. be parties to the relevant communications. The Wiretap Act is a wiretapping statute, and just because a scenario sounds in fraud or deceit does not mean it sounds in wiretapping.80
When amending the federal [W]iretap [A]ct in 1968 to its current state, Congress specifically mentioned Pasha in its discussions of the “party to the communication” provision. In discussing § 2511(2)(c), which is in pari materia with § 2511(2)(d) and differs from that provision only in that § 2511(2)(e) applies to persons acting under color of law, the Senate Judiciary Committee stated:
Paragraph 2(c) provides that it shall not be unlawful for a party to any wire or oral communication ... to intercept such communication. It largely reflects existing law. Where one of the parties consents, it is not unlawful.... “[P]arty” would mean the person actually participating in the communication. (United States v. Pasha, 332 F.2d 193 (7th Cir.1964)).78
Finally, the plaintiffs argue that § 2511(2)(d) should not apply because the defendants’ acquisition of the communications at issue was tortious under California law. The basis for this argument is that § 2511(2)(d) is inapplicable when the communication at issue is “intercepted for the purpose of committing any criminal or tor-*145tious act in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States or of any State.” But the plaintiffs point to no legal authority providing that the exception to § 2511(2)(d) is triggered when, as here, the tortious conduct is the alleged wiretapping itself. By contrast, all authority of which we are aware indicates that the criminal or tortious acts contemplated by § 2511(2)(d) are acts secondary to the acquisition of the communication involving tortious or criminal use of the interception’s fruits.81
As the Second Circuit explained in Caro v. Weintraub, “to survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must plead sufficient facts to support an inference that the offender intercepted the communication for the purpose of a tortious or criminal act that is independent of the intentional act of recording.”82 And though the plaintiffs may well plead facts that constitute violations of California laws related to intrusion upon seclusion, for purposes of the exception to § 2511(2)(d), “[i]nvasion of privacy through intrusion upon seclusion presents a problem ... — it is a tort that occurs through the act of interception itself.”83 As the plaintiffs plead no tortious or criminal use of the acquired internet histories, § 2511(2)(d) is not inapplicable on the basis of the criminal-tortious purpose exception.
Based on the facts alleged in the pleadings, the defendants were parties to any communications that they acquired, such that their conduct is within the § 2511(2)(d) exception.84 We will accordingly affirm the District Court’s dismissal of the plaintiffs’ Wiretap Act claim.
B. The Stored Communications Act
We next address the plaintiffs’ claim for violation of the Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2701. Enacted in 1986, the Stored Communications Act was born from congressional recognition that neither existing federal statutes nor the Fourth Amendment protected against potential intrusions on individual privacy arising from illicit access to “stored communications in remote computing operations and large data banks that stored emails.”85
To state a claim under the Stored Communications Act, a plaintiff must show that the defendant “(1) intentionally accesses without authorization a facility through which an electronic communication service *146is provided; or (2) intentionally exceeds an authorization to access that facility; and thereby obtains, alters, or prevents authorized access to a wire or electronic communication while it is in electronic storage in such system.”86
The District Court dismissed this claim on the basis of the Act’s requirement that the illicit access be with respect to “a facility through which an electronic communication service is provided.”87 As pled in the complaint, the illicit access at issue was to the plaintiffs’ personal web browsers. But according to the District Court, “an individual’s personal computing device is not a ‘facility through which an electronic communications service is provided.’ ”88 We agree, and we find persuasive the analysis of the Fifth Circuit in Garcia v. City of Laredo, which held that “a home computer of an end user is not protected by the [Act].”89
As noted by the Garcia court, though the Act does not define the term “facility,” the Act does define the term “electronic communication service,” which it defines as “any service which provides to users thereof the ability to send or receive wire or electronic communications.”90 This most naturally describes network service providers, and, indeed,- “[c]ourts have interpreted the statute to apply to providers of a communication service such as telephone companies, [i]nternet or e-mail service providers, and bulletin board services.”91 The Act also defines “electronic storage” as “(A) any temporary, intermediate storage of a wire or electronic communication incidental to the electronic transmission thereof; and (B) any storage of such communication by an electronic communication service for purposes of backup protection of such communication.”92 Temporary storage incidental to transmission and storage for purposes of backup protection are not how personal computing devices keep communications, but how third party network service providers do — or at least did, in 1986.93
There is then the language of 18 U.S.C. § 2701(c)(1), which provides that the prohibitory language of the Act “does not apply with respect to conduct authorized ... by the person or entity providing a wire or electronic communication service.” This makes sense when talking about third-party access to network service providers’ own facilities. But were the prohibitory language understood to apply to facilities other than those of network service providers, the language of the exeep*147tion becomes problematic. As one district court has explained, “[i]t would certainly seem odd that the provider of a communication service could grant access to one’s home computer to third parties, but that would be the result of [the plaintiffs’] argument.” 94
The origin of the Stored Communications Act confirms that Congress crafted the statute to specifically protect information held by centralized communication providers. “ ‘Sen. Rep. No. 99-541 (1986)’s entire discussion of [the Stored Communications Act] deals only with facilities operated by electronic communications services such as “electronic bulletin boards” and “computer mail facilities],” and the risk that communications temporarily stored in these facilities could be accessed by hackers. It makes no mention of individual users’ computers....’”95
The plaintiffs take a different view, arguing that the plain language of the terms “facility” and “electronic communication service” are sufficiently flexible to encompass contemporary personal computing devices that are used to engage with telecommunications services. After all, when the Act was enacted, Black’s Law Dictionary defined “facilities” as “that which promotes the ease of any action, operations, transaction, or course of conduct.”96 And the plaintiffs here use their web browsers to access network services such as email and websurfing.
In considering the plaintiffs’ argument that we should give “facility” a broad, plain language meaning, we are reminded that “[a] fair reading of legislation demands a fair understanding of the legislative plan.”97 And we agree with the Fifth Circuit that the Act clearly shows a specific congressional intent to deal with the particular problem of private communications in network service providers’ possession. The textual cues surrounding the term “facility,” bolstered by the legislative history and enactment context of the Act, support the conclusion that “the words of the statute were carefully chosen: ‘[T]he statute envisions a provider (the [Internet Service Provider] or other network service provider) and a user (the individual with an account with the provider), with the user’s communication in the possession of the provider.’ ”98 And “[t]his is consistent with the [Act]’s purpose: home computers are already protected by the Fourth Amendment, so statutory protections are not needed.”99 In this context, “facility” is a term of art denoting where network service providers store private communications.
Other Courts of Appeals have understood the Act in a similar manner. In In re: Zynga Privacy Litigation, the Ninth Circuit explained that the Act “covers access to electronic information stored in third party computers.”100 So, too, the Eleventh Circuit in United States v. Steiger, which held that “the [Stored Communi*148cations Act] clearly applies, for example, to information stored with a phone company, Internet Service Provider (ISP), or electronic bulletin board system,” but that the Act “does not appear to apply to the [government’s] source’s hacking into [the plaintiffs personal] computer ... because there is no evidence that [the] computer maintained any ‘electronic communication service[.]’”101 The plaintiffs point to various district court decisions that have accepted that personal computers can be protected “facilities” under the Stored Communications Act.102 However, as another district court observes, these decisions “provide little analysis on this point of law, instead assuming [the plaintiffs’] position to be true due to lack of argument and then ultimately ruling on other grounds.”103 The plaintiffs point to no decision of any Court of Appeals holding that a personal computing device is protected by the Stored Communications Act.
In sum, the defendants’ alleged conduct implicates no protected “facility.” The District Court’s dismissal of the claim for violation of the Act will therefore be affirmed.
C. Computer Fraud and Abuse Act
The plaintiffs’ final federal claim is for violation of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1030. The Act creates a cause of action for persons “who suffer[] damage or loss” because, inter alia, a third party “intentionally accesses a computer without authorization or exceeds authorized access, and thereby obtains ... information from any protected comput-gj. ” 104
The District Court dismissed this claim for failing to meet the statutory requirement of “damage or loss.”105 Under the Act, “the term ‘damage’ means any impairment to the integrity or availability of data, a program, a system, or information.” 106 Meanwhile, “the term ‘loss’ means any reasonable cost to any victim, including the cost of responding to an offense, conducting a damage assessment, and restoring the data, program, system, or information to its condition prior to the offense, and any revenue lost, cost incurred, or other consequential damages incurred because óf interruption of service.” 107
On appeal, the plaintiffs contend that they have properly pled “loss” under the statute because they have alleged that their “impermissibly seized ' [personally [identifiable [information is both ‘currency’ and a marketable ‘commodity.’ ”108 By capturing and making economic use of such information, the plaintiffs say, the defendants have taken the value of such information for themselves, depriving the *149plaintiffs of their own ability to sell their internet usage information. Insofar as the plaintiffs have a right to capture that value for themselves, the plaintiffs contend that the defendants’ conduct has caused them harm.
