People v. Snyder

People v. Snyder , 32 Cal.3d 590

[Crim. No. 22293. Supreme Court of California. October 18, 1982.]
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. NEVA B. SNYDER, Defendant and Appellant (Opinion by Richardson, J., with Bird, C. J., Mosk and Kaus, JJ., concurring. Separate dissenting opinion by Broussard, with Newman and Reynoso, JJ., concurring.)

OPINION RICHARDSON, J.

Defendant Neva Snyder appeals from a judgment convicting her of possession of a concealable firearm by a convicted felon (Pen. Code, § 12021), based upon her 1973 conviction for sale of marijuana, a felony (former Health & Saf. Code, § 11531). Defendant contends that the trial court erred in excluding evidence of her mistaken belief that her prior conviction was only a misdemeanor. We will conclude that defendant's asserted mistake regarding her legal status as a convicted felon did not constitute a defense to the firearm possession charge. Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment.

At trial, defendant offered to prove the following facts supporting her theory of mistake: The marijuana possession charge resulted from a plea bargain not involving a jail or prison sentence. At the time the bargain was struck, defendant's attorney advised her that she was pleading guilty to a misdemeanor. Believing that she was not a felon, defendant thereafter had registered to vote,

and had voted. On one prior occasion, police officers found a gun in her home but, after determining that it was registered to her husband, the officers filed no charges against defendant. The trial court refused to admit any evidence of defendant's mistaken belief that her prior conviction was a misdemeanor and that she was not a felon. The court also rejected proposed instructions requiring proof of defendant's prior knowledge of her felony conviction as an element of the offense charged.
Penal Code section 12021, subdivision (a), provides: "Any person who has been convicted of a felony under the laws of the ... State of California ... who owns or has in his possession or under his custody or control any pistol, revolver, or other firearm capable of being concealed upon the person is guilty of a public offense, ..."
[1] The elements of the offense proscribed by section 12021 are conviction of a felony and ownership, possession, custody or control of a firearm capable of being concealed on the person. (citations omitted) No specific criminal intent is required, and a general intent to commit the proscribed act is sufficient to sustain a conviction. With respect to the elements of possession or custody, it has been held that knowledge is an element of the offense.
[2] Does section 12021 also require knowledge of one's legal status as a convicted felon? No case has so held. Penal Code section 26 provides that a person is incapable of committing a crime if he acted under a "mistake of fact" which disproves criminal intent. In this regard, the cases have distinguished between mistakes of fact and mistakes of law. As we stated in an early case: "It is an emphatic postulate of both civil and penal law that ignorance of a law is no excuse for a violation thereof. Of course, it is based on a fiction, because no man can know all the law, but it is a maxim which the law itself does not permit any one to gainsay .... The rule rests on public necessity; the welfare of society and the safety of the state depend upon its enforcement. If a person accused of a crime could shield himself behind the defense that he was ignorant of the law which he violated, immunity from punishment would in most cases result." (citations omitted) Accordingly, lack of actual knowledge of the provisions of Penal Code section 12021 is irrelevant; the crucial question is whether the defendant was aware that he was engaging in the conduct proscribed by that section.
In the present case, defendant was presumed to know that it is unlawful for a convicted felon to possess a concealable firearm. (Pen. Code, § 12021.) She was also charged with knowledge that

the offense of which she was convicted (former Health & Saf. Code, § 11531) was, as a matter of law, a felony. That section had prescribed a state prison term of from five years to life, and the express statutory definition of a "felony" is "a crime which is punishable with death or by imprisonment in the state prison." (Pen. Code, § 17, subd. (a).)

Thus, regardless of what she reasonably believed, or what her attorney may have told her, defendant was deemed to know under the law that she was a convicted felon forbidden to possess concealable firearms. Her asserted mistake regarding her correct legal status was a mistake of law, not fact. It does not constitute a defense to section 12021.
None of the California cases relied on by defendant is apposite here. People v. Hernandez (1964) 61 Cal.2d 529​, and People v. Mayberry (1975) ​15 Cal.3d 143​, each involved mistakes of fact, not law. In Hernandez, the mistake concerned the age of the alleged victim of a statutory rape. In Mayberry, defendant erred in assuming that the adult victim of forcible rape consented to his acts. People v. Vogel (1956) ​46 Cal.2d 798​, involved the good faith belief of a defendant charged with bigamy that he is free to remarry. We were careful to explain that defendant's mistake was a factual one: "We have concluded that defendant is not guilty of bigamy, if he had a bona fide and reasonable belief that facts existed that left him free to remarry." (Id., at p. 801) Moreover, Vogel characterized bigamy as a crime which "has been regarded for centuries as ... involving moral turpitude, ..." Obviously a bona fide belief that one is free to remarry nullifies the moral opprobrium attached to the charge. On the other hand, being an ex-felon in possession of a concealable firearm, while illegal, hardly stamps the person charged as a moral leper. His belief that he is not a felon thus does not affect the criminality of his conduct.
...
We conclude that the trial court properly excluded evidence of defendant's asserted mistake regarding her status as a convicted felon.
The judgment is affirmed.

BROUSSARD, J.
I dissent.
The two elements of a violation of Penal Code section 12021 are felony status and possession of a concealable firearm. While no specific criminal intent is required, a general criminal intent

should be required as to both elements in accordance with long-settled rules of statutory interpretation, and an honest and reasonable mistake as to either element of the offense, however induced, should negate the requisite general criminal intent. Defendant's testimony if believed would have established an honest and reasonable mistaken belief that her prior offense was not a felony but a misdemeanor, and it was prejudicial error to refuse to admit the evidence and to refuse instructions on the mistake doctrine.
The majority have adopted a special strict liability rule as to section 12021, holding that a felon is charged with knowledge of his status and that an honest and reasonable mistaken belief as to the nature of the conviction is not a defense unless apparently it is induced or corroborated in whole or in part by governmental conduct. The traditional and longstanding defense of mistake negating criminal intent should not be limited to situations where the mistake is induced or corroborated by government officials. ...