Notes and Questions (State v. Blurton)

Notes & Questions 

1. The defense's case for Blurton rested on what is called a "failure of proof" argument. If Blurton genuinely believed the assistant manager's story, it would mean that the state failed to prove that he had the requisite mens rea. This kind of argument is helpful to the defense because the burden to prove each element of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt rests with the prosecution. Could an "insanity defense" or a showing of diminished mental capacity have also worked for Blurton? What evidence would he have needed to make such claims? Which defense (failure-of-proof vs. insanity vs. diminished capacity) strikes you as the best argument in Blurton's favor? Why? 
   
   
2. On a different note: Why should we let Blurton off the hook? Couldn't Blurton's stupidity in believing the Navy Seal-mastermind story easily have resulted in serious harm? What justifications for punishment might be relevant to consider as you answer this question? 
   
   
3. You are the prosecutor in this case. What, if anything, is the mastermind-assistant manager guilty of? 
   
   
4. Even as we continue to apply the legal framework of mens rea, it is important to keep in mind that these legal classifications rest on somewhat antiquated understandings of the human mind. The possibility that new developments in neuroscience might raise concerns about how criminal law understands volition and intent is actually a hotly debated issue within legal scholarship. Consider the following passage, for example: 

Although the Model Penal Code brought much-needed clarity to the concepts of actus reus and mens rea, it has by no means solved the conceptual problems of what kinds of things should fall into the categories of volition, intent, and choice. For one thing, . . . both conscious, voluntary conduct (actus reus) and the various levels of intent (mens rea) require a reasoning process relating what the person perceives to be reality with the situation within which he must act (or not) and how. This reasoning, or imaginative process, may be greatly altered if the brain is not functioning correctly . . . . In other words, the law attempts to separate categories that are not really separable.

[T]he legal meaning of choice, intent, and volition originated, not from empirical studies about human brains and behavior, but from ungrounded beliefs about human nature. Despite a paradigm shift in understanding human behavior that has occurred through new developments in neurobiology, the law still operates on outdated nineteenth century assumptions about how human beings function. As a result, the categories into which some of these human actions belong are porous and indeterminate. The separate legal categories of actus reus and mens rea and their meanings reflect outdated assumptions about human nature and the objectives of criminal justice.

Erica Beecher-Monas and Edgar Garcia-Rill, Actus Reus, Mens Rea, and Brain Science: What Do Volition and Intent Really Mean? Kentucky Law Journal, 106: 265-314, 268 (2017). Entire article available at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj/vol106/iss2/5.