The complaint plausibly alleges a market for internet history information such as that compiled by the defendants. Further, the defendants’ alleged practices make sense only if that information, tracked and associated, had value. However, when it comes to showing “loss,” the plaintiffs’ argument lacks traction. They allege no facts suggesting that they ever participated or intended to participate in the market they identify, or that the defendants prevented them from capturing the full value of their internet usage information for themselves. For example, they do not allege that they sought to monetize information about their internet usage, nor that they ever stored their information with a future sale in mind. Moreover, the plaintiffs do not allege that they incurred costs, lost opportunities to sell, or lost the value of their data as a result of their data having been collected by others. To connect their allegations to the statutory “loss” requirement, the plaintiffs’ briefing emphasizes that lost revenue may constitute “loss” as that term is defined in the Act.109 This is inapposite, however, in that the plaintiffs had no revenue.
We see no “damage” or “loss” in the pleadings. We will therefore affirm the District Court’s dismissal of the claim for violation of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act.
IV. State Law Claims Against Google
We now turn to the five California state law claims brought against, Google only.
A. Freestanding Privacy Claims
We first consider, in tandem, the plaintiffs’ freestanding privacy claims under the California Constitution110 and California tort law.
“A privacy violation based on the common law tort of intrusion has two elements.”111 “First, the defendant must intentionally intrude into a place, conversation, or matter as to which the plaintiff has a reasonable expectation of privacy.”112 This means “the defendant must have ‘penetrated some zone of physical or sensory privacy ... ■ or obtained unwanted access to data’ by electronic or other covert means, in violation of the law or social norms.”113 Second, “the intrusion must occur in a manner highly offensive to a reasonable person.”114
“The right to privacy in the California Constitution sets standards similar to the common law tort of intrusion.”115 “First, [the plaintiff] must possess a legally protected privacy interest.... Second, *150the plaintiffs expectations of privacy must be reasonable.... Third, the plaintiff must show that the intrusion is so serious ‘in nature, scope, and actual or potential impact as to constitute an egregious breach of the social norms.’ ”116
When presented with parallel privacy claims under tort law and the California Constitution, the California Supreme Court has performed a dual inquiry “under the rubric of both ... tests.”117 This “considers] (1) the nature of any intrusion upon reasonable expectations of privacy, and (2) the offensiveness or seriousness of the intrusion, including any justification and other relevant interests.”118 In evaluating the offensiveness of an invasion, the court is to consider “pragmatic policy concerns” such that “no cause of action will lie for accidental, misguided, or excusable acts of overstepping upon legitimate privacy rights.”119
In dismissing the freestanding privacy claims, the District Court concluded that Google’s alleged practices “did not rise to the level of a serious invasion of privacy or an egregious breach of social norms.”120 Contending the District Court got it right, Google says the plaintiffs voluntarily sent Google all the internet usage information at issue.121 Moreover, Google argues, tracking cookies are routine.122 Pointing to cases describing cookies as, more or less, innocuous,123 Google offers that courts “routinely” find no actionable privacy invasion in cases involving tracking, collation, and disclosure of internet usage information.124 Google gives particular attention to Low v. Linkedln, where the Northern District of California explained that “[e]ven disclosure of personal information, including social security numbers, does not constitute an ‘egregious breach of the social norms’ to establish an invasion of privacy claim.”125
For purposes of California privacy law, Google’s emphasis on tracking and disclosure amounts to a smokescreen. What is notable about this case is how Google accomplished its tracking. Allegedly, this was by overriding the plaintiffs’ cookie blockers, while concurrently announcing in its Privacy Policy that internet users could “reset your browser to refuse all cookies.” 126 Google further assured Safari users specifically that their cookie blockers meant that using Google’s in-house prophylactic would be extraneous. Characterized by deceit and disregard, the alleged conduct raises different issues than tracking or disclosure alone.127
*151Directly pertinent to whether Google’s alleged practices implicated a protected privacy interest, California tort law treats as actionable an “unwanted access to data by electronic or other covert means, in violation of the law or social norms.”128 Moreover, the California Constitution protects an interest in “conducting personal activities without observation,” with the reasonableness of any given expectation “resting] on an examination of customs ... as well as the opportunity to be notified in advance and consent to the intrusion.”129 To Google’s point, a sophisticated internet user may well have known that, in browsing the internet, her URL information was sent to Google. But such a user would also reasonably expect that-her activated cookie blocker meant her URL queries would not be associated with each other due to cookies.130 As the activated cookie blocker equates, in our view, to an express, clearly communicated denial of consent for installation of cookies, we find Google “intru[ded] upon reasonable expectations of privacy.”131
As for whether the alleged conduct is “so serious in nature[ ] [and] scope ... as to constitute an egregious breach of the social norms,”132 Google not only contravened the cookie blockers&emdash;it held itself out as respecting the cookie blockers. Whether or not data-based targeting is the internet’s pole star, users are entitled to deny consent, and they are entitled to rely on the public promises of the companies they deal with. Furthermore, Google’s alleged conduct was broad, touching untold millions of internet users; it was surreptitious, surfacing only because of the independent research of Mayer and the Wall Street Journal; and it was of indefinite duration, with Google’s counsel conceding at argument that their tracking cookies have no natural lifespan. Particularly as concerns Google’s public statements regarding the Safari cookie blocker, we see no justification. Neither, apparently, do the elected branches, as California and federal executive agencies have themselves sought to penalize Google for the events alleged in the complaint.133 Based on the pled facts, a reasonable factfinder could indeed deem Google’s conduct “highly offensive” or “an egregious breach of social norms.”134
A reasonable jury could conclude that Google’s alleged practices constitute the serious invasion of privacy contemplated by California law. We will vacate the dismissal of the plaintiffs’ claims under the *152California Constitution and California tort law.
B. California Invasion of Privacy Act
We next consider the plaintiffs’ claim against Google for violation of the California Invasion of Privacy Act, Cal.Penal Code § 631(a). Like the federal Wiretap Act, § 631(a) “broadly prohibits the interception of wire communications and disclosure of the contents of such intercepted communications.”135 The California Supreme Court has explained that “Section 631 was aimed at one aspect of the privacy problem&emdash;eavesdropping, or the secret monitoring of conversations by third parties.”136
The District Court dismissed the § 631(a) claim for the same reasons that it dismissed the plaintiffs’ federal wiretapping claim. As discussed above, the pleadings demonstrate that Google was itself a party to all the electronic transmissions that are the bases of the plaintiffs’ wiretapping claims.137 Because § 631 is aimed only-at “eavesdropping, or the secret monitoring of conversations by third parties,” 138 we will affirm the dismissal of the California Invasion of Privacy Act claim for the same reasons we affirm the dismissal of the federal Wiretap Act claim.
C. Remaining State Law Claims
We will affirm the District Court’s dismissals of the remaining state law claims against Google.
The District Court dismissed the plaintiffs’ claim under the California Unfair Competition Law, Cal. Bus. & Prof.Code § 17200, on the basis that, under the statute, “private standing is limited to any ‘person who ... has lost money or property’ as a result of unfair competition.”139 Likewise, the District Court dismissed the plaintiffs’ claim under the California Comprehensive Computer Data Access and Fraud Act, CaLPenal Code § 502, on the basis of § 502’s requirement that a suit may only be brought by one who has “suffer[ed] damage or loss by reason of a violation.”140 As discussed above in connection with the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, the complaint fails to show damage or actual loss. Accordingly, the dismissal of these claims was proper.
