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Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 566 U.S. 189 (2012)
Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 566 U.S. 189 (2012)
[excerpt]
Chief Justice ROBERTS delivered the opinion of the Court.
[1] Congress enacted a statute providing that Americans born in Jerusalem may elect to have “Israel” listed as the place of birth on their passports. The State Department declined to follow that law, citing its longstanding policy of not taking a position on the political status of Jerusalem. When sued by an American who invoked the statute, the Secretary of State argued that the courts lacked authority to decide the case because it presented a political question. The Court of Appeals so held.
[2] We disagree. The courts are fully capable of determining whether this statute may be given effect, or instead must be struck down in light of authority conferred on the Executive by the Constitution.
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[3] In 2002, Congress enacted the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 2003. Section 214 of the Act is entitled “United States Policy with Respect to Jerusalem as the Capital of Israel.”
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[4] The fourth and final provision, § 214(d), is the only one at stake in this case. Entitled “Record of Place of Birth as Israel for Passport Purposes,” it provides that “[f]or purposes of the registration of birth, certification of nationality, or issuance of a passport of a United States citizen born in the city of Jerusalem, the Secretary shall, upon the request of the citizen or the citizen’s legal guardian, record the place of birth as Israel.” Ibid.
[5] The State Department’s Foreign Affairs Manual states that “[w]here the birthplace of the applicant is located in territory disputed by another country, the city or area of birth may be written in the passport.” The manual specifically directs that passport officials should enter “JERUSALEM” and should “not write Israel or Jordan” when recording the birthplace of a person born in Jerusalem on a passport.
[6] Section 214(d) sought to override this instruction by allowing citizens born in Jerusalem to have “Israel” recorded on their passports if they wish. In signing the Foreign Relations Authorization Act into law, President George W. Bush stated his belief that § 214 “impermissibly interferes with the President’s constitutional authority to conduct the Nation’s foreign affairs and to supervise the unitary executive branch.” He added that if the section is “construed as mandatory,” then it would “interfere with the President’s constitutional authority to formulate the position of the United States, speak for the Nation in international affairs, and determine the terms on which recognition is given to foreign states.”
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[7] Petitioner Menachem Binyamin Zivotofsky was born in Jerusalem on October 17, 2002, shortly after § 214(d) was enacted. Zivotofsky’s parents were American citizens and he accordingly was as well, by virtue of congressional enactment. Zivotofsky’s mother filed an application for a consular report of birth abroad and a United States passport. She requested that his place of birth be listed as “Jerusalem, Israel” on both documents. U.S. officials informed Zivotofsky’s mother that State Department policy prohibits recording “Israel” as Zivotofsky’s place of birth. Pursuant to that policy, Zivotofsky was issued a passport and consular report of birth abroad listing only “Jerusalem.”
[8] Zivotofsky’s parents filed a complaint on his behalf against the Secretary of State. Zivotofsky sought a declaratory judgment and a permanent injunction ordering the Secretary to identify his place of birth as “Jerusalem, Israel” in the official documents.
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[9] The lower courts concluded that Zivotofsky’s claim presents a political question and therefore cannot be adjudicated. We disagree.
[10] In general, the Judiciary has a responsibility to decide cases properly before it, even those it “would gladly avoid.” Our precedents have identified a narrow exception to that rule, known as the “political question” doctrine. We have explained that a controversy “involves a political question . . . where there is `a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it.'” Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 228, (1993). In such a case, we have held that a court lacks the authority to decide the dispute before it.
[11] The lower courts ruled that this case involves a political question because deciding Zivotofsky’s claim would force the Judicial Branch to interfere with the President’s exercise of constitutional power committed to him alone. The District Court understood Zivotofsky to ask the courts to “decide the political status of Jerusalem.” This misunderstands the issue presented. Zivotofsky does not ask the courts to determine whether Jerusalem is the capital of Israel. He instead seeks to determine whether he may vindicate his statutory right, under § 214(d), to choose to have Israel recorded on his passport as his place of birth.
