Notes & Questions (People v. Knoller)

 Notes and Questions

1.    Aftermath. In 2019, Marjorie Knoller became eligible for parole and was subsequently denied. The parole board will decide on her parole status again in 2022. Knoller’s husband, Robert Noel, served four years for involuntary manslaughter and died in June 2018 in a La Jolla nursing home according to this article from the Mercury News.

For further reading on the aftermath of People v. Knoller please see this Rolling Stone Article and the Memorial of Diane Alexis Whipple.  

2.    Test Your Thinking. Based on the law set out in the case, applied to the facts of the case, should Knoller be convicted of 2nd degree murder or should the conviction be mitigated to a lesser offense? Explain your reasoning.

3.    Implied Malice. In its discussion, the court attempts to clarify implied malice—defined as “abandoned and malignant heart” in the applicable California statute—by emphasizing that the defendant must act with an awareness that the act endangers human life and must have a conscious disregard for life. Should depraved heart killings necessarily be considered less culpable than intentional killings? See if you can come up with your own hypothetical. Does your hypothetical disprove the rule or merely suggest that the rule has limitations? 

4.    Professional Responsibility. Recall that Knoller was more than just a layperson: she was an attorney. Should she bear any heightened responsibility for her actions?

In California (Knoller's state), attorneys are subject to the California Rules of Professional Conduct, adopted by the State Bar of California and approved by the Supreme Court of California in order to promote the administration of justice, protect the public, and uphold the integrity of the legal system. Rule 1.0 of the California Rules of Professional Conduct establishes standards of professional conduct for lawyers that, when violated, act as a basis for formal discipline.

Lawyers are also bound by applicable law. In California, these include the State Bar Act (Business and Professions Code section 6000 et seq.); opinions of California courts; and the opinions of professional ethics committees (see Rule 1.0 of the California Rules of Professional Conduct). As such, when an attorney commits a criminal act, they may be in violation of an applicable Penal Code section and subject to punishment under criminal law, and they may also be in violation of Rule 8.4(b) of the California Rules of Professional Conduct and subject to discipline under applicable Business and Professions Code sections. 

Moreover, a conviction of a felony or misdemeanor involving moral turpitude—and in fact any act involving moral turpitude—constitutes cause for disbarment or suspension (Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 6101 and 6106) and by the California Supreme Court (Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 6100 and 6102), which typically accords great weight to the recommendation of discipline by the California State Bar. Toll v. State Bar of Cal., 12 Cal. 3d 824, 831 (1974). Moral turpitude has been defined as an act of “baseness, vileness or depravity in the private and social duties which a [person] owes to...society” and as an act “contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals.” In re Disbarment of Craig, 12 Cal. 2d 93, 97 (1938). Unsurprisingly, murder constitutes an act of moral turpitude. In re Kirschke, 16 Cal. 3d 902 (1976). However, it is important to recognize that other misconduct, even that not involving moral turpitude, may lead to discipline. For example, one attorney was placed on disciplinary probation for three years after being convicted on two occasions of driving under the influence (under Vehicle Code section 23152). In re Kelley, 52 Cal. 3d 487 (1990).

To get an idea of other misconduct and the disciplinary measures taken, see the discipline summaries, based on orders listed on the California State Bar website.

If you were in charge of disbarment, would you seek to disbar Knoller for an act of moral turpitude? Would your decision on disbarment employ a different evidentiary standard from that needed to prove guilt on the charge of murder? How would you characterize the purpose of disbarment: is it a punishment? deterrence? protection for the integrity of the legal profession? something else?

5.    LGBT Rights and Wrongful Death. Reckless action such as Knoller’s can lead not only to criminal charges, but to recovery for the victim’s spouse via the tort of “wrongful death.”

Sharon Smith, Diane Whipple’s partner, became an activist for the LGBT community. Along with the National Center for Lesbian Rights and attorney Michael Cardoza, Smith paved the way for same-sex partners to be able to sue for wrongful death. For more information, please see the Memorial of Diane Alexis Whipple. 

6.    Noting the Difference. What is the difference between People v. Thomas and People v. Phillips, the two lines of decisions that interpret the “depraved heart”/ “implied malice” standard under California law? Which one does the court adopt in Knoller? Would the case have come out differently if the court had applied a different legal standard? How does it compare to the MPC? 

7.    Changing the Facts. If you would find Knoller guilty of second-degree murder, would your verdict change (and, if so, why) in light of one or more of the following changed circumstances:

a. The dog, Bane, had never shown signs of aggression before, nor had Knoller ever witnessed the dog act aggressively, so she genuinely believed that the veterinarian’s concerns were exaggerated.

b. Although everything prior to the homicide occurred as described in the case, it turns out that at the moment of attack Knoller was home and, hearing the cries of Diane Whipple, she made a heroic but unsuccessful effort to pull Bane away. Knoller then contacted 911 quickly, and expressed deep remorse to the paramedics and police thereafter.

8.    Connecting the Cases. Recall the Midgett case. Applying the test set out in Knoller, (assuming the case arose in CA after Knoller was decided), should Midgett be found guilty of implied malice murder? Why/why not?

9.    A Hypothetical. Mr. Moore was upset after having been burglarized. He got in his Nissan Pathfinder and sped along Hill Ave at an estimated 80 mph--well in excess of the 35mph speed limit. He passed another car, crossing over a solid double-yellow line into on-coming traffic and causing cars to swerve. As he approached the intersection of Hill Ave and Washington Blvd, he checked his speedometer and saw he was going 80 mph. He saw a red light ahead, and saw a Toyota Corolla (smaller car) crossing the intersection. Because he was going too fast, he did not try to stop, but instead ran the intersection, striking the Toyota, breaking the driver’s arm and causing it to strike a third car, which had been waiting to turn left. The driver in the third car was instantly killed. Moore did not get out of his car to check on the victims, but instead continued to drive north on Hill Ave. 

When police finally stopped and arrested Moore, he said he did not intend to kill anyone, but that he believed he was going too fast to stop. Asked why he didn’t stop, he said, “Yeah man. I cut them in half, dude. It’s a wonder I survived.” He added, “Leaving the scene wasn’t really the problem…they were dead,” and said he’d planned, after the accident, to “go clean up, probably have a beer, sit down and watch television.” People v. Moore, 187 Cal.App.4th 937 (2010).

What’s the highest homicide charge the state of California could realistically bring against Moore? What are the best/worst facts for the state? How would the state’s charges and arguments shift if this case arose under the MPC?