The California Consumers Legal Remedies Act, Cal. Civ.Code § 1770, proscribes various “unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices undertaken by any person in a transaction intended to result or which results in the sale or lease of goods or *153services to any consumer.”141 On appeal, the plaintiffs argue that they plead a forced “sale” whereby they gave their trackable internet history information in exchange for advertisements delivered to their browsers (i.e., the “services”). The plaintiffs present no caselaw in support of their expansive construction of “sale.” And California federal courts have expressly rejected defining “sale” as to include “transactions” based on non-tangible forms of payment, including internet usage information specifically.142 Likewise, Black’s Law Dictionary defines a sale as a “transfer or property or title for a price,” requiring specifically “a price in money paid or promised.”143 We follow the view of the California federal courts, and see no “sale ... of services” in the allegations of the complaint. The dismissal of this claim was thus proper, too.
V. Conclusion
In light of the foregoing, we will dispose of the plaintiffs’ claims in the following manner.
We will affirm the dismissal of the three federal law claims brought against all defendants. Because the defendants were parties to all electronic transmissions at issue in this case, and plaintiffs state no Wiretap. Act violation per 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(d). The alleged intrusion upon the plaintiffs’ personal computing devices does not implicate a “facility” protected by the Stored Communications Act. And the plaintiffs plead no cognizable losses as required by the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act.
We will vacate the District Court s dismissal of th'e plaintiffs’ freestanding privacy claims against Google under the California Constitution and California tort law. A reasonable factfinder could conclude that the means by which defendants allegedly accomplished their tracking, i.e., by way of a deceitful override of the plaintiffs’ cookie blockers, marks the serious invasion of privacy contemplated by California law. But we will affirm the dismissal of the remainder of the plaintiffs’ state law claims. The plaintiffs fail to plead a violation of the California Invasion of Privacy Act for the same reason that they fail to plead a violation of the federal Wiretap Act. Likewise, because they do not show loss, the plaintiffs fail to show violations of the California Unfair Competition Law or the California Comprehensive Computer Data Access and Fraud Act. Finally, the plaintiffs do not plead a “sale” as required by the California Consumers Legal Remedies Act.
2.4.2.5 In re Facebook, Inc. Internet Tracking Litigation (9th Cir. 2020) 2.4.2.5 In re Facebook, Inc. Internet Tracking Litigation (9th Cir. 2020)
956 F. 3d 589
Need help understanding this case? Read this Lawfare blog post; skip the section titled “Article III Standing” and the discussion of U.S. v. Pasha.
956 F.3d 589 (2020)
IN RE FACEBOOK, INC. INTERNET TRACKING LITIGATION,
Perrin Aikens Davis; Brian K. Lentz; Cynthia D. Quinn; Matthew J. Vickery, Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
Facebook, Inc., Defendant-Appellee.
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
Argued and Submitted April 16, 2019, San Francisco, California.
Filed April 9, 2020.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of California; Edward J. Davila, District Judge, Presiding, D.C. No. 5:12-md-02314-PERRIN EJD.
David A. Straite (argued), Frederic S. Fox, and Ralph E. Labaton, Kaplan Fox & Kilsheimer LLP, New York, New York; Laurence D. King, Matthew George, and Mario M. Choi, Kaplan Fox & Kilsheimer LLP, San Francisco, California; Stephen G. Grygiel, Silverman Thompson Slutkin White LLC, Baltimore, Maryland; for Plaintiffs-Appellants.
Lauren R. Goldman (argued) and Michael Rayfield, Mayer Brown LLP, New York, New York; Matthew D. Brown, Cooley LLP, San Francisco, California; for Defendant-Appellee.
Marc Rotenberg, Alan Butler, Natasha Babazadeh, and Sam Lester, Electronic Privacy Information Center, Washington, D.C., for Amicus Curiae Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC).
Douglas Laycock, University of Virginia Law School, Charlottesville, Virginia; Steven W. Perlstein, Kobre & Kim LLP, New York, New York; Beau D. Barnes, Kobre & Kim LLP, Washington, D.C.; for Amicus Curiae Professor Douglas Laycock.
Before: SIDNEY R. THOMAS, Chief Judge, MILAN D. SMITH, JR., Circuit Judge, and KATHERINE H. VRATIL,[*] District Judge.
*595 OPINION
THOMAS, Chief Judge:
In this appeal, we are asked to determine whether: (1) Facebook-users Perrin *596 Davis, Brian Lentz, Cynthia Quinn, and Mathew Vickery ("Plaintiffs") have standing to allege privacy-related claims against Facebook, and (2) Plaintiffs adequately allege claims that Facebook is liable for common law and statutory privacy violations when it tracked their browsing histories after they had logged out of the Facebook application. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We affirm in part; reverse in part; and remand for further proceedings.
I
Facebook uses plug-ins[1] to track users' browsing histories when they visit third-party websites, and then compiles these browsing histories into personal profiles which are sold to advertisers to generate revenue. The parties do not dispute that Facebook engaged in these tracking practices after its users had logged out of Facebook.
Facebook facilitated this practice by embedding third-party plug-ins on third-party web pages. The plug-ins, such as Facebook's "Like" button, contain bits of Facebook code. When a user visits a page that includes these plug-ins, this code is able to replicate and send the user data to Facebook through a separate, but simultaneous, channel in a manner undetectable by the user.
As relevant to this appeal, the information Facebook allegedly collected included the website's Uniform Resource Locator ("URL") that was accessed by the user. URLs both identify an internet resource and describe its location or address. "[W]hen users enter URL addresses into their web browser using the `http' web address format, or click on hyperlinks, they are actually telling their web browsers (the client) which resources to request and where to find them. In re Zynga Privacy Litig., 750 F.3d 1098, 1101 (9th Cir. 2014). Thus, the URL provides significant information regarding the user's browsing history, including the identity of the individual internet user and the web server, as well as the name of the web page and the search terms that the user used to find it. In technical parlance, this collected URL is called a "referer header" or "referer." Facebook also allegedly collected the third-party website's Internet Protocol ("IP") address,[2] which reveals only the owner of the website.
Facebook allegedly compiled the referer headers it collected into personal user profiles using "cookies"—small text files stored on the user's device. When a user creates a Facebook account, more than ten Facebook cookies are placed on the user's browser. These cookies store the user's login ID, and they capture, collect, and compile the referer headers from the web pages visited by the user. As most relevant to this appeal, these cookies allegedly continued to capture information after a user logged out of Facebook and visited other websites.
Plaintiffs claim that internal Facebook communications revealed that company executives were aware of the tracking of logged-out users and recognized that these practices posed various user-privacy issues. According to the Plaintiffs, Facebook stopped tracking logged-out users only after Australian blogger Nik Cubrilovic published a blog detailing Facebook's tracking *597 practices.[3]
Plaintiffs filed a consolidated complaint on behalf of themselves and a putative class of people who had active Facebook accounts between May 27, 2010 and September 26, 2011. After the district court dismissed their first complaint with leave to amend, Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint. In the amended complaint, they alleged a number of claims. The claims relevant to this appeal consist of: (1) violation of the Wiretap Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2510, et seq.; (2) violation of the Stored Communications Act ("SCA"), 18 U.S.C. § 2701; (3) violation of the California Invasion of Privacy Act ("CIPA"), Cal. Pen. Code §§ 631, 632; (4) invasion of privacy; (5) intrusion upon seclusion; (6) breach of contract; (7) breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing; (8) civil fraud; (9) trespass to chattels; (10) violations of California Penal Code § 502 Computer Data Access and Fraud Act ("CDAFA"); and (11) statutory larceny under California Penal Code §§ 484 and 496.
The district court granted Facebook's motion to dismiss the amended complaint. First, the district court determined that Plaintiffs had failed to show they had standing to pursue claims that included economic damages as an element, thus disposing of the claims for trespass to chattels, violations of the CDAFA, fraud, and statutory larceny. It dismissed these claims without leave to amend.
The district court also dismissed for failure to state a claim, without leave to amend, Plaintiffs' claims for violations of the Wiretap Act, CIPA, and the SCA, as well as their common law claims for invasion of privacy and intrusion upon seclusion. The district court dismissed the claims for breach of contract and the breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, but granted leave to amend these claims. In response, Plaintiffs amended their complaint as to the breach of contract and implied covenant claims. The district court subsequently granted Facebook's motion to dismiss the amended claims. This timely appeal followed.