[12] For its part, the D.C. Circuit treated the two questions as one and the same. That court concluded that “[o]nly the Executive—not Congress and not the courts— has the power to define U.S. policy regarding Israel’s sovereignty over Jerusalem,” and also to “decide how best to implement that policy.” Because the Department’s passport rule was adopted to implement the President’s “exclusive and unreviewable constitutional power to keep the United States out of the debate over the status of Jerusalem,” the validity of that rule was itself a “nonjusticiable political question” that “the Constitution leaves to the Executive alone.” Indeed, the D.C. Circuit’s opinion does not even mention § 214(d) until the fifth of its six paragraphs of analysis, and then only to dismiss it as irrelevant: “That Congress took a position on the status of Jerusalem and gave Zivotofsky a statutory cause of action . . . is of no moment to whether the judiciary has [the] authority to resolve this dispute. . . .”
[13] The existence of a statutory right, however, is certainly relevant to the Judiciary’s power to decide Zivotofsky’s claim. The federal courts are not being asked to supplant a foreign policy decision of the political branches with the courts’ own unmoored determination of what United States policy toward Jerusalem should be. Instead, Zivotofsky requests that the courts enforce a specific statutory right. To resolve his claim, the Judiciary must decide if Zivotofsky’s interpretation of the statute is correct, and whether the statute is constitutional. This is a familiar judicial exercise.
[14] Moreover, because the parties do not dispute the interpretation of § 214(d), the only real question for the courts is whether the statute is constitutional. At least since Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137 (1803), we have recognized that when an Act of Congress is alleged to conflict with the Constitution, “[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.” That duty will sometimes involve the “[r]esolution of litigation challenging the constitutional authority of one of the three branches,” but courts cannot avoid their responsibility merely “because the issues have political implications.”
[15] In this case, determining the constitutionality of § 214(d) involves deciding whether the statute impermissibly intrudes upon Presidential powers under the Constitution. If so, the law must be invalidated and Zivotofsky’s case should be dismissed for failure to state a claim. If, on the other hand, the statute does not trench on the President’s powers, then the Secretary must be ordered to issue Zivotofsky a passport that complies with § 214(d). Either way, the political question doctrine is not implicated. “No policy underlying the political question doctrine suggests that Congress or the Executive . . . can decide the constitutionality of a statute; that is a decision for the courts.”
[16] The Secretary contends that “there is `a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment'” to the President of the sole power to recognize foreign sovereigns and, as a corollary, to determine whether an American born in Jerusalem may choose to have Israel listed as his place of birth on his passport. Perhaps. But there is, of course, no exclusive commitment to the Executive of the power to determine the constitutionality of a statute. The Judicial Branch appropriately exercises that authority, including in a case such as this, where the question is whether Congress or the Executive is “aggrandizing its power at the expense of another branch.” Freytag v. Commissioner, 501 U.S. 868, 878 (1991).
[17] Our precedents have also found the political question doctrine implicated when there is “`a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving'” the question before the court. Nixon, supra, at 228 (quoting Baker, supra,at 217). Framing the issue as the lower courts did, in terms of whether the Judiciary may decide the political status of Jerusalem, certainly raises those concerns. They dissipate, however, when the issue is recognized to be the more focused one of the constitutionality of § 214(d). Indeed, both sides offer detailed legal arguments regarding whether § 214(d) is constitutional in light of powers committed to the Executive, and whether Congress’s own powers with respect to passports must be weighed in analyzing this question.
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[18] Recitation of these arguments—which sound in familiar principles of constitutional interpretation—is enough to establish that this case does not “turn on standards that defy judicial application.” Baker, 369 U.S., at 211, 82 S.Ct. 691. Resolution of Zivotofsky’s claim demands careful examination of the textual, structural, and historical evidence put forward by the parties regarding the nature of the statute and of the passport and recognition powers. This is what courts do. The political question doctrine poses no bar to judicial review of this case.