We review de novo a district court's determination of whether a party has standing. San Luis & Delta-Mendota Water Auth. v. United States, 672 F.3d 676, 699 (9th Cir. 2012). We review de novo dismissals for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). Dougherty v. City of Covina, 654 F.3d 892, 897 (9th Cir. 2011).
II
The Plaintiffs have standing to bring their claims. "Where standing is raised in connection with a motion to dismiss, the court is to `accept as true all material allegations of the complaint, and... construe the complaint in favor of the complaining party.'" Levine v. Vilsack, 587 F.3d 986, 991 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Thomas v. Mundell, 572 F.3d 756, 760 (9th Cir. 2009)).
To establish standing, a "[p]laintiff must have (1) suffered an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of the defendant, and (3) that is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision." Spokeo v. Robins, ___ U.S. ___, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547, 194 L.Ed.2d 635 (2016). To establish an injury in fact, a plaintiff must show that he or she suffered "an invasion of a legally protected interest" that is "concrete and particularized." Id. at 1548 (quoting Lujan *598 v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992)). A particularized injury is one that affects the plaintiff in a "personal and individual way." Id.; see also Dutta v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 895 F.3d 1166, 1173 (9th Cir. 2018).
A concrete injury is one that is "real and not abstract." Spokeo, 136 S.Ct. at 1548 (internal quotation marks omitted). Although an injury "must be `real' and `not abstract' or purely `procedural' ... it need not be `tangible.'" Dutta, 895 F.3d at 1173. Indeed, though a bare procedural violation of a statute is insufficient to establish an injury in fact, Congress may "elevat[e] to the status of legally cognizable injuries concrete, de facto injuries that were previously inadequate" to confer standing. Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1549 (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 578, 112 S.Ct. 2130).
To determine whether Congress has done so, we ask whether: (1) "Congress enacted the statute at issue to protect a concrete interest that is akin to a historical, common law interest[,]" and (2) the alleged procedural violation caused real harm or a material risk of harm to these interests. Dutta, 895 F.3d at 1174.
A
The district court properly concluded that Plaintiffs had established standing to bring claims for invasion of privacy, intrusion upon seclusion, breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, as well as claims under the Wiretap Act and CIPA, because they adequately alleged privacy harms.
Plaintiffs have adequately alleged an invasion of a legally protected interest that is concrete and particularized. "[V]iolations of the right to privacy have long been actionable at common law." Patel v. Facebook, 932 F.3d 1264, 1272 (9th Cir. 2019) (quoting Eichenberger v. ESPN, Inc., 876 F.3d 979, 983 (9th Cir. 2017)). A right to privacy "encompass[es] the individual's control of information concerning his or her person." Eichenberger, 876 F.3d at 983 (quoting U.S. Dep't of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 763, 109 S.Ct. 1468, 103 L.Ed.2d 774 (1989)).
As to the statutory claims, the legislative history and statutory text demonstrate that Congress and the California legislature intended to protect these historical privacy rights when they passed the Wiretap Act, SCA, and CIPA. See S. REP. No. 99-541, at 2 (1986) ("[The Wiretap Act] is the primary law protecting the security and privacy of business and personal communications in the United States today."); Id. at 3 ("[The SCA] is modeled after the Right to Financial Privacy Act, 12 U.S.C. § 3401 et seq. to protect privacy interests in personal and proprietary information...."); Cal. Pen. Code § 630 (noting that CIPA was passed "to protect the right of privacy of the people of this state"). Thus, these statutory provisions codify a substantive right to privacy, the violation of which gives rise to a concrete injury sufficient to confer standing. See Campbell v. Facebook, Inc., 951 F.3d 1106, 1117-19 (9th Cir. 2020).
Plaintiffs have adequately alleged harm to these privacy interests. Plaintiffs alleged that Facebook continued to collect their data after they had logged off the social media platform, in order to receive and compile their personally identifiable browsing history. As alleged in the complaint, this tracking occurred "no matter how sensitive" or personal users' browsing histories were. Facebook allegedly constantly compiled and updated its database with its users' browsing activities, including what they did when they were not *599 using Facebook. According to Plaintiffs, by correlating users' browsing history with users' personal Facebook profiles—profiles that could include a user's employment history and political and religious affiliations —Facebook gained a cradle-to-grave profile without users' consent.
Here, Plaintiffs have adequately alleged that Facebook's tracking and collection practices would cause harm or a material risk of harm to their interest in controlling their personal information. As alleged, Facebook's tracking practices allow it to amass a great degree of personalized information. Facebook's user profiles would allegedly reveal an individual's likes, dislikes, interests, and habits over a significant amount of time, without affording users a meaningful opportunity to control or prevent the unauthorized exploration of their private lives.
"[A]dvances in technology can increase the potential for unreasonable intrusions into personal privacy." Patel, 932 F.3d at 1272. As the Third Circuit has noted, "[i]n an era when millions of Americans conduct their affairs increasingly through electronic devices, the assertion ... that federal courts are powerless to provide a remedy when an internet company surreptitiously collects private data ... is untenable. Nothing in Spokeo or any other Supreme Court decision suggests otherwise." In re Google Inc. Cookie Placement Consumer Privacy Litig., 934 F.3d 316, 325 (3rd Cir. 2019) ("In re Google Cookie").
Accordingly, Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged a clear invasion of the historically recognized right to privacy. Therefore, Plaintiffs have standing to pursue their privacy claims under the Wiretap Act, SCA, and CIPA, as well as their claims for breach of contract and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
B
Plaintiffs also alleged theories of California common law trespass to chattels and fraud, statutory larceny, and violations of the CDAFA. The district court dismissed these claims for lack of standing, concluding that the Plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that they had suffered the economic injury the district court viewed as necessary to bring each of these claims.[4] We respectfully disagree.
Plaintiffs allege that Facebook is unjustly enriched through the use of their data. Facebook argues that unjust enrichment is not sufficient to confer standing, and that Plaintiffs must instead demonstrate that they either planned to sell their data, or that their data was made less valuable through Facebook's use. They similarly assert that Plaintiffs' entitlement to damages does not constitute an injury for purposes of standing.
However, "state law can create interests that support standing in federal courts." Cantrell v. City of Long Beach, 241 F.3d 674, 684 (9th Cir. 2001). As relevant here, California law recognizes a right to disgorgement of profits resulting from unjust enrichment, even where an individual has not suffered a corresponding loss. *600 See Cty. of San Bernardino v. Walsh, 158 Cal. App. 4th 533, 542, 69 Cal.Rptr.3d 848 (2007) (noting that where "a benefit has been received by the defendant but the plaintiff has not suffered a corresponding loss, or in some cases, any loss, but nevertheless the enrichment of the defendant would be unjust ... [t]he defendant may be under a duty to give to the plaintiff the amount by which [the defendant] has been enriched" (quoting Rest., Restitution, § 1, com. e)); see also Ghirardo v. Antonioli, 14 Cal. 4th 39, 51, 57 Cal.Rptr.2d 687, 924 P.2d 996 (1996) ("Under the law of restitution, an individual may be required to make restitution if he is unjustly enriched at the expense of another.").
In other words, California law requires disgorgement of unjustly earned profits regardless of whether a defendant's actions caused a plaintiff to directly expend his or her own financial resources or whether a defendant's actions directly caused the plaintiff's property to become less valuable. See, e.g., CTC Real Estate Servs. v. Lepe, 140 Cal. App. 4th 856, 860-61, 44 Cal.Rptr.3d 823 (2006) (holding that a woman whose identity was stolen and used to obtain later-foreclosed-upon property was entitled to surplus funds from the sale at auction because "she was entitled to the product of identity theft"); Ward v. Taggert, 51 Cal. 2d 736, 742-43, 336 P.2d 534 (1959) (holding that plaintiffs could recover profits unjustly realized by a real estate agent who misrepresented the purchase price of real estate, even though the plaintiffs did not pay more than the land was worth when they purchased it); cf. Walsh, 158 Cal. App. 4th at 542-43, 69 Cal.Rptr.3d 848 (holding that the district court did not err where it solely relied on profit to the defendants rather than loss to the plaintiffs to calculate damages).