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[19] To say that Zivotofsky’s claim presents issues the Judiciary is competent to resolve is not to say that reaching a decision in this case is simple. Because the District Court and the D.C. Circuit believed that review was barred by the political question doctrine, we are without the benefit of thorough lower court opinions to guide our analysis of the merits. Ours is “a court of final review and not first view.” We see no reason to depart from this approach in this case. Having determined that this case is justiciable, we leave it to the lower courts to consider the merits in the first instance.
[20] The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit is vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
[21] It is so ordered.
Justice SOTOMAYOR, with whom Justice BREYER joins as to Part I, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.
[1] As this case illustrates, the proper application of Baker‘s six factors has generated substantial confusion in the lower courts. I concur in the Court’s conclusion that this case does not present a political question. I write separately, however, because I understand the inquiry required by the political question doctrine to be more demanding than that suggested by the Court.
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[2] The political question doctrine speaks to an amalgam of circumstances in which courts properly examine whether a particular suit is justiciable—that is, whether the dispute is appropriate for resolution by courts. The doctrine is “essentially a function of the separation of powers,” Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), which recognizes the limits that Article III imposes upon courts and accords appropriate respect to the other branches’ exercise of their own constitutional powers.
[3] In Baker, this Court identified six circumstances in which an issue might present a political question: (1) “a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department”; (2) “a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it”; (3) “the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion”; (4) “the impossibility of a court’s undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government”; (5) “an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made”; or (6) “the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question.” Baker established that “[u]nless one of these formulations is inextricable from the case at bar, there should be no dismissal for nonjusticiability.” Ibid. But Baker left unanswered when the presence of one or more factors warrants dismissal, as well as the interrelationship of the six factors and the relative importance of each in determining whether a case is suitable for adjudication.
[4] In my view, the Baker factors reflect three distinct justifications for withholding judgment on the merits of a dispute. When a case would require a court to decide an issue whose resolution is textually committed to a coordinate political department, as envisioned by Baker‘s first factor, abstention is warranted because the court lacks authority to resolve that issue. In such cases, the Constitution itself requires that another branch resolve the question presented.
[5] The second and third Baker factors reflect circumstances in which a dispute calls for decisionmaking beyond courts’ competence. “`The judicial Power’ created by Article III, § 1, of the Constitution is not whatever judges choose to do,” but rather the power “to act in the manner traditional for English and American courts.” Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 (2004) (plurality opinion). That traditional role involves the application of some manageable and cognizable standard within the competence of the Judiciary to ascertain and employ to the facts of a concrete case. When a court is given no standard by which to adjudicate a dispute, or cannot resolve a dispute in the absence of a yet-unmade policy determination charged to a political branch, resolution of the suit is beyond the judicial role envisioned by Article III. This is not to say, of course, that courts are incapable of interpreting or applying somewhat ambiguous standards using familiar tools of statutory or constitutional interpretation. But where an issue leaves courts truly rudderless, there can be “no doubt of [the] validity” of a court’s decision to abstain from judgment. Ibid.
[6] The final three Baker factors address circumstances in which prudence may counsel against a court’s resolution of an issue presented. Courts should be particularly cautious before forgoing adjudication of a dispute on the basis that judicial intervention risks “embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question,” would express a “lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government,” or because there exists an “unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made.” We have repeatedly rejected the view that these thresholds are met whenever a court is called upon to resolve the constitutionality or propriety of the act of another branch of Government. A court may not refuse to adjudicate a dispute merely because a decision “may have significant political overtones” or affect “the conduct of this Nation’s foreign relations,” Nor may courts decline to resolve a controversy within their traditional competence and proper jurisdiction simply because the question is difficult, the consequences weighty, or the potential real for conflict with the policy preferences of the political branches. The exercise of such authority is among the “gravest and most delicate dut[ies] that this Court is called on to perform,” but it is the role assigned to courts by the Constitution. “Questions may occur which we would gladly avoid; but we cannot avoid them. All we can do is, to exercise our best judgment, and conscientiously to perform our duty.”