"The `gist of the question of standing' is whether the plaintiff has a sufficiently `personal stake in the outcome of the controversy.'" Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151, 1159 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 517, 127 S.Ct. 1438, 167 L.Ed.2d 248 (2007)). Because California law recognizes that individuals maintain an entitlement to unjustly earned profits, to establish standing, Plaintiffs must allege they retain a stake in the profits garnered from their personal browsing histories because "the circumstances are such that, as between the two [parties], it is unjust for [Facebook] to retain it." McBride v. Boughton, 123 Cal. App. 4th 379, 389, 20 Cal.Rptr.3d 115 (2004) (emphasis in original) (quoting First Nationwide Savings v. Perry, 11 Cal. App. 4th 1657, 1662, 15 Cal.Rptr.2d 173 (1992)). Under California law, this stake in unjustly earned profits exists regardless of whether an individual planned to sell his or her data or whether the individual's data is made less valuable.
Because California law recognizes a legal interest in unjustly earned profits, Plaintiffs have adequately pleaded an entitlement to Facebook's profits from users' personal data sufficient to confer Article III standing. Plaintiffs allege that their browsing histories carry financial value. They point to the existence of a study that values users' browsing histories at $52 per year, as well as research panels that pay participants for access to their browsing histories.
Plaintiffs also sufficiently allege that Facebook profited from this valuable data. According to the complaint, Facebook sold user data to advertisers in order to generate revenue. Indeed, as alleged, Facebook's ad sales constituted over 90% of the social media platform's revenue during the relevant period of logged-out user tracking. *601 Plaintiffs' allegations are sufficient at the pleading stage to demonstrate that these profits were unjustly earned. As stated in the complaint, "despite Facebook's false guarantee to the contrary," the platform "charges users by acquiring the users' sensitive and valuable personal information" and selling it to advertisers for a profit. Plaintiffs allegedly did not provide authorization for the use of their personal information, nor did they have any control over its use to produce revenue. This unauthorized use of their information for profit would entitle Plaintiffs to profits unjustly earned.
Thus, Plaintiffs sufficiently alleged a state law interest whose violation constitutes an injury sufficient to establish standing to bring their claims for CDAFA violations and California common law trespass to chattels, fraud, and statutory larceny.
III
Plaintiffs adequately stated claims for relief for invasion of privacy, intrusion upon seclusion, breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, as well as their claims under the Wiretap Act and CIPA. In order to survive a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the facts alleged must "plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief." Dougherty, 654 F.3d at 897 (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009)). At the pleading stage, all allegations of material fact are taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Id.
A
Plaintiffs adequately stated claims for relief for intrusion upon seclusion and invasion of privacy under California law. To state a claim for intrusion upon seclusion under California common law, a plaintiff must plead that (1) a defendant "intentionally intrude[d] into a place, conversation, or matter as to which the plaintiff has a reasonable expectation of privacy[,]" and (2) the intrusion "occur[red] in a manner highly offensive to a reasonable person." Hernandez v. Hillsides, Inc., 47 Cal. 4th 272, 286, 97 Cal.Rptr.3d 274, 211 P.3d 1063 (2009).
A claim for invasion of privacy under the California Constitution involves similar elements. Plaintiffs must show that (1) they possess a legally protected privacy interest, (2) they maintain a reasonable expectation of privacy, and (3) the intrusion is "so serious ... as to constitute an egregious breach of the social norms" such that the breach is "highly offensive." Id. at 287, 97 Cal.Rptr.3d 274, 211 P.3d 1063.
Because of the similarity of the tests, courts consider the claims together and ask whether: (1) there exists a reasonable expectation of privacy, and (2) the intrusion was highly offensive. Id. We address both in turn.
1
The existence of a reasonable expectation of privacy, given the circumstances of each case, is a mixed question of law and fact. Hill v. NCAA, 7 Cal. 4th 1, 40, 26 Cal.Rptr.2d 834, 865 P.2d 633 (1994). "[M]ixed questions of fact and law are reviewed de novo, unless the mixed question is primarily factual." N.B. v. Hellgate Elem. Sch. Dist., ex rel. Bd. of Dirs., Missoula Cty., Mont., 541 F.3d 1202, 1207 (9th Cir. 2008). Here, because we are reviewing the district court's legal conclusions, we review de novo.
We first consider whether a defendant gained "unwanted access to data *602 by electronic or other covert means, in violation of the law or social norms." Hernandez, 47 Cal. 4th at 286, 97 Cal.Rptr.3d 274, 211 P.3d 1063 (internal quotation marks omitted). To make this determination, courts consider a variety of factors, including the customs, practices, and circumstances surrounding a defendant's particular activities. Hill, 7 Cal. 4th at 36, 26 Cal.Rptr.2d 834, 865 P.2d 633.
Thus, the relevant question here is whether a user would reasonably expect that Facebook would have access to the user's individual data after the user logged out of the application. Facebook's privacy disclosures at the time allegedly failed to acknowledge its tracking of logged-out users, suggesting that users' information would not be tracked.
The applicable Facebook Statement of Rights and Responsibilities ("SRR") stated:
Your privacy is very important to us. We designed our Privacy Policy to make important disclosures about how you can use Facebook to share with others and how we collect and can use your content and information. We encourage you to read the Privacy Policy, and to use it to make informed decisions.
SRR, dated April 26, 2011.
Facebook's applicable Data Use Policy,[5] in turn, stated:
We receive data whenever you visit a game, application, or website that uses [Facebook's services]. This may include the date and time you visit the site; the web address, or URL, you're on; technical information about the IP address, browser and the operating system you use; and, if you are logged in to Facebook, your user ID.
Data Use Policy, dated September 7, 2011 (emphasis added).
Finally, Facebook's "Help Center" at the time included answers to questions related to data tracking. Most relevantly, one answer from a Help Center page at the time answered the question "[w]hat information does Facebook receive about me when I visit a website with a Facebook social plug in?"[6] The Help Center page first stated that Facebook collected the date and time of the visit, the referer URL, and other technical information. It continued, "[i]f you are logged into Facebook, we also see your user ID number and email address. ... If you log out of Facebook, we will not receive this information about partner websites but you will also not see personalized experiences on these sites."
Plaintiffs have plausibly alleged that an individual reading Facebook's promise to "make important privacy disclosures" could have reasonably concluded that the basics of Facebook's tracking— when, why, and how it tracks user information —would be provided. Plaintiffs have plausibly alleged that, upon reading Facebook's statements in the applicable Data Use Policy, a user might assume that only logged-in user data would be collected. Plaintiffs have alleged that the applicable Help Center page affirmatively stated that logged-out user data would not be collected. Thus, Plaintiffs have plausibly alleged that Facebook set an expectation that logged-out user data would not be collected, but then collected it anyway.
*603 In addition, the amount of data allegedly collected was significant. Plaintiffs allege that "[n]o matter how sensitive the website, the referral URL is acquired by Facebook along with the cookies that precisely identify the [logged-out] user" and that Facebook acquires an "enormous amount of individualized data" through its use of cookies on the countless websites that incorporate Facebook plug-ins. That this amount of information can be easily collected without user knowledge is similarly significant. Plaintiffs have plausibly alleged that Facebook did not disclose that the cookies would continue to track users' browsing history after they log out of the platform. Nor did it disclose the extent of information collected.
In light of the privacy interests and Facebook's allegedly surreptitious and unseen data collection, Plaintiffs have adequately alleged a reasonable expectation of privacy. Case law supports this determination. In In re Google Cookie—where the Third Circuit similarly interpreted California Law—the court held that users maintained a reasonable expectation of privacy in their browsing histories when Google tracked URLs after the users denied consent for such tracking. 806 F.3d at 129, 151; see also In re Nickelodeon Cons. Priv. Litig., 827 F.3d 262, 293-94 (3d Cir. 2016) ("In re Nickelodeon") (holding, under analogous New Jersey law, that a reasonable expectation of privacy existed when Nickelodeon promised users that it would not collect information from website users, but then did). That users in those cases explicitly denied consent does not render those cases distinguishable from the instant case, given Facebook's affirmative statements that it would not receive information from third-party websites after users had logged out. Indeed, in those cases, the critical fact was that the online entity represented to the plaintiffs that their information would not be collected, but then proceeded to collect it anyway.
The nature of the allegedly collected data is also important. Plaintiffs allege that Facebook obtained a comprehensive browsing history of an individual, no matter how sensitive the websites visited, and then correlated that history with the time of day and other user actions on the websites visited. This process, according to Plaintiffs, resulted in Facebook's acquiring "an enormous amount of individualized data" to compile a "vast repository of personal data."
Facebook argues that Plaintiffs need to identify specific, sensitive information that Facebook collected, and that their more general allegation that Facebook acquired "an enormous amount of individualized data" is insufficient. However, both the nature of collection and the sensitivity of the collected information are important. The question is not necessarily whether Plaintiffs maintained a reasonable expectation of privacy in the information in and of itself. Rather, we must examine whether the data itself is sensitive and whether the manner it was collected—after users had logged out—violates social norms.
When we consider the sensitivity of that data, moreover, we conclude there remain material questions of fact as to whether a reasonable individual would find the information collected from the seven million websites that employ Facebook plug-ins "sensitive and confidential." Hill, 7 Cal. 4th at 35, 26 Cal.Rptr.2d 834, 865 P.2d 633. "Technological advances[,]" such as Facebook's use of cookies to track and compile internet browsing histories, "provide `access to a category of information otherwise unknowable' and `implicate privacy concerns' in a manner different from traditional intrusions as a `ride on horseback' is different from `a flight to the moon.'" Patel, 932 F.3d at 1273 (quoting Riley v. *604 California, 573 U.S. 373, 393, 134 S.Ct. 2473, 189 L.Ed.2d 430 (2014)). Thus, viewing the allegations in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, as we must at this stage, the allegations that Facebook allegedly compiled highly personalized profiles from sensitive browsing histories and habits prevent us from concluding that the Plaintiffs have no reasonable expectation of privacy.[7]
Contrary to Facebook's arguments, this case can also be distinguished from Forrester and Zynga as it relates to an analysis of a reasonable expectation of privacy. Forrester, 512 F.3d 500; Zynga, 750 F.3d 1098. In Forrester, we considered whether the individuals had a reasonable expectation of privacy in "the to/from addresses of their messages or the IP addresses of the websites they visit." 512 F.3d at 510. Concluding that users did not maintain a reasonable expectation of privacy in such information, we determined that users "should know that this information is provided to and used by Internet service providers for the specific purposes of directing the routing information." Id. But, in a footnote, we went on to distinguish the IP addresses collected in Forrester from the collection of URLs, which we stated "might be more constitutionally problematic," explaining that, "[a] URL, unlike an IP address, identifies the particular document within a website that a person views and thus reveals much more information about the person's Internet activity." Id. at n.6.
In Zynga, the plaintiffs relied on this footnote to argue that they maintained a reasonable expectation of privacy in the URLs of gaming websites collected without their knowledge and disclosed to third parties by Zynga (a gaming platform) and Facebook. 750 F.3d at 1108-09. The Zynga plaintiffs alleged that users would log in to their Facebook account and "then click on the Zynga game icon within the Facebook interface." Id. at 1102. Facebook and Zynga would then collect a referer header containing the URL for the Zynga game, after which the Zynga server would load the game in a small frame embedded on the Facebook website. Id. According to the Zynga plaintiffs, "Zynga programmed its gaming applications to collect the information provided in the referer header, and then transmit this information to advertisers and other third parties." Id. This information included "the user's Facebook ID and the address of the Facebook webpage *605 the user was viewing when the user clicked the link." Id. at 1102.
In Zynga, we concluded that the collected information was not problematic because it differed from the URLs containing sensitive information alluded to in Forrester's footnote. We determined that "[i]nformation about the address of the Facebook webpage the user was viewing is distinguishable from the sort of communication involving a search engine discussed in Forrester." Id. at 1108. We then continued to say that "a Google search URL not only shows that a user is using the Google search engine, but also shows the specific search terms the user had communicated to Google." Id. We continued, "the referer header information at issue here includes only basic identification and address information, not a search term or similar communication made by the user." Id. at 1108-09.
Here, Plaintiffs allege that Facebook collects a full-string detailed URL, which contains the name of a website, folder and sub-folders on the web-server, and the name of the precise file requested. Their complaint notes that a user might type a search term into Google's search engine, which would return a link to an article relevant to the search term. According to Plaintiffs, when the user clicks the link, a communication is created that contains a "GET request and the full-string detailed URL." They allege that Facebook collected this communication, including the "full referral URL (including the exact subpage of the precise items being purchased)" and that Facebook then "correlates that URL with the user ID, time stamp, browser settings and even the type of browser used."
In sum, Plaintiffs allege that a Google search could generate links that include full-string, detailed URLs that Facebook then collected. Thus, they have sufficiently alleged that the collected URLs in this case are distinct from IP addresses collected in Forrester, as well as the URLs collected in Zynga. The URLs, by virtue of including "the particular document within a website that a person views" reveal "much more information" than the IP addresses collected in Forrester. 512 F.3d at 510 n.6. Unlike the URLs in Zynga, which revealed only that a Facebook user had clicked on a link to a gaming website, Plaintiffs allege that the URLs in the instant case could emanate from search terms inputted into a third-party search engine. These terms and the resulting URLs could divulge a user's personal interests, queries, and habits on third-party websites operating outside of Facebook's platform.
Moreover, the users in Zynga clicked on links to the gaming websites after they had logged into their Facebook user accounts. Zynga, 750 F.3d at 1102. Then, the linked material appeared within the Facebook interface. Id. Here, in contrast, Plaintiffs allege that users were not logged in to the website, making it impossible for the linked material to be viewed within Facebook's interface.
The fact that users could have taken additional measures to prevent cookies from tracking their browsing, as Facebook asserts, is not relevant at the pleading stage. This is a fact-based defense to be developed and asserted at a later stage of the litigation. And Plaintiffs have alleged that these protections would not have done any good, even if users had employed them. Specifically, they allege that Facebook would "hack its way past data protection software" to "bypass[] security settings for the purpose of gathering intelligence" on the users' real-time searches, and similarly, with respect to a subclass of individuals who used the Internet Explorer browser, that Facebook fraudulently *606 maintained that it employed a protocol that would result in its tracking being automatically blocked by the browser. These issues cannot be resolved at the pleading stage.
In sum, Plaintiffs have sufficiently pleaded a reasonable expectation of privacy to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.
2
However, in order to maintain a California common law privacy action, "[p]laintiffs must show more than an intrusion upon reasonable privacy expectations. Actionable invasions of privacy also must be `highly offensive' to a reasonable person, and `sufficiently serious' and unwarranted so as to constitute an `egregious breach of the social norms.'" Hernandez, 47 Cal. 4th at 295, 97 Cal.Rptr.3d 274, 211 P.3d 1063. Determining whether a defendant's actions were "highly offensive to a reasonable person" requires a holistic consideration of factors such as the likelihood of serious harm to the victim, the degree and setting of the intrusion, the intruder's motives and objectives, and whether countervailing interests or social norms render the intrusion inoffensive. Id. at 287, 97 Cal.Rptr.3d 274, 211 P.3d 1063; see also Hill, 7 Cal. 4th at 25-26, 26 Cal.Rptr.2d 834, 865 P.2d 633. While analysis of a reasonable expectation of privacy primarily focuses on the nature of the intrusion, the highly offensive analysis focuses on the degree to which the intrusion is unacceptable as a matter of public policy. Hernandez, 47 Cal. 4th at 287, 97 Cal.Rptr.3d 274, 211 P.3d 1063 (noting that highly offensive analysis "essentially involves a `policy' determination as to whether the alleged intrusion is highly offensive under the particular circumstances").
The ultimate question of whether Facebook's tracking and collection practices could highly offend a reasonable individual is an issue that cannot be resolved at the pleading stage. Plaintiffs have identified sufficient facts to survive a motion to dismiss. Plaintiffs' allegations of surreptitious data collection when individuals were not using Facebook are sufficient to survive a dismissal motion on the issue. Indeed, Plaintiffs have alleged that internal Facebook communications reveal that the company's own officials recognized these practices as a problematic privacy issue.
In sum, Plaintiffs have sufficiently pleaded the "reasonable expectation of privacy" and "highly offensive" elements necessary to state a claim for intrusion upon seclusion and invasion of privacy to survive a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.[8]
B
Plaintiffs also have sufficiently alleged that Facebook's tracking and collection practices violated the Wiretap Act and CIPA.