[7] Rare occasions implicating Baker‘s final factors, however, may present an “`unusual case'” unfit for judicial disposition. Because of the respect due to a coequal and independent department, for instance, courts properly resist calls to question the good faith with which another branch attests to the authenticity of its internal acts. Likewise, we have long acknowledged that courts are particularly ill suited to intervening in exigent disputes necessitating unusual need for “attributing finality to the action of the political departments,” or creating acute “risk [of] embarrassment of our government abroad, or grave disturbance at home,” Baker, 369 U.S., at 226, 82 S.Ct. 691. See, e.g., Luther, 7 How., at 43 (“After the President has acted and called out the militia, is a Circuit Court of the United States authorized to inquire whether his decision was right? . . . If the judicial power extends so far, the guarantee contained in the Constitution of the United States is a guarantee of anarchy, and not of order”). Finally, it may be appropriate for courts to stay their hand in cases implicating delicate questions concerning the distribution of political authority between coordinate branches until a dispute is ripe, intractable, and incapable of resolution by the political process. Abstention merely reflects that judicial intervention in such cases is “legitimate only in the last resort,” and is disfavored relative to the prospect of accommodation between the political branches.
[8] When such unusual cases arise, abstention accommodates considerations inherent in the separation of powers and the limitations envisioned by Article III, which conferred authority to federal courts against a common-law backdrop that recognized the propriety of abstention in exceptional cases. The political questions envisioned by Baker‘s final categories find common ground, therefore, with many longstanding doctrines under which considerations of justiciability or comity lead courts to abstain from deciding questions whose initial resolution is better suited to another time, or another forum. To be sure, it will be the rare case in which Baker‘s final factors alone render a case nonjusticiable. But our long historical tradition recognizes that such exceptional cases arise, and due regard for the separation of powers and the judicial role envisioned by Article III confirms that abstention may be an appropriate response.
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[9] The court below held that this case presented a political question because it thought petitioner’s suit asked the court to decide an issue “textually committed” to a coordinate branch—namely, “to review a policy of the State Department implementing the President’s decision” to keep the United States out of the debate over the status of Jerusalem. Largely for the reasons set out by the Court, I agree that the Court of Appeals misapprehended the nature of its task. In two respects, however, my understanding of the political question doctrine might require a court to engage in further analysis beyond that relied upon by the Court.
[10] First, the Court appropriately recognizes that petitioner’s claim to a statutory right is “relevant” to the justiciability inquiry required in this case. In order to evaluate whether a case presents a political question, a court must first identify with precision the issue it is being asked to decide. Here, petitioner’s suit claims that a federal statute provides him with a right to have “Israel” listed as his place of birth on his passport and other related documents. To decide that question, a court must determine whether the statute is constitutional, and therefore mandates the Secretary of State to issue petitioner’s desired passport, or unconstitutional, in which case his suit is at an end. Resolution of that issue is not one “textually committed” to another branch; to the contrary, it is committed to this one. In no fashion does the question require a court to review the wisdom of the President’s policy toward Jerusalem or any other decision committed to the discretion of a coordinate department. For that reason, I agree that the decision below should be reversed.
[11] That is not to say, however, that no statute could give rise to a political question. It is not impossible to imagine a case involving the application or even the constitutionality of an enactment that would present a nonjusticiable issue. Indeed, this Court refused to determine whether an Ohio state constitutional provision offended the Republican Guarantee Clause, Art. IV, § 4, holding that “the question of whether that guarantee of the Constitution has been disregarded presents no justiciable controversy.” Ohio ex rel. Davis v. Hildebrant, 241 U.S. 565 (1916). A similar result would follow if Congress passed a statute, for instance, purporting to award financial relief to those improperly “tried” of impeachment offenses. To adjudicate claims under such a statute would require a court to resolve the very same issue we found nonjusticiable in Nixon. Such examples are atypical, but they suffice to show that the foreclosure altogether of political question analysis in statutory cases is unwarranted.