1
The Wiretap Act prohibits the unauthorized "interception" of an "electronic communication." *607 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(a)-(e). Similarly, CIPA prohibits any person from using electronic means to "learn the contents or meaning" of any "communication" "without consent" or in an "unauthorized manner." Cal. Pen. Code § 631(a). Both statutes contain an exemption from liability for a person who is a "party" to the communication, whether acting under the color of law or not. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(c), (d); see Warden v. Kahn, 99 Cal.App.3d 805, 160 Cal. Rptr. 471, 475 (1979) ("[S]ection 631 ... has been held to apply only to eavesdropping by a third party and not to recording by a participant to a conversation."). Courts perform the same analysis for both the Wiretap Act and CIPA regarding the party exemption. See, e.g., In re Google Cookie, 806 F.3d at 152 (holding that CIPA claims could be dismissed because the parties were exempted from liability under the Wiretap Act's party exception).
The party exception must be considered in the technical context of this case. When an individual internet user visits a web page, his or her browser sends a message called a "GET request" to the web page's server. The GET request serves two purposes: it first tells the website what information is being requested and then instructs the website to send the information back to the user. The GET request also transmits a referer header containing the personally-identifiable URL information. Typically, this communication occurs only between the user's web browser and the third-party website. On websites with Facebook plug-ins, however, Facebook's code directs the user's browser to copy the referer header from the GET request and then send a separate but identical GET request and its associated referer header to Facebook's server. It is through this duplication and collection of GET requests that Facebook compiles users' browsing histories.
The Wiretap Act does not define the term "party" in its liability exemption, and the other circuit courts that have considered the Act's scope have interpreted the term in different ways. The First and Seventh Circuits have implicitly assumed that entities that surreptitiously duplicate transmissions between two parties are not parties to communications within the meaning of the Act. In In re Pharmatrak, Inc. Privacy Litig., the First Circuit considered whether the defendant could face liability under the Wiretap Act when it employed software that "automatically duplicated part of the communication between a user and a [third-party website] and sent this information to [the defendant]." 329 F.3d 9, 22 (1st Cir. 2003). The First Circuit rejected the defendant's argument that "there was no interception because `there were always two separate communications: one between the Web user and the [third-party website], and the other between the Web user and [the defendant].'" Id. Noting that the defendant "acquired the same URL ... exchanged as a part of the communication between the [third-party website] and the user," it determined that the defendant's acquisition constituted an interception and could still render it liable. Id.
In United States v. Szymuszkiewicz, the Seventh Circuit reached a similar conclusion. 622 F.3d 701 (7th Cir. 2010). In that case, the Seventh Circuit considered whether a defendant violated the Wiretap Act when he employed a software that instructed his employer's email to duplicate and forward all emails the employer received to the defendant's own inbox. Id. at 703. The court determined that, because the copies were sent contemporaneously with the original emails, the defendant had intercepted the communications and could be held liable. Id. at 706.
*608 However, the Third Circuit has held to the contrary. In In re Google Cookie, the court considered whether internet advertising companies were parties to a communication when they placed cookie blockers on web-users' browsers to facilitate online advertisements. 806 F.3d at 143. As in the instant case, the users sent GET requests to third-party websites and upon receipt, the website would duplicate the GET request and send it to the defendants. Id. at 140. The Third Circuit concluded that the defendants were "the intended recipients" of the duplicated GET requests, and thus "were parties to the transmissions at issue." Id. at 143; see also In re Nickelodeon, 827 F.3d at 275-76 (citing In re Google Cookie for the same).[9]
We adopt the First and Seventh Circuits' understanding that simultaneous, unknown duplication and communication of GET requests do not exempt a defendant from liability under the party exception. As we have previously held, the "paramount objective of the [Electronic Communications Privacy Act, which amended the Wiretap Act] is to protect effectively the privacy of communications." Joffe v. Google, 746 F.3d 920, 931 (9th Cir. 2013). We also recognize that the Wiretap Act's legislative history evidences Congress's intent to prevent the acquisition of the contents of a message by an unauthorized third-party or "an unseen auditor." See S. REP. No. 90-1097, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 2154, 2182. Permitting an entity to engage in the unauthorized duplication and forwarding of unknowing users' information would render permissible the most common methods of intrusion, allowing the exception to swallow the rule.
Therefore, we conclude that Facebook is not exempt from liability as a matter of law under the Wiretap Act or CIPA as a party to the communication. We do not opine whether the Plaintiffs adequately pleaded the other requisite elements of the statutes, as those issues are not presented on appeal.
C
The district court properly dismissed Plaintiffs' SCA claims. The SCA requires Plaintiffs to plead that Facebook (1) gained unauthorized access to a "facility" where it (2) accessed an electronic communication in "electronic storage." 18 U.S.C. § 2701(a).
Electronic storage is defined as either the "temporary, intermediate storage of a wire or electronic communication incidental to the electronic transmission thereof" and "any storage of such communication by an electronic communication service for purposes of backup protection of such communication." 18 U.S.C. § 2510(17).
Plaintiffs allege that "[w]eb-browsers store a copy of the Plaintiffs' URL requests in the toolbar while the user remains present at a particular webpage," and that this storage is incidental to the electronic communication because once "the user hits the Enter button or clicks on a link, the communication is in the process of being sent and received between the user and the first-party website." Plaintiffs similarly assert that their browsing history—a record of previously viewed websites—serves purposes of "backup protection" of such communications. *609 In short, Plaintiffs allege that the URL is in "electronic storage" in the toolbar during the split-second that it takes to complete a search. In Plaintiffs' view, because Facebook duplicates the URL and sends it to its servers during that split second, it accesses the URL while it is in this "electronic storage."
The district court considered the GET requests that Facebook duplicated and forwarded to its servers as wholly separate from the copy of the URL displayed in the search toolbar. Because the copy in the toolbar was not stored "incident to transmission" but was only present for the user's convenience, the district court determined that the Plaintiffs' data was not in electronic storage.
We agree. The communications in question —the GET requests themselves—are not the communications stored in the user's toolbar. Rather, the GET requests are sent directly between the user and the third-party website. The text displayed in the toolbar serves only as a visual indication —a means of informing the user—of the location of their browser. Thus, the URL's appearance in the toolbar is not "incidental" to the transmission of the URL or GET request.
What is more, Plaintiffs' interpretation of the SCA would stretch its application beyond its limits. True, the SCA's legislative history suggests that Congress intended the term "electronic storage" to be broadly construed, and not limited to "particular mediums, forms, or locations." Hately v. Watts, 917 F.3d 770, 786 (4th Cir. 2019) (citing H.R. REP., No. 99-647, at 39 (1986)). Nonetheless, the text and legislative history of the SCA demonstrate that its 1986 enactment was driven by congressional desire to protect third-party entities that stored information on behalf of users. See id. at 782 (noting that the SCA was enacted to protect against illicit access to stored communications in "remote computing operations and large data banks that stored emails"). Since then, the SCA has typically only been found to apply in cases involving a centralized data-management entity; for instance, to protect servers that stored emails for significant periods of time between their being sent and their recipients' reading them. See id. at 798 (considering whether a web-based email service "stored" emails); Theofel v. Farey-Jones, 359 F.3d 1066, 1072 (9th Cir. 2004) (considering whether emails stored by an internet service provider fell under the statute's purview). Here, the allegations, even construed in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, do not show that the communications were even in "storage," much less that the alleged "storage" within a URL toolbar falls within the SCA's intended scope.
Plaintiffs alternatively argue that their browsing histories are stored for "purposes of back-up" and thus satisfy the SCA's electronic storage definition. Plaintiffs note that, in Theofel, we held that a copy of information stored on a user's computer "in the event that the user needs to download it again" constituted storage for backup purposes. 359 F.3d at 1075. In this case, however, the browsing histories are not composed of the actual communications sent between the individuals—rather, the browsing histories are merely a record of URLs visited. Thus, Plaintiffs' claims for relief under the SCA are insufficient, and the district court correctly dismissed them.[10]
*610 D
The district court also properly held that the Plaintiffs have not stated a breach of contract claim. In order to establish a contract breach, Plaintiffs must allege: (1) the existence of a contract with Facebook, (2) their performance under that contract, (3) Facebook breached that contract, and (4) they suffered damages. Oasis West Realty, LLC v. Goldman, 51 Cal. 4th 811, 821, 124 Cal.Rptr.3d 256, 250 P.3d 1115 (2011).
Plaintiffs allege that Facebook entered into a contract with each Plaintiff consisting of the SRR, Privacy Policy, and relevant Help Center pages. The parties agree that the SRR constitutes a contract. In their third amended complaint, Plaintiffs attached the SRR that was last revised April 26, 2011. This document states "[y]our privacy is very important to us" and "[w]e encourage you to read the Privacy Policy, and to use it to help make informed decisions." But this document does not contain an explicit promise not to track logged-out users. For that allegation, Plaintiffs instead rely on language from the Data Use Policy and the Help Center pages.
To properly incorporate another document, the document "need not recite that it incorporates another document, so long as it guide[s] the reader to the incorporated document." Shaw v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 58 Cal. App. 4th 44, 54, 67 Cal.Rptr.2d 850 (1997) (internal quotations and citations omitted). During the class period, Facebook changed the title of its "Privacy Policy" to "Data Use Policy" and made adjustments to its content. Although the relevant SRR directs readers to the Privacy Policy, Plaintiffs rely on the latest version of this document, titled "Data Use Policy," last revised September 7, 2011. The attached SRR does not reference a Data Use Policy and thus, it does not guide the reader to the incorporated document on which Plaintiffs rely. As such, as a matter of law, any promise not to track logged-out users therein was not incorporated.
On appeal, Plaintiffs argue that the Data Use Policy constitutes an additional agreement separate from the SRR. Plaintiffs support this allegation with text from the September 2011 Data Use Policy, which states that, were Facebook to transfer ownership, the new owner would "still have to honor the commitments we have made in this privacy policy," and the December 2010 Privacy Policy, which states "[b]y using or accessing Facebook, you agree to our privacy practices outlined here."
First, the December 2010 Privacy Policy does not contain any agreement that Facebook would not track logged-out user data.[11] Second, and more generally, the Privacy and Data Use Policies do not outline shared commitments to which users must abide. For a contract to exist, there must be an exchange for a promise. Steiner v. Thexton, 48 Cal. 4th 411, 421, 106 Cal.Rptr.3d 252, 226 P.3d 359 (2010). The 2011 Data Use Policy does not contain any exchange. To illustrate, while the SRR outlines commitments to which both Facebook and users agree (for example, users agree not to "send or otherwise post unauthorized commercial communications" *611 on Facebook, while Facebook promises to "provide ... tools to help you protect your property rights"), the 2011 Data Use Policy merely provides information— not commitments—regarding Facebook's use of information and how users can control that information (for example, it states that "[y]our information is the information that's required when you sign up for the site"). Plaintiffs' reliance on one use of the term "commitment" within this document cannot overcome the fact that the document does not require the user to make any commitment. Thus, the Data Use Policy does not constitute a separate contract. Because Plaintiffs have failed to allege adequately the existence of a contract that was subject to breach, we affirm the district court's dismissal of their breach of contract claim.
Plaintiffs also alleged that Facebook's tracking practices violated the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. However, as pleaded, the allegations did not go beyond the breach of contract theories asserted by Plaintiffs and were thus properly dismissed. Careau & Co. v. Sec. Pac. Bus. Credit, Inc., 222 Cal. App.3d 1371, 1395, 272 Cal.Rptr. 387 (1990).
IV
In sum, we conclude that Plaintiffs have standing to assert their claims. We affirm the district court's dismissal of the SCA, breach of contract, and breach of implied covenant claims. We conclude that Plaintiffs adequately pleaded their remaining claims at this early stage to survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). We remand these issues to the district court for further consideration. We do not reach any other issue argued by the parties, leaving those issues for consideration by the district court in the first instance. All pending motions are denied as moot. The parties shall bear their own costs.
AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED.
[*] The Honorable Kathryn H. Vratil, United States District Judge for the District of Kansas, sitting by designation.
[1] A plug-in is a program that extends the functionality of an existing program, such as an internet browser.
[2] An "IP address" is a numerical identifier for each computer or network connected to the Internet. hiQ Labs, Inc. v. LinkedIn Corp., 938 F.3d 985, 991 n.4 (9th Cir. 2019).
[3] The blog post quickly gained notoriety and played a role in a lawsuit that alleged multiple counts of deceptive trade practices brought against Facebook by the Federal Trade Commission. In the Matter of Facebook Inc., FTC File No. 0923184. Facebook reached a settlement with the FTC in November 2011.
[4] To prevail on a claim for trespass to chattels, Plaintiffs must demonstrate that some actual injury may have occurred and that the owner of the property at issue may only recover the actual damages suffered as a result of the defendant's actions. Intel Corp. v. Hamidi, 30 Cal. 4th 1342, 1351-52, 1 Cal.Rptr.3d 32, 71 P.3d 296 (2003). Fraud similarly requires damages, Beckwith v. Dahl, 205 Cal. App. 4th 1039, 1064, 141 Cal.Rptr.3d 142 (2012), as does a violation of the CDAFA, Mintz v. Mark Bartelstein & Assocs., 906 F. Supp. 2d 1017, 1032 (C.D. Cal. 2012) (noting that "[u]nder the plain language of the statute[,]" damages must be established). Damages is an inherent element of larceny.
[5] This policy was originally titled "Privacy Policy." During the class period, its title was changed to "Data Use Policy."
[6] Facebook disputes that some of the Help Center pages Plaintiffs attached to their complaint were dated during the class period. It does not dispute, however, that this particular Help Center page fell within the class period.
[7] Analogous cases decided in the Fourth Amendment context support a conclusion that the breadth of information allegedly collected would violate community norms. These cases hold that individuals have a reasonable expectation of privacy in collections of information that reveal "familiar, political, professional, religious, and sexual associations." See Carpenter v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2217, 201 L.Ed.2d 507 (2018) (holding that individuals have a reasonable expectation of privacy in long-term location tracking data under the Fourth Amendment because it reveals all-encompassing information); Riley, 573 U.S. at 397-99, 134 S.Ct. 2473 (holding that individuals have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of their cell phones under the Fourth Amendment due to the large amount of personal data stored therein); United States v. Forrester, 512 F.3d 500, 510 n.6 (9th Cir. 2008) (noting that, in a Fourth Amendment search context, URLs may be particularly sensitive because they "identif[y] the particular document within a website that a person views and thus reveals much more information about the person's Internet activity"). We acknowledge that the Fourth Amendment imposes higher standards on the government than those on private, civil litigants. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2213-14. But we have nonetheless found analogies to Fourth Amendment cases applicable when deciding issues of privacy related to technology. See Patel, 932 F.3d at 1272-73. And, viewed broadly, these cases stand for the proposition that individuals maintain the expectation that entities will not be able to collect such broad swaths of personal information absent consent.
[8] The non-precedential cases cited by Facebook do not compel the opposite conclusion. For instance, in In re Google, Inc. Privacy Policy Litig., the Northern District of California found no highly offensive conduct when Plaintiffs alleged that Google surreptitiously tracked their browsing data while using Google's services. 58 F. Supp. 3d 968, 987-88 (N.D. Cal. 2014). Here, on the other hand, Plaintiffs had logged out and were not using Facebook when Facebook tracked them. The same is true in Low v. LinkedIn Corp., 900 F. Supp. 2d 1010, 1016-18 (N.D. Cal. 2012) and In re iPhone App. Litig., 844 F. Supp. 2d 1040, 1049-50 (N.D. Cal. 2012). In those cases, there were likewise no allegations that the defendants tracked the plaintiffs after the plaintiffs stopped using the defendant's services.
[9] In Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., we adopted a definition of "intercept" that encompassed both an "acquisition contemporaneous with transmission" and an act requiring a party to "stop, seize, or interrupt in progress or course before arrival." 302 F.3d 868, 878 (9th Cir. 2002). In that case, however, we considered whether items viewed on a private website were intercepted, in violation of the Wiretap Act, not plug-ins that duplicated and sent GET requests, as we consider here.
[10] Because we hold that the URLs are not in electronic storage, we need not decide whether Plaintiffs sufficiently allege that their personal computers, web browsers, and browser managed files are "facilities," through which electronic communications service providers operate.
[11] The December 2010 Privacy Policy states: "If you log out of Facebook before visiting a pre-approved application or website, it will not be able to access your information." This statement merely provides that the third-party websites will not receive a user's information. It does not make any promises regarding Facebook's receipt of data.