[12] Second, the Court suggests that this case does not implicate the political question doctrine’s concern with issues exhibiting “`a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards,'” because the parties’ arguments rely on textual, structural, and historical evidence of the kind that courts routinely consider. But that was equally true in Nixon, a case in which we found that “the use of the word `try’ in the first sentence of the Impeachment Trial Clause lacks sufficient precision to afford any judicially manageable standard of review of the Senate’s actions.” We reached that conclusion even though the parties’ briefs focused upon the text of the Impeachment Trial Clause, “the Constitution’s drafting history,” “contemporaneous commentary,” “the unbroken practice of the Senate for 150 years,” contemporary dictionary meanings, “Hamilton’s Federalist essays,” and the practice in the House of Lords prior to ratification. Such evidence was no more or less unfamiliar to courts than that on which the parties rely here.
[13] In my view, it is not whether the evidence upon which litigants rely is common to judicial consideration that determines whether a case lacks judicially discoverable and manageable standards. Rather, it is whether that evidence in fact provides a court a basis to adjudicate meaningfully the issue with which it is presented. The answer will almost always be yes, but if the parties’ textual, structural, and historical evidence is inapposite or wholly unilluminating, rendering judicial decision no more than guesswork, a case relying on the ordinary kinds of arguments offered to courts might well still present justiciability concerns.
[14] In this case, however, the Court of Appeals majority found a political question solely on the basis that this case required resolution of an issue “textually committed” to the Executive Branch. Because there was no such textual commitment, I respectfully concur in the Court’s decision to reverse the Court of Appeals.
[Justice ALITO’s concurrence is omitted]
Justice BREYER, dissenting.
[1] I join Part I of Justice SOTOMAYOR’s opinion. As she points out, Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), set forth several categories of legal questions that the Court had previously held to be “political questions” inappropriate for judicial determination.
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[2] As Justice SOTOMAYOR also points out, these categories (and in my view particularly the last four) embody “circumstances in which prudence may counsel against a court’s resolution of an issue presented.” Justice SOTOMAYOR adds that the circumstances in which these prudential considerations lead the Court not to decide a case otherwise properly before it are rare. I agree. But in my view we nonetheless have before us such a case. Four sets of prudential considerations, taken together, lead me to that conclusion.
[3] First, the issue before us arises in the field of foreign affairs. (Indeed, the statutory provision before us is a subsection of a section that concerns the relation between Jerusalem and the State of Israel. The Constitution primarily delegates the foreign affairs powers “to the political departments of the government, Executive and Legislative,” not to the Judiciary. And that fact is not surprising. Decisionmaking in this area typically is highly political. It is “delicate” and “complex.” It often rests upon information readily available to the Executive Branch and to the intelligence committees of Congress, but not readily available to the courts. It frequently is highly dependent upon what Justice Jackson called “prophecy.” And the creation of wise foreign policy typically lies well beyond the experience or professional capacity of a judge. At the same time, where foreign affairs is at issue, the practical need for the United States to speak “with one voice and ac[t] as one,” is particularly important.
[4] The result is a judicial hesitancy to make decisions that have significant foreign policy implications, as reflected in the fact that many of the cases in which the Court has invoked the political-question doctrine have arisen in this area, e.g., cases in which the validity of a treaty depended upon the partner state’s constitutional authority, or upon its continuing existence; cases concerning the existence of foreign states, governments, belligerents, and insurgents; and cases concerning the territorial boundaries of foreign states.
[5] Second, if the courts must answer the constitutional question before us, they may well have to evaluate the foreign policy implications of foreign policy decisions. The constitutional question focuses upon a statutory provision, § 214(d), that says: The Secretary of State, upon the request of a U.S. citizen born in Jerusalem (or upon the request of the citizen’s legal guardian), shall “record” in the citizen’s passport or consular birth report “the place of birth as Israel.” And the question is whether this statute unconstitutionally seeks to limit the President’s inherent constitutional authority to make certain kinds of foreign policy decisions.
[6] The Secretary of State argues that the President’s constitutional authority to determine foreign policy includes the power to recognize foreign governments, that this Court has long recognized that the latter power belongs to the President exclusively, that the power includes the power to determine claims over disputed territory as well as the policy governing recognition decisions, and that the statute unconstitutionally limits the President’s exclusive authority to exercise these powers.
[7] Zivotofsky, supported by several Members of Congress, points out that the Constitution also grants Congress powers related to foreign affairs, such as the powers to declare war, to regulate foreign commerce, and to regulate naturalization. They add that Congress may share some of the recognition power and its attendant power of determining claims over disputed territory. And they add that Congress may enact laws concerning travel into this country and concerning the citizenship of children born abroad to U.S. citizens. They argue that these powers include the power to specify the content of a passport (or consular birth report). And when such a specification takes the form of statutory law, they say, the Constitution requires the President (through the Secretary of State) to execute that statute.
[8] Were the statutory provision undisputedly concerned only with purely administrative matters (or were its enforcement undisputedly to involve only major foreign policy matters), judicial efforts to answer the constitutional question might not involve judges in trying to answer questions of foreign policy. But in the Middle East, administrative matters can have implications that extend far beyond the purely administrative. Political reactions in that region can prove uncertain. And in that context it may well turn out that resolution of the constitutional argument will require a court to decide how far the statute, in practice, reaches beyond the purely administrative, determining not only whether but also the extent to which enforcement will interfere with the President’s ability to make significant recognition-related foreign policy decisions.
[9] Certainly the parties argue as if that were so. Zivotofsky, for example, argues that replacing “Jerusalem” on his passport with “Israel” will have no serious foreign policy significance.
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[10] At the same time, the Secretary argues that listing Israel on the passports (and consular birth reports) of Americans born in Jerusalem will have significantly adverse foreign policy effects. She says that doing so would represent “`an official decision by the United States to begin to treat Jerusalem as a city located within Israel,'” that it “would be interpreted as an official act of recognizing Jerusalem as being under Israeli sovereignty,” and that our “national security interests” consequently “would be significantly harmed.” Such an action, she says, “`would signal, symbolically or concretely, that'” the United States “`recognizes that Jerusalem is a city that is located within the sovereign territory of Israel,'” and doing so, “`would critically compromise the ability of the United States to work with Israelis, Palestinians and others in the region to further the peace process.'” She adds that the very enactment of this statutory provision in 2002 produced headlines in the Middle East stating the “the U.S. now recognizes Jerusalem as Israel’s capital.”
[11] A judge’s ability to evaluate opposing claims of this kind is minimal. At the same time, a judicial effort to do so risks inadvertently jeopardizing sound foreign policy decisionmaking by the other branches of Government. How, for example, is this Court to determine whether, or the extent to which, the continuation of the adjudication that it now orders will itself have a foreign policy effect?
[12] Third, the countervailing interests in obtaining judicial resolution of the constitutional determination are not particularly strong ones. Zivotofsky does not assert the kind of interest, e.g., an interest in property or bodily integrity, which courts have traditionally sought to protect. Nor, importantly, does he assert an interest in vindicating a basic right of the kind that the Constitution grants to individuals and that courts traditionally have protected from invasion by the other branches of Government. And I emphasize this fact because the need for judicial action in such cases can trump the foreign policy concerns that I have mentioned.
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[13] Fourth, insofar as the controversy reflects different foreign policy views among the political branches of Government, those branches have nonjudicial methods of working out their differences. The Executive and Legislative Branches frequently work out disagreements through ongoing contacts and relationships, involving, for example, budget authorizations, confirmation of personnel, committee hearings, and a host of more informal contacts, which, taken together, ensure that, in practice, Members of Congress as well as the President play an important role in the shaping of foreign policy.
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[14] The upshot is that this case is unusual both in its minimal need for judicial intervention and in its more serious risk that intervention will bring about “embarrassment,” show lack of “respect” for the other branches, and potentially disrupt sound foreign policy decisionmaking. For these prudential reasons, I would hold that the political-question doctrine bars further judicial consideration of this case. And I would affirm the Court of Appeals’ similar conclusion.
[15] With respect, I dissent